Defendant doesn’t challenge the stop or the frisk, just the seizure of the baggie of drugs that the officer felt in his “watch pocket.” The officer could tell what it was by its feel. Affirmed. United States v. Williams, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 9621 (3d Cir. Apr. 23, 2025).*
Defendant’s cell phone search in Malaysia isn’t shown to be a search by the U.S. Government, even though the phone was sent to NYC for prosecution. The delay in the return wasn’t unreasonable. United States v. Hiya, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76609 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2025).
The police were sufficiently involved in the private search of defendant’s motorcycle saddlebag at work that it qualifies as a state search. People v. Tomasello, 2025 NY Slip Op 50570(U), 2025 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2514 (Erie Co. Apr. 2, 2025).*
Plaintiff was at a Texas fitness center with her child when police in tactical gear showed up to execute a DNA warrant from Louisiana, taking her into custody and removing her to a police station instead of just taking the DNA sample. They get qualified immunity because plaintiff can’t point to a case in point. Bass v. Jackson, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76786 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2025).* (This isn’t going in the supplement because: (a) it’s qualified immunity [which needs to be done away with, and this is one reason why], and (b) it’s just wrong [one shouldn’t need a case exactly on point when it’s intuitively just bad]. She can’t even move to suppress in a criminal case because she hasn’t been charged.]
Federal habeas, here § 2241, can’t be used in place of a pretrial motion to suppress. Poulson v. Ulbricht, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76512 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2025), adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75519 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2025):
“Przychocki alleges that defendants Kearns, Grimm, and Schill violated her Fourth Amendment rights by surveilling her property from the street to identify code violations. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. A government action is a ‘search’ only if it intrudes upon an area where an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. … Surveillance from a public street, even for a lengthy period of time, is not a search because it is not reasonable to expect privacy in what is plainly visible to the public. Id. (camera surveillance of home from a public place did not violate Fourth Amendment). Przychocki affirmatively alleges that defendants inspected her property from a public street, so her Fourth Amendment claim fails as a matter of law.” Przychocki v. Kearns, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76246 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 21, 2025).*
The affidavit for warrant was based on probable cause, and, even if not, it was good enough for the good faith exception. United States v. Jennings, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 9544 (4th Cir. Apr. 22, 2025).*
“Defendant was seized when Officer Oyana placed his hand on Defendant’s arm and asked for Defendant’s identification.” United States v. Jackson, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75902 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2025).*
Defendant’s traffic stop was unreasonably extended without reasonable suspicion. “The Magistrate Judge could see ‘no objectively logical path of deduction that le[d] to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity’ at the Rodriguez moment. Id. at 2. In coming to this conclusion, the Magistrate Judge considered ‘the totality of the circumstances that existed both before the stop and during the initial eleven minutes of the stop-Sanchez’s nervousness and previous presence in high crime areas.’ Id. at 1-2 (citing United States v. Monsivais, 848 F.3d 353, 363 (5th Cir. 2017)). Because Officer Gonzalez did not have reasonable suspicion that a crime other than the traffic infraction had been, was being, or was about to be committed, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Officer Gonzalez could not prolong the traffic stop to wait for the K-9 unit to arrive and perform the free-air sniff. Id. at 2. The Magistrate Judge therefore found that the seizure violated Sanchez’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, and recommended that the evidence obtained therefrom, including the handgun found after the K-9 alerted to the presence of drugs in the car, be suppressed. Id.” Adopted. Essentially, the government sought a divide-and-conquer approach to reasonable suspicion on the totality. It just wasn’t there. United States v. Sanchez, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75942 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2025).*
Posted inReasonable suspicion|Comments Off on E.D.Tex.: Gov’t divide-and-conquer RS effort rejected
Downloading data from a planted GPS device violated no reasonable expectation of privacy. McNeely v. Loeschner, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 9537 (9th Cir. Apr. 22, 2025). The facts of the planted device are below: McNeely v. City of Sparks, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85647 (D. Nev. May 13, 2024).*
There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in information in a police database, so one’s name can be run. Brown v. Thornell, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75494 (D. Ariz. Mar. 11, 2025).*
This court previously held in 2001 that the exclusionary rule doesn’t apply to sentencing. Here it doesn’t apply to Miranda violations at sentencing either. United States v. Fowler, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 9514 (10th Cir. Apr. 22, 2025).*
There was enough of a factual dispute for a jury to find that the force was excessive. Summary judgment properly denied. Est. of Harmon v. Salt Lake City, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 9512 (10th Cir. Apr. 22, 2025).* Same for shooting of a pet dog. Love v. Grashorn, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 9515 (10th Cir. Apr. 22, 2025).*
A confusing case presented from both sides, a cautionary tale: “this appeal is a mess.” Cave v. Valenti, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 9405 (7th Cir. Apr. 21, 2025):
Wired: How to Protect Yourself From Phone Searches at the US Border by Lily Hay Newman & Matt Burgess (“Customs and Border Protection has broad authority to search travelers’ devices when they cross into the United States. Here’s what you can do to protect your digital life while at the US border.”)
