CO: Unlawfully obtained cell phone PIN used to search phone required suppression

The police unlawfully obtained defendant’s cell phone’s 6-digit PIN number to access his phone after a failed “brute force attack” attempting to get into the phone. That required suppression of the cell phone. People v. d’Estree, 2024 COA 106, 2024 Colo. App. LEXIS 1210 (Oct. 3, 2024). The syllabus from the court:

A division of the court of appeals reverses the district court’s decision declining to suppress evidence obtained from the second of two warrants issued to search the contents of a defendant’s cell phone. While the second warrant would have met the independent source doctrine’s requirements, here police used an illegally obtained cell phone PIN code to execute the otherwise lawful second warrant. Thus, the district court should have excluded evidence obtained from the phone at trial. The division further holds that when police seek to obtain a cell phone PIN code without a defendant’s consent, in this case via a digital “brute force attack,” this constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment and requires authorization via a warrant. Finally, the division holds that the use of the PIN code here does not meet the requirements of the inevitable discovery doctrine as police abandoned the lawful search to find the PIN code pursuant to the second warrant and expedited their access to the phone using the PIN code illegally obtained pursuant to the first warrant. The defendant’s convictions are reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court to hold a new trial.

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NY1: Vehicle being involved in recent prior crime was RS for stop

There was reasonable suspicion for the stop of defendant’s car just because the police had information that the car had previously been involved in a potential crime. People v. Zubidi, 2024 NY Slip Op 04824, 2024 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5115 (1st Dept. Oct. 3, 2024) (4-1) with an interesting dissent there was no reasonable suspicion:

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D.Minn.: No need to test a roach for PC, plus def admitted what it was

“During the stop, Mr. Winston himself confirmed that the roaches were marijuana; his possession charge, however, is not based on them. There was thus no reason to test the roaches to confirm the presence of marijuana. The failure on the part of the United States to run that test provides no basis to undermine a finding of probable cause, nor does it in any other way justify exclusion of the evidence here.” United States v. Winston, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180990 (D. Minn. Sep. 4, 2024),* adopted, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180157 (D. Minn. Oct. 2, 2024).*

Non-anonymous 911 call coupled with officer’s observations of defendant’s driving justified his stop. People v. Johnson, 2024 IL App (4th) 231185 (Oct. 2, 2024).*

“The Court will assume, for the purposes of Defendant’s [habeas] petition, that the outcome of his case would have been different if the evidence from his vehicle had been suppressed. But the Court cannot conclude that a motion to suppress would have had any merit.” The stop was valid, as was the following search incident. United States v. Henderson, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180433 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 2, 2024).*

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D.N.H.: Federal case can rely on state SW

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not challenging the search warrant in his federal case that was issued by a state court judge because it wouldn’t win. Lessard v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180669 (D.N.H. Oct. 3, 2024).*

The CI’s story here was substantially corroborated by independent information, so there was probable cause. United States v. Krueger, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180991 (D. Minn. Sep. 11, 2024).*

Defendant was a suspect in a weapons offense, and officers felt defendant’s backpack and felt what was probably a gun. Continued manipulation of the bag after that was not unreasonable. United States v. Barnes, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 24873 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2024).*

Despite legalization of hemp, the smell of marijuana alone is enough for probable cause. State v. Schiene, 2024 N.C. App. LEXIS 764 (Oct. 1, 2024);* State v. Schiene, 2024 N.C. App. LEXIS 764 (Oct. 1, 2024).*

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WaPo: Police seldom disclose use of facial recognition despite false arrests

WaPo: Police seldom disclose use of facial recognition despite false arrests By Douglas MacMillan, David Ovalle & Aaron Schaffer (“Hundreds of Americans have been arrested after being connected to a crime by facial recognition software, a Washington Post investigation has found, but many never know it because police seldom disclose their use of the controversial technology.’)

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NPR: 23andMe is on the brink. What happens to all its DNA data?

