DE: Changing cell phones doesn’t defeat nexus

The state showed nexus and no staleness in warrant for defendant’s cell phone for pornography despite the fact he had a different phone at the time of the search. State v. Clark, 2024 Del. Super. LEXIS 619 (Aug. 29, 2024). [For example: Getting a new iPhone, at least, means everything saved to iCloud from the old phone is downloaded to the new phone if you don’t stop it.]

The search of defendant’s car was reasonable both under the automobile exception and as a search incident from seeing heroin in his lap during a lawful traffic stop. United States v. Quintana-Pena, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156938 (D.N.M. Aug. 30, 2024).*

Controlled buys involving defendant’s home gave probable cause for the warrant for it. United States v. Herron, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157101 (W.D. Tenn. July 9, 2024).

Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not challenging the GPS warrant against defendant [when he never says that he would have prevailed]. State v. Thompkins, 2024-Ohio-3386 (5th Dist. Aug. 29, 2024).*

Posted in Cell phones, Nexus | Comments Off on DE: Changing cell phones doesn’t defeat nexus

CA1: Seeing one’s naked body can violate 4A without it being a “search”

Plaintiff inmate gave birth at a hospital while serving a jail sentence. The jailers allegedly seeing her naked in the hospital delivery room violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law. “Thus, a search under the Fourth Amendment does not require Haskell or Dickey to have touched Brown, caused Brown to have exposed herself, or be present for the purpose of collecting evidence of a crime. A search occurs when a jail official inspects an incarcerated individual’s naked body, regardless of whether the official set out to do so. Wood, 354 F.3d at 63. If Haskell or Dickey inspected Brown’s naked body in the hospital room, such an observation would constitute a search triggering Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Cookish provides the standard for determining whether that search was unlawful.” Brown v. Dickey, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 22304 (1st Cir. Sep. 3, 2024).

A prison excessive force claim is an Eighth not Fourth Amendment claim, and Egbert counsels against expanding Bivens here. Also, there are BOP administrative remedies. Ajaj v. Fozzard, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 22213 (7th Cir. Aug. 30, 2024).*

There were disputes from the video and other evidence that the use of force here was unnecessary and unjustified. The right is clearly established. Summary judgment for defendant reversed. Spiller v. Harris County, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 22219 (5th Cir. Aug. 30, 2024).*

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CA6: Some reasonable property damage during an arrest is not subject to 5A takings clause

As long as the police were reasonable in their actions, some damages to an arrestee’s property is not subject to the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause. Slaybaugh v. Rutherford Cty., 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 22277 (6th Cir. Sep. 3, 2024):

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CA10: Failure to mention search condition for supervised release at sentencing cured by it being in judgment

At sentencing, defendant was told that the “standard conditions apply,” and being subjected to warrantless searches was not mentioned. It was, however, in the judgment, and that’s notice enough. United States v. Martin, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 22091 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 2024).*

In plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, he claims a Fourth Amendment violation but doesn’t articulate it. The defense motion does that there wasn’t one, and that one’s granted. Ramirez v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Sierra Cty., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155867 (D.N.M. Aug. 29, 2024).*

Defendant was pulled over for a traffic stop, and a drug dog was called for. Defendant jumped back in his car and took off, leading police on a high-speed chase for 10-15 minutes. What he tossed from the car was abandoned because fleeing is an independent crime. United States v. Fizer, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 22043 (6th Cir. Aug. 28, 2024).*

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KS: Def’s general motion to suppress didn’t preserve particularity for appeal

“Huggins argued one reason for suppression at trial and hopes the language of his objection was sufficiently vague to preserve a different basis for appeal. This defeats the statutory requirement for specificity, and it leaves trial courts guessing what the grounds for an objection may be. We are disinclined to retreat from our long-held position that a party must state to the trial court the basis for an objection. And Huggins does not contend that any exceptions to the contemporaneous objection rule apply to his situation. [¶] Because the issue of the particularity of the search warrant was not set out to the court at trial, we will not address it on appeal.” State v. Huggins, 2024 Kan. LEXIS 80 (Aug. 30, 2024).

