Residential mental health facilities are heavily regulated and consented to inspections as a condition of licensing. My Friend’s Place in Unity v. Ohio Dep’t of Mental Health, 2024-Ohio-3257, 2024 Ohio App. LEXIS 3067 (10th Dist. Aug. 27, 2024).
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment complaint is dismissed with prejudice as malicious under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (IFP screening) for repetitively bringing the same claims and having them all dismissed. Hall v. Nisbet, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152352 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2024).*
The exclusionary rule doesn’t apply in supervised release hearings. United States v. Dials, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152740 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 26, 2024).*
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim fails because the complaint’s allegations are speculation that the officer acted out of spite. Brown v. Perugino, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21595 (3d Cir. Aug. 26, 2024).*
The Well News: The Silent Erosion of Privacy: Why We Should Care About Financial Surveillance by John Yelland (“In today’s digital age, financial transactions are meticulously tracked by both private companies and government entities. This pervasive financial surveillance often goes unnoticed by the public, which seems largely indifferent to the potential privacy violations it entails. Despite significant Fourth Amendment implications, the general acceptance of financial data collection poses serious ethical and legal concerns.”)
The dog sniff violated the Fourth Amendment because the dog’s nose went in the car window and sniffed the interior. State v. Organ, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 6279 (Tex. App. – Houston (14th Dist.) Aug. 27, 2024).
“We conclude that the Supreme Court of Arkansas would adopt this interpretation of the careless driving statute if presented the issue. Therefore, based on Baker and the undisputed fact that Lockhart drove on the yellow centerline before Officer Ware stopped him, we conclude that Officer Ware had probable cause or at least an objectively reasonable basis to believe that Lockhart had violated the careless driving statute. At most, Officer Ware made an objectively reasonable mistake of law in applying the careless driving statute. His initial stop was constitutionally valid under the Fourth Amendment.” Lockhart v. Siloam Springs, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21492 (8th Cir. Aug. 26, 2024).*
There was probable cause for the first search warrant for defendant’s property, so the second warrant is not fruit of the poisonous tree. Even so, the good faith exception applies here. United States v. Valle, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152367 (D. Minn. June 28, 2024),* adopted, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147344 (D. Minn. Aug. 19, 2024).*
The Guardian: US police use force on 300,000 people a year, with numbers rising since George Floyd: ‘relentless violence’ by Sam Levin (“Police in the US use force on at least 300,000 people each year, injuring an estimated 100,000 of them, according to a groundbreaking data analysis on law enforcement encounters. Mapping Police Violence, a non-profit research group that tracks killings by US police, launched a new database, policedata.org, on Wednesday cataloging non-fatal incidents of police use of force, including stun guns, chemical sprays, K9 dog attacks, neck restraints, beanbags and baton strikes. The database features incidents from 2017 through 2022, compiled from public records requests in every state.”)
Posted inExcessive force|Comments Off on The Guardian: US police use force on 300,000 people a year, with numbers rising since George Floyd: ‘relentless violence’
Defendant operated a pill-making operation in his house for years without detection. He moved to a new place without suspicion for it. The warrant for the prior house was not sufficiently stale to still be valid under the good faith exception. It was a reasonable conclusion, for good faith purposes, that the operation would still be at the old house. The probable cause question was close and doesn’t have to be decided. United States v. Gonzalez, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21524 (1st Cir. Aug. 26, 2024).
The Delaware AG is investigating theft of ammunition from respondent’s sporting goods store. AG subpoenas can only be to investigate for the “public peace, safety and justice.” This subpoena duces tecum doesn’t impinge on Fourth Amendment rights, and it was reasonable in time, scope, and subject matter. State ex rel. Jennings v. Cabela’s Inc., 2024 Del. Super. LEXIS 603 (Aug. 9, 2024).*
Costs of victims and third parties dealing with search warrants and subpoenas are not a “loss” for sentencing. “USSG § 2B1.1, Application Note 3(D)(ii) (excluding from loss ‘costs incurred by victims primarily to aid the government in the prosecution and criminal investigation of an offense’).” United States v. Pauley, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152282 n.84 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2024).*
“[W]e agree with the district court that nothing in either motion justified a Franks hearing because, at bottom, Bordeaux did not explain the basis for his multiple assertions of falsity or make a sufficient showing that the officers acting knowingly or intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth. We thus affirm the denial of Bordeaux’s initial motion to suppress and find no abuse of discretion in the court declining to reconsider that ruling.” United States v. Bordeaux, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21511 (4th Cir. Aug. 26, 2024).*
Plaintiff’s civil Franks claim fails for lack of materiality even if it was reckless or intentional. Marvaso v. Sanchez, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21418 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2024).*
Defendant’s Franks challenge fails on both prongs. United States v. Zafaranchi, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151873 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 23, 2024).*
The court finds the challenged sentence in the search warrant affidavit was misleading, but it was not material. United States v. Dejesus, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151453 (D. Conn. Aug. 23, 2024).*
Posted inBurden of pleading, Franks doctrine|Comments Off on CA4: Def’s failure to explain Franks claim means no abuse of discretion in denying motion to suppress
Defense counsel was ineffective for not raising the Posse Comitatus Act where his offense was just outside the Pearl Harbor base and the military was the first to respond. Other courts disagree, but the state exclusionary rule shows that there was a reasonable chance, with a hearing, that exclusion could have occurred. State v. Yuen, 2024 Haw. LEXIS 136 (Aug. 20, 2024).
Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim in federal court was rejected. The state courts’ conclusion on the merits of his Fourth Amendment claim was a reasonable application of the law on the merits of the search, therefore, no ineffective assistance. Williams v. Emig, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152023 (D. Del. Aug. 23, 2024).*
Search of a storage unit was based on a search warrant supported by probable cause. Defense counsel’s failure to challenge the reliability of the drug dog used to corroborate it wouldn’t change the outcome. Nasir v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151492 (D. Del. Aug. 23, 2024).*
The Omaha Municipal Code required refusal of consent before an inspection warrant is issued. The officer had probable cause for code violations when he sought the warrant. The warrant will not be suppressed because there is no Fourth Amendment requirement that consent be sought and refused before a warrant can issue. State v. Anderson, 317 Neb. 435 (Aug. 23, 2024):
Posted inAdministrative search, Consent|Comments Off on NE: Despite municipal code requiring refusal of consent, 4A doesn’t require that before SW issues
Defendant’s conviction for interfering with a seizure under UCMJ 131e is affirmed. NIS had seized the phone but not yet put it in a Faraday bag to protect it when she remotely erased it. United States v. Strong, 2024 CAAF LEXIS 478 (C.A.A.F. Aug. 22, 2024).
Fictitious LPN is justification for a stop. Here, probable cause developed, too. State v. Cantu, 2024-Ohio-3211 (2d Dist. Aug. 23, 2024).*
The dog sniff here did not prolong the stop because it occurred contemporaneously with the normal incidents of the stop. United States v. Sutton, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151317 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 23, 2024).*
The parole officers here were invited in by defendant. United States v. Heeman, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151754 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2024).*
Plaintiffs showed ripeness and standing for their Fourth Amendment claim over the requirement of cryptocurrency currency transaction reports under 26 U.S.C. § 6050I. Remanded, but taking no position on the claim. Carmen v. Yellen, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20033 (6th Cir. Aug. 9, 2024), rev’g in part Carman v. Yellen, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124141, 2023 WL 4636883 (E.D. Ky. July 19, 2023):
EFF: Backyard Privacy in the Age of Drones by Hannah Zhao (“This article was originally published by The Legal Aid Society’s Decrypting a Defense Newsletter on August 5, 2024 and is reprinted here with permission.”):
Texas Observer: Texas State Police Gear Up for Massive Expansion of Surveillance Tech by Francesca D’Annunzio (“In June, the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) signed an acquisition plan for a 5-year, nearly $5.3 million contract for a controversial surveillance tool called Tangles from tech firm PenLink, according to records obtained by the Texas Observer through a public information request. The deal is nearly twice as large as the company’s $2.7 million two-year contract with the federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Tangles is an artificial intelligence-powered web platform that scrapes information from the open, deep, and dark web. Tangles’ premier add-on feature, WebLoc, is controversial among digital privacy advocates. Any client who purchases access to WebLoc can track different mobile devices’ movements in a specific, virtual area selected by the user, through a capability called ‘geofencing.’ Users of software like Tangles can do this without a search warrant or subpoena. (In a high-profile ruling, the Fifth Circuit recently held that police cannot compel companies like Google to hand over data obtained through geofencing.)”)
Posted inSurveillance technology|Comments Off on Texas Observer: Texas State Police Gear Up for Massive Expansion of Surveillance Tech
There was justification for the plain view seizure of defendant’s cell phone when it came to the scene of the crime with him. United States v. Dulaney, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151204 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 23, 2024).*
“Saldana-Alaniz fails to show that a reasonable person would not have understood that he was consenting to a search of his one-room efficiency apartment when he told officers that they could search his apartment. … Moreover, even if the officers failed to appreciate a limitation that he contends he placed on his consent, that mistake was reasonable given that Saldana-Alaniz expressly agreed to the search and told them he lived in the efficiency.” United States v. Saldana-Alaniz, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21292 (5th Cir. Aug. 22, 2024).* [Sounds like the court shifted the burden of proving consent.]
