WI: After suppression, how does the independent source rule work to salvage the search? Or does it?

After a warrant for electronics was suppressed, a second was obtained with the same evidence claiming independent source. The Court of Appeals is so troubled by this that it certifies the case to the Supreme Court to sort it out. State v. Lancial, 2026 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1248 (Nov. 17, 2026)* (a fascinating opinion, but not yet on court’s website):

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OH: Officer safety alone doesn’t justify prolonging a traffic stop for a dog sniff

Officer safety does not justify prolonging a traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff since a sniff is not part of the mission of a traffic stop. Thus, the state failed to meet its burden to prove that traffic stop was not unlawfully extended when evidence failed to establish that administrative tasks incident to traffic stop were ongoing when canine alerted. State v. Kincaid, 2026-Ohio-4510 (Nov. 17, 2026).

One of petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claims was decided in the original case, so it can’t be relitigated. As to his Franks claim: “This minor detail is not enough to claim that the police included false or recklessly misleading statements in the warrant affidavit. In other words, many of the statements Jackson claims were false or recklessly misleading were true and supported by the evidence. At the time the search warrant was obtained, police had acquired the information Jackson challenges from interviews with JV-1 and JV-2. Thus, Jackson’s attorneys were not constitutionally deficient by failing to request a hearing on the alleged Franks issue.” Jackson v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 263210 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 17, 2026).*

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D.D.C.: Def’s arrest was completely without probable cause, and it’s ordered expunged

Because defendant’s arrest was completely without probable cause, the arrest is ordered expunged. United States v. Butler, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 262642 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2026) (USMJ).

It would have been better for the search warrant application to have stated how defendant’s devices would have helped providing evidence of alleged child sexual abuse, but the warrant was sufficient enough for the good faith exception. United States v. Cain, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 35039 (3d Cir. Nov. 17, 2026).*

The apparent smell of marijuana is still probable cause even if it might be hemp. United States v. Freeman, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 263012 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 17, 2026).*

Posted in Arrest or entry on arrest, Good faith exception, Plain view, feel, smell | Comments Off on D.D.C.: Def’s arrest was completely without probable cause, and it’s ordered expunged

CA2: It wasn’t IAC to not raise CSLI when cert was granted in Carpenter during def’s trial

The cert petition in Carpenter was granted during petitioner’s state trial. The state court held defense counsel was not ineffective for not raising CSLI warrants. This was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. White v. Wolcott, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 35000 (2d Cir. Nov. 17, 2026).

The CI’s information was substantially corroborated. “So too here. Driving to Colorado and quickly returning, being present near suspected drug houses, and suffering mechanical problems with a vehicle could all be innocent events. But given all the pieces of the informant’s information that were verified, police had a reasonable basis to believe that the remaining unverified claim—that Defendant was transporting methamphetamine—was likewise true. See Draper, 358 U.S. at 313.” United States v. Schear, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 35031 (10th Cir. Nov. 17, 2026).*

Plaintiff had U.S. coins obtained from industrial waste shipped back to the Port of Long Beach, and they were seized at the border. This Bivens claim arises in a new context, and it’s barred. Lang Yu v. U.S. Mint, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 262754 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2026).*

Posted in § 1983 / Bivens, Cell site location information, Ineffective assistance, Informant hearsay, Unreasonable application / § 2254(d) | Comments Off on CA2: It wasn’t IAC to not raise CSLI when cert was granted in Carpenter during def’s trial

FL6: A writing not required to prove inventory policy

Officer testimony alone is enough to establish the department inventory procedure without putting into evidence. “While not controlling, it is both telling and persuasive that multiple federal circuits addressing this issue have found not only that officer testimony alone is sufficient to establish a policy but have further held that the law enforcement policy need not be in writing.” Broughton v. State, 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 9088 (Fla. 6th DCA Nov. 13, 2026).