Defense counsel’s failure to object to the USMJ’s R&R on the Fourth Amendment claim isn’t ineffective assistance because the Fourth Amendment claim was unmeritorious. Fisher v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155202 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2024).*

Officers had a 911 call about a man with a gun in a KFC bag. When they encountered defendant, they could see a gun protruding from a cross-body bag. All together, that was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Williams, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155840 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2024).*

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N.D.Ind.: Slightly different trial testimony doesn’t make a Franks violation; it’s what the officer knew at the time

Slightly different trial testimony here didn’t support a Franks challenge. The officer swore to what he knew when he applied for the warrant, and that wasn’t false. United States v. Bates, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156420 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 30, 2024).

Although it’s a “close call,” there was probable cause for the search warrants based on informant hearsay that also was not stale. “Rather, the court concluded that the evidence, although not recent, was reliable because multiple disparate sources provided consistent information.” The affidavit also showed nexus to the place to be searched. United States v. May, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155817 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 29, 2024).*

The magistrate found the affidavit for warrant met the “low bar” of probable cause. In his objections, defendant is “playing word games” with “at” and “near” which the court finds unavailing. United States v. Herron, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156537 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 30, 2024).*

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M.D.Ala.: Under Evans, DV OP justified stop that led to inventory even though it had unknowingly been set aside

The officer reasonably relied on a report from dispatch that defendant had a DV order of protection against him by his wife. After the stop and the inventory for towing his car, his estranged wife showed up with a copy of an order setting the OP aside. Still, the inventory was valid under Arizona v. Evans. United States v. Gilreath, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155429 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 29, 2024), adopting, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156481 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 1, 2024).

Defendant granted consent to search his car. “Mr. Cardiel initially stated that there may be meth in the car. Then, when the deputy asked him whether there was anything else illegal in the car, Mr. Cardiel acted guiltily when he hesitated in responding, stared at the steering wheel, and then said, ‘There shouldn’t be.’ This conduct and his statements were sufficient to support probable cause for the officer to search the car.” United States v. Medina-Flores, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 22005 (5th Cir. Aug. 29, 2024).*

Defendant’s cell phone was searched at the border two days after it was seized. It was moved from Port Canaveral to Tampa for the search, but that did not make it an extended border search. United States v. Falzone, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156587 (M.D. Fla. July 29, 2024).

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Cal.6: Cell phone SW was limited to a specific date and time for certain materials, but the search far exceeded it; suppressed, no GFE

The search warrant here was issued for evidence of a sexual assault of an adult. There were pretext text messages sent by the police pretending to be the victim to get an admission. When the search warrant was executed, child pornography was found. The warrant was limited to a particular date and time, and the search far exceeded that. “Because [the officers] did not act within the scope of the search warrant in conducting their search of DiMaggio’s cellphone, but, rather, intentionally disregarded and substantially exceeded the limitations in the warrant’s scope, the good faith exception does not apply.” Dimaggio v. Superior Court, 2024 Cal. App. LEXIS 538 (6th Dist. Aug. 30, 2024).

The trial court did not err in admitting conversations recorded by the other party. This issue is well settled. State v. Mosley., 2024 R.I. LEXIS 86 (Aug. 28, 2024).*

A search warrant was executed at plaintiff’s house using tear gas to get him out. Except he wasn’t home, and that apparently should have been obvious. $50,000 damage was caused. The complaint was dismissed by the district court relying on an after action report (AAR) that wasn’t in the record. Reversed. Cuervo v. Sorenson, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 22092 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 2024).*

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CO: Second entry after seeing a dead dog in def’s yard was without exigency and suppressed

The officer’s first approach to defendant’s door was a knock-and-talk, and he could see a dead dog which he checked on and confirmed. The trip to the front door was not to gather information en route. The warrantless entry coming back to attend to the dead dog, however, was unreasonable, and it was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Any exigency was over. People v. Gillespie, 2024 COA 98, 2024 Colo. App. LEXIS 1089 (Aug. 29, 2024).

