TSA officers are law enforcement officers for searches under the FTCA. Five other circuits hold that. Koletas v. United States, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 29609 (11th Cir. Nov. 12, 2025).
While each factor here isn’t reasonable suspicion on its own, they are in their totality. State v. Rainey, 2025 Mo. App. LEXIS 762 (Nov. 12, 2025).*
The search probably wasn’t valid under Gant, but it was under the automobile exception. United States v. Garrott, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222461 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 12, 2025).*
Reasonable suspicion isn’t subject to the good faith exception, except for potential reasonableness making it that way. But this wasn’t. State v. S.H.-M., 2025 Wash. App. LEXIS 2317 (Nov. 12, 2025).*
Note to sov cits: Refusing to get out of the car when directed is reasonable suspicion. State v. Carter, 2025 Iowa App. LEXIS 983 (Nov. 13, 2025).*
“Even the most seemingly trivial traffic infraction or equipment violation gives a peace officer probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop a motorist.” State v. Schmitz, 2025 Iowa App. LEXIS 980 (Nov. 13, 2025).*
A reasonable mistake of fact can support a stop. State v. Schmitz, 2025 Iowa App. LEXIS 980 (Nov. 13, 2025).*
Probable cause supported the warrant. “Alternatively, even if the court agreed with Garrett that the warrant lacked probable cause, the good-faith exception applies. The warrant was not ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render the officers’ belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’” United States v. Garrett, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222641 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 12, 2025).*
CBP seized and searched defendant’s cell phones at the border under existing authority. After subsequent case law called that into question, the government sought a search warrant for the phones disclosing all the facts. The subsequent warrant was valid. United States v. Walden, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222763 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2025).
Unreasonable killing of a family dog is a seizure of property under the Fourth Amendment. Bledsoe v. City of Caddo Valley, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221931 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 14, 2025).*
“Plaintiff alleges only that he was forcefully removed from his vehicle without his consent. Such allegations are insufficient to establish a claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” He refused an order to get out of the car. “Plaintiff responded, ‘I do not consent to any of this.’ … Officer Neal answered, ‘Shut up, this isn’t Tik Tok.’” Davis v. Olivera, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221894 (D.S.C. Sep. 30, 2025).*
Ohio provides a mechanism to challenge searches and seizures in state court, so there’s no 2254 remedy just because you don’t like the outcome. McGee v. Warden, Belmont Corr. Inst., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222816 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 12, 2025).*
When challenged, the government fails to prove that the area of the stop was “high crime.” There were nine gun seizures in four months in a 500 meter radius. “The Government has established, however, that Abass engaged in unprovoked and almost immediate flight upon noticing police. For the reasons below, this factor partially but not fully supports reasonable suspicion.” It doesn’t here, however. “Although the Government has failed to establish that plus factor here, it points to two other factors that-taken together-narrowly clear the bar,” and that’s that it appeared he was holding a gun against his body while running. United States v. Abass, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221425 (D.D.C. Nov. 10, 2025).
Plaintiff’s civil Franks claim fails. The alleged false statement was neither that nor material. Ferrara v. Travis Cty. Att’y’s Office, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 29567 (5th Cir. Nov. 11, 2025).*
Defendant had an accident in DC. When the police arrived to discuss it, he fled, discarding a gun en route under a car. The record supports that the officer could see an illegal oversized magazine through the window of the car, based on the inference the gun was illegal because it was discarded. Miller v. United States, 2025 D.C. App. LEXIS 367 (Nov. 6, 2025).
A 911 call about a potential impaired driver with kids in the car justified the officer’s interaction with the defendant. A welfare community caretaking check isn’t unreasonable just because it’s intertwined with a potential crime. Children can’t be expected to fend for themselves in this situation. State v. Leiby, 2025 Fla. App. LEXIS 8339 (Fla. 4th DCA Nov. 5, 2025).
“As did the district court, for each officer, we start and end with the ‘clearly established law’ prong of the qualified immunity analysis. We do so because Johnson offers no clearly established law applicable to either officer’s conduct, and that is fatal to her arguments for both Connolly and Vado.” It is plaintiff’s burden to show it. Johnson v. Smith, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 29049 (5th Cir. Nov. 5, 2025).*
The state’s mechanism for resolution of search and seizure claims is adequate for the Stone bar. McGee v. Warden, Belmont Corr. Inst., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218066 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 5, 2025).*
Posted inIssue preclusion, Qualified immunity|Comments Off on FL4: Welfare check not unreasonable just because a crime might also be involved
The government doesn’t provide justification for sealing this search warrant application merely because there are cell phone number in it. It is presumptively a public record. In re Matter of Application by United States for Search Warrant to Search, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218242 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2025).
