The district court granted a limited CoA in this 2254 appeal. Petitioner doesn’t get to expand it to a consensual recording issue [that is frivolous]. Sontay v. Heidle, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 30613 (6th Cir. Nov. 21, 2025).*
2241 petitioner’s habeas petition was filed while his case was pending in state court so it’s barred by Younger. Also, the Fourth Amendment claim is frivolous and parallels § 1983 claims already rejected from the same jail. And it doesn’t work in habeas. Jeffries v. Bodiford, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228670 (D.S.C. Oct. 15, 2025).*
To prevail in a habeas Fourth Amendment claim, petitioner must plead and prove his or her inability to pursue a state claim. Williams v. Tinsley, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228668 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 23, 2025).*
2254 petitioner doesn’t get a CoA on GPS issue somehow relating to a DNA sample taken by search warrant where the affidavit never mentioned the GPS. Burdick v. Bousch, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 30621 (6th Cir. Nov. 21, 2025).*
No CoA on petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim rejected both under Stone and on the merits. Smith v. United States, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 30629 (11th Cir. Nov. 21, 2025).*
Defendant had no constitutional right to build a greenhouse in his front yard in violation of a city zoning ordinance, and the zoning official did not seize his property by attempting to post a stop work order on it. “While the stop work order apprised Lamb that the construction violated the Township’s ordinances, it didn’t meaningfully interfere with his possession of his property. That’s because Lamb kept possession of the partially built greenhouse even after Crofoot posted the stop work order—the greenhouse remained on his front yard. And Lamb retained possession of the material used to construct the greenhouse after taking it apart. In short, Crofoot never seized the greenhouse or any part of it.” Lamb v. Crofoot, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 30453 (6th Cir. Nov. 19, 2025).
“[Probable cause] is ‘not a difficult standard to meet.’ … Therefore, in the search warrant context, ‘it follows that a warrant’s validity should not turn on whether it is supported by an “actual showing” of criminal activity at the targeted location,’ but on ‘whether officers provided direct or circumstantial support to create “more than mere suspicion” that contraband will be found at the location in question.’ … This analysis is ‘holistic,’ … and requires courts to focus on the ‘totality of the circumstances’ rather than scrutinizing an affidavit in a ‘hypertechnical’ or ‘line-by-line’ manner …” United States v. Hawkins, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 30456 (6th Cir. Nov. 19, 2025).*
“The Court concludes, however, that the September 5, 2025, tracking warrant was supported by probable cause because there was a substantial basis to believe that the phone tracker warrant would uncover evidence of criminal activity. The affidavit provided strong evidence that the phone number ending in -3974 was used for drug trafficking. …” United States v. Aguilar, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228944 (D. Minn. Oct. 24, 2025).*
Posted inProbable cause, Seizure, Tracking warrant|Comments Off on CA6: Zoning officer’s attempting to post a stop work order was not a seizure of real property
“The warrant here, and, specifically, the attachment describing the items to be seized, satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. Kerrissey argues, first, that the attachment was overbroad because it authorized the seizure of ‘“all records, in whatever form” for multiple businesses without any temporal limitation.’ … This argument ignores the plain language of the warrant, which limited the records to be seized to violations of a certain statute during a defined time period, that is ‘evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. [§] 1343’ from ‘April 2020 until the present.’ … Contrary to Kerrissey’s argument, the Court must read this ‘broad first clause, which identifie[d] the criminal offense[] that the target evidence was expected to establish’ in light of the more ‘detailed and particularized’ subclauses that follow, whose particularity Kerrissey does not specifically challenge.” United States v. Kerrissey, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228510 (D. Mass. Nov. 20, 2025).
An officer who provided information leading to a probable cause determination that has buyer’s remorse later doesn’t undo the probable cause finding. Jackson v. Dickens, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228646 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 20, 2025).*
The state’s plea offer was to plead without getting any discovery. Defendant adequately pled defense counsel was ineffective for counseling this, including waiving getting access to the search warrant materials. The trial court erred in denying a hearing. State v. Simpson, 2025-Ohio-5240, 2025 Ohio App. LEXIS 3975 (5th Dist. Nov. 19, 2025).
