Defendant was stopped for speeding, and he was arrested for drugs based on unidentified pills found in his lap when the officer looked in. That might have been reasonable suspicion, but it wasn’t probable cause. Therefore, the arrest and car search are invalid and suppressed. United States v. Vogel, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186990 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2026).
Breaking plaintiff’s car window and pulling him out here was justified by his uncooperativeness and refusing to keep his hands visible. For 14 minutes he refused to show his DL or get out when directed. “Balancing the nature of the intrusion against the severity of the suspected offense, the potential threat to officer safety, and Plaintiff’s continued resistance, the Court finds that no reasonable juror could conclude that the force used in arresting Plaintiff was objectively unreasonable.” Basargin v. City of Homer, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187097 (D. Alaska Aug. 20, 2026).*
Search warrants run to the place, not the person in alleged control. Here, there were nine cell phones found. The affidavit didn’t infer they all belonged to one defendant, but since they were found there, that was enough to search them under the warrant. United States v. Davis, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187118 (D. Minn. Aug. 20, 2026).*
It was reasonable for officers to conclude that evidence or instrumentalities of the crime would be found in the car used in a robbery. A mistaken description of the location of the car in the warrant was neither intentional nor reckless for Franks. “In sum, although we decline to opine on whether the 9-1-1 call, dialed to determine the number connected to the Samsung device, constituted an unlawful search for which the Detective should have obtained a warrant, we hold that the evidence obtained from the phone would have been inevitably discovered because the phone number itself was ultimately immaterial to whether the search warrant would have been granted.” United States v. Onyewu, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 25421 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 21, 2026).*
The officer’s question about a thing in the car was not related to the traffic stop, and it extended the stop. The court finds, however, that the government showed inevitable discovery applied, and the evidence will not be suppressed. United States v. Drew, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188321 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 21, 2026).*
Defendant and his girlfriend were breaking up, and she validly consented to entry into the home, but she didn’t have apparent authority to consent to entry into his safe in the house. United States v. Ricker, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188230 (D. Nev. Aug. 21, 2026).*
Google and others flagged apparent CSAM by hash value alone and reported them to NCMEC which forwarded them to police where the IP address was. The officer viewed the images without a warrant and found them with names suggesting they were CSAM, and he conducted other investigation. The government could have done more, but there was probable cause by “a hair’s breadth.” United States v. Braun, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 25399 (7th Cir. Aug. 20, 2026).
The officer’s reliance on the search warrant here was objectively reasonable, and the good faith exception applies. There also was probable cause and the information was not stale. United States v. Williams, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188317 (E.D. La. Aug. 21, 2026).*
The officer’s queries during the stop were all related to officer safety and didn’t unreasonably prolong the stop. United States v. Birry, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 25435 (3d Cir. Aug. 21, 2026).*
Minor detours to the traffic stop, but all related to it, didn’t unreasonably extend the stop. The dog was quickly called for. United States v. Alba, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189133 (D. Utah Aug. 21, 2026). How the court handled the detours is instructive:
Posted inDog sniff, Reasonable suspicion|Comments Off on D.Utah: Minor time detours to writing up a traffic ticket didn’t unreasonable extend this stop; the dog was quickly on its way
A search warrant for defendant’s place was because Customs had flagged a child sex doll coming to his house. While the state supreme court held that while nexus was lacking, it remanded for determination of the good faith exception. Looking at the totality of the testimony and circumstances, the court of appeals concludes the good faith exception should apply. There was at least some evidence of nexus, and the police were not at all reckless in what they were doing. Commonwealth v. Master, 2026 Ky. App. LEXIS 83 (Aug. 21, 2026).
Defendant was stopped because he was reasonably suspected of having a murder warrant for him. The handcuffing and detention of four minutes before he was released was reasonable. McCrea v. McGill, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183665 (D.S.C. Aug. 14, 2026).*
The officer here didn’t extend the stop for the dog sniff. Defendant slowed it himself a bit, and the dog was already there. And there was reasonable suspicion, too. United States v. Brown, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 24779 (5th Cir. Aug. 17, 2026).*
Collecting defendant’s DNA from his trash out for collection didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment or the Colorado Constitution. People v. Anderson, 2026 COA 64 (Aug. 20, 2026) (2-1 on the state issue; a warrant should be required).