The vehicle was validly searched under the automobile exception, so the validity of the search warrant for it doesn’t matter. State v. Hall, 2026-Ohio-4525 (3d Dist. Nov. 16, 2026).*

Defendant was seen in a high crime area with a bulge in his pants and blading away from the officers. On the totality, there wasn’t reasonable suspicion. United States v. Muldor, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 262452 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2026).*

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CA8: Civil Franks claim fails; falsity must be more than “metaphyscal”

Plaintiff’s § 1983 civil Franks claim fails; he doesn’t show reckless or intentional misstatement. It has to be more than “metaphysical.” Clark v. City of St. Louis, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 34885 (8th Cir. Nov. 16, 2026):

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D.Conn.: 4A issue resolved in prior state case bars relitigation here

In a § 1983 case against seizure of animals, the Fourth Amendment and Franks claim was resolved in a prior state court case and can’t be relitigated here. Donovan v. Hutchins, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261937 (D. Conn. Nov. 16, 2026).

The officer’s certified speedometer when pacing defendant showed he was speeding. That’s justification for the stop, even if incorrect under Heien. State v. Laney, 2026-Ohio-4541 (11th Dist. Nov. 13, 2026).*

In a long and [unnecessarily] detailed opinion, there was probable cause and nexus for this search warrant of defendant’s place. United States v. Branch, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 260263 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 13, 2026).*

The stop was for speeding and it turned into reasonable suspicion of DUI which justified its extension. State v. Saunsoci, 322 Neb. 809 (Nov. 13, 2026).*

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W.D.Pa.: Payton justified the entry to arrest, then defendant consented in writing

Defendant’s arrest warrant justified the entry into his house under Payton, and then defendant consented to a search where the form was in Spanish and advised him of his rights. United States v. Lopez, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 260397 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2026).

A felony arrest in public without a warrant with probable cause is reasonable. United States v. Lucas, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261748 (D. Minn. Nov. 16, 2026).*

Plaintiff’s complaint attached a state court record that completely belies her Fourth Amendment claim. The case was properly dismissed. Luther v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 34904 (10th Cir. Nov. 16, 2026).*

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CA5: In chaos of SWAT gunfight, the shooting of an unarmed person was not objectively unreasonable

“The facts of this case are tragic. But tragic facts alone do not establish liability under the Constitution. Because Gallegos did not violate Tuttle’s or Nicholas’s constitutional rights, he is entitled to qualified immunity.” There was a gunfight in a house on execution of a search warrant, and multiple people, including officers, had been shot. In the chaos, an unarmed person got shot, but it can’t be determined to be objectively unreasonable. The whole event lasted 80 seconds. The officer gets qualified immunity. Tuttle v. Gallegos, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 34926 (5th Cir. Nov. 16, 2026).*

Defendant was arrested on a criminal complaint after HSI discovered he was flying from Miami to Medellin, Colombia. The search warrant for his phone sought after his arrest was based on probable cause and didn’t require special notice to him. United States v. Subil, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261033 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2026).*

Officers had probable cause for defendant’s vehicle search. It was based on a report from a complaining witness. United States v. Cook, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261233 (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2026).*

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FL6: Testimony alone can establish inventory procedure; written policy not required

Officer testimony alone is enough to establish the department inventory procedure without putting into evidence. “While not controlling, it is both telling and persuasive that multiple federal circuits addressing this issue have found not only that officer testimony alone is sufficient to establish a policy but have further held that the law enforcement policy need not be in writing.” Broughton v. State, 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 9088 (Fla. 6th DCA Nov. 13, 2026).

In a long and detailed opinion, there was probable cause and nexus for this search warrant of defendant’s place. United States v. Branch, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 260263 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 13, 2026).*

Defendant’s arrest warrant justified the entry into his house under Payton, and then defendant consented to a search where the form was in Spanish and advised him of his rights. United States v. Lopez, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 260397 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2026).

