W.D.Ky.: In a criminal trial against a police office for excessive force during a raid, is 404(b) evidence of other bad searches admissible?

Defendant is a police officer charged with deprivation of rights from firing a gun into a window with blinds drawn during execution of a search warrant. This is about his mistaken belief that an AR-15 was firing from inside, and the relevance of evidence at trial which starts Tuesday. More interesting though: the government wants to put in 404(b) evidence of two prior botched searches. That’s denied without prejudice for the time being. United States v. Hankison, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185334 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 10, 2024). After analyzing the issue with limited information:

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CA2: A wrecked vehicle that has to be towed away is mobile for the automobile exception

Defendant wrecked his rental car and it was undriveable. It was still subject to the automobile exception because it would almost certainly be towed away, and that’s mobility. United States v. Jones, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 25563 (2d Cir. Oct. 10, 2024).

Defendant had his full and fair opportunity to litigate his search claim in state court and waived it, which the state appellate court already held. Mullen v. Salamon, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185127 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2024).*

Defendant and his confederates were caught in the act on home video surveillance transmitting to an app. The victim called the police who caught them at the door. The search of defendant’s backpack was reasonable under search incident. Commonwealth v. Soto, 2024 Mass. App. LEXIS 136 (Oct. 10, 2024).*

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D.Md.: Waiting for backup doesn’t unreasonably extend a stop under Rodriguez

Waiting for backup is for legitimate safety concerns and does not unreasonably extend a stop under Rodriguez. United States v. Bagayoko, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185066 (D. Md. Oct. 9, 2024):

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OH: Even when the driver isn’t the owner with a suspended DL, it’s not unreasonable to ask for his DL

The stop was because the vehicle owner had an expired DL. When the officer discovers the driver is not the owner, the officer does not act unreasonably in asking for the driver’s DL. State v. Dunlap, 2024-Ohio-4821, 2024 Ohio LEXIS 2203 (Oct. 9, 2024). Update: Similar is State v. McConico, 2024-Ohio-5657 (1st Dist. Dec. 4, 2024).

Defendant stayed in his hotel room past check out time despite clear warnings their stuff would be removed and thrown away, so he had no standing. United States v. Brown, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184492 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 23, 2024).*

The defendant was the passenger in a minivan stopped by the police. There was reasonable suspicion as to the vehicle but not specifically as to the passenger. The reasonable suspicion as a whole extended to her and her purse. State v. Hale, 2024-Ohio-4866 (Oct. 9, 2024).*

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E.D.Pa.: SW papers remain sealed because the investigation isn’t complete

The government opposes the unsealing of the search warrant papers in this case because the investigation is still ongoing. The first motion was denied about a year ago. On renewal of the motion, the court finds the investigation still ongoing, and the government still has an interest in keeping it sealed. Maybe later. In re Search Warrants Issued November 30, 2022, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182963 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2024).

Selective or discriminatory prosecution is a Fourteenth Amendment, not a Fourth Amendment claim. Ex parte Aparicio, 2024 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 739 (Oct. 9, 2024).*

“‘[T]he whole is often greater than the sum of its parts—especially when the parts are viewed in isolation.’ D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 60-61 (2018). Here, the Affidavit’s recitation of the totality of the circumstances, as outlined above, provided a substantial basis for the Magistrate Judge to have determined that there was a fair probability that evidence of Mr. Carothers’s alleged crimes would be found on the cell phones. Thus, this Court cannot say that, based on the Affidavit, the Magistrate Judge lacked a substantial basis upon which to find probable cause. Accordingly, the Court will DENY Mr. Carothers’s Motion.” United States v. Carothers, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184776 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 2024).*

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FL1: Def’s refusal to admit computer searched was his denies him standing

At the suppression hearing, defendant refused to claim ownership of the computer the subject of the motion to suppress. Therefore, he has no standing. Alternatively, the good faith exception saves the search even if there was no probable cause. Bates v. State, 2024 Fla. App. LEXIS 7913 (Fla. 1st DCA Oct. 9, 2024).

“Our supreme court recently held that law enforcement need only have a reasonable suspicion that a person is residing in the place to be searched for officers to execute a warrantless search pursuant to a search waiver. Bailey, 2024 Ark. 87, 687 S.W.3d 819 (declining to apply the probable-cause standard from United States v. Thabit, 56 F.4th 1145 (2023)). The determination is based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. (citing Thompson v. State, 2010 Ark. 294, 377 S.W.3d 207).” Canady v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 478 (Oct. 9, 2024).*

The age of the child allegedly consenting to the search of the home here was irrelevant when it was conducted under a parole search waiver. McClure v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 487 (Oct. 9, 2024).*

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D.P.R.: Officer’s construction of traffic law was “ardous” and unreasonable under Heien

The officer’s conclusion defendant violated a U-turn statute was unreasonable, and the motion to suppress is granted. “While mistakes of law based on arduous questions of statutory interpretation may justify an officer’s judgment, a poor study of the law cannot constitute a reasonable mistake. [Heien] at 55. ‘Thus, an officer can gain no Fourth Amendment advantage through a sloppy study of the law he is duty-bound to enforce.’ Id. at 67.” United States v. Pizarro-Quiñones, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184047 (D.P.R. Oct. 7, 2024).

