D.D.C.: Illegal search on stop tainted consent

“On August 12, 2025, seven U.S. Marshals partially surrounded Defendant Judge Alston’s car over a minor parking violation. The Government concedes that before Alston gave any consent, a Marshal began illegally searching his car. Because that initial illegal search both tainted Alston’s subsequent consent and rendered it involuntary, the court will GRANT Alston’s Motion to Suppress Tangible Evidence.” By searching Alston’s car without first asking for his permission, Lozada implied to Alston that his consent was unnecessary—he ‘ha[d] no right to resist the search’ that the Marshals had already begun. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550.” The fact the initial search found nothing isn’t determinative. United States v. Alston, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45664 (D.D.C. Mar. 5, 2026).

“After careful review, we conclude that arguable exigent circumstances supported Shullaw’s initial detention, the initial entry into his home, and the brief search inside. So we reverse the denial of qualified immunity as to those claims. The Deputies had been dispatched to Shullaw’s home in relation to an open missing-persons case involving an 8-year-old girl, and Shullaw answered the door with a gun in his left hand after chambering a round, which created an audible “racking” noise that the Deputies heard outside. In these ambiguous circumstances, with potentially serious consequences, we cannot say it would have been apparent to any reasonable officer that it was unlawful to detain Shullaw pending further investigation.” Shullaw v. McMullen, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 6593 (11th Cir. Mar. 5, 2026).*

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