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CA6: Requirement of in person reporting of sex offenders doesn’t violate 4A

Requirement of in person reporting of sex offenders doesn’t violate the Fourth Amendment. Does v. Mich. State Police, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 34794 (6th Cir. Nov. 13, 2026).

Even if the warrant didn’t say to search devices, attachment B to the warrant described the devices “to be searched” and that meant that the warrant included their seizure and search. United States v. Ramnarine, 2026 U.S. Dist. Lexis 259998 (E.D. N.Y. Nov. 12, 2026).

“We agree with the district court that officers had probable cause to seize Colvin’s cell phone before obtaining the search warrant, that probable cause supported the search warrant, and that-even if the warrant were deficient-the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied.” United States v. Colvin, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 34672 (4th Cir. Nov. 12, 2026)* (per curiam with no facts).

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W.D.N.Y.: No due process right to adversarial hearing before issuance of a DNA warrant

Officers had a search warrant for defendant’s DNA. He had no due process right to contest it before issuance. United States v. Ibrahim, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 260838 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2026).

“Indeed, Officer Selleny’s unrebutted testimony, which the trial court found credible, is bolstered by the explanation El himself provided for his presence. Assuming El was being truthful with the officers, this precise location – immediately adjacent to a fenced-off, decommissioned public building – was so prone to mischief that R-CAP was contracted to provide late-night armed security there. It would be illogical to conclude that patrol officers lacked reasonable suspicion to investigate when they observed, at nearly midnight, an unmarked vehicle of a type typically stolen parked in exactly that spot.” State v. El, 2026-Ohio-4489 (8th Dist. Nov. 12, 2026).*

Defendant consented to officers entering his hotel room to look for people, and that supported their plain view of drugs. United States v. Kimble, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 259528 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2026).*

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E.D.Wis.: Lifetime GPS monitoring of some sex offenders traveling out of state doesn’t violate 4A

Lifetime GPS monitoring of convicted sex offenders after parole or supervision and traveling out of state required by state law doesn’t violate the Fourth Amendment, relying on Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2016), and Braam v. Carr, 37 F.4th 1269 (7th Cir. 2022). Vyskocil v. Knutson, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 259488 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 12, 2026).* And then, the next day: Antrim v. Hoy, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 34818 (7th Cir. Nov. 13, 2026)* (we’ve held this three times now).

This pro se plaintiff stated enough to survive a 12(b)(6) motion that there was no exigency for police entry into his home under a suspected child abuse investigation. McDaniel v. Ivener, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 259735 (D. Kan. Nov. 10, 2026).*

2255 petitioner claimed defense counsel was ineffective for not challenging the cell phone search. But he did, and lost, and losing doesn’t mean he was ineffective. Sinisterra v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 260194 (D. Conn. Nov. 13, 2026).*

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CA9: With a SW for a murder weapon, a frisk of the occupants is reasonable

There was reasonable suspicion for a frisk. “Here, Officer Viola knew that (1) she was executing a warrant to search Washington and his apartment, in which Rollins was an overnight guest, for weapons in relation to an attempted murder investigation; (2) Rollins was on probation or supervised release; and (3) Rollins was seated on a couch between two people, one of whom was not restrained, covered by a blanket, and had been permitted to move around the living room. Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Viola reasonably believed Rollins was armed and presently dangerous, justifying a frisk.” United States v. Rollins, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 34792 (9th Cir. Nov. 13, 2026).*

The warrant was for evidence of transmitting obscene pictures (apparently revenge porn), and CSAM was discovered, resulting in another warrant for that. The first warrant wasn’t a general warrant because the files could have been in various places in multiple devices. “The omissions would not have negated probable cause if Trooper Murphy included them in the warrant application and affidavit. Investigators independently verified the information Doe provided when they interviewed her then-current paramour and her friends. … Having confirmed the veracity of that information, Trooper Murphy had no reason to detail Doe’s initial lie about the love triangle.” United States v. Anderson, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 34683 (3d Cir. Nov. 10, 2026).*

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W.D.Mich.: Drug dealers commonly keep proceeds and drugs at home, and that’s nexus

It is settled in this circuit [and everywhere] that the proceeds of a controlled buy likely are at the dealer’s home. United States v. Lopez, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 260022 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2026)*:

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OH8: For Rodriguez purposes, checking out-of-state DLs just takes longer

Checking out-of-state DLs takes longer, so the officer didn’t intentionally delay the stop for the drug dog to arrive. State v. Haught, 2026-Ohio-4479 (8th Dist. Nov. 12, 2026).