“Here, there is no question of the adequacy of the state law remedy. Petitioner moved and fully litigated the Fourth Amendment issues through a hearings court and both levels of state appellate review. The New York Court of Appeals, in fact, granted leave to appeal this issue and wrote a detailed decision on it. Under these circumstances, and applying the authorities, the state courts have provided a full and fair opportunity to raise his Fourth Amendment claim, and there is no reason for this Court to exercise its discretion by undertaking a further level of review.” [He just disagrees with the result there and essentially is appealing it to federal court.] McMillan v. Shanley, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155784 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2024).*

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D.Kan.: Reinstalling a deleted app to an iPhone to get to def’s account exceeded the scope of consent to search the phone

Defendant consented to a search of his iPhone, but here the officer reinstalled the Telegram app and then used it to search defendant’s Telegram account, finding child porn. All this exceeded his consent. There is no case in point because of these unique facts, but one case is similar and helpful: Bowers v. County of Taylor, 598 F. Supp. 3d 719, 722 (W.D. Wis. 2022), a civil case. In addition, impersonating him to Telegram exceeded consent. There is a reasonable expectation of privacy in information deleted from an iPhone that the government was able to put back on it. United States v. Castro, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155494 (D. Kan. Aug. 29, 2024):

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MO: Break in chain from Good Samaritan Law entry occurred when def was searched for transport in police car

The Missouri Good Samaritan Law provides immunity from prosecution from evidence of crime found as a result of a medically-related entry. Here, however, defendant was searched before he was placed in a patrol car, and immunity wasn’t what the legislature intended. Where there is a break in the causal chain, there should be no immunity, relying on State v. Waiters, 347 So.3d 533 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022). State v. Smith, 2024 Mo. App. LEXIS 600 (Aug. 28, 2024).

“Any alleged conspiracy to violate plaintiff’s rights would have been complete by the date of arrest in 2018. The overturned conviction based on the invalid search warrant would have no bearing on this claim. Therefore, the claim would be time-barred.” Smitherman v. Quaintance, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155213 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2024).*

Defendant waived his claims, including a Fourth Amendment ineffectiveness claim, but not complying with prior orders to file amended pleadings. When finally filed they were out of time beyond limitations, and there was no equitable tolling. Calderon v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155352 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2024).*

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D.Minn.: Warrantless ion scan of car door handle was reasonable

A DNA ion scan of a car door handle was reasonable, relying on United States v. Jones, 2024 WL 1810220 (D. Minn. Apr. 25, 2024), finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in an ion scan on an apartment door from a common hallway. Also, defendant lacks standing in a place searched: “Mr. Cone-Wade has not shown a reasonable expectation of privacy in any of the places searched or the items seized, nor has he even argued that he has one.” United States v. Dirksmeyer, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155086 (D. Minn. Aug. 29, 2024).

“The parties do not dispute that Smith acted within his discretionary authority. And Smith has waived any issue concerning whether he violated ‘clearly established’ law at the time of the alleged violation because he failed to raise it in his opening brief on appeal.” The “any crime” rule for malicious prosecution was not clearly established at the time of the arrest, and that means judgment for defendants. Sorrells v. Dodd, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21914 (11th Cir. Aug. 29, 2024).*

On a mistaken identify arrest by the USMS, the information that the officers were relying on gave them reasonable grounds to believe he was the guy wanted. Therefore, this was a reasonable mistake and no liability. Henry v. Essex Cty., 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21925 (3d Cir. Aug. 29, 2024).*

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E.D.Tenn.: A lab report used to support PC doesn’t have to be included in the affidavit

“As to the omissions cited by defendant, the Court concludes that they do not detract from the probable cause analysis, as such elaborate specificity is not required. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (explaining that search warrant affidavits ‘are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation,’ such that ‘[t]echnical requirements of elaborate specificity’ are not required in evaluating probable cause in a search warrant). Defendant’s assertion that the Certificates are meaningless without a signature does not persuade the Court, as it is ‘not [to] scrutinize a warrant affidavit in a “hypertechnical”’ manner. See Sanders, 106 F.4th at 463. [¶] Neither does the fact that operator of the LightLab Analyzer was not identified or that the operator’s qualifications or the specific method by which the operator tested the samples were not included in the affidavit. … And defendant does not identify any authority that would suggest that the magistrate, supplied with such information, should have asked for the qualifications of the individual with the Tennessee Dangerous Drug Task Force who tested the samples or any further information about testing before finding there was probable cause to issue the search warrant.” United States v. Manning, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155072 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 29, 2024).

