CA10: Disagreement over spelling of street name didn’t make warrant fail particularity; GFE at least would apply

“The warrant authorized a search of 10 McGinnis Street, Eufaula, OK 74432. The correct address, Mr. Davis said, was 10 Meginnis Street, Eufaula, OK 74432. And beyond the address, the warrant contained no description of the house.” The suppression hearing was over whether the warrant failed particularity. No party put in evidence a street sign. Google maps didn’t recognize McGinnis. The District Court had no definitive answer, and the good faith exception applied. The officers didn’t search the wrong place. United States v. Davis, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 10859 (10th Cir. Apr. 16, 2026).

Disclosure of the CI has nothing to do with the proof at trial, and the warrant was issued with probable cause. This isn’t a ground for 2255 relief. McKinney v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34995 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 20, 2026).*

The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the government from obtaining the user of IP addresses. United States v. Grace, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82715 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2026).*

The defendant was wanted for murder, and the warrantless protective sweep of his place before a search warrant was obtained was reasonable because officers still had reason to believe other dangerous persons could be there. United States v. Flores, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 10890 (6th Cir. Apr. 15, 2026).*

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VA: Statutory requirement to provide SW papers only applies to “places of abode”

Defendant sold drugs in a store in a controlled buy. The statute on providing a warrant and affidavit to the occupant only applies to places of abode. Blow v. Commonwealth, 2026 Va. LEXIS 29 (Apr. 16, 2026).

A narcotics officer who pistol whipped a handcuffed non-resisting suspect was convicted of excessive force on the suspect, and then lying about it. Affirmed. United States v. Cartagena, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 10703 (1st Cir. Apr. 15, 2026).*

The USDJ can’t simply override the credibility determinations of the USMJ conducting the suppression hearing. Here it was on whether one officer smelled marijuana when one did not. United States v. Calhoun, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82173 (N.D.W. Va. Apr. 15, 2026).*

Defendant’s quick and apparently repeated round trips to California supported reasonable suspicion. United States v. Oakes, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82999 (D. Kan. Apr. 15, 2026).*

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D.Idaho: Not unreasonable for PO to hand over def’s cell phone to LEO for extraction after RS developed from Snapchat app

Defendant missed a PO visit, and they went to his house. There, they got his cell phone and looked at his Snapchat app finding messages between him and a 14 year old. It was not unreasonable for them to hand the phone over to police to conduct a warrantless Cellebrite extraction of the phone. United States v. Lewis, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82689 (D. Idaho Apr. 13, 2026).

Defendant’s 5½ year old conviction is affirmed. The citizen informant was believable. People v. Flores, 2026 NY Slip Op 02215 (1st Dept. Apr. 14, 2026).*

The community caretaking function supported entering defendant’s car. He was slumped over his steering wheel in the parking lot of a closed convenience store that police were called about. Morrow v. State, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 3461 (Tex. App. – San Antonio Apr. 15, 2026).*

Body cavity searches in prison violate no Fourth Amendment rights unless they are punitive or excessive. Walker v. Arnold, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 10701 (9th Cir. Apr. 15, 2026).*

Posted in Body searches, Cell phones, Community caretaking function, Informant hearsay, Prison and jail searches, Probation / Parole search | Comments Off on D.Idaho: Not unreasonable for PO to hand over def’s cell phone to LEO for extraction after RS developed from Snapchat app

AtL: Sotomayor Apologizes For Possibly Hurting Kavanaugh’s Feelings Over The Racial Profiling He Invented

Above the Law: Sotomayor Apologizes For Possibly Hurting Kavanaugh’s Feelings Over The Racial Profiling He Invented by Joe Patrice

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MN: Geofence warrant was not particular

The Minnesota Constitution doesn’t categorically prohibit geofence warrants, but here the warrant was not particular as to all those swept up. Reversed and remanded to the court of appeals (rev’g State v. Contreras-Sanchez, 5 N.W.3d 151 (Minn. App. 2024)). State v. Contreras-Sanchez, 2026 Minn. LEXIS 172 (Apr. 15, 2026):

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IA: Bodycam and dashcam videos undermined claim of plain view

The bodycam and dashcam videos show that the officer could not have made the plain view he claims he did of a portion of a gallon-sized Ziplock bag in defendant’s waistband. A clear video can even undermine trial court credibility determinations that are otherwise unassailable. State v. Hoskins, 2026 Iowa App. LEXIS 369 (Apr. 15, 2026) (2-1):