2254 petitioner doesn’t show that he didn’t get a full and fair opportunity to litigate his search issue in state court. Shaw v. Buesgen, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183157 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 7, 2024).*

Facebook on its own perused user accounts for child pornography, finding some attributable to defendant. The fact Facebook had a dual motive of protecting its business interests and then turning over what it finds to NCMEC and thus to the government still made it not a private search. United States v. Azucenas, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 25489 (9th Cir. Oct. 8, 2024).*

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FL5: Weaving justified welfare check stop

Defendant’s obvious weaving justified at least a welfare check stop that was reasonable. State v. Sheldon, 2024 Fla. App. LEXIS 7892 (Fla. 5th DCA Oct. 8, 2024).

2254 petitioner doesn’t show that he didn’t get a full and fair opportunity to litigate his search issue in state court. Shaw v. Buesgen, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183157 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 7, 2024).*

“Therefore, under all of the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the police officers’ initial interaction with Wilkins was a consensual encounter and not a seizure implicating his Fourth Amendment rights. Wilkins was free to refuse to speak to the officers and leave. See Vogt, 356 Wis. 2d 343, ¶30. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order granting suppression.” State v. Wilkins, 2024 Wisc. App. LEXIS 836 (Oct. 8, 2024)* (2-1, with a dissent).

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E.D.Okla.: Housing authority’s warning of a pest inspection permitted under lease agreement amounts to no REP

The housing authority told plaintiff they were coming in for a pest inspection and did under the conditions of the lease. That was reasonable, and there was no violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy when the inspectors saw drugs. McVicker v. Muskogee Hous. Auth., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181690 (E.D. Okla. Oct. 4, 2024).

Defendant charged with DUI on a federal installation. “The Court finds that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Blanchard did not consent to the blood test, and that no exigent circumstances justified the warrantless blood test. The results of the blood test must therefore be suppressed.” United States v. Blanchard, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183059 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2024).*

“Even assuming that trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress the DNA search warrant was objectively unreasonable, we agree with the Superior Court that Elder failed to establish prejudice. Elder asserted from the beginning that he had consensual sexual contact with the victim. The presence of Elder’s DNA on the victim was consistent with what he told the police and others. Elder failed to show that there is a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different had his trial counsel filed a successful motion to suppress the DNA evidence.” Elder v. State, 2024 Del. LEXIS 341 (Oct. 7, 2024).*

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IN: Warrantless pulling on a loose car door panel was with PC and reasonable

The officer’s warrantless pulling on a loose car door panel with probable cause was not an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment or state constitution. Young v. State, 2024 Ind. App. LEXIS 279 (Oct. 4, 2024).

The arrival of drug dog didn’t prolong the stop; defendant’s not having a license did. United States v. Tinson, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182958 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2024).*

The claimant lacked standing in other searches that were a predicate to the forfeiture seizure. United States v. $61,450 in United States Currency, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183097 (D. Minn. Oct. 7, 2024).*

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E.D.N.Y.: RS required for non-routine customs cell phone search

An Italian businessman with business in Luxembourg and investment in the United States had his cell phone seized without reasonable suspicion at JFK and searched elsewhere. Reasonable suspicion is required for a non-routine cell phone search, and the data taken is ordered destroyed under Rule 41(g). Matta v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182966 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 11, 2024):

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Law360: Open Questions In Unsettled Geofence Warrant Landscape

Law360: Open Questions In Unsettled Geofence Warrant Landscape by Charles Fowler (“This summer produced the first two federal appellate decisions on the Fourth Amendment implications of geofence warrants…. Neither decision is final. And the dust may well settle somewhere in between these poles: Geofence warrants are likely governed by the same probable-cause, overbreadth, particularity and good faith rules as courts apply to most other warrants.”)

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S.D.W.Va.: Reasonable during a traffic stop to ask about firearms in the car

The traffic stop was reasonable, and it was also reasonable for the officer to just ask whether there was a gun in the car for safety reasons because carrying in legal in this state. United States v. Martin, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181880 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 4, 2024).

There was probable cause for the warrant for defendant’s place based on allegations of his drug dealing over a relatively long period of time. United States v. Carter, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182276 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 7, 2024).*

No showing for a Franks hearing. Also the good faith exception applies. United States v. Del Toro, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182240 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2024).*

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AgWeb: Feds Claim Access to 1.2 Billion Private Acres Without Warrant or Probable Cause

AgWeb: Feds Claim Access to 1.2 Billion Private Acres Without Warrant or Probable Cause by Chris Bennett (“The federal government asserts power over at least 96% of all private land in the U.S.” “How much private land can the federal government access without probable cause, search warrant, or consent? Almost all of it, as in 1.2 billion acres, or at least 96% of all private holdings in the United States. The staggering numbers, tabulated in research by Institute for Justice (IJ), highlight the scope of the Open Fields doctrine—the power of federal officials to enter and surveil private land with no limitations on frequency or duration.”)