The USMJ found there was reasonable suspicion for the probation search based on the CI’s information. Defendant’s only complaint is that the CI was biased. Adopted. United States v. German, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228755 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 20, 2025).*
“Mr. Morales’s generic descriptions of the Fourth Amendment, see ECF No. 1, at 3-4, are not sufficient to raise a justiciable claim, as this court ‘lacks Article III jurisdiction to adjudicate an abstract and undefined Fourth Amendment claim,’ Maye Torrez, 2025 WL 1897824, at 2.” Morales v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228699 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2025).*
The exclusionary rule, along with a host of other things, doesn’t apply in revocation proceedings. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 2025 Va. LEXIS 57 (Nov. 20, 2025) (citing treatise § 9.16).
The collective knowledge doctrine applies to traffic stops. United States v. Frantz, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226259 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 18, 2025).*
“On this record, we hold that as a matter of law the evidence provided in support of the 205 Curtis Street search warrant failed to satisfy the basis of knowledge requirement of the Aguilar-Spinelli test …. The general allegation that the informant was ‘aware that narcotics are kept inside the location’ provides no indication ‘that the information was based upon personal observation’ …. Likewise, the informant’s statement that at some unidentified point in time the informant had conducted a narcotics transaction at that address ‘did not describe defendant’s activities with sufficient particularity to warrant an inference of personal knowledge’ … Nor was the information conveyed by the informant corroborated by police observation …. Accordingly, the informant’s statements fail to meet the requirements of Aguilar-Spinelli and, because there are no other allegations in the search warrant affidavit to establish ‘a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed or that evidence of a crime may’ have been found at 205 Curtis Street …, the search warrant for that address was not supported by probable cause, and the evidence seized there should have been suppressed.” People v. Berry, 2025 N.Y. LEXIS 1911 (Nov. 20, 2025).*
Reason: Lindsey Graham Is Outraged About Federal Surveillance Powers That Lindsey Graham Helped Create and Expand by Eric Boehm (“Graham is incensed that his phone records were subpoenaed by federal prosecutors—without his knowledge—as part of Special Counsel Jack Smith’s investigation into President Donald Trump’s role in the January 6 riot. He’s accused the FBI of spying on him, and this week wrote a letter demanding the suspension and impeachment of federal Judge James Boasberg, who approved that subpoena and related gag order. In an interview on Fox News, Graham threatened to sue someone (it’s unclear who, exactly) for ‘tens of millions of dollars’ over all this … Graham has been a key player in the construction of America’s modern digital and telecom panopticon. As a member of the House, he voted for the Patriot Act in 2001. After Edward Snowden revealed that the National Security Agency (NSA) was scooping up Americans’ phone records, Graham said he was ‘glad the NSA is trying to find out what the terrorists are up to overseas and in our country.’ (He later tried to place sanctions on any country aiding Snowden.) He voted to codify those surveillance powers into Section 702 in 2008 and has repeatedly backed its preauthorization.”).
Posted inFISA, National security|Comments Off on Reason: Lindsey Graham Is Outraged About Federal Surveillance Powers That Lindsey Graham Helped Create and Expand
NBC: Top military lawyer raised legal concerns about boat strikes by Gordon Lubold, Courtney Kube and Dan De Luce (“The lawyer at U.S. Southern Command, which oversees the operations against alleged drug-smuggling boats near Venezuela, disagreed that the strikes are legal and was overruled, according to six sources.”)
Posted inExcessive force, Foreign searches|Comments Off on NBC: Top military lawyer raised legal concerns about boat strikes
Lobstering is a closely regulated industry, and GPS tracking of lobster boats by the State of Maine is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Thompson v. Wilson, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 30135 (1st Cir. Nov. 18, 2025) (appellant first conceded that it was a closely regulated industry, and then tried to back out of it, but to no avail):
A murder for hire scheme was exigency for a warrantless search. Here, the officers thought the firearm would be moved imminently on December 31, 2024, but the warrant wasn’t signed until after midnight January 1, 2025. It wasn’t automatically stale, and there was exigency. United States v. Fultz, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225617 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2025).