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MA: Waiting 24 hours after the alleged traffic violation to make a stop was unreasonable

Waiting 24 hours after the alleged traffic violation to make a stop was unreasonable under the state constitution. Commonwealth v. Arias, 2026 Mass. LEXIS 161 (Apr. 15, 2026):

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CA10: SW for gun three weeks after road rage incident wasn’t stale

Search warrant for a gun in defendant’s house allegedly involved in a road rage incident three weeks earlier was not stale. United States v. Becker, 168 F.4th 1337 (10th Cir. Mar. 9, 2026).

Defendant’s December 2019 conviction is affirmed. Reviewing the sealed search warrant materials, there was probable cause for the search. People v. Kinsey, 2026 NY Slip Op 02218 (1st Dept. Apr. 14, 2026).* (6½ years to get an appeal decided?)

It is not ineffective assistance of counsel to withdraw a motion to suppress in favor of a plea agreement. Lanier v. Warden, Noble Corr. Inst., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81400 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2026).*

Defendant’s detention arguments about the absence of evidence of controlled buys is for a suppression motion, not for detention. United States v. Hardison, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81423 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 14, 2026).*

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OH10: Parole search of cell phone can occur even when it’s taken from the property room at jail

Defendant was in jail, and his PO went to the jail and got his phone from the property room to search it. This was a reasonable search under his parole search condition. State ex rel. Woodard v. Hoying, 2026-Ohio-1351 (10th Dist. Apr. 13, 2026).

The alleged private search of defendant’s phone by his wife was by joint authority, so no Fourth Amendment search claim. Ortego v. State, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 3421 (Tex. App. – Houston (1st Dist.) Apr. 14, 2026).*

The odor of marijuana coming off the juvenile’s person was the valid reason for his stop. In re State in the Interst of T.Q., 2026 La. App. LEXIS 666 (La. App. 1 Cir Apr. 13, 2026).*

Officers approached a group smoking pot outside a housing project, and they dispersed. Walking away can be suggestive of supporting reasonable suspicion. Defendant was grabbed and his backpack was frisked for a weapon, too. Washington v. Commonwealth, 2026 Va. App. LEXIS 213 (Apr. 14, 2026).*

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TX14: No REP in location information on bondsman’s GPS monitor

In the third opinion in this case, all with the same outcome, a defendant on GPS monitoring by his bondsman as a condition of release had no reasonable expectation of privacy that the information would never be given to law enforcement. Hawkins v. State, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 3412 (Tex. App. – Houston (14th Dist.) Apr. 14, 2026) [prior opinion, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 1874 (Tex. App. – Houston (14th Dist.) Feb. 26, 2026), withdrawn]:

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W.D.N.Y.: No IAC for not challenging search without standing

“In view of Dunnigan’s self-professed lack of any interest in or connection to the premises searched, Dunnigan’s attorney cannot be faulted for failing to challenge a search for which his client lacked standing to challenge.” United States v. Dunnigan, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80506 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2026).

Officers executing a search warrant could seize property they believed to be stolen that they saw in plaintiff’s place by plain view. Alexander v. Arceneaux, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 10524 (5th Cir. Apr. 13, 2026).*

Fleeing police and then bailing from the car and running abandons what was in the car. United States v. Pierre, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79746 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 13, 2026).*

The seizure of plaintiff’s car for unpaid tickets was reasonable. Clark v. Phila. Parking Auth., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79701 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2026).*

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CAAF: Victim’s 4A rights were at issue, too

The military court had to also consider the Fourth Amendment rights of the victim to sensitive information the accused sought access to for trial. All things considered, even if the court martial judge was wrong denying it, it was harmless error on this record. United States v. Braum, 2026 CAAF LEXIS 343 (C.A.A.F. Apr. 8, 2026).