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OH2: Arrest clothes in jail storage can be searched without a warrant

Under established authority from 1993 in this court, defendant’s clothes from his arrest in storage at the jail can be tested for evidence without a warrant. State v. Wells, 2024-Ohio-4813 (2d Dist. Oct. 4, 2024).

Defendant pled guilty and only part of the money seized was forfeitable. Since he’s been sentenced the government doesn’t need it for the prosecution, and it is ordered returned under Rule 41(g). United States v. Ocadiz-Castro, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181455 (D. Nev. Oct. 3, 2024).

“For these reasons, as well as others outlined by the Magistrate Judge, the search warrant affidavit established sufficient probable cause that evidence of the alleged schemes would be found on Mr. Takyi’s phone and in his Apple accounts. See United States v. McCall, 84 F.4th 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Given the established link between the cell phone and the crime, the affidavit also ties the cell phone’s associated iCloud account to the crime.”). Mr. Takyi’s objection is overruled.” United States v. Takyi, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181493 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 4, 2024).*

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IA: A brief detention at the scene is not “arrest” for speedy trial purposes

“Arrest” for speedy trial purposes doesn’t include a brief detention at the scene before the actual arrest. State v. Harris, 2024 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 79 (Oct. 4, 2024).

Defendant satisfied his first Franks burden of a substantial preliminary showing of recklessness or falsity. Reviewing the remainder of the affidavit, the challenged information isn’t material to the probable cause showing. United States v. Casher, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182418 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2024).*

The vehicle search here was with probable cause and thus is valid both under the search incident doctrine and automobile exception. United States v. Davis, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 25285 (7th Cir. Oct. 7, 2024).*

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UT: NCMEC didn’t look at the CP this time, but it had this case, and that’s enough

The fact the hash value of defendant’s material was known to be child pornography, it didn’t matter that NCMEC didn’t view the material before passing it on to the police who did. There was a prior private search. State v. Williamson, 2024 UT App 141, 2024 Utah App. LEXIS 142 (Oct. 3, 2024).

The officers collectively had reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop, and the facts communicated to his PO was enough for a search. United States v. Madarassy, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181223 (D. Mont. Oct. 3, 2024).*

There was probable cause for defendant’s search warrant so defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not challenging it. United States v. Allen, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181466 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2024).*

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Law Review: The Automated Fourth Amendment

Maneka Sinha, The Automated Fourth Amendment, 73 Emory L. J. 589 (2024). The abstract:

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S.D.Ohio: SW for def’s address produced documents related to another address of his which were lawfully seized

“[T]he Court agrees with Moore that papers listing the 3151 Gobel address that were taken from the 3100 Vienna Woods address fall outside the scope of the search warrant’s plain language. … But that does not end the inquiry as Moore believes. That is because ‘[d]uring a search, “evidence not described in a search warrant may be seized if it is reasonably related to the offense which formed the basis for the search warrant.”’” And this stuff was. United States v. Moore, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181005 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 2024).

In a fatal shooting case, qualified immunity for the initial entry was properly denied because there’s a fact question whether it violated the Fourth Amendment. Hicks v. Scott, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 25063 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2024).*

“Given the totality of circumstances, an objectively reasonable police officer would conclude Mr. Reyes was committing a crime. Thus, there was probable cause to arrest Mr. Reyes. … From these facts, ‘a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair probability that [Mr. Reyes] had committed a crime.’” United States v. Reyes, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181282 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2024).*

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CO: Unlawfully obtained cell phone PIN used to search phone required suppression

The police unlawfully obtained defendant’s cell phone’s 6-digit PIN number to access his phone after a failed “brute force attack” attempting to get into the phone. That required suppression of the cell phone. People v. d’Estree, 2024 COA 106, 2024 Colo. App. LEXIS 1210 (Oct. 3, 2024). The syllabus from the court:

A division of the court of appeals reverses the district court’s decision declining to suppress evidence obtained from the second of two warrants issued to search the contents of a defendant’s cell phone. While the second warrant would have met the independent source doctrine’s requirements, here police used an illegally obtained cell phone PIN code to execute the otherwise lawful second warrant. Thus, the district court should have excluded evidence obtained from the phone at trial. The division further holds that when police seek to obtain a cell phone PIN code without a defendant’s consent, in this case via a digital “brute force attack,” this constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment and requires authorization via a warrant. Finally, the division holds that the use of the PIN code here does not meet the requirements of the inevitable discovery doctrine as police abandoned the lawful search to find the PIN code pursuant to the second warrant and expedited their access to the phone using the PIN code illegally obtained pursuant to the first warrant. The defendant’s convictions are reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court to hold a new trial.

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