Posted inBorder search, Cell phones|Comments Off on Wired: How to Protect Yourself From Phone Searches at the US Border
Defendant was indicted for possession of drugs in a storage unit, but drugs and cash were also found in his house. That can come in under 404(b). United States v. Harris, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75696 (W.D. La. Apr. 21, 2025).
This case involves alleged Fourth Amendment violations as a result of one obtaining a California falconry license. It is on remand from Stavrianoudakis v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 108 F.4th 1128 (9th Cir. 2024). The state is in the process of amending the regulations, so a stay is granted. Stavrianoudakis v. United States Dep’t of Fish, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75639 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2025).*
Even if the statement in the affidavit for warrant was false, it wasn’t material. United States v. Lee, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75564 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2025).*
2254 petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim was presented to the state courts and can’t be relitigated here. Brown v. Thornell, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75494 (D. Ariz. Mar. 11, 2025).*
Squatters have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the property they’ve appropriated. Lewis v. Blakeslee, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75568 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2025).
In a written order denying an arrest warrant of a male victim of an alleged sexual assault by a female, the judge’s comments were offensive and he’s removed. In re Hanson, 2025 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 47 (Apr. 18, 2025),* also noted in Legal Profession Blog’s Magistrate Removed From Office.
“What Larry Anthany experienced amid the chaos the Springfield police encountered upon arriving at the Greer’s home was far from an obvious violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure. At the very least-and even though he bears the burden of showing Officers Johnson and Valenti are not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity-Larry Anthany has not pointed us to a case that clearly establishes his right to be free from forcible, temporary detainment when he confronted police officers responding to a volatile situation with a baseball bat and then told the officers that he wanted to be released so he could go fight his sister’s boyfriend. We know of no case clearly informing the officers that their actions violated the Fourth Amendment. [¶] Quite the opposite. Our case law provides that officers may detain a person to ensure officer safety or the safety of others, so long as the infringement on the person’s liberty is proportionate to the safety concern.” Cave v. Valenti, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 9405 (7th Cir. Apr. 21, 2025).*
Defendant’s backyard is curtilage, and the entry suppressed. United States v. Ringleb, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75030 (D.N.M. Apr. 18, 2025).
The Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA) Police Department conducted an entry under the basic lease agreement that permitted “‘a duly authorized CMHA agent, employee, or representative’ to enter his apartment to perform maintenance and conduct inspections. Absent emergencies, the lease required CMHA to provide St. John with 48-hour notice before entering his unit.” The officers get qualified immunity for their entry under the lease agreement. St. John v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 9351 (6th Cir. Apr. 18, 2025).*
Defendant’s traffic stop for not signaling coming out of an alley was objectively reasonable. Reasonable suspicion developed to extend the stop. United States v. O’Brien, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74972 (D. Idaho Apr. 18, 2025).*
Petitioner brings seven claims in a successor petition, including a Fourth Amendment claim. None of them satisfy the successor rule. In re Boswell, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 9278 (5th Cir. Apr. 18, 2025).*
Posted inUncategorized|Comments Off on D.N.M.: Backyard is curtilage
In an excessive force civil rights prosecution, evidence of training on use of force was relevant and, here, admitted for a limited purpose. “So Martin’s testimony was relevant to willfulness, and the Court’s instructions—instructions Defendant and the Government jointly proposed—made clear that training standards do not inform the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard.” United States v. Williams, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73996 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2025).
