D.Mass.: “All records” relating to wire fraud was particular enough

“The warrant here, and, specifically, the attachment describing the items to be seized, satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. Kerrissey argues, first, that the attachment was overbroad because it authorized the seizure of ‘“all records, in whatever form” for multiple businesses without any temporal limitation.’ … This argument ignores the plain language of the warrant, which limited the records to be seized to violations of a certain statute during a defined time period, that is ‘evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. [§] 1343’ from ‘April 2020 until the present.’ … Contrary to Kerrissey’s argument, the Court must read this ‘broad first clause, which identifie[d] the criminal offense[] that the target evidence was expected to establish’ in light of the more ‘detailed and particularized’ subclauses that follow, whose particularity Kerrissey does not specifically challenge.” United States v. Kerrissey, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228510 (D. Mass. Nov. 20, 2025).

An officer who provided information leading to a probable cause determination that has buyer’s remorse later doesn’t undo the probable cause finding. Jackson v. Dickens, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228646 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 20, 2025).*

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