As to handcuffs too tight during arrest, “Shotwell bears the burden of proving excessiveness, but he falls short. … When tight handcuffs cause only a de minimis injury, the handcuffing is not excessive. … And Shotwell admits his wrist injuries were temporary and minimal, causing only redness lasting a few hours. … That is much less than even ‘superficial lacerations,’ which themselves are not enough.” Shotwell v. Del. Dep’t of Sec., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155058 (D. Del. Aug. 28, 2024).*

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CA7: SW affiant doesn’t have to explore all of def’s possible defenses in affidavit

When the affiant officer establishes probable cause for a search warrant, he or she isn’t required to explore all the defenses or affirmative defenses the search target may have to put in the affidavit. Here, this arose in the context of a Franks challenge that fails. Schimandle v. Dekalb Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21883 (7th Cir. Aug. 28, 2024).

Defendant’s motion to suppress the contents of his cell phone based on the passcode being covered by marital privilege but disclosed to the police by his wife is denied. She had regular control of the cell phone, had the password, and it’s not covered by marital privilege. United States v. Bonilla, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154601 (D.P.R. Aug. 26, 2024).*

Defendant’s boat was stopped by Florida Fish and Wildlife officers. One of the occupants of the boat opened a cooler revealing its contents. This was not an illegal search. Suppression order reversed. State v. Vinokurov, 2024 Fla. App. LEXIS 6714 (Fla. 3d DCA Aug. 28, 2024).*

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MN: The totality of circumstances claimed to be RS were more innocent that suggesting criminality was afoot

“Altogether, the totality of the circumstances in this record do not amount to particularized suspicion. The officer acknowledged he did not have sufficient evidence to support a DUI investigation. The evidence at the suppression hearing consisted of ‘“otherwise perfectly legal or innocuous conduct or behavior”’ and not indicia of illegal drug activity. … Loberg’s detention and canine sniff were supported by no more than a generalized suspicion or an inarticulable hunch of criminal activity. The State has not provided sufficient evidence to satisfy an exception to the search warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Sections 10 and 11, of the Montana Constitution. The evidence must be suppressed.” State v. Loberg, 2024 MT 188, 2024 Mont. LEXIS 941 (Aug. 27, 2024). (The suppression hearing evidence recounted in the opinion shows defense counsel went over and above in showing that nothing defendant allegedly did was suggestive of criminal activity and was innocent behavior. The court also was concerned that accepting the state’s argument would make nearly everyone subject to an extended stop without cause.)

Minnesota requires reasonable suspicion for a dog sniff during a traffic stop. The driver’s appearance supported it. “Trooper Bredsten testified that the scabs on the passenger’s pick marks [on her face] were ‘relatively recent’ and that she showed signs of ‘prolonged drug use,’ and under these circumstances, an officer could reasonably infer that the passenger had recently used drugs.” State v. Garding, 2024 Minn. LEXIS 458 (Aug. 28, 2024).*

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LA2: SI before arrest was still valid

Defendant was stopped for aggravated assault from allegedly waving a gun. The search incident of his bag for a gun was reasonable as a search incident even though it preceded the arrest. State v. Gipson, 2024 La. App. LEXIS 1382 (La. App. 2 Cir. Aug. 28, 2024).