The search warrant and wiretaps here were supported by probable cause based on information from confidential informants whose credibility was bolstered by details showing firsthand knowledge and corroboration found by the police. United States v. Rodriguez, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21384 (1st Cir. Aug. 23, 2024).*
With passage of personal use marijuana in California, courts have held that a small amount in the car is not probable cause. However, “[i]t follows that a warrantless vehicle search will be justified where the presence of a lawful amount of marijuana, combined with other suspicious facts or circumstances, gives officers reasonable grounds to believe the suspect has an illegal amount of marijuana or is otherwise violating marijuana regulations. (Moore, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 298, 300.)” Sellers v. Superior Court, 2024 Cal. App. LEXIS 522 (3d Dist. Aug. 22, 2024).
Defendant wasn’t in custody when he was asked questions because he had not yet been put into handcuffs. State v. Alvarez, 2024-Ohio-3208 (2d Dist. Aug. 23, 2024).*
There is no duty that holds a private citizen to probable cause standard when reporting a crime. Plaintiff was identified from surveillance video as the alleged burglar of a DFW store, and that person was followed on video to the gate boarding the Reno flight at 6:29 pm. After 17 days in jail in New Mexico, plaintiff was released and the charges dropped. Summary judgment for AA. Lowe v. Amerian Airlines, Inc., 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 6165 (Tex. App. – Ft. Worth Aug. 22, 2024).*
Posted inCustody, Probable cause|Comments Off on Cal.3d: A small amount of MJ in def’s car isn’t PC, but here there were suspicious circumstances that make PC
On denial of rehearing, the First Circuit suggests that SCOTUS take review of a case to decide the scope of containers subject to search incident, comparing Robinson (crumpled cigarette pack) and Riley (cell phones). United States v. Perez, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21377 (1st Cir. Aug. 23, 2024)*:
Under binding Supreme Court precedent, the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment categorically allows not only the seizure but also the warrantless search of the contents of certain physical containers that are “of the person” of the arrestee. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1973) (crumpled cigarette package in a coat pocket); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 262, 266 (1973) (“cigarette box” in a coat pocket); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 804-05 (1974) (clothing). There remains great uncertainty, however, about the kinds of containers that are subject to that categorical rule.
In United States v. Eatherton, this court acknowledged the uncertainty but held that the categorical rule applies to a briefcase held by an arrestee because distinctions between a briefcase in hand and a cigarette container in a pocket were too “gossamer” to justify drawing a line. 519 F.2d 603, 610 (1st Cir. 1975). This petition for rehearing en banc asks us to reconsider that nearly half-century-old precedent in the context of a backpack that the arrestee was wearing at the time of his arrest.
Posted inScope of search, Search incident|Comments Off on CA1 suggests SCOTUS review categorical rule for search incident of containers
A welfare check at defendant’s father’s house led to police entering without a warrant. “[O]fficers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that the victim was in his house and in need of emergency assistance. Although the police may no longer rely on the community caretaking doctrine as a standalone justification to enter a home without a warrant, see Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194, 196 (2021), the emergency aid doctrine remains a valid exception to the warrant requirement.” Defendant was standing near the body, and the gun in the shooting had his fingerprints on it. Commonwealth v. Regan, 2024 Mass. App. LEXIS 114 (Aug. 23, 2024).
Officers had arguable reasonable suspicion to briefly detain plaintiff based on his presence with the apartment resident after a 911 call about a fight there. His failure to provide identification while lawfully detained provided arguable probable cause for an arrest under Florida law. And, accepting plaintiff’s version that he did not resist and the officers used gratuitous force, they violated his clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Colon v. Smith, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21243 (11th Cir. Aug. 22, 2024).*
The USMJ’s Franks ruling was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law. “Beyond reiterating his arguments for a Franks hearing, Wright’s objection does little to support his contention the magistrate judge erred, especially in light of the deferential governing standard. Wright’s objection … is therefore overruled.” United States v. Wright, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150304 (D. Neb. Aug. 22, 2024).*
Defendant posted anonymously about killing libtards and their children (“parasites”) and “black robed despots” (judges), and he was a San Jose police officer. Officers knew he had nine guns. Officers got a search warrant for his computer to link him better to the poses, and they found instead child pornography. State law requires only that a search warrant affidavit “tend to show” that a violation of the law could be found, and this satisfied that standard. Moreover, the good faith exception applied. United States v. Shevchenko, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150076 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2024).* [The Fourth Amendment rule is the same.]
