Officers could enter defendant’s curtilage to look in his just parked car at night. They had an arrest warrant for a suspected passenger and they couldn’t tell whether she was in the car before it was parked under Payton. State v. Troup, 2026 Ida. App. LEXIS 14 (Mar. 9, 2026).
Where vehicle insurance is in the DMV database showing the car insured, it is unreasonable under Rodriguez to extend the stop for not showing insurance. Petino v. State, 2026 Ga. App. LEXIS 147 (Mar. 9, 2026).
“Investigator Green’s subjective motivations for initiating the traffic stop are also irrelevant” because it was otherwise objectively reasonable. United States v. Bryant, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47891 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 9, 2026).*
The description of an arrestee as a 30ish male with the last name starting in “Mc” didn’t justify defendant’s detention in a park. People v. McGee, 2026 CO 14 (Mar. 9, 2026):
Leave to appeal denied, but one judge concurs thinking that an inordinate delay in searching a cell phone of a person not in custody can become unreasonable by the delay alone. Cavanagh v. Evans, 2026 Mich. LEXIS 434 (Mar. 6, 2026).*
“The officer reasonably suspected that Seabreeze was armed and dangerous given his movements toward the backseat, where the officer saw a backpack, Seabreeze’s apparent nervousness, and his initial non-compliance with the order to exit the car.” United States v. Seabreeze, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 6841 (3d Cir. Mar. 9, 2026).*
Defendant’s cell phone was unreasonably seized and the contents suppressed. Inevitable discovery isn’t as broad as the government argues. United States v. Patchiav, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47106 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2026)*:
The officer getting the protective sleeve from a hospital thermometer to test for defendant’s DNA wasn’t unreasonable. Mundt v. State, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 2126 (Tex. App. – Texarkana Mar. 6, 2026) (unpublished).
After an initial inspection of this vessel, the Coast Guard saw a passenger throwing packages overboard, and that was justification for a second stop and attempting forfeiture. United States v. One (1) 27′ Ctr. Console Vessel (PR-2881BB/ El Cadillac), 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46990 (D.P.R. Mar. 5, 2026).*
There was reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop for one traffic offense, so the other one he contests doesn’t have to be addressed. State v. Weber, 320 Neb. 934 (Mar. 5, 2026).*
Information from his PO justified defendant’s arrest on a warrant at his brother’s place. He’d been arrested there before, and he was seen there. Officers did not need to exclude other possible places he should have been first. United States v. Martinez-Hipolito, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 6785 (6th Cir. Mar. 5, 2026).
There was probable cause for search of defendant’s cell phone based on information child pornography was coming from it. United States v. Day, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 6788 (6th Cir. Mar. 5, 2026).*
Defendant gets his cell phone and wallet back because the government has no need to keep them for evidence. United States v. Arrington, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46958 (D. Idaho Mar. 5, 2026).*
Posted inRule 41(g) / Return of property|Comments Off on CA6: PO’s information that def was probably at a house was enough to arrest him there on a warrant
“Defendant was charged with committing specific acts of violence against an identifiable person, who reported the incident. An arrest itself cannot be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree, and defendant himself was not a suppressible fruit. Nor was he entitled to suppression or a Mapp hearing in regard to clothing he wore during arrest, which was seized at the precinct. Finally, parts of the motion seeking suppression or hearings on Payton violation grounds because officers pulled him out of his doorway after he opened the door was denied.” People v. Honyghan, 2026 NYLJ LEXIS 311 (N.Y. Co. Feb. 5, 2026).
Unlawful arrest doesn’t lead to release from custody. Noori v. Soto, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46396 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2026)
Plaintiff’s decedent fired a gun into the air to celebrate New Years. An officer nearby perceived a threat claiming he started to point the gun at him. That’s a fact question for trial; no qualified immunity. Williams v. City of Canton, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 6705 (6th Cir. Mar. 6, 2026).*
‘In Ground Four, Defendant argues as follows: The warrant and affidavit w[ere] invalid. The warrant’s scope was exceeded. The affidavit was facially invalid. Counsel did not challenge this. Again, the Court will not ‘fashion Defendant’s arguments for him’ when Defendant’s contentions are conclusory and not supported by specific factual allegations. … Such ‘[c]onclusory allegations’ and ‘vague descriptions of the alleged deficient performance’ do not suffice to establish the deficiency prong of Strickland. …” United States v. LaFever, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46324 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 5, 2026).*
Police with a warrant for defendant could enter a third party’s premises to arrest him on probable cause that he was present. Under Steagald, defendant had no more reasonable expectation of privacy in the third party’s premises than the owner or prime resident would. United States v. Butler, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 6663 (8th Cir. Mar. 6, 2026).