NPR: 23andMe is on the brink. What happens to all its DNA data? by Bobby Allyn (“As 23andMe struggles for survival, customers like Wiles have one pressing question: What is the company’s plan for all the data it has collected since it was founded in 2006? [¶] ‘I absolutely think this needs to be clarified,’ Wiles said. ‘The company has undergone so many changes and so much turmoil that they need to figure out what they’re doing as a company. But when it comes to my genetic data, I really want to know what they plan on doing.’) There are 15 million customers. Will the government just buy it? Perhaps DoJ won’t think of that.

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NACDL CLE: Artificial Justice: AI, Tech and Criminal Defense (Oct. 7-8)

NACDL CLE: Artificial Justice: AI, Tech and Criminal Defense, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC, October 7-8 from NACDL’s Fourth Amendment Center and Georgetown. The materials were distributed yesterday, and it will be excellent.

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SCOTUS grants cert in excessive force case

Barnes v. Felix, 23-1239 (granted Oct. 4, 2024):

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OH1: “Suspicious vehicle” report didn’t justify stop when it drove off as officers were looking at it

Officers had a report of a suspicious vehicle on an apartment complex parking lot. They stopped and shined lights on it and looked. After about a minute, the vehicle drove off. The stop was without reasonable suspicion and was a felony level stop without justification. The trial court suppressed, and it’s affirmed. State v. Jackson, 2024-Ohio-4770, 2024 Ohio App. LEXIS 3539 (1st Dist. Oct. 1, 2024).

Defense counsel’s advice to not pursue an “uncertain” motion to suppress in exchange for the government dropping a five year consecutive count for a plea was not unreasonable strategic advice. United States v. Dumay, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180184 (D.N.J. Oct. 2, 2024).*

There was probable cause for defendant’s arrest by the time his car was towed. The subjective intent of the officers alleged to be a bogus inventory is unavailing here. Then they got a search warrant. State v. Walls, 2024 Mo. App. LEXIS 711 (Oct. 1, 2024).*

There was probable cause for issuance of the search warrant so defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not challenging it. State v. Reber, 2024 N.C. App. LEXIS 756 (Oct. 1, 2024).*

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CA6: New evidence of possible Franks violation for successor habeas not adequate to possibly alter outcome

2255 petitioner’s successor petition claims newly discovered evidence from an FOIA response that casts doubt on the affidavit for the search warrant obtained in 2011. “So Duval has not shown that the search warrant affidavit contained a false statement. Nor has he shown that the absence of any DEA reports for May 2011 would be sufficient to establish—by clear and convincing evidence—that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1).” In re Duval, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 24833 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2024).*

There is statutory exclusionary rule for this taillight statute, but the stop wasn’t strictly for that, so it doesn’t apply. Flores v. Commonwealth, 2024 Va. App. LEXIS 566 (Oct. 1, 2024).*

Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective on this search claim because it lacked merit. Hardy v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178368 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2024).*

When defendant was ordered out of the car, they didn’t know he was a convicted felon. Still, they could do that under Mimms. United States v. Player, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178364 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2024).*

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MO: Def fled state and abandoned murder weapon at his grandmother’s house

When defendant fled the state to avoid arrest, he left a bag with the murder weapon at his grandmother’s house. That was abandonment. The ping of his cell phone to locate him to arrest him was with exigent circumstances. State v. McClain, 2024 Mo. App. LEXIS 704 (Oct. 1, 2024).

On the merits, plaintiff’s building was destroyed by the city as a nuisance. He was given notice before it happened and didn’t act. He’s collapsing due process and reasonableness of seizure. (His Fourth Amendment claim was first rejected as abandoned because he didn’t address it on summary judgment, and then rejected on the merits.) Brasfield v. City of Pine Bluff, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177234 (E.D. Ark. Sep. 30, 2024).*

In response to defendant’s motion to suppress, the government says that it hasn’t decided yet whether to use the evidence from defendant’s computer. Therefore, the motion is denied without prejudice to be reasserted if necessary. United States v. Baker, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177999 (W.D. Wash. Sep. 30, 2024).*

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Reason: A Houston Drug Cop’s Murder Conviction Highlights the Potentially Deadly Consequences of ‘Testifying’

Reason: A Houston Drug Cop’s Murder Conviction Highlights the Potentially Deadly Consequences of ‘Testifying’ by Jacob Sullum (“It is hard to say how often this sort of thing happens, since prosecutors, judges, and jurors tend to discount the protestations of drug defendants—especially if they have prior convictions—and automatically accept the testimony of cops like [former narcotics officer Gerald] Goines, who are presumed to be honest and dedicated public servants. But similar scandals in cities such as Baltimore, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and San Francisco show the problem of ‘testilying’ is not limited to Houston. … Similar scandals across the country suggest the problem is widespread.”)