“Practically speaking, if the factfinder were to believe Wehunt, then Dubielak used excessive force, and Wehunt’s Fourth Amendment right was clearly established; if the factfinder were to believe Dubielak, then he used appropriate force in order to effectuate the arrest, there was no constitutional violation, and Wehunt’s right would not be clearly established on the facts of this case. But the question whom to believe is a question of fact that the court cannot resolve on summary judgment.” Wehunt v. Dubielak, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150687 (N.D. Ala. July 25, 2024).*
In the civil rights prosecution in the police shooting death of Breona Taylor, “Thus, to state a case for the death-results penalty enhancement, the Government must allege facts which, if true, would permit the conclusion that Taylor’s death was the natural and probable consequence of the lack of probable cause to enter her apartment. It has not done so.” United States v. Meany, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150867 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 22, 2024).*
“[A]n overnight guest of a registered hotel guest shares the registered guest’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room and thus has standing to contest the search.” Fitzgerald v. State, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 6161 n.11 (Tex. App. — Ft. Worth Aug. 22, 2024).*
The traffic stop was valid. “Initially, Officer Brozell testified that, before he observed or interacted with Mr. Wofford, he ‘detected a strong odor of marijuana upon approaching the vehicle.’ Tr. 8, 9 (first smelled odor of marijuana ‘[u]pon approaching the vehicle, towards the rear’). Thus, before he had an opportunity to observe any alleged signs of nervousness, Officer Brozell had probable cause to search the vehicle based upon the odor of marijuana.” United States v. Wofford, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150298 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2024).*
Defendant was involved in an auto accident. His walking across the street to check on the others was not abandonment. There was no probable cause for the automobile exception. The vehicle search, however, was valid under inventory. There is no constitutional requirement to explore alternate means of removal. This car was wrecked and inoperable. United States v. Scott, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150383 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 22, 2024).*
The citizen informant’s 911 call that defendant was drunk, belligerent, and driving gave reasonable suspicion to stop defendant under Naverette. City of Parma v. Coyne, 2024-Ohio-3192, 2024 Ohio App. LEXIS 3019 (8th Dist. Aug. 22, 2024).
“And here, even expunging the information derived from Defendant’s suppressed interview, the warrant affidavit establishes the requisite probable cause.” The trial court erred in suppressing. State v. Broussard, 2024 La. App. LEXIS 1328 (La. App. 3 Cir Aug. 21, 2024).*
“Ofc. Kraft was acting diligently in the course of a missing person investigation, and the facts and circumstances he knew about Josephson’s disappearance at the time he spotted the Impala two blocks from the location where Josephson was last seen surpassed the threshold of a ‘mere hunch or unparticularized suspicion.’ Further, after Ofc. Kraft’s blue lights were activated, Appellant turned the wrong way down a one-way road. This fact coupled with Appellant’s lack of identification, the apparent odor of marijuana emanating from the car, and Appellant’s flight on foot permitted further detention by law enforcement pursuant to Robinson.” State v. Rowland, 2024 S.C. App. LEXIS 70 (Aug. 21, 2024).*
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3)’s good-cause standard applied to defendant’s specific suppression arguments that were raised for the first time on appeal rather than plain error review under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Because defendant did not demonstrate good cause for his failure to raise the arguments before the district court, their merits could not be considered on appeal. United States v. Sok, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21209 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 2024):
Yet Sok contends that he functionally made the same or similar arguments before the District Court and can reframe them on appeal. In this regard, we require litigants to preserve specific arguments for appeal, not merely issues. United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 341 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[R]aising an issue in the District Court is insufficient to preserve for appeal all arguments bearing on that issue. Instead, to preserve a suppression argument, a party must make the same argument in the District Court that he makes on appeal.”). In other words, “raising an issue is not sufficient to preserve all arguments within the issue.” Id. Determining whether an argument raised on appeal is the same as one raised in the trial court requires at least that “they depend on the same legal rule or standard” and “on the same facts.” Id. at 342. And while “[p]arties are free … to place greater emphasis and more fully explain an argument on appeal than they did in the District Court [and] may even, within the bounds of reason, reframe their argument,” “they may not change [its] substance.” Id. at 341.
Sok simply did not raise, in any form, his two arguments against inevitable discovery before the District Court. While he cited the legal rule for inevitable discovery and noted some of the steps in the Live Stop Policy’s procedure for impoundment in his supplemental briefing, he did not argue that the Government failed to demonstrate an impoundment would have been lawful or inevitable. Instead, as discussed, his trial attorney appears simply to have confused the inevitable-discovery and independent-source doctrines. By arguing that no impoundment under the Live Stop Policy actually occurred, Sok’s trial counsel did not address the Government’s inevitable-discovery defense, which relies on the premise that an impoundment, although it did not occur, would inevitably have occurred under the Policy. Nor did Sok’s counsel otherwise attempt to raise the arguments he presses here, such as through a motion for reconsideration of the suppression ruling.
Because Sok failed to raise before the District Court the two suppression-related arguments he presses on appeal, we cannot consider them under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 unless he shows good cause for us to do so.
Posted inBurden of pleading, Motion to suppress|Comments Off on CA3: Reframing issues outside of the original argument below requires plain error review
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