Ordering defendant out of his car during a nighttime stop was not unreasonable nor unrelated to the purpose of the stop. United States v. Nicely, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226834 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 6, 2025).*
Defendant’s vehicle could have been searched on the side of the road. Instead, officers waited 18 hours to get a search warrant for it to search for drugs they saw in it. The delay was not unreasonable. United States v. Walker, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226275 (N.D. Iowa Nov. 18, 2025).*
Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not challenging the search warrant for what appears now [to this author] to be speculative reasons. MacVicar v. United States, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226254 (D. Me. Nov. 18, 2025).*
There was a drug abatement order from 2011 for an apartment area in Jonesboro, Arkansas. A sign warned of warrantless residential searches. The JPD street crimes unit saw several men standing outside defendant’s apartment. Marijuana could be smelled, and they searched defendant finding two Oxys. Two bottles of cough syrup and a blunt were seen by his residence door. They entered as well. Despite the entry violating the Fourth Amendment, the 12 years of the abatement order plus the call to the city attorney for guidance made the good faith exception apply. Thompson v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 558 (Nov. 19, 2025):
Posted inGood faith exception|Comments Off on AR: Warrantless entry under 12-year-old drug abatement search order never before challenged was in good faith, despite 4A violation
Defendant’s car in a “trailer park” communal parking area near his place was not on his “curtilage.” The court of appeals erred in finding it was curtilage. State v. Charles, 2025 La. LEXIS 1624 (Nov. 19, 2025).
“Here, the renewed warrant was issued after a controlled buy involving the target cellphone. In his affidavit, Beal described that transaction in detail, linked it to Hill’s cellphone, summarized the progress of the investigation, and referenced Hill’s prior federal prosecution and state arrests. Taken together, this information established a fair probability that GPS data from the phone would yield evidence of drug trafficking and demonstrated a clear nexus between Hill’s criminal activity and his cellphone. Far from boilerplate, the affidavit offered ‘powerful corroborative evidence for purposes of determining probable cause.’ …” United States v. Hill, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 30244 (2d Cir. Nov. 19, 2025).*
Shooting plaintiff in the eye with a pepper ball gun to disperse and not apprehend was not clearly established to be excessive force. Keup v. Sarpy Cty., 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 30228 (8th Cir. Nov. 19, 2025).*
Defendant was an overnight guest at the place searched, and the officers executing a warrant were authorized to search her stuff, too. United States v. Inyang, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 30148 (5th Cir. Nov. 18, 2025).
Undercover officer’s recording in defendant’s house didn’t violate Fourth Amendment. United States v. Robinson, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226857 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 31, 2025).*
Defendant’s flight justified his stop. State v. Doyle, 2025 La. App. LEXIS 2227 (La. App. 2 Cir. Nov. 19, 2025).*
Defendant fails in his Franks challenge in making the substantial preliminary showing of falsity. And even if it was, it wasn’t material to the finding of probable cause. United States v. Mack, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 30243 (2d Cir. Nov. 19, 2025).*
Officers suspected defendant was carrying a weapon, and they saw it as they approached. Under state law, he had to have the permit on him. “So, were the officers’ following actions (handcuffing Pettes and putting him in the squad car) ‘reasonably related’ to investigating whether Pettes was lawfully carrying a concealed weapon? Undoubtedly. These precautions enabled officers to investigate whether Pettes had a CPL in a safe and orderly manner.” United States v. Pettes, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224869 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 14, 2025).
State courts have the authority to get cell phone information across state lines. United States v. Wilnau, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225951 (D. Mont. Nov. 17, 2025).*
“Computers and related equipment” in the warrant includes cell phones. United States v. Kuhn, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225738 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 17, 2025).*
The protective sweep before the warrant arrived was reasonable and limited. “While the Court notes that the affidavit of probable cause attached to the first search warrant could have provided more details regarding the alleged previous narcotics activities of Mims, there are sufficient facts alleged to demonstrate probable cause that evidence of the crime would be found in a particular place.” United States v. Mims, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226932 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2025).*
In this false arrest case, the sheriff admitted he had no training in the Fourth Amendment. Harris v. Breeden, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225584 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2025).
