CA7: Administrative inspection stop without RS was pretext for drug search

Defendant showed that the administrative stop and inspection of this semi-truck was pretextual, without reasonable suspicion for the stop, and not in furtherance of the administrative program for truck inspections. Under Burger, pretext can be an issue. United States v. Martinez, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 19808 (7th Cir. July 7, 2026):

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LA5: Nervousness and avoiding getting on airplane to LAX (a source city) was RS

DEA and State DTF officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant departing the NOLA airport for LAX (a source city) when he saw them as they looked all nervous and then walked away from boarding the airplane. State v. Wells, 2026 La. App. LEXIS 1347 (La. App. 5 Cir July 7, 2026).

Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not filing a Franks motion when defendantoffers nothing to show it would have succeeded. Gilmore v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147995 (M.D. Fla. July 6, 2026).*

Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress a digital search warrant that would not have succeeded. Smith v. State, 2026 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 427 (July 6, 2026).*

Plaintiff doesn’t show that the use of force here violated any clearly established law. Estate of Dismang v. Reed, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 19614 (10th Cir. July 6, 2026).*

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D.D.C.: A cell phone SW without PC in a felon in possession case is a general warrant because of its intrusiveness

Cell phone warrant for felon in possession case is quashed. No probable cause or nexus to the crime. Just because someone owns a cell phone doesn’t mean the government gets to search it. It is effectively a general warrant. United States v. Harris (In re Search of A Black Cellphone Currently Stored at the Metro. Police Department’s Evidence Control Branch in Wash. D.C. Under Rule 41), 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149838 (D.D.C. July 6, 2026):

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N.D.Ga.: 2020 election materials GJ subpoena quashed as burdensome

The grand jury subpoena for identifying details and contact information of every person who worked on the Fulton County 2020 general election is quashed. It’s apparent this is for an improper purpose, it’s way overbroad and intrusive (see F.R.Crim.P. 17 where subpoenas can be quashed if unreasonable and oppressive), and the five-year statute of limitations clearly has run, at the earliest, election certification day 2020. The government’s need for the information is low because it can’t extend the statute of limitations. The subpoena puts a high burden on the County, and it will deter people from every wanting to work elections in the future. Fulton County Board of Registration and Elections v. United States, 1:26-cv-02777-WMR (N.D. Ga. July 7, 2026):

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SCOTUSBlog: Justice Jackson reignites the interpretation wars, adding to textualism’s emerging cracks

SCOTUSBlog: Justice Jackson reignites the interpretation wars, adding to textualism’s emerging cracks by Abbe Gluck:

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The Guardian: AI surveillance is being supercharged – and it will chill social progress

The Guardian: AI surveillance is being supercharged – and it will chill social progress by Bruce Schneier and Jon Penney (“These systems will soon be able to track our public and private lives. But we can make the policy choices to reject it.”)

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CA7: Scrolling through def’s cell phone was a reasonable border search

Scrolling through defendant’s cell phone was a reasonable border search. United States v. Eta, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 19568 (7th Cir. July 6, 2026):

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E.D.Ark.: Bivens not extended to knock-and-announce violation and shooting; FTCA applies instead

Bivens won’t be extended to an alleged knock-and-announce violation and a police shooting of the homeowner. SCOTUS should just go ahead and abandon Bivens. It proceeds as an FTCA case. Malinowski v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148126 (E.D. Ark. July 6, 2026).

An Ohio municipal court judge issuing a warrant for cell phone records in New Jersey was not a fundamental error and was subject to the good faith exception. State v. Tisdale, 2026-Ohio-2567 (7th Dist. July 1, 2026).*

Probable cause and nexus were shown for defendant’s cell phone in a drug trafficking conspiracy based on messages and calls between co-conspirators. United States v. Harris, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146630 (E.D. Mo. June 1, 2026).*

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D.Mont.: This ping warrant was based on PC and was not governed by Chatrie

This cell phone ping warrant was based on a showing of probable cause. It was a one-time deal and didn’t involve the factors of Chatrie and geofence warrants. United States v. Kunz, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148872 (D. Mont. July 6, 2026).