Defendant argues the search was void under the community caretaking exception. Instead, the automobile exception applies, and it’s valid. United States v. Williams, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 257715 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 10, 2026).*

The evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that the stop wasn’t unreasonably extended. The drug dog arrived within 18 minutes of the actual stop. State v. Coots, 2026 Mo. LEXIS 329 (Nov. 10, 2026).*

Defendant’s speeding stop was justified by at least reasonable suspicion. United States v. Red, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 258477 (D. Neb. Oct. 28, 2026).*

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W.D.La.: Israel’s capture of Palestinian cell phone calls was foreign search in case here

Israel officials captured Palestinian cell phone traffic that partly resulted in this indictment. That was sufficiently a foreign search. United States v. Al-Muhtadi, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 258887 (W.D. La. Nov. 10, 2026).

The complained of omissions from the affidavit for search warrant weren’t material to the probable cause finding. If the information had been included, the warrant still wouldn’t have been overbroad. United States v. Subil, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 258589 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 10, 2026).*

Probable cause was shown on the totality of information in the affidavit for warrant despite defendant’s claim some allegations were too general or had possible innocent explanations. United States v. McGauley, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 258291 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 30, 2026),* adopted, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 256740 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2026).*

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IN: Officer’s interpretation of traffic law wasn’t reasonable so stop was void

The officer’s interpretation of the traffic law justifying his stop was just wrong, and it was not objectively reasonable under Heien. Therefore, the stop was void. Lanier v. State, 2026 Ind. LEXIS 719 (Nov. 10, 2026).

Plaintiff’s complaint that the Dept. of Taxation engaged in illegally using cameras and listening devices in 2015 was barred by limitations and for failure otherwise state a claim. Jabr v. Dep’t of Taxation, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 256918 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2026).*

Imposing an increased DWI penalty for a prior BAC refusal that violated the Fourth Amendment was barred. State v. Rossow, 2026 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1221 (Nov. 10, 2026).*

Nervousness, heaving chest breaths, failure to promptly stop in a high crime area, t-shirt pulled up too high was reasonable suspicion. Commonwealth v. Williams, 2026 PA Super 254 (Nov. 10, 2026).*

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Gizmodo: How You Could End Up in a Government Surveillance Database and Never Know It

Gizmodo: How You Could End Up in a Government Surveillance Database and Never Know It by Bruce Gill (“From money transfers to license plate readers and cellphone location data, ordinary activities can quietly feed government and law enforcement surveillance dragnets.”)

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Reason: Miami Sheriff Hired a Private Law Firm To Pursue—and Profit From—Asset Forfeiture Cases

Reason: Miami Sheriff Hired a Private Law Firm To Pursue—and Profit From—Asset Forfeiture Cases by C.J. Ciaramella (“A court appeal challenging the Miami-Dade County sheriff’s unusual practice of using a private law firm to pursue property seizures on its behalf—and guaranteeing the firm a cut of the proceeds—could change the law surrounding police seizures in Florida and is drawing national attention from think tanks and criminal defense groups. The appeal, brought by a group of Miami-area mobile phone distributors and retailers who had tens of millions of dollars seized by the Miami-Dade County Sheriff’s Office (MDSO) last year, is the first time Florida state courts have considered whether police departments can pay private law firms on a contingency basis to represent them in civil asset forfeiture cases.”)

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