The emergency aid exception permitted entry into victim’s home. She hadn’t been seen all day and her child was unaccounted for. This entry was objectively reasonable, and the police were not required to use alternate means to seek to find the child which would delay them. State v. Lovejoy, 2024 ME 42, 2024 Me. LEXIS 45 (May 23, 2024).
Defendant’s landlord entered with a repairman for HVAC repair and found five dead dogs. Permitting the police to enter to check was reasonable under the emergency aid exception. Then a warrant was obtained. The dogs’ necropsy showed they’d died months earlier from lack of food and water. State v. Leuders, 2024 Conn. App. LEXIS 141 (May 28, 2024).
“In any case, here, the protective sweep was justified as a warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment. The warrantless entry was a reasonable response to police perception of possible danger based on appellant’s statement that someone else, appellant’s father, was inside the home. The fact that appellant indicated his father was not aware of the situation did not automatically negate the threat the father may have posed. Appellant had just informed police that he committed a violent crime in the house and that another person had helped him dispose of the body. It was reasonable for police to secure the premises in case other occupants posed a similar danger. The fact that police detained appellant before entering did not render the sweep unreasonable, because they had reason to believe that the house harbored at least one other person.” Pough v. Commonwealth, 2024 Va. App. LEXIS 297 (May 28, 2024)* (unpublished).
In a criminal copyright case, cookies on website led to defendant’s business and personal email accounts, and that gave nexus to them for the warrant. “Under the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the search warrant reveals a fair probability that evidence of a crime related to the operation of Jetflicks would be found within the contents of Mr. Dallmann’s personal email. account.” United States v. Dallmann, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93779 (D. Nev. May 25, 2024).
The fact a brief entry into defendant’s hotel room didn’t reveal a gun was not material for the later search warrant where there was probable cause. Shots were fired from the room, a clip was found, and there appeared to be bullet holes in the window. United States v. Thomas, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93670 (N.D. Ga. May 25, 2024).*
There were two search warrants for defendant’s cell phone, and they were issued with probable cause. The time frame of the first showed email chains starting before the start time. They were permitted to seek a second warrant to get the whole email chain starting a week earlier. “In my view, this extra week constitutes a reasonably limited ‘look back’ period for police to investigate the nature of Defendant’s relationship with the victim in the leadup to her death. The warrant appropriately ends the time period to coincide with the date when Defendant was taken into police custody.” State v. Riley, 2024 Del. Super. LEXIS 414 (May 22, 2024).
There was no Franks violation where the government emailed to the USMJ the search warrant request where defendant was arranging to meet an officer in a sting operation before defendant called off the meeting. This change wasn’t material to the other probable cause. It also wasn’t false when made. United States v. Githens, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92780 (E.D. Cal. May 22, 2024).*
Where the record wasn’t clear that defendant abandoned his cell phone but lost it because of a car crash, there wasn’t abandonment. As to inventory, “the Court here does not have sufficient evidence to determine whether there are appropriate safeguards on the GPD policy that apparently authorized this search. And where such safeguards cannot be ascertained, the inventory search cannot be upheld as an exception to the Fourth Amendment.” Guam v. Taimanglo, 2024 Guam Trial Order LEXIS 1 (Apr. 3, 2024).*
Defendant was detained but not yet arrested. “From these cases, it is clear that the use of physical restraints during a traffic stop does not automatically transform a detention into an arrest. Instead, physical restraints are merely one factor in the ‘fact-specific inquiry [] guided by the general Fourth Amendment requirement of reasonableness.’” The patdown was on reasonable suspicion. Guam v. Nicolas, 2024 Guam Trial Order LEXIS 57 (Apr. 3, 2024).*
Posted inInventory, Stop and frisk|Comments Off on E.D.Cal.: Change in facts after SW application emailed to USMJ but before signing wasn’t material or knowing false statement
Probable cause didn’t exist for a warrant to search defendant’s car after a traffic accident for the cause of the accident. “Here, given the circumstances as they existed when the search warrant was issued, we find that the magistrate did not have a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to issue the search warrant for Harris’s car. The trooper’s affidavit set forth no facts indicating that Harris had committed a crime or traffic offense.” Harris v. State, 2024 Ga. App. LEXIS 200 (May 24, 2024).
Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not moving to suppress a search that would be legal anyway because of inevitable discovery. United States v. Chaney, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 12537 (10th Cir. May 24, 2024).*
Materiality of omitted information isn’t shown. United States v. Bradley, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92919 (N.D. Ohio May 23, 2024).*
Denial of a Rule 41(g) motion for return of property lacks jurisdiction for an interlocutory appeal when there’s a pending criminal investigation. Burke v. United States, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 12590 (11th Cir. May 24, 2024).