Plaintiff’s claim that his arrest lacked probable cause is viewed as an effort to undermine his conviction in violation of Heck v. Humphrey, and the claim is dismissed. Tam Ho v. Arnold, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184441 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 18, 2026).*
Defendant was stopped because he was reasonably suspected of having a murder warrant for him. The handcuffing and detention of four minutes before he was released was reasonable. McCrea v. McGill, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183665 (D.S.C. Aug. 14, 2026).*
The officer here didn’t extend the stop for the dog sniff. Defendant slowed it himself a bit, and the dog was already there. And there was reasonable suspicion, too. United States v. Brown, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 24779 (5th Cir. Aug. 17, 2026).*
Nebraska statute authorizes search warrants to cross state lines, and this does not violate the Fourth Amendment. This was a Snapchat warrant. [The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a,d), allows state subpoenas to cross state lines.] United States v. Peterson, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 24711 (8th Cir. Aug. 17, 2026).
Five phones were seized. “Human error” led to misidentifying one of them on defendant’s consent form. The consent was invalid because it was the wrong phone. United States v. Morales-Aguirre, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184752 (D.N.M. Aug. 17, 2026).*
Officers had a person warrant for defendant with a 10 pm limit. It was executed at 9:49, and defendant’s flight didn’t make it unreasonable to search the belongings he left behind when he fled. United States v. Klapman, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183516 (D. Mass. Aug. 17, 2026).*
License plate propped in the window was still reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop. Hudson v. Commonwealth, 2026 Va. App. LEXIS 444 (Aug. 18, 2026).*
The court imposing a sweat patch on plaintiff violated his state constitutional privacy rights. Lesser intrusive measures are required. Bailey-Cobb v. Snohomish Cty. Dist. Court, 2026 Wash. App. LEXIS 1871 (Aug. 17, 2026).
Plaintiff stated a claim for his severe injuries after being thrown to the ground for touching the reins of a police horse by police without apparent justification because he was not resisting. Flores v. Perez, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 24648 (5th Cir. Aug. 14, 2026).*
By creating an X account, defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the posts. United States v. Branscum, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184993 (W.D. Mo. June 22, 2026).*
Civil Franks claim fails for lack of materiality in the false statement. Degollado v. City of Port Lavaca, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 24919 (5th Cir. Aug. 18, 2026).*
The administrative search provisions of the Michigan liquor control statute don’t measure up to the Burger/Patel standards for administrative searches. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment denied. Generis Ent., LLC v. Donley, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185142 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 2026)*:
Reason: Border Agents Searched His Phone 5 Times Without a Warrant. He’s Asking the Supreme Court To Put a Stop to It. by Elizabeth Nolan Brown (“The Fourth Amendment says authorities can’t search you or your things without probable cause and a warrant. But U.S. immigration authorities have long claimed that this constitutional mandate doesn’t apply to them, at least not when it comes to searching people—including American citizens—who are entering or exiting the United States. Under current Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) policies, agents are allowed to seize and search your stuff—including your cellphone, your laptop, or any other electronic devices—without a warrant and without suspicion if you’re around the border or flying into or out of the country. It happened to George Anibowei five times. Now, he’s asking for the U.S. Supreme Court to intervene.”)
Posted inBorder search, Cell phones|Comments Off on Reason: Border Agents Searched His Phone 5 Times Without a Warrant. He’s Asking the Supreme Court To Put a Stop to It.
“This appeal is about the reasonable expectation of privacy–or the lack thereof. Kenneth Mininger secretly placed video cameras in shared rooms in his ex-wife’s house. He used these cameras to record his ex-wife’s minor daughter undressing. The police examined the SD cards attached to these cameras without a warrant and, based on the cards’ contents, obtained a warrant for Mininger’s other devices. On those devices, law enforcement found large amounts of child sexual abuse material for which Mininger was convicted. He brings a Fourth Amendment challenge, arguing that the district court should have suppressed all of this evidence and that the resulting warrant was overbroad. But, in large part because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the SD cards he had placed, unsecured, in a shared room in his ex-wife’s house, Mininger’s Fourth Amendment arguments fail. Accordingly, we affirm his convictions.” United States v. Mininger, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 24934 (11th Cir. Aug. 18, 2026).