Defendant’s stop was justified by a traffic offense, and he contradicted what officers had just observed, and then he attempted to flee. There was justification for extending the stop. Officers had his cell phones in hand when he fled. Their seizure was reasonable. United States v. Berry, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148778 (W.D. Mich. July 6, 2026).*

There was reasonable suspicion to continue the stop 24 minutes to wait for the drug dog which alerted. United States v. Carroll, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148675 (E.D. Tex. July 2, 2026).*

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KY: Unrelated questions during ongoing traffic stop didn’t extend it under Rodriguez

While the officer asked unrelated questions during the traffic stop, the mission of the stop was ongoing throughout. Therefore, the questions didn’t really extend the stop. Miller v. Commonwealth, 2026 Ky. App. LEXIS 64 (July 2, 2026).

The officer saw defendant following too close behind a truck, and that gave an objectively reasonable basis for this stop. [Four minutes into the stop, a drug dog was called, and not a word about reasonable suspicion for that.] United States v. Gilley, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111425 (W.D. Ark. May 20, 2026).*

Defendant lacked any standing in the property searched. Also, the locks had been changed by the time of the search, and he had no access then. United States v. Reger, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148699 (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2026).*

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TX1: Defendant had no REP in a package of drugs he never possessed and on another person

Defendant lacked standing to suppress 4,100 grams of ketamine seized from Brown because he never possessed the package, had no reasonable expectation of privacy in package of drugs carried by Brown, and the ketamine was recovered away from him during Brown’s separate arrest outside the Holiday Inn. But, law enforcement lacked probable cause to arrest him because he merely drove Brown to the Holiday Inn, parked, walked behind the hotel, returned with a water bottle, and appeared nervous when confronted by police – conduct consistent with innocent activity that did not establish criminal behavior. Akinrinlola v. State, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 4935 (Tex. App. – Houston (1st Dist.) May 28, 2026)

The statement in the affidavit for BAC warrant was accurate because it was what the officer was told, even if he had no personal knowledge that alcohol could be smelled on defendant in the ambulance. State v. Berretta, 2026 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 410 (June 30, 2026).*

Defendant lacked standing to challenge the search of the car he was a passenger in. Besides, in the bodycam video, he denies ever being in the car. United States v. Thompson, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147854 (D.D.C. July 3, 2026).*

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Stone v. Powell decided 50 years ago today

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), barring habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims was decided 50 years ago today.

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DC: Officers were a good ways away from def when he fled without any apparent reason

“We now hold that the officers had the requisite reasonable articulable suspicion to justify their seizure of D.W. when they grabbed his leg. We reach that conclusion largely because D.W. ran upon the mere sight of police officers approaching from a substantial distance, with little indication that they were intent on stopping, searching, or even questioning him in particular. D.W. had not been singled out in any way and, to that point, had little reason to think he could not simply go about his business.” D.W. v. United States, 2026 D.C. App. LEXIS 222 (July 2, 2026).

A storage company owner’s citizen call to police that defendant was a felon with a gun was reasonable suspicion for defendant’s detention. Then his words resulted in handcuffing. United States v. Westfield, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120520 (E.D. Okla. May 5, 2026),* adopted, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118669 (E.D. Okla. May 29, 2026).*

Defendant’s Franks challenge “misses the mark.” He challenges reference to a hand-to-hand transaction. The officer’s trial testimony referred to another time, not the one in the affidavit. United States v. Rosario, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 19242 (3d Cir. July 1, 2026).*

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Cell phone GPS: WaPo: This little blue dot on your phone is a revolutionary invention

WaPo: This little blue dot on your phone is a revolutionary invention by Katherine Dunn (“U.S. policy used to jam up GPS. Now, those signals beam into your pocket.”):

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D.S.D.: No RS on totality when drug dog called for

The USMJ found that the officers abandoned the mission of the traffic stop (for Rodriguez purposes) when they called for the drug dog. So, the question is then whether there was reasonable suspicion at that point, and the answer is no. R&R adopted granting motion to suppress. United States v. Ruegge, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147661 (D.S.D. June 29, 2026).* A helpful discussion on reasonable suspicion on the totality:

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Cal.4: State’s argument of exigency for DUI blood draw boiled down to “there’s always exigency”