“Considering the totality of the circumstances, the court concludes that Streit’s initial interaction with Robinson was consensual. To be sure, there were common factors indicative of a seizure present here: Robinson was aware of the police presence nearby, he could see Streit’s duty weapon in its holster and her tactical vest identifying her as a sheriff’s deputy, and she confirmed her status by announcing ‘Sheriff’s Office.’ On balance, however, the circumstances of the encounter reveal that a reasonable person in Robinson’s shoes would have believed he was free to leave. Streit circled in front of Robinson to address him face-to-face, but this did not prevent him from turning on his heel or simply stepping into the grass on either side of the sidewalk to pass by her. … She was the only officer present at the time, and she did not touch Robinson until he gave her permission to disarm him. Streit did not yell, she did not draw her gun, and she did not tell Robinson he could not leave. Robinson is an adult, there is no evidence he could not understand Streit’s questions, and their initial encounter lasted only long enough for her to find out that he was armed.” United States v. Robinson, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92587 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 25, 2024).*
Posted inConsent, Rule 41(g) / Return of property, Seizure|Comments Off on CA11: Denial of 41(g) motion for return of property not appealable while case or investigation is going on
Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a police interrogation room while he was talking to his mother under both the Fourth Amendment and the state constitution when he was led to believe it was private. “Finally, the state cites to cases from outside Rhode Island in an attempt to persuade us that Mr. Brown could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a police interrogation room. This argument fails for two reasons. First, we have unmistakably held that the Fourth Amendment and article 1, section 6 of the Rhode Island Constitution protect people, not the locations they find themselves in. Sinapi, 295 A.3d at 800. Where, as here, interrogating officers create an environment that reasonably allows an individual suspected of a crime to believe that they may have a private conversation, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of that conversation exists.” State v. Brown, 2024 R.I. LEXIS 47 (May 22, 2024). Update: techdirt: State Court Says There’s A Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy In Conversations With Non-Cops In Interrogation Rooms by Tim Cushing
The “pole camera which was installed outside Defendant’s house without a search warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment, so Defendant’s Motion to Suppress all images from the pole camera will be denied.” United States v. Delgado, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92713 (E.D. Mich. May 23, 2024).*
In a false tax preparer’s return case, a misstatement in a chart wasn’t material under Franks. Deleting the chart still left probable cause. United States v. Oliver, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92874 (N.D.W. Va. May 23, 2024).*
“We hold that binding Fourth Amendment precedent permits a K-9 officer arriving midway through a lawful traffic stop to command the driver to exit the vehicle for officer safety before conducting a lawful vehicle sweep.” [Mimms] State v. Creller, 2024 Fla. LEXIS 792 (May 23, 2024), revg Creller v. State, 336 So. 3d 817 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022).
Real time CSLI warrants for defendant’s phone was sought in 2017 before Carpenter and again in 2021. Both warrants were issued with probable cause. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 2024 PA Super 104, 2024 Pa. Super. LEXIS 200 (May 22, 2024).*
Defendant’s stop was with reasonable suspicion, and he voluntarily consented to his search. United States v. Izquierdo, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92310 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 2024).*
“With this opinion, we first reaffirm the division’s [Mayo v. United States, 284 A.3d 403 (D.C. 2022)] predicate holding, uncontested by the government, that Mr. Mayo was seized when the GRU officer dove to tackle him and grabbed his foot, even though he got away. This holding is compelled by Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306 (2021), which effectively overruled this court’s decision in Henson v. United States, 55 A.3d 859 (D.C. 2012). Second, we reject the government’s interpretation of Wardlow as authorizing police to make Terry stops whenever they perceive anyone seeking to evade them in an area labeled ‘high crime.’ We hold, in keeping with our understanding of Wardlow, that (1) in assessing reasonable articulable suspicion, flight must be examined in the context of the totality of the circumstances and (2) general locational crime evidence, if relevant and nonconclusory, may provide context for police observations of ambiguous conduct, but its appropriate weight will turn on its quality and specificity. Applying this framework, we reaffirm the division’s conclusion that Mr. Mayo’s rights under the Fourth Amendment were violated. Lastly, because the government did not seek en banc review on this question, we reinstate the division’s holding that the items of physical evidence subsequently recovered by the police from Mr. Mayo’s person and in the area of the chase were fruits of his unlawful seizure that must be suppressed.” Mayo v. United States, 2024 D.C. App. LEXIS 195 (May 23, 2024) (en banc).