Plaintiff gets summary judgment on an unlawful entry into his curtilage to arrest him without a warrant. It was clearly established that a warrant was required, but for exigent circumstances, and the defense justifications for that are lacking. Moore v. Finley, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45460 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 5, 2026).*
Defendant’s new habeas claim that the USMJ violated his judicial role in an NIT/Playpen warrant nine years ago is a successive petition. The Fourth Amendment claim was litigated long ago. United States v. Jones, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45444 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 5, 2026).*
Just because the state seizes a cell phone doesn’t mean they know the Brady implications of the contents. Moss v. Jeffreys, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45716 (D. Neb. Mar. 4, 2026) (§ 60.58 n.2)
2255 petitioner’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective for not pursuing a motion to suppress the search of his cell phone is denied because defense counsel did litigate one. Smith v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45698 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 9, 2026).*
Plaintiff’s complaint he was unreasonably seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment doesn’t satisfy the Rule 8 “short, plain statement” of facts that show a seizure. Keith v. Romain, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45625 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2026).*
The affidavit for search warrant for defendant’s cell phone was based on probable cause, and, even if it wasn’t, the good faith exception applies. United States v. Rondon-Perez, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45833 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2026).*
“The Anders point to no case holding that officers violated the Fourth Amendment in the process of levying property pursuant to a valid writ of execution. ‘For search and seizure claims, the Supreme Court has cautioned that “courts should define the clearly established right at issue on the basis of the specific context of the case.’” … Even defined at a level of generality inappropriate for qualified immunity, the Anders cannot show that the law is clearly established in this Fourth Amendment context for entry, search, or seizure of property.” [Indeed, a judicial authorized order to execute on property would usually satisfy the Fourth Amendment.] Anders v. Rumfield, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 6614 (5th Cir. Mar. 5, 2026).*
On qualified immunity: “This case, however, is a he-said, she-said type of matter arising out of a domestic violence protection order. The officer was not at the marital residence at the time the alleged PFA violation occurred. Consequently, in her complaint, plaintiff pled the factual basis upon which the arrest was made, or, as she asserts, the lack of factual basis to support probable cause. Therefore, the complaint’s own allegations define the universe of information available to the officer at the time of arrest (and prosecution) for an evaluation of qualified immunity. That same universe of facts informs whether existing precedent put the officer on notice that his conduct was unlawful. Unlike most cases where qualified immunity is raised on a 12(b)(6) motion, the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient for the court to define the right with specificity and to assess whether existing precedent clearly established that those facts were insufficient to support probable cause.” Hontz v. Bednarski, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45688 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2026).*
“On August 12, 2025, seven U.S. Marshals partially surrounded Defendant Judge Alston’s car over a minor parking violation. The Government concedes that before Alston gave any consent, a Marshal began illegally searching his car. Because that initial illegal search both tainted Alston’s subsequent consent and rendered it involuntary, the court will GRANT Alston’s Motion to Suppress Tangible Evidence.” By searching Alston’s car without first asking for his permission, Lozada implied to Alston that his consent was unnecessary—he ‘ha[d] no right to resist the search’ that the Marshals had already begun. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550.” The fact the initial search found nothing isn’t determinative. United States v. Alston, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45664 (D.D.C. Mar. 5, 2026).
“After careful review, we conclude that arguable exigent circumstances supported Shullaw’s initial detention, the initial entry into his home, and the brief search inside. So we reverse the denial of qualified immunity as to those claims. The Deputies had been dispatched to Shullaw’s home in relation to an open missing-persons case involving an 8-year-old girl, and Shullaw answered the door with a gun in his left hand after chambering a round, which created an audible “racking” noise that the Deputies heard outside. In these ambiguous circumstances, with potentially serious consequences, we cannot say it would have been apparent to any reasonable officer that it was unlawful to detain Shullaw pending further investigation.” Shullaw v. McMullen, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 6593 (11th Cir. Mar. 5, 2026).*
Based on two bases of collective knowledge, the officer had justification for a stop and a search, so the justification for the drug dog isn’t even relevant. United States v. Carter, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45275 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 5, 2026).
Defendant isn’t charged with the drugs found in the CI’s car, so he doesn’t have standing to challenge it. United States v. Hardison, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44702 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 3, 2026).*
Franks hearing denied: “Defendant has neither: (1) ‘accompanied [these allegations with] an offer of proof’ in the form of ‘affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses’ or any other evidence, that makes the requisite preliminary showing that Officer Frampton knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, included a false statement in his Affidavit, or omitted information from his Affidavit, knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth; nor (2) otherwise satisfactorily explained the absence of such offers of proof.” United States v. Lindsey, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44555 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2026).*
2254 petitioner’s claim the officer perjured himself during his suppression hearing doesn’t overcome the Stone bar. Soliven v. Thornell, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45209 (D. Ariz. Mar. 5, 2026).