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S.D.Ohio: City’s mowing unkempt yard wasn’t 4A violatoin

The city’s coming on to a sovereign citizen’s yard to mow it when he refused did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Prows v. City of Oxford, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177976 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 30, 2024).*

Defendant’s motion for return of property two years after his plea agreement is denied. He agreed to forfeiture. United States v. Grabau, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177030 (N.D. Iowa Sep. 30, 2024).*

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failing to file a motion to suppress a firearm found in a search warrant for drugs is dismissed. Circuit law is clear that the gun was admissible. Del Daggett v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177177 (E.D. Mo. Sep. 30, 2024).*

Plaintiff’s employment Fourth Amendment claim fails for failure to plead sufficient facts, aside from the fact it all appears waived. Friedmann v. Franklin Pierce Pub. Sch., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177586 (W.D. Wash. Sep. 30, 2024).*

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E.D.Wis.: Vehicle of arrested parolee still subject to parole search when he had no access to it

Even though this parolee was arrested and in custody, the vehicle he was in was still subject to search even though he was out of control of it at the time. His search incident on parole argument fails, too, as illogical. United States v. Smith, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176849 (E.D. Wis. Sep. 30, 2024).

2254 petitioner’s claim the Fourth Amendment was violated underlying counsel’s performance was unpreserved. Another part of the Fourth Amendment claim was relitigating what has already been lost. Adams v. Sec’y of the Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176602 (M.D. Fla. Sep. 30, 2024).*

Plaintiff fails to state sufficient facts to show that the EEOC violated the Fourth or Fifth Amendment. Cunningham v. United States Equal Opportunity Emp’t Comm’n, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176681 (D.D.C. Sep. 30, 2024).*

It is settled now that the smell of burnt cannabis was no longer probable cause in Illinois. People v. Eubanks, 2024 IL App (1st) 221229, 2024 Ill. App. LEXIS 2232 (Sept. 30, 2024).*

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CA1: Church rectory was objectively a single family dwelling; it had common living areas

It was reasonable for officers seeking a search warrant for a church rectory for child pornography to consider it a single-family dwelling. All the objective information was that it was single family residence. It turned out to be a residence with common living spaces. United States v. Jackson, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 24636 (1st Cir. Sep. 30, 2024):

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W.D.Pa.: A state court dispute over return of seized property held by feds heading toward contempt was removable to federal court

Defendant’s property was seized under a state search warrant. Defendant sought return in state court, but it had been transferred to federal officers. They refused return. Contempt was sought against the federal officers in state court and this was removable to federal court. United States v. Roberts, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175354 (W.D. Pa. Sep. 27, 2024).

The trial court erred in excluding evidence of defendant’s alcohol impairment because there was probable cause of impairment for the BAC warrant. State v. Haynes, 2024 Ga. App. LEXIS 375 (Sep. 30, 2024).*

2254 appellant got his “full and fair opportunity” to litigate his search claim in state court, so he gets no CoA here. Fuentes v. Harpe, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 24609 (10th Cir. Sep. 30, 2024).*

Plaintiff sufficiently alleged false arrest and excessive force where he was rousted from his MGM hotel room at 4 am and arrested and detained for stealing a $25 chip at a craps table when the surveillance video showed it wasn’t him. They wanted a white male and he was Hawaiian. Padilla v. Nev. Gaming Control Bd., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176499 (D. Nev. Sep. 29, 2024).*

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WA: Arrest and search for a probation violation of a conviction that could have been sealed but wasn’t yet was valid

While defendant’s drug conviction could have been sealed and thus not supported his probation violation arrest, it hadn’t been yet, and the arrest was still valid. State v. Balles, 2024 Wash. App. LEXIS 1937 (Sep. 27, 2024).