Posted inReasonable suspicion|Comments Off on DC (en banc): Flight in a high crime area alone isn’t RS
“Because Owens’s motorcycle was on a public street with no displayed license plate and was uninsured, the community caretaking function applied, even though it was parked at the time of his arrest.” Owens v. Fitzgerald, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 12292 (2d Cir. May 22, 2024).
“The fact that the informant provided information ‘in lieu of criminal charges’ could plausibly support either the informant’s veracity or a lack thereof.” No probable cause shown. “Notwithstanding that conclusion, however, the court does not find that the warrant affidavit was so lacking of indicia of probable cause that it could not be reasonably relied upon by law enforcement.” United States v. Torres, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90526 (D. Utah May 20, 2024).*
“Three of the four Brown factors weigh in favor of the State. Weighing the factors together, we are satisfied that the confession in this case was sufficiently attenuated from the taint of any illegal arrest.” Rodriguez v. State, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 3508 (Tex. App. – San Antonio May 22, 2024).*
Automatic license plate readers showing points where a vehicle was located at various times can’t be compared to CSLI. The officers also had reasonable suspicion during this stop. It also did not violate state law. United States v. Salcido-Gonzalez, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91349 (D. Utah May 21, 2024):
The government sought search warrants for cell phones in California in 2024 for six alleged misdemeanors at the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021. The court finds no probable cause to believe that there is evidence on the phones three years later. In re Search Warrant for the Prop. Located at Irvine, Cal., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91322 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2024):
Defendant’s motion to suppress is granted on the exhibits and briefs without a hearing because there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop. “However, the information provided by the caller was insufficient on its own for the police to have reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. Based on the content of the call, the officers knew that Glenn was in possession of a gun. Openly carrying firearms and carrying concealed firearms are presumptively legal in Montana.” Nothing else supports reasonable suspicion. United States v. Glenn, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91171 (D. Mont. May 20, 2024).
Defendant’s completely hearsay statement that T-Mobile said it didn’t service his cell phone account doesn’t overcome the affidavit saying that they did. [Whether they did or not, what of it?] United States v. Diaz, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91129 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2024).*
The USMJ’s R&R on the Franks question is free of clear error. United States v. Ji Wang, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91119 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2024).*
Posted inFranks doctrine|Comments Off on D.Mont.: Reliable informant’s report defendant had a gun wasn’t RS because this is an open carry state
“After Charles Brumitt struck Evansville Police Department Sergeant Sam Smith, Smith defended himself by punching Brumitt four times in the face, knocking him unconscious. Brumitt sued Smith under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that Smith used excessive force in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Smith moved for summary judgment. He argued that the force he used was objectively reasonable and that, because no clearly established law held otherwise, he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied Smith’s motion, concluding that factual disputes prevented it from determining whether the force was reasonable and whether Smith was entitled to qualified immunity. … Because we conclude that the law does not clearly establish that Smith used unlawful force, we reverse the district court’s decision and remand to enter judgment for Smith.” Brumitt v. Smith, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 12092 (7th Cir. May 20, 2024).* (I tried a similar case with a jail guard accused of excessive force, and the jail training Lt. said it was justified force. Directed verdict.)
Plaintiff doesn’t get partial summary judgment on his Franks claim within a malicious prosecution case. [It’s fact bound and reads like hundreds of others, so I won’t bore you.] Folks v. Sainato, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89888 (E.D. La. May 20, 2024).*
“In sum, [plaintiffs] have failed to direct the undersigned to a case directly on-point or existing precedent placing the lawfulness of the challenged searches and seizures beyond debate. See Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64. As such, they have failed to meet their burden of establishing the Officers and/or Vaughn are not entitled to qualified immunity as to Count One. Therefore, these defendants’ motions will be granted as to Count One on qualified immunity grounds.” Howell v. McCormick, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90102 (M.D. Tenn. May 20, 2024).*
“In his first claim, Juarez-Sanchez argues that two search warrants issued in this case were not supported by probable cause. Below, the district court rejected this argument and, in the alternative, held that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. … On appeal, Juarez-Sanchez neglects to challenge the court’s application of the good faith exception; consequently, he has waived appellate review of this issue, …, so we need not consider the validity of the warrants.” United States v. Juarez-Sanchez, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 12171 (4th Cir. May 21, 2024).