In an excessive force case, the Fifth Circuit finds a near unpublished case not part of the “robust consensus of persuasive authority” and reverses the qualified immunity determination. Still, it leaves open revival of the claims after discovery. Nevarez v. Dorris, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 9267 (5th Cir. Apr. 18, 2025).*
Plaintiff prisoner’s claim about the alleged excessive use of restraints during his transport was an Eighth Amendment claim, not a Fourth. Lucas v. Quiros, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74089 (D. Conn. Apr. 18, 2025).*
Posted inAdmissibility of evidence, Excessive force|Comments Off on M.D.Fla.: In civil rights prosecution, 4A training information admitted for willfulness, not to prove a constitutional violation
While the question is close here, the protective sweep of defendant’s house during a search warrant was reasonable on the totality. Essentially, the search warrant doesn’t define the scope of a justified protective sweep. “[T]he Fourth Amendment permits law enforcement officers to conduct a protective sweep of a residence incident to an arrest when they possess a reasonable belief, based on specific and articulable facts, that the area to be swept harbors an individual who may pose a danger. Pruneda, 518 F.3d at 603 (citing Buie, 494 U.S. at 334); Walsh, 299 F.3d at 733).” United States v. Conroy, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74909 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 18, 2025).
Defendant changed lawyers two weeks before the original trial date, and pretrial proceedings were extended. No motion to suppress was filed. On appeal, he challenges scope of search as revealed at trial. The search was for weapons and ammunition. Some of the places searched wouldn’t hide a gun, but could have held ammunition. On the merits of the search claim, he’d have lost if a motion to suppress had been made. United States v. Jacobs, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 9272 (7th Cir. Apr. 18, 2025).*
Defense counsel at trial couldn’t be ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress where inevitable discovery applies. State v. Lively, 2025 Del. Super. LEXIS 194 (Apr. 16, 2025).*
Defendant’s motion for new trial in her fraud case is denied. One claim is defense counsel’s failure to move to suppress a ring binder of information that came in at trial to help prove fraud. It was properly seized under the documents warrant because it was logically a place information could be found of where the defrauded money went. United States v. Fiore, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74801 (D. Nev. Apr. 18, 2025). The two opening paragraphs, and then to the Fourth Amendment claim:
Fifteen months to review a cell phone search “was accomplished in a reasonable amount of time. Although a review period of fifteen months is ‘certainly not brief,’ it was not unreasonably long considering ‘the challenges of searching ESI from electronic devices’ and the Government’s multiple attempts to extract the data in a reviewable format. United States v. Daskal, 676 F. Supp. 3d 153, 178-79 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) (finding that a review period of 23 months was reasonable). Moreover, courts in this Circuit regularly find that similarly lengthy review periods are reasonable. …” United States v. Fofanah, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74575 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2025).
Smell of marijuana from defendant’s car was probable cause for an automobile exception search. United States v. Warfield, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73725 (W.D. La. Apr. 1, 2025),* adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72831 (W.D. La. Apr. 16, 2025).*
No Franks hearing: “This time, though, Hitchcock misreads the affidavit. It did not purport to state that [Officer] Jousma had seen the drugs. It stated only that Jousma ‘observed Hitchcock do what appeared to be a hand to hand drug transaction.’” Probable cause was shown. United States v. Hitchcock, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 9252 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 2025).*
Defendant objects to the search warrant materials being unsealed on the docket. He has not overcome the common law presumption of open access. The First Amendment right of public access is even broader. These papers are unsealed. United States v. Harding, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72082 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2025).
Plaintiff was a NY prison inmate subjected to a strip and/or body cavity search, but the defense motion for partial summary judgment only creates a fact dispute. Denied. Rosa v. Hoke, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73326 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2025).*
“Per Franks, the Government’s search warrant affidavit disclosed CC-1’s criminality from top to bottom. The affidavit disclosed that CC-1 possessed a firearm during a pre-buy search; that CC-1 later engaged Taylor in an unsanctioned drug transaction that led to a shootout in the Walmart parking lot’ and that CC-1 had his own extensive criminal history. Indeed, the affidavit stated that CC-1 provided statements to law enforcement ‘with the hope of receiving potential consideration on CC-1’s criminal charges.’ … All of this information was disclosed to the magistrate for purposes of assessing reliability and probable cause, thereby obviating any grounds for a Franks motion.” United States v. Taylor, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73403 (W.D. Va. Apr. 17, 2025).*
Because the affidavit for search warrant differs so much from the ultimate crime defendants were charged with, defendant at least gets a Franks hearing. There’s some suggestion of materiality, but that’s not decided yet. United States v. Peraire-Bueno, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73550 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2025).
