Category Archives: Consent

W.D.Wash.: Ryder truck rental location data is third-party data and not governed by Carpenter

The location data on a Ryder rental truck is third-party information, not comparable to CSLI in Carpenter, and a search warrant wasn’t needed to get it. United States v. Subil, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 255856 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 6, 2026). … Continue reading →

Posted in Consent, GPS / Tracking Data, Seizure, Third Party Doctrine | Comments Off on W.D.Wash.: Ryder truck rental location data is third-party data and not governed by Carpenter

TX: 18 year old’s mother had apparent authority to consent to search of room

The 18 year old defendant lived with his mother. When the police were at the house looking for consent to search, she had apparent authority to consent to a search of his room. “We do not hold that a parent … Continue reading →

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CA6: Knowing passcode to cell phone shows common authority over it to consent

Defendant’s friend had common authority over the phone to consent, including knowing the passcode. United States v. Cook, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 31506 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 2026). Defendant consented to the search of his cell phone left with an … Continue reading →

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S.D.N.Y.: Stop on an NYPD I-card showing PC was reasonable

NYPD uses “I-cards” (investigation cards) which can show facts supporting probable cause. This investigation was “closed,” but the I-card still was around, and officers used it to stop and question defendant. He refused to identify himself and he ended up … Continue reading →

Posted in Collective knowledge, Consent, Inevitable discovery, Inventory, Probable cause, Stop and frisk | Comments Off on S.D.N.Y.: Stop on an NYPD I-card showing PC was reasonable

TN: Bailbond bounty hunter not state actor

Bailbonding agent’s bounty hunters were not state actors in capturing defendant and searching his car. State v. Dragg, 2026 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 637 (Sep. 24, 2026). Defendant’s post-conviction petition argues defense counsel applied the wrong standard of review but … Continue reading →

Posted in Consent, Emergency / exigency, Ineffective assistance | Comments Off on TN: Bailbond bounty hunter not state actor

Cal.4: School resource officers need RS for a weapons search in school

School resource officers also need reasonable suspicion for a weapons search in school, and here the officer had it. At a middle school no less. In re N.S., 2026 Cal. App. LEXIS 548 (4th Dist. Sep. 8, 2026). As long … Continue reading →

Posted in Consent, Dog sniff, Reasonable suspicion, School searches | Comments Off on Cal.4: School resource officers need RS for a weapons search in school

MT: Semi-conscious injured driver couldn’t consent to BAC blood draw

Defendant was seriously injured in a car wreck and was at best semi-conscious. She could not consent to a DUI blood draw. Suppression order affirmed. State v. Laroque, 2026 MT 209 (Sept. 1, 2026). The totality of circumstances showed defendant … Continue reading →

Posted in Consent, DNA, Drug or alcohol testing, Independent source, Scope of search | Comments Off on MT: Semi-conscious injured driver couldn’t consent to BAC blood draw

KY: Consent to blood draw was not voluntary under totality

Defendant’s consent to a blood draw was not voluntary under the totality of circumstances. “The facts at hand demonstrate why a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis is crucial. McCarthy and Haney provide that being read a coercive implied consent warning is but one … Continue reading →

Posted in Consent, Drug or alcohol testing, Ineffective assistance, Issue preclusion | Comments Off on KY: Consent to blood draw was not voluntary under totality

E.D.Mich.: Person a cell phone was given to as gift could consent to search

Defendant gave an old cell phone to his niece. On it, she found child pornography, and she took it to the police who she showed images and texts. The officer didn’t search. She had apparent authority to consent to search … Continue reading →

Posted in Admissibility of evidence, Apparent authority, Cell phones, Consent, Good faith exception | Comments Off on E.D.Mich.: Person a cell phone was given to as gift could consent to search

CA8: Nebraska statute allowing SWs to cross state lines doesn’t violate 4A

Nebraska statute authorizes search warrants to cross state lines, and this does not violate the Fourth Amendment. This was a Snapchat warrant. [The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a,d), allows state subpoenas to cross state lines.] United States v. … Continue reading →

Posted in Arrest or entry on arrest, Consent, Reasonable suspicion, Warrant execution | Comments Off on CA8: Nebraska statute allowing SWs to cross state lines doesn’t violate 4A

NC: Def’s bloody shirt seized as evidence from ER didn’t need a SW to test for DNA