The affidavit for warrant for a marijuana grow operation including a cell phone was issued with probable cause. It was reasonable to conclude that information about the grow operation would be on his cell phone. United States v. Koistinen, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78897 (D. Ariz. Apr. 8, 2026).*

“It is certainly true that Deputy Parker was in no rush to complete the warning citation, and the approximately seventeen minutes he took to do so here trends toward the outer limit of reasonableness in these circumstances. But for all the reasons previously discussed, the Court finds that the stop was not unlawfully prolonged. The motion to suppress is denied as to this ground.” United States v. Acosta, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78366 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2026).*

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D.D.C.: It took the govt years to search def’s computers, and the court has to balance that huge delay with the truth-seeking function in resolving it

In a fraud case, the government took years to search the computers. A second warrant was obtained for some. The government doesn’t get to undo the delay by a new warrant, but the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule applies. The court has to balance the deterrence interest with the truth-seeking function. United States v. Maresca, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76586 (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 2026).

Defendant was frisked at the time of his stop, but the government won’t be using that, so it’s moot. United States v. Mayorga-Ibarra, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79393 (D. Colo. Apr. 9, 2026).*

Defendant’s car was lawfully being towed, so it could be inventoried. United States v. Clayton, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 10414 (6th Cir. Apr. 10, 2026).*

Apple’s find app said stolen Airpods were in a house when they were actually outside. Stating what the find app said was not a Franks violation. Briscoe v. St. Louis Cty., 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 10405 (8th Cir. Apr. 10, 2026).*

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OH3: Cell phone search can extend to cloud storage it’s connected to

Defendant gave consent to search his cell phone, and the court notes, without deciding, that other courts have held that such consent would reach his data stored on the cloud or another server. That issue doesn’t, however, have to be decided because there was a warrant, too, and it was particular and used in good faith. State v. Houser, 2026-Ohio-1339 (3d Dist. Apr. 13, 2026).

Dog sniff during traffic stop was reasonable where it didn’t delay the stop. State v. Unser, 2026-Ohio-1267 (1st Dist. Apr. 8, 2026).*

Dog sniff at a hotel room door from a common hallway violated no reasonable expectation of privacy. United States v. Nemeth, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 10469 (10th Cir. Apr. 13, 2026).*

Plaintiff gets his PV hearing stayed pending a suppression motion he wants to file in his new criminal case but can’t yet. Matter of Sandlers v. Martuscello, 2026 NY Slip Op 26047 (Rensselaer Co. Apr. 6, 2026).*

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CA4: PIT maneuver with unmarked car for detectives making a stop could be excessive force

Using an unmarked police car to stop plaintiff with a PIT maneuver requested by detectives without warning here raised sufficient factual disputes that the officers do not get summary judgment nor qualified immunity on an excessive force claim in his stop. Payne v. Moser, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 10488 (4th Cir. Apr. 13, 2026).

Defendant’s cell phone was sufficiently connected to his alleged offense for nexus, and probable cause was shown. United States v. Manuchekhri, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76624 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2026).*

“‘Generally, a dog sniff does not require separate reasonable suspicion because it is not a search under the Fourth Amendment.’ Stepp, 680 F.3d at 663 (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842 (2005)). Even still, the Deputies had reasonable suspicion to pursue their narcotics investigation.” His actions were indicative of drug activity. United States v. Cunningham, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77609 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 9, 2026).*

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CA4: Ptf student’s cell phone properly searched at school under T.L.O.

Plaintiff student’s cell phone was properly searched at school under T.L.O. when he was heard bragging about having explicit photographs on it at school. O.W. v. Carr, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 10241 (4th Cir. Apr. 9, 2026).

Plaintiff made a disturbance call to the police, but, before the entry to his house, he confirmed there was no burglary. He states a claim for the entry being unjustified. Campbell v. Broome Cty., 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 10211 (2d Cir. Apr. 9, 2026).*

The question to defendant, “You don’t got nothing on you, sir?” was based on reasonable suspicion that what was in his pants was the slide to a firearm. Then he fled. Williams v. United States, 2026 D.C. App. LEXIS 111 (Apr. 9, 2026).*

Defendant was adamant that defense counsel file a motion to suppress that defense counsel said would lose. It was filed anyway, but never heard. This wasn’t ineffective assistance of counsel because it wouldn’t have won. Taylor v. State, 2026 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 186 (Apr. 9, 2026).*

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D.Me.: Entering passcode into cell phone to see if it works is not a search

Defendant’s cell phone was seized and a warrant obtained to search it, but it was protected by a passcode and the phone was not searched. So, a couple of months later, they tried again with a new warrant. The information on the locked-up phone and the probable cause didn’t go stale. Also, using a passcode to merely see if it works to open a phone doesn’t amount to a search. United States v. Ball, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77141 (D. Me. Apr. 7, 2026).