“Ultimately, Mitchell’s references to ‘rival priorities,’ ‘more pressing needs,’ and ‘other pressing duties’ of police officers (588 U.S. at p. 856; see id. at pp. 840, 851), must be understood in the context of the opinion’s focus on an officer responding to the natural chaos that pervades the scene of automobile accident. And this focus helps explain the flaw in the magistrate’s reasoning when she suggested that a finding of exigency could be based on the fact that ‘[e]very minute that Officer Pope was there [at the hospital], he was not out on the freeways.’ Accepting that theory, the exigency exception would swallow the warrant rule because the time an officer spends obtaining a warrant could always be used for other police duties. Yet we must remember that obtaining warrants before conducting searches and seizures is a crucial part of a police officer’s duties, not a distraction from them, and Mitchell does not suggest otherwise. Rather, Mitchell only observes that traffic accidents, by their very nature, often create competing demands on an officer’s time, which will be especially relevant in establishing exigent circumstances.” People v. Castro, 2026 Cal. App. LEXIS 403 (4th Dist. July 1, 2026).

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SC: Police didn’t need a SW to access def’s bondsman’s GPS monitoring of him because he agreed to GPS monitoring for release

Defendant submitted to GPS monitoring by his bondsman as a condition of bail, and the police could call the bondsman for the GPS information to connect defendant to a new crime without a warrant. State v. Eberhart, 2026 S.C. App. LEXIS 41 (July 1, 2026).

Here, there were two apartments, an upper and lower. Defendant was the upper. He had no standing to a search of the lower. United States v. Robinson, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147747 (W.D.N.Y. May 20, 2026).*

Even if some details leading to the stop were incorrect or maybe even false, the main facts added up to reasonable suspicion. United States v. Mason, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145531 (N.D. Ohio July 1, 2026).*

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N.D.Ga.: Standing has to be shown for the time of the search, not at some time in the past

“Earl was required to show, not that he had an expectation of privacy in the home at some time, but that he had that expectation at the time of the search. United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120, 1148 (11th Cir. 1997) (‘we are not persuaded that [the defendant] carried his burden of showing a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment … at the time of the search’); United States v. Sweat, 2007 WL 9717235, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 9, 2007) (‘The Court must determine whether Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time of the search, not whether Defendant ever had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property.’). His evidence showed only that he previously had access to the residence—not that he maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy when agents executed the warrant months later.” United States v. Earl, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145439 (N.D. Ga. July 1, 2026).

“A judge found probable cause to issue a warrant to search defendant Julien Giraud Jr.’s … home at 30 Elm Place in Irvington, New Jersey based on a detective’s sworn oral testimony. That testimony included statements that the detective should have known were inaccurate and omitted critical information that the judge should have been provided. Because the detective’s testimony was recklessly inaccurate and formed the basis of the judge’s determination of probable cause, all evidence obtained from the search of the residence will be suppressed.” “‘[O]missions are made with reckless disregard for the truth when an officer recklessly omits facts that any reasonable person would know that a judge would want to know.’” United States v. Giraud, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146800 (D.N.J. July 2, 2026).*

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Fed.Cir.: VA’s determination here for mandatory in-home reassessment visits did not violate 4A under Wyman v. James

The VA’s determination here for mandatory in-home reassessment visits did not violate the Fourth Amendment under Wyman v. James. The statute gives the VA that discretion. Latham v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 17328 (Fed. Cir. June 16, 2026) (2 Search and Seizure § 43.33).

Defendant had no standing to challenge the search of a passenger’s fanny pack. United States v. Haslam, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146116 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2026).*

The officer had reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop as a felon in possession and handcuffs were reasonable for officer safety. United States v. Westfield, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120520 (E.D. Okla. May 5, 2026),* adopted 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118669 (E.D. Okla. May 29, 2026),* later proceeding 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145294 (E.D. Okla., June 25, 2026).*

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E.D.Mich.: Full forensic search of a def’s university computer violated particularity and became a general warrant

The motion to suppress the search of devices for lack of particularity is granted, but the cloud search is not. Defendant is accused of hacking into student accounts on the University of Michigan’s computer system. The IT policy says that the university has the ability to search computers that it owns, but that does not apply to the police. The computers searched were used only by him. See United States v. Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2002). Here, “[t]he lack of particularity in UMPD’s forensic search warrants renders them unconstitutional general warrants.” It was a full forensic search without limits. United States v. Weiss, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146101 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2026):

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