“Review of Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim is barred under Stone because he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this claim before trial, and he does not show that ineffective assistance of counsel or a Brady violation affected his full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim.” Hahn v. United States, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73627 (D.N.M. Apr. 17, 2025).*
Without an affidavit of standing, the motion to suppress and for discovery of the warrant papers is denied. United States v. Green, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73675 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2025).*
“Here, even if we omit [Officer] Kulisek’s alleged false statements, ‘there remain[s] enough uncontested, reliable evidence to support probable cause as a matter of law.’ … Barnett’s own admissions and the remaining undisputed facts were sufficient for a reasonable person to believe that Barnett committed the crime of theft of lost or mislaid property.” Barnett v. City of Chi., 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 9184 (7th Cir. Apr. 16, 2025).*
The AG’s civil investigative demand to Planned Parenthood wasn’t unreasonable as a subpoena. “To comply with the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement, a CID, which is an administrative subpoena, must (1) comply with the statute authorizing it, (2) seek information that is relevant to the administrative inquiry, and (3) not be too indefinite or too broad. Charter Commc’ns, 461 S.W.3d at 859.” This meets those requirements. Private information is not sought. Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. State ex rel. Bailey, 2025 Mo. App. LEXIS 238 (Apr. 15, 2025).
“At least four sets of facts support the reasonableness of the suspicion that the two men found in the backyard were two participants in the robbery.” Therefore, the encounter was reasonable. Parker v. United States, 2025 D.C. App. LEXIS 76 (Apr. 17, 2025).*
The officer opened defendant’s car door to seize a glass pipe. It was not an unreasonable trespass under Jones and Class. United States v. Rogers, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73414 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 17, 2025).*
Plaintiff’s decedent was in a shopping mall lawfully carrying a gun. When a shooting occurred, he drew his weapon and advanced to provide assistance. An officer on patrol in the mall saw him with the gun moving toward a man who may have been shot, and the officer shot and killed him. The use of force under the circumstances was not unreasonable. The whole thing took five seconds. Pipkins v. City of Hoover, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 9162 (11th Cir. Apr. 17, 2025)*:
Plaintiff was ticketed by officers of the Kirkland PD, one for having a fictitious license plate, and he sued in federal court claiming Fourth Amendment and right to travel violations and the city had no jurisdiction over him. Younger bars the action. Harris v. City of Kirtland, Inc., 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 9141 (6th Cir. Apr. 16, 2025).
The alleged civil Franks violation was neither a misrepresentation nor material. Jackson v. Rosen, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72934 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2025).*
“A defendant who neither sends nor is the listed recipient of a parcel generally does not have a subjective expectation of privacy in its contents. … On the face of the parcels, someone other than McCurdy sent them and someone other than McCurdy was to receive them. Without more, the facts do not present a reasonable expectation of privacy in the parcels sufficient to bring the Fourth Amendment challenge McCurdy now asserts.” United States v. McCurdy, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73064 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 17, 2025).*
While Rhode Island had decriminalized small amounts of marijuana, the fact it’s still a federal crime permitted officers to prolong the stop. United States v. Pavao, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 9156 (1st Cir. Apr. 17, 2025).
2255 petitioner’s Franks claim is essentially a rehash of the same claim rejected on direct appeal, so no CoA. United States v. McKinney, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 9109 (10th Cir. Apr. 17, 2025).*
Plaintiff’s false arrest case was properly dismissed against the officer. The body cam video shows the probable cause. Logan v. Israel, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 9150 (11th Cir. Apr. 17, 2025).*
This 2254 Franks claim fails: “Even if the search warrant affidavit falsely stated that the downloads occurred through April 28, 2014, instead of February 5, 2014, the remaining evidence demonstrated a reasonable probability that Dickie possessed child pornography on his computer on July 8, 2014, when the detective applied for the warrant.” Dickie v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72892 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2025).*
Posted inFranks doctrine, Probable cause|Comments Off on CA1: Because it’s still a federal crime, state decrim of MJ didn’t defeat PC
by John Wesley Hall Criminal Defense Lawyer and Search and seizure law consultant Little Rock, Arkansas Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!” ---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