The frisk here was without reasonable suspicion, including the bag defendant had. McKissick v. Commonwealth, 2025 Ky. App. LEXIS 101 (Nov. 14, 2025).*
The court of appeals concludes that there was [barely] reasonable suspicion to continue this stop and it wasn’t based merely on a hunch. The officer articulated some grounds. Dobbin v. State, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 8804 (Tex. App. – Dallas Nov. 14, 2025).* [This should have been reversed. It was really thin.]
There was probable cause for the warrant, and defendant doesn’t even have standing. People v. Delaney, 2025 Mich. App. LEXIS 9214 (Nov. 17, 2025).*
Under Kansas statute, only KHP officers can randomly stop regulated trucks for inspection, and it can’t be delegated to county sheriffs by an MOU. “There is no dispute here that regulation of commercial motor carriers triggers a substantial government interest.” But, under Burger v. New York, it must further the regulatory needs of the state. This fails Burger. State v. Sharp, 2025 Kan. App. LEXIS 53 (Nov. 14, 2025).
The trial court didn’t abuse its discretion in denying a supplemental post-trial motion to suppress. Commonwealth v. Hill, 2025 PA Super 259 (Nov. 14, 2025).*
“The MDOC’s policy of conducting strip searches following contact visits is reasonable and therefore does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” Parker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 29782 (6th Cir. Nov. 13, 2025).*
Defendant fails in his Franks challenge of the search warrant for BAC because the affidavit for warrant shows essentially full disclosure. People v. Martinez, 2025 NYLJ LEXIS 3509 (Putnam Co. Nov. 14, 2025).*
MSNOW: ICE’s biometric dragnet is a 21st century general warrant for your body by Robert Frommer (Detained persons are having DNA, fingerprints, and photographs collected despite no charges (“In addition to our DNA, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has recently and quietly authorized ICE officers to forcibly collect and retain intimate identifiers: our fingerprints and digital images of our faces. Combined with other technologies, the department is creating a general warrant for our persons, the kind of abuse that ignited the American Revolution.”)).
Posted inFacial recognition|Comments Off on MSNOW: ICE’s biometric dragnet is a 21st century general warrant for your body
There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in property where the defendant isn’t entitled to be, abandoned or otherwise unoccupied. El Pueblo v. Rondón, 2025 TSPR 113 (Nov. 4, 2025). (translation by Lexis)
The stop of this known felon was with reasonable suspicion and then a gun was seen in plain view. That led to a search. Calling a drug dog was not unreasonable. United States v. Taylor, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224471 (D.S.D. Nov. 12, 2025).*
There was reasonable suspicion for a FST on defendant after a hit-and-run with a tree. State v. Wheeler, 2025-Ohio-5165 (2d Dist. Nov. 14, 2025).*
The stop was justified because the license plate holder border covered part of the state of issuance which the officer thought violated Arkansas law. United States v. Grace, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224162 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 14, 2025).*
A ShotSpotter alert of 16 gunshots from the vicinity of defendant’s home confirmed by witnesses in a car leaving the area was justification for exigent entry onto the curtilage. “Since the addition of the omitted information does not disturb the probable cause in the warrant to search Defendants’ home, there were no material omissions, and Defendants are not entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Franks or suppression of the evidence recovered from the search.” United States v. Gonzalez, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224600 (S.D. Fla. Sep. 26, 2025).
“The evidence of record and the facts pleaded by Penascino show that the arrest was permitted under Pennsylvania law as the probable cause standard was met. Nothing before the Court indicates that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest. Thus, Penascino cannot show that he was falsely imprisoned. Therefore, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.” Penascino v. Cope, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223747 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2025).*
Motion for sixth extension of time to file a motion to suppress is denied. A Franks motion was filed back in August. United States v. Hardison, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224499 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 14, 2025).*
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