California law provides a mechanism to challenge searches, and failure to do so here was Stone barred. Bryson v. Madden, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221586 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2025).*
Defendant’s discovery request for video of the controlled buy that led to the warrant wasn’t timely, and the court could affirm on that basis alone. On the merits, however, it is speculative that it’s Brady material. United States v. Hill, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 29357 (11th Cir. Nov. 7, 2025).*
The fact a forensic search of defendant’s computer was done in a county other than where the search warrant for its seizure was executed doesn’t violate any law. Fields v. State, 2025 Miss. App. LEXIS 430 (Nov. 4, 2025).
The bodycam shows the use of force against the agitated plaintiff was reasonable when he produced a knife. Padilla v. City of N.Y., 2025 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8670 (Queens Co. Oct. 24, 2025).*
The Spanish speaking defendant consented to the search of his phone. He came to the police station with a translator, and the objective facts showed that the situation was not coercive. Garcia v. State, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 8651 (Tex. App. – Amarillo Nov. 10, 2025).*
Plaintiff’s illegal search claim here would backdoor his criminal case, so it’s Heck barred. Allee v. Matjeka, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218052 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2025).*
The CSLI “affidavit showed a fair probability that the cell-site location data associated with Frazier’s cell phone would further incriminate Frazier (an identified suspect in the crime at issue) by confirming that he was in the vicinity of the crime when it occurred. The affidavit contained specific facts that showed a connection between Frazier, the phone owner, and the crime.” Nexus: “Given the pervasive use of cell phones in contemporary society, Pope asserted it was reasonable to infer Frazier had his cell phone on his person when he committed the robbery. He also asserted that it was fairly probable that the cell phone location data would help confirm Frazier’s location before, during, and after the crime.” Frazier v. State, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 8552 (Tex. App. – Houston (1st Dist.) Nov. 6, 2025).
The claim the search warrant was obtained by witness bribery is unsupported. Successor 2255 is denied. In re Alward, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 29153 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2025).*
“Considering the totality of the circumstances, including Officer Jensen’s training and experience, his observations of Mr. Davis driving his pickup, and the dash cam footage, we conclude the district court reasonably found Officer Jensen had a sufficient basis to believe Mr. Davis had committed a traffic violation.” Drewry v. Brenner, 2025 WY 121 (Nov. 6, 2025).*
You don’t get a hearing on a motion to suppress without showing a factual dispute to be resolved. United States v. Figueroa-Figueroa, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218467 (D.P.R. Nov. 4, 2025).
“A claim that a law enforcement official used excessive force is to be analyzed under the objective reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment.” The undisputed facts from the bodycam establish the reasonableness of the force. Padilla v. City of New York, 2025 NYLJ LEXIS 3465 (Queens Co. Nov. 6, 2025).*
“Gilbert fails to demonstrate that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in state court under Stone. Indeed, Gilbert’s Motion to Suppress was thoroughly briefed, a lengthy evidentiary hearing was held in which two witnesses provided testimony, the state court considered the merits of Gilbert’s motion in a 19-page detailed order, and the Nevada Supreme Court issued an 18-page, reportable opinion discussing only the suppression issue. … Accordingly, not only did Gilbert have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim, but his claim was exceedingly and painstakingly reviewed.” Gilbert v. Henley, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218780 (D. Nev. Nov. 5, 2025).*
Entrapment is not a defense to a search warrant, so CoA denied. Neeley v. United States, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 29144 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2025).
The motion to suppress for lack of jurisdiction to serve warrants is denied. It’s statewide. State v. Pratt, 2025 Del. Super. LEXIS 545 (Nov. 4, 2025).*
There was reasonable suspicion for defendant’s frisk for having a gun, which was found, and search was inevitable because there were warrants for his arrest. United States v. Harris, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219311 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 3, 2025).*
“When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress regarding a search warrant, our court first decides whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies; if it does, denial of the motion is appropriate without further inquiry.” United States v. Washington, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 29218 (5th Cir. Nov. 6, 2025).*
Not raising before conviction all the conceivable Fourth Amendment claims defendant thought were useful was a reasonable tactical decision. Perez v. United States, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220629 (D.N.D. Nov. 7, 2025).