Defendant’s permission to stay in the property searched was in dispute, and he failed to show his standing. State v. Jones, 2026 Mo. App. LEXIS 624 (Aug. 18, 2026).*
Plaintiff’s claim of false confessions sounds in the Fourth Amendment not Fourteenth. But here, the alleged false confession was never used in court. Therefore, no liability. Savory v. Andrews, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 24655 (7th Cir. Aug. 14, 2026)*:
This strip search of a female detainee stated a claim and overcame qualified immunity. Brown v. Wallace, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 24643 (5th Cir. Aug. 14, 2026):
The affidavit for warrant here provided neither nexus nor timing to address 6740. As to all around it, yes, but not there. As to timing, as to the others, yes, but all the police had as to 6740 was 13-year-old information. It was all so lacking, the court spends nine paragraphs on why the good faith exception doesn’t apply. United States v. Griffin, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 24629 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 2026):
Bad faith administrative subpoenas are grounded in the Fourth Amendment, but the burden is high in showing bad faith, and plaintiffs didn’t meet it. Queerdoc, PLLC v. DOJ, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 24567 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2026) (“The prohibition against bad-faith subpoenas is also grounded in the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that a subpoena be reasonable. Golden Valley, 689 F.3d at 1113. Whether the authority rests on our inherent equitable power or on the Fourth Amendment, the inquiry remains the same.”).
Defendant had no standing to contest the search of his victim’s cell phone. State v. Carroll, 2026 S.C. App. LEXIS 54 (Aug. 12, 2026).*
Defendant’s parole search “stalking horse” argument utterly failed on the proof. United States v. Malyk, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 24446 (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 2026).*
The trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law on there being reasonable suspicion for the length of stop before the drug dog are clearly erroneous. Reversed. State v. Belony, 2026 ME 86 (Aug. 13, 2026).*
Search warrants are usually issued ex parte, and there’s no Fourth Amendment justification for advance notice to the target of the search. It avoids warning the target to destroy or hide evidence or flee. United States v. Leeper, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 24432 (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 2026):
“In light of totality of the circumstances of this case, we thus ask whether Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Defendant Josephs’ repeated refusal of Plaintiff’s requests to use his own restroom rendered Plaintiff’s seizure unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Though we are not limited to the Graham factors we use typically to evaluate a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, discussion of those factors is instructive. Based on the following, we find that Plaintiff has plausibly plead a § 1983 Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim.” Antol v. English, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 24454 (6th Cir. Aug. 13, 2026).
Delaware’s search and seizure provision follows Pennsylvania’s, not the Fourth Amendment. Calm v. Taylor, 2026 Del. Ch. LEXIS 343 (Aug. 11, 2026).
“Defendant’s attempt to characterize the encounter as a roadside strip search is not supported by the record. All three officers testified that Defendant’s genitalia and buttocks remained clothed.” United States v. Nelson, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180844 (D. Me. Aug. 13, 2026).*
Not exactly following the inventory policy doesn’t make it unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Maldonadochavarria, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180956 (W.D. Mo. July 13, 2026).
“Here, King was placed in handcuffs and moved from the Rite Shop to the parking lot and placed in a police cruiser. While King was placed in handcuffs, only three minutes passed between King being placed in handcuffs in the Rite Shop and law enforcement searching the fanny pack to discover the firearm and the drugs. Indeed, upon King’s initial detention, law enforcement diligently searched for the fanny pack and found it approximately 90 seconds later. The Court accordingly finds that King’s brief detention in the police cruiser did not transform the Terry stop into a full arrest.” United States v. King, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180922 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 13, 2026).*
Defense counsel was ineffective for not filing a plausible motion to suppress. Defense counsel was deficient in communicating with defendant and kept saying he was working on a motion to suppress but one was never filed. United States v. Jones, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181146 (D. Kan. Aug. 13, 2026).*
Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not challenging a complete cell phone download as overbroad before the search because no binding case says it is. Lenon v. State, 2026 Ga. LEXIS 250 (Aug. 13, 2026).
The question is not whether plaintiff was speeding. It’s whether there was probable cause to believe he was, and it was reasonable for the officer to think that. Henderson v. Vill. of New Holland, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 23845 (6th Cir. Aug. 7, 2026).*
“Although the street was residential and turning on hazard lights may be an innocent act, based on the proximity to the border, characteristics of the area, Agent Egbert’s knowledge of previous unlawful border crossings in the area, and the known border crossing just north of the white Mercedes parked location, he had reasonable suspicion to conduct the investigatory stop. Because reasonable suspicion existed, no unlawful seizure occurred and thus the fhiit of the seizure need not be suppressed.” United States v. Lin, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181512 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 13, 2026).*
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