Defendant was a suspect in a shooting incident. At the ER, his bloody shirt was collected as evidence. A separate search warrant wasn’t required to test the DNA on it. State v. Howze, 2026 N.C. App. LEXIS 652 (Aug. 5, … Continue reading →

Posted in Consent, DNA, Informant hearsay | Comments Off on NC: Def’s bloody shirt seized as evidence from ER didn’t need a SW to test for DNA

CA8: Lesser intrusive measures not required for jail strip search

Defendant was strip searched on going into jail, no matter what type of unit he was going to, and a baggie of meth was found under his genitals. The strip search was reasonable and the jail didn’t have to accommodate … Continue reading →

Posted in Consent, Prison and jail searches, Reasonable suspicion, Staleness, Strip search | Comments Off on CA8: Lesser intrusive measures not required for jail strip search

MI: Suppression hearing is a critical stage of the proceedings

A suppression hearing is a critical stage of the proceedings, and defendant was unrepresented at that point due to disagreements with first retained and then appointed counsel. Remanded. The pretrial motions in general were disorganized, and the Fourth Amendment claim … Continue reading →

Posted in Consent, Privileges, Qualified immunity, Suppression hearings | Comments Off on MI: Suppression hearing is a critical stage of the proceedings

SC: Police didn’t need a SW to access def’s bondsman’s GPS monitoring of him because he agreed to GPS monitoring for release

Defendant submitted to GPS monitoring by his bondsman as a condition of bail, and the police could call the bondsman for the GPS information to connect defendant to a new crime without a warrant. State v. Eberhart, 2026 S.C. App. … Continue reading →

Posted in Consent, Private search, Reasonable suspicion, Standing | Comments Off on SC: Police didn’t need a SW to access def’s bondsman’s GPS monitoring of him because he agreed to GPS monitoring for release

D.D.C.: SW of house for clothing used in crime didn’t violate 4A

There was probable cause for search of defendant’s house for clothing that was worn in the crime. What happens outside the house can create an inference that what’s sought is inside. (The good faith exception would also apply.) United States … Continue reading →

Posted in Airport searches, Consent, Nexus, Probable cause, Reasonable expectation of privacy, Standing | Comments Off on D.D.C.: SW of house for clothing used in crime didn’t violate 4A

E.D.Ark.: Ptf stated claim for SW entry without proper announcement

The search target’s shooting death case can proceed on an excessive force claim and failure to properly announce entry in an ATF raid. Malinowski v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134589 (E.D. Ark. June 17, 2026). “Harris fails to … Continue reading →

Posted in § 1983 / Bivens, Apparent authority, Consent, Knock and announce, Standing | Comments Off on E.D.Ark.: Ptf stated claim for SW entry without proper announcement

CA6: The smell of burnt MJ in a car is still PC for driving under influence even where personal possession is legal.

“Possession of recreational marijuana may be legal in Missouri, but ‘[o]perating or being in physical control of any motor vehicle … while under the influence of marijuana’ is not. Mo. Const. art. XIV § 2(3)(1)(d). Considering the strong odor of … Continue reading →

Posted in Consent, Plain view, feel, smell, Reasonable suspicion | Comments Off on CA6: The smell of burnt MJ in a car is still PC for driving under influence even where personal possession is legal.

CA8: Admission of anonymous tip that led to stop violated Confrontation Clause

Admission in evidence of the anonymous tip that led to defendant’s stop violated the Confrontation Clause. United States v. Simpson, 25-1263 (8th Cir. June 2, 2026). The search warrants here were subject to the Privacy Protection Act, and they were … Continue reading →

Posted in Admissibility of evidence, Consent, Drug or alcohol testing, Privileges, Probable cause, Reasonable suspicion | Comments Off on CA8: Admission of anonymous tip that led to stop violated Confrontation Clause

CA8: Def’s 20 prior arrests helped show voluntariness of consent

Despite the lack of a Miranda warning, defendant consented to the search. After all, she’d been arrested about 20 times before this one. United States v. Marr, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 15161 (8th Cir. May 28, 2026). A Bivens action … Continue reading →

Posted in § 1983 / Bivens, Consent, Ineffective assistance, Reasonable expectation of privacy, Voluntariness | Comments Off on CA8: Def’s 20 prior arrests helped show voluntariness of consent

N.D.Fla.: Monitored bowel movement in prison didn’t violate 4A

In prison, “the visual strip search and the monitored bowel movement did not violate the Fourth Amendment.” McDonald v. Spears, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107383 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2026). Defendant’s consent to search his cell phone was limited and … Continue reading →

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