Defendants were stopped because of a BOLO that they could have been were involved in a robbery, and there were furtive movements. A protective sweep of the vehicle was justified. United States v. Davis, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21795 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2024).*

A medical privacy case, not a Fourth Amendment case, but with implications for access to search warrant records: Hawai’i’s rule that medical records filed in a case are sealed is unconstitutional under the First Amendment right of access to court records. There has to be a case-by-case analysis of what is sealed and what is not. Civil Beat Law Ctr. for the Pub. Int., Inc. v. Maile, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21811 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2024).*

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OR: Def’s removing a vehicle from impound lot subject to SW supported tampering charge even if the initial seizure was invalid

After a stop, defendant’s truck was seized and he was told that a search warrant would be sought for it. In the impound lot at 3 and 5 am, defendant showed up in the impound lot and was seen on surveillance removing the vehicle. Even if the stop was invalid and the search would be suppressed, his tampering with evidence is a new crime attenuated from the original stop. State v. Caoile, 334 Or. App. 590 (Aug. 28, 2024).

Here a parole home visit resulted in the PO seeing drugs in plain view and that justified a further search. United States v. Hill, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154110 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 28, 2024).*

Petitioner’s 41(g) motion for return of property essentially amounts to an effort to suppress the evidence, and it’s denied. Martino v. United States, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21800 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2024).*

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W.D.Wash.: Warrantless arrest in def’s doorway violated 4A

Defendant’s warrantless arrest in his doorway violated the Fourth Amendment. After objecting, defendant acceded to their demands when they pulled a Taser on him. The remedy of what to do with his statement will be addressed later. United States v. Colfax, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153865 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 27, 2024).

Petitioner claimed defense counsel was ineffective for not using the product of the warrant to impeach a witness more than he did. There was effective cross-examination. “This is precisely the kind of strategic choice that Strickland instructs the courts not to second-guess, and this court will refrain from doing so. Movant has failed to overcome this presumption and these claims should be denied as Movant has failed to show ineffective assistance or prejudice.” Provines v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153732 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2024),* adopted, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152574 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2024).*

No other case says that psychological injury is a part of an excessive force claim, so defendant gets qualified immunity on that. Terrell v. Allgrunn, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21728 (5th Cir. Aug. 27, 2024).*

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NM: Def’s new crime after arrest not to be excluded

“We agree with the Court of Appeals that the new crime exception to the exclusionary rule applies and we agree with its analysis of the issue. The exclusionary rule applies only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its societal costs. Strieff, 579 U.S. at 237. The societal cost of excluding evidence of these new crimes, which include violent behavior against police officers, exceeds the gains. See United States v. Pryor, 32 F.3d 1192, 1196 (7th Cir. 1994) (‘Police do not detain people hoping that they will commit new crimes in their presence …. Thus the gains from extending the rule to exclude evidence of fresh crimes are small, and the costs high.’). Accordingly, we decline to exclude the evidence of Defendant’s remaining crimes to which Defendant conditionally pleaded no contest.” State v. Penman, 2024 N.M. LEXIS 189 (Aug. 26, 2024).

The officers here were hired for off-duty security at a church to keep away a persona non grata pastor, which they did. Their actions look reasonable, and they weren’t required to second guess the paperwork they saw about whether plaintiff could be there. They get qualified immunity. “Here, although the officers acted without a court order, they had other evidence on which they relied—namely, the February 6 letter, which bolstered Jones and others’ claim of authority.” Couzens v. City of Forest Park, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21671 (6th Cir. Aug. 27, 2024).*

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N.D.Fla.: Speeding stop doesn’t require state to prove officer’s speedometer was properly calibrated

Speeding 10 over the speed limit justified the stop, and the state didn’t have to prove the police car speedometer was properly calibrated. United States v. Powell, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153757 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2024), adopted, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153228 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2024).

This successor petition is denied. The Fourth Amendment claim was raised and litigated before, and it’s barred now. In re Brown, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21600 (11th Cir. Aug. 26, 2024).*

Defendant was charged with DUI in Yellowstone. His appellate suppression issues were never presented to the district court, so they’re waived on appeal. United States v. Henning, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21612 (10th Cir. Aug. 27, 2024).*

Defendant’s guilty plea waived his Fourth Amendment claim. Hardy v. State, 2024 Miss. App. LEXIS 362 (Aug. 27, 2024).*

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