“As the trial court noted, approximately one minute passed between the vehicle stop and when Trooper Lewis asked driver Hollings to exit the vehicle. Lewis then observed a white powder on the driver’s seat, that field tested as cocaine, and green vegetation that he suspected to be marijuana. These observations, as well as the driver’s lack of knowledge regarding their intended destination, led Lewis to believe that criminal activity may be afoot, and provided reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of his stop and [probable cause] to search the vehicle.” State v. Banks, 2025-Ohio-5082 (4th Dist. Oct. 28, 2025).*
“[E]ven if the Court were to determine that Officer Romero did not testify credibly, at the very least about his observations regarding the condition of the temporary tag once he exited his vehicle, it nonetheless would have been eminently reasonable for Officer Romero to extend the stop by a short time, if for no other reason than to notify Defendant that he was free to leave. But it was during this stage of the encounter that Officer Romero developed an additional independent basis to extend the stop, i.e., the odor of marijuana.” United States v. Joseph, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218514 (M.D. La. Nov. 5, 2025).*
NPR: Immigration agents have new technology to identify and track people by Jude Joffe-Block (“Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is acquiring powerful new surveillance tools to identify and monitor people. They include apps that let federal agents point a cell phone at someone’s face to potentially identify them and determine their immigration status in the field, and another that can scan irises. Newly licensed software can give ‘access to vast amounts of location-based data,’ according to an archive of the website of the company that developed it, and ICE recently revived a previously frozen contract with a company that makes spyware that can hack into cell phones. The federal agency is also ramping up its social media surveillance, with new AI-driven software contracts, and is considering hiring 24/7 teams of contractors assigned to scouring various databases and platforms like Facebook and TikTok and creating dossiers on users.”)
Posted inFacial recognition|Comments Off on NPR: Immigration agents have new technology to identify and track people
Search under a general administrative tax warrant under state law violates the Fourth Amendment. This involved a search of a house where the taxes were not paid on illegal drugs. Also, it was issued by the Secretary of Revenue and not a judicial officer. State v. Hickman, 2025 N.C. App. LEXIS 784 (Nov. 5, 2025).
The district court erred in dismissing this case as moot. It sought recovery of seized money and the affidavits for warrant. Payment of the money didn’t make it moot. Cal. Palms Addiction Recovery Campus, Inc. v. United States, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 29180 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2025).*
There was consent to search defendant’s cell phone, and the search incident of his truck was reasonable. United States v. Smtih, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218961 (D. Kan. Nov. 6, 2025).*
“Somehow dismissing the reports of interview, the text messages, and their own surveillance, Defendant claims the FBI had no knowledge that a drug transaction was about to occur. Such facts are not required because probable cause is ‘a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’ Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243 (2013).” The CI’s information was creditable. United States v. Oca, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218877 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2025).*
Defendant had no standing to contest the opening of an apartment refrigerator finding a decapitated body. This was plain smell. The officers could smell the decomposing body, and that was enough to open the refrigerator door. People v. McGee, 2025 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8668, 2025 NYLJ LEXIS 3480 (Kings Co. Nov. 7, 2025).
The product of a Brazilian cell phone search showed defendant was hiding assets he didn’t disclose to pretrial services. Release denied. United States v. Braga, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220310 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 2025).*
Defendant doesn’t get discovery of the CI’s drug buy that led to the search warrant. There’s a limited privilege to not disclose the CI’s identity. United States v. Hill, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 29357 (11th Cir. Nov. 7, 2025).*
Defendant’s shifting arguments in the district court lead the court of appeals to conclude waiver of the issue now presented on appeal. United States v. Smith, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 29273 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2025).*
Summary by the court: “The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the City of Henderson, its police department, and several police officers arising from the shooting death of 12-year-old Joseph Hawatmeh, who officers attempted to rescue from a man who had killed Joseph’s mother and housekeeper, gravely wounded his sister, and was holding him hostage. [¶] The panel held that the officers did not violate Joseph’s Fourth Amendment right to be free of excessive force. The officers did not seize Joseph for Fourth Amendment purposes when they employed control tactics or force in an attempt to rescue him from an active hostage situation. Moreover, even had plaintiffs plausibly alleged a constitutional violation, the officers would be entitled to qualified immunity because Joseph’s right to be free of excessive force during an active hostage situation was not clearly established at the time of the violation.” Hawatmeh v. City of Henderson, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 29328 (9th Cir. Nov. 7, 2025). See CNS: Ninth Circuit: Police didn’t violate civil rights of 12-year-old killed in hostage standoff
Posted inUncategorized|Comments Off on CA9: Accidentally killing the hostage was subject to qualified immunity
Being a federal contractor wasn’t enough to make defendant food service company a state actor. Ellis v. Ben E. Keith Co., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217957 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2025).
Officers had a warrant for the place searched and found defendant’s bag in a cooler there, one he had on him earlier. It was covered by the warrant where it was found. United States v. Alston, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218079 (D.S.C. Nov. 5, 2025).*
Consent isn’t involuntary just because the officer has the defendant’s ID when asked. Torralba v. State, 2025 Fla. App. LEXIS 8324 (Fla. 3d DCA Nov. 5, 2025).* (Interestingly, this opinion is a string of quotes from other cases following “Affirmed.” I saw that once before in a fictional opinion in the NLJ back in the 1990s. Surely they’ve done this before, but I just haven’t seen it.)
Posted inConsent, Private search, Scope of search|Comments Off on N.D.Tex.: Merely being a federal contractor doesn’t make employer’s search state action
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
