D.Kan.: Reinstalling a deleted app to an iPhone to get to def’s account exceeded the scope of consent to search the phone

Defendant consented to a search of his iPhone, but here the officer reinstalled the Telegram app and then used it to search defendant’s Telegram account, finding child porn. All this exceeded his consent. There is no case in point because of these unique facts, but one case is similar and helpful: Bowers v. County of Taylor, 598 F. Supp. 3d 719, 722 (W.D. Wis. 2022), a civil case. In addition, impersonating him to Telegram exceeded consent. There is a reasonable expectation of privacy in information deleted from an iPhone that the government was able to put back on it. United States v. Castro, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155494 (D. Kan. Aug. 29, 2024):

[Cases the government relies on] establish that consent to search a cell phone permits law enforcement to find and reconstruct deleted data on the phone. Here, Mr. Castro’s phone contained no data—deleted or otherwise—that inculpated him. To the contrary, incriminating evidence came from a Telegram server. So, “[a] reasonable person may be expected to know that recently deleted information can be reconstructed on a cell phone.” Thurman, 889 F.3d at 368. But that doesn’t mean that a reasonable person should expect law enforcement—after receiving consent to search, limited to a phone—to reinstall an application on that mobile phone, impersonate the user to gain access to that application, and then stream data from a remote server with that application.

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