“Having reviewed [the reports and videos], the undersigned finds that competent attorneys could reasonably disagree on whether a motion to suppress challenging the length of the traffic stop was likely to succeed. As such, Norris has not shown that ‘no competent attorney would a motion to suppress would have failed[,]’ … and thus has not shown that Colvin was ineffective under Strickland.” Norris v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175798 (S.D. Ala. Sep. 5, 2024).*

“Bonner does not address the standing issue on appeal, but he repeats his claim, made before the trial court, that he ‘does not live’ nor is he ‘connected’ to the subject residence. Furthermore, the record simply contains no evidence by which the trial court could have concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, Bonner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises.” And thus no standing. State v. Bonner, 2024-Ohio-4717 (6th Dist. Sep. 27, 2024).*

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D.P.R.: REP in workplace isn’t automatic; here there wasn’t any in a postal sorting area

A reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s workspace is not automatic. Here it was a postal worker in a sorting area, and that wasn’t private. United States v. Alarcón-Rodríguez, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175916 (D.P.R. Sep. 25, 2024).*

“Because a car’s interior is ‘subject to Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable intrusions by the police,’ New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114-115, 106 S. Ct. 960, 89 L. Ed. 2d 81 (1986), ‘a justification for that action had to be offered.’” Defendant’s “altercation” where the officer unjustifiably yanked open his car door and they “struggled” over it was not probable cause for defendant’s arrest here. Commonwealth v. Tyson, 2024 Mass. App. LEXIS 130 (Sep. 30, 2024).*

Defendant was stopped in 2011 on an “investigative alert” and there was probable cause. The constitutionality of those stops wasn’t decided until 2019, so the police acted in good faith at the time. People v. Mathis, 2024 IL App (1st) 211102 (Sep. 30, 2024).*

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AL: Officer being unable to differentiate smell of MJ and hemp doesn’t negate PC

“Because probable cause does not require certainty, but only probability, we agree with the trial court that the fact that officers cannot distinguish between hemp and marijuana based on odor alone ‘does not void probable cause.’ … Other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions.” Bain v. State, 2024 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 47 (Sep. 27, 2024).

Barely avoiding a collision with a police car on a narrow country road was reasonable suspicion for a stop. State v. Deyton, 2024 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 428 (Sep. 27, 2024).*

“Here, defendant’s conduct in voluntarily unbuttoning and unzipping his own pants established that the scope of his consent included a search of the inside of his clothing.” People v. Heverly, 2024 NY Slip Op 04656 (4th Dept. Sep. 27, 2024).*

The officer ran the LPN and saw the owner had a suspended DL. Also, the car was driving too slow in the left lane. He immediately determined that the driver was not the owner, but the reasonable suspicion for the stop didn’t evaporate because of the driving violation. State v. Tomlin, 2024-Ohio-4710 (2d Dist. Sep. 27, 2024).*

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AK: Exclusionary rule doesn’t apply in civil cases

The exclusionary rule doesn’t apply in civil cases in Alaska. Alaska R.E. 412. O’Brien v. Delaplain, 2024 Alas. LEXIS 99 n.35(Sep. 27, 2024).

The officer’s observations on a table near the door from outside the dwelling during a knock-and-talk provided probable cause. Bitter v. Commonwealth, 2024 Ky. LEXIS 291 (Sep. 26, 2024).*

LPN check that showed owner’s DL suspended justified stop. State v. Tomlin, 2024-Ohio-4710 (2d Dist. Sep. 27, 2024).*

“Deputy Gallardo’s warrantless entry was objectively reasonable because it was prompted by credible information that Steve both ‘was a suicide risk and had the means to act on it.’ Clark v. Thompson, 850 F. App’x 203, 211 (5th Cir. 2021) (emphasis added); Rice, 770 F.3d at 1132. Deputy Gallardo’s entry was clearly in line with Rice, exigent circumstances existed, and no constitutional violation occurred.” Winder ex rel. J.W. v. Gallardo, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 24545 (5th Cir. Sep. 27, 2024).*

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