2254 petitioner’s effort to include an “inadvertently omitted” Fourth Amendment claim after his original 2254 claim was denied is a successor petition. Bethel v. Louthan, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 6550 (10th Cir. Mar. 5, 2026).*
Habeas petitioner’s Fourth Amendment and ineffective assistance of counsel claim is time barred and dismissed. Frazier v. Meisner, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44765 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 2, 2026).*
Posted inIssue preclusion, Waiver|Comments Off on D.Ariz.: Alleged perjury at state suppression hearing doesn’t overcome Stone bar
Plaintiff doesn’t state a claim for a “constructive seizure” by telling someone else of a warrant being out. Gladden v. Bd. of Educ. of Harford Cty., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45075 (D. Md. Mar. 5, 2026).*
Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim that defense counsel didn’t properly argue a Fourth Amendment claim is denied. Counsel succeeded in getting two phones suppressed. He’s not specific as to what else. United States v. Armstrong, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45127 (D. Minn. Mar. 5, 2026).*
Nexus was shown for search warrants for defendant’s email and social media accounts being somehow connected to the offense. United States v. Luthor, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45158 (D. Minn. Mar. 5, 2026).*
Reason: Controversial Geofence Warrants Face Supreme Court Challenge by J.D. Tuccille (“It sometimes seems technology provides a moving target for the Fourth Amendment, evolving new means of snooping on people while courts struggle to keep up. That’s the case with Chatrie v. United States, in which the U.S. Supreme Court will soon determine how much leeway the authorities have to electronically search whole geographic areas to discover who was present. Civil liberties groups like the Institute for Justice and the Electronic Frontier Foundation are scrambling to hold the line on search-and-seizure protections in a world where smartphones create a constant record of most people’s locations.”)
Posted ingeofence, SCOTUS|Comments Off on Reason: Controversial Geofence Warrants Face Supreme Court Challenge
The mistaken year here was no mere typo that can be overlooked. It was repeated three times, and it made the probable cause showing stale. State v. Harris, 2026 N.J. Super. LEXIS 35 (Mar. 5, 2026):
Defendant’s mid-trial motion to suppress can’t be justified and was waiver. United States v. Cooks, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 6547 (10th Cir. Mar. 5, 2026).
Defendant’s post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal alleging conclusory violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment alleges nothing and is denied. United States v. Rambang, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44527 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 4, 2026).*
The search warrant for the premises included his gun safe without specifying it. The warrant satisfied inevitable discovery over his statements. United States v. Severance, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44770 (D. Alaska Mar. 4, 2026).*
Police actions in dispersing a crowd were not a seizure, even using less than lethal force. Perkins v. City of Des Moines, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 6528 (8th Cir. Mar. 5, 2026).*
CBP officer’s conviction for excessive force on a detainee is affirmed. United States v. Delgado, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 6254 (5th Cir. Mar. 3, 2026).*
“In fact, in making this decision, the question is not whether Brown actually had probable cause, but only whether he arguably had probable cause. Galanakis v. City of Newton, Iowa, 134 F.4th 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2025); Joseph v. Allen, 712 F.3d 1222, 1226 (8th Cir. 2013) (arguable probable cause exists even if officer mistakenly arrests a suspect, so long as the mistake is objectively reasonable). … It was objectively reasonable for Brown to believe that Nelson was the suspect driving away from the fight. Although unpleasant for Nelson, objectively reasonable mistakes of fact do not violate the Fourth Amendment. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014).” Nelson v. Brown, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44284 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 2, 2026).*
Defendant was on the patio of a bar drinking a beer, and his motorcycle was 50-100′ away with his backpack on it. He was arrested, and he’d arranged for others to take his motorcycle. The backpack was seized and searched. It was not abandoned, and it was not a proper inventory. United States v. White, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44504 (D. Minn. Jan. 14, 2026).
Defendant’s stop revealed marijuana in plain view, and that was reasonable suspicion for a probation search, too. United States v. Ellison, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44441 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2026).*
Defendant was stopped because his LPN didn’t match his truck, and reasonable suspicion quickly developed allowing for a dog sniff. The dog alerted, so the automobile exception applies. Fort Peck Tribes v. Grandchamp, 2026 Mont. Fort Peck Tribe LEXIS 3 (Mar. 3, 2026).*
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