Posted inExcessive force, Good faith exception|Comments Off on CA4: When PC and GFE are the issue on appeal, both have to be appealed or it’s waiver
NY evaluates the stop and continued seizure of a moving vehicle under the community caretaking function, and concludes this one continued past the need for the stop and was unreasonable. (The court notes a lot of state decisions on the question of stop of a moving vehicle.) People v. Brown, 2024 NY Slip Op 02765, 2024 NY Slip Op 02765 (May 21, 2024):
Posted inCommunity caretaking function|Comments Off on NY: Community caretaking function justified stop of a moving vehicle but its continuation was unreasonable
“After Corban Elmore’s teenage son suffered a drug overdose at Elmore’s home, law-enforcement officers secured the scene and prohibited anyone from entering the house. The officers then continued to investigate and allowed almost eight hours to elapse before applying for a search warrant. Once they had a warrant in hand, the officers searched Elmore’s home and discovered two firearms in his bedroom. Elmore entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm and now appeals the denial of his motion to suppress. Because the eight-hour seizure of Elmore’s home was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and because the exclusionary rule requires suppression of the firearms, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.” Applying Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001), the seizure of the home for eight hours when getting a search warrant was unreasonable. “We conclude that the seizure in this case violated the Fourth Amendment. Even assuming probable cause and exigency supported the initial seizure of Elmore’s home, that seizure became unreasonable when the officers made no effort to reconcile the competing interests at stake and extended the seizure longer than reasonably necessary to diligently obtain a search warrant.” United States v. Elmore, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 12144 (10th Cir. May 21, 2024).
Plaintiff doesn’t get partial summary judgment on his Franks claim within a malicious prosecution case. [It’s fact bound and reads like hundreds of others, so I won’t bore you.] Folks v. Sainato, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89888 (E.D. La. May 20, 2024).*
“In sum, [plaintiffs] have failed to direct the undersigned to a case directly on-point or existing precedent placing the lawfulness of the challenged searches and seizures beyond debate. See Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64. As such, they have failed to meet their burden of establishing the Officers and/or Vaughn are not entitled to qualified immunity as to Count One. Therefore, these defendants’ motions will be granted as to Count One on qualified immunity grounds.” Howell v. McCormick, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90102 (M.D. Tenn. May 20, 2024).*
Dropbox found child porn in defendant’s account, and it reported to NCMEC. Dropbox conducted a private search. United States v. Balog, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90179 (D. Mont. May 20, 2024).*
“Defendant argues that the search of his vehicle was improper because it did not fall in the curtilage of the home subject to the search warrant. Even assuming arguendo that defendant’s car was not within the curtilage of the home, we hold that Detective Gonzalez had independent probable cause to search defendant’s vehicle.” State v. Lamar Young, 2024 N.C. App. LEXIS 426 (May 21, 2024).*
There was an objective basis for the stop, so pretext fails. On reconsideration, what is complained about was already considered. United States v. Alexander, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90122 (D.S.C. May 20, 2024).*
“We find that Guice was, like the driver in Byrd, a driver in lawful possession or control of a rental car and the mere fact that she had retained the vehicle beyond the rental return date does not defeat her otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy. Like the unauthorized driver in Byrd, Guice, as the possessor and driver, would have the expectation of privacy that comes with the right to exclude and would be permitted to exclude third parties from it, such as a carjacker. Byrd at 1528-1529.” State v. Guice, 2024-Ohio-1914 (4th Dist. May 10, 2024).*
Drivers can have standing in rental cars. “But here, aside from the fact that the defendant was driving a car that happened to be a rental, there is no other information regarding whether the vehicle was rented to him or whether he was authorized to drive it as per the rental agreement. Similarly, there was no evidence introduced as to how Lopategui came to be in possession of the vehicle.” United States v. Lopategui-Paoli, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90495 (D.P.R. May 14, 2024).*
Defendant’s stop was based on a radio report of an older Lexus driving erratically. When the officer saw the car, the LPN was expired. The stop led to the officer smelling marijuana. The smell was enough to invoke the automobile exception. A search of the car produced a weapon. Defendant moved to suppress and sought a hearing but didn’t specify the factual disputes. The bodycam is enough to decide these issues. It’s defendant’s brother’s car, but he’s given standing to contest the search of his luggage in the car. The fact marijuana is legal in California doesn’t make it legal in a national park. United States v. Gearhart, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89743 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2024).*
The fact plaintiff was searched in the past doesn’t mean that there’s a risk of searches in the future to seek injunctive relief. Libman v. United States, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 12069 (9th Cir. May 20, 2024).*
The state post-conviction court’s determination that defendant consented to the taking of his DNA was not an unreasonable application of the law. Kennon v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89837 (M.D. Fla. May 20, 2024).*
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