There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in opening nonlegal prisoner mail. Payne v. Nicely, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75497 (W.D. Va. Apr. 6, 2026).*

Five controlled buys meant the CI’s criminal history was less important than defendant thinks. United States v. Carter, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75170 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 7, 2026).*

Former defense counsel got the DNA warrant materials, but it disappeared somehow. The AUSA said they’d deliver it promptly to new counsel but didn’t. This will not be suppressed. It’s not Brady material. United States v. Early, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77112 (D. Minn. Apr. 9, 2026).*

Posted in Cell phones, DNA, Informant hearsay, Mail and packages, Prison and jail searches, Search | Comments Off on D.Me.: Entering passcode into cell phone to see if it works is not a search

CA10: Use of flashlight to aid a drone is still plain view

Officers were waiting for a search warrant to enter premises to look for a person. With consent of a neighbor, an officer climbed higher to use a flashlight to aid an overhead drone at night, seeing a gun on the roof. That view was permissible. United States v. Coronado, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 10074 (10th Cir. Apr. 8, 2026) (§ 13.14 n.2).

“Defendant is not entitled to a Franks hearing because he has not made the threshold substantial preliminary showing for two reasons. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. First, he did not make an offer of proof establishing that SA Pacini misstated or omitted information from the Affidavit knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. See id. …. Rather, Defendant asserts that the FBI contradicted itself by stating that they did not conduct trash pulls or establish surveillance because he lived in a multi-unit apartment building or they did not know where he lived, but later stated that they used geolocation information to gather information about where he lived. As the Government noted, these statements are not inconsistent because SA Pacini explained that the FBI used geolocation data to identify residences “utilized by” Defendant and others. … Second, even if the alleged contradictory information is excised, the Affidavit still contains ample content to support a finding of probable cause as discussed herein.” United States v. Yarbough, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76063 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2026).*

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D.P.R.: Def can lack standing in the place yet still be in possession to be convicted

“Furthermore, there is nothing impermissible with the Government arguing that a defendant does not have an expectation of privacy in a place to assert a Fourth Amendment violation, while arguing that the defendant possessed the evidence seized in that same place to prove guilt at trial. United States v. Gómez, 770 F.2d 251, 253-54 (1st Cir. 1985) (“the fourth amendment protects legitimate privacy expectations. Therefore, it is possible for prosecutors to assert that a defendant had a possessory interest in goods seized yet had not had any privacy expectation invaded.”) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in the original). [¶] Further, even if the Court were to find that Defendant has standing to challenge the evidence seized from Apartment 19, his arguments that the evidence seized should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree would also have to be rejected.” United States v. Cruz-Sierra, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75853 (D.P.R. Apr. 6, 2026).

No standing. “None of these factors favor Jackson. He points to no evidence that he asserted ownership over items in the vehicle and did not testify about his legitimate expectation of privacy. Moreover, no evidence indicates that he had permission from either the lawful owner or someone with authority to permit him to drive the vehicle. At best, Jackson points to his statement to officers that he was considering buying the car from a friend’s daughter’s girlfriend. Yet there is no record evidence indicating that the friend’s daughter’s girlfriend, whomever she may be, is either the registered owner or someone with authority to give Jackson permission to drive the vehicle.” United States v. Jackson, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 9898 (10th Cir. Apr. 7, 2026).*

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VA: No REP in ALPR

Flock ALPR systems can’t be compared to Carpenter’s “near perfect surveillance.” Motion to suppress properly denied. There’s no reasonable expectation of privacy of public movement on the roads. Robinson v. Commonwealth, 2026 Va. App. LEXIS 199 (Apr. 7, 2026).

In Ohio, at least, a drug dog can sniff any car during any traffic stop as long as it doesn’t prolong it at all. Here, defendant was stopped at a convenience store, and he refused commands to stay with the car and walked into the stop accusing the police of stopping him because he was black. He prolonged the stop. State v. Craft, 2026-Ohio-1205 (7th Dist. Apr. 2, 2026).*

Defendant consented to this search after being told he could refuse or revoke consent. It didn’t come right away, and it included negotiating over whether he could watch. [Long discussion of the facts showing voluntariness and his good treatment on bodycam.] United States v. Day, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74048 (D.S.D. Apr. 2, 2026).*

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