CO: Opening car door to aid drug dog sniff was a search

The drug dog officer facilitated the drug-detection dog’s entry into Pham’s vehicle by leaving the door open and partially closing and reopening it to allow the dog to enter. That constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, following Felders v. Malcolm from the Tenth Circuit. That search was conducted without probable cause, and the officers had no indication defendant was involved in criminal activity or that his vehicle contained contraband beyond the traffic violation. The court recognized that instinctive action from the dog likely would not constitute a search, but that is not this. People v. Dinh Pham, 2025 CO 4, 2025 Colo. LEXIS 89 (Feb. 3, 2025):

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CA6: Impeaching def’s trial testimony about the search of his property using his proffer agreement was prejudicial, but harmless

Impeaching defendant’s trial testimony about the search of his property using his proffer agreement was prejudicial, but it was harmless on this record. They could have cross-examined without it. United States v. Grogan, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 2354 (6th Cir. Feb. 3, 2025). [In my experience, any testimony about the conduct of the search isn’t really relevant, unless you can show evidence was planted, and it opens the door for the prosecution to go into things that sure won’t help.]

Probable cause was shown for the warrant here even without defendant’s statement. United States v. Campbell, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19358 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 4, 2025).*

This case involved an anti-doping allegation about the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. The search warrant for defendant’s phone was sufficiently particular as to the crime under investigation to guide the search. United States v. Barrett, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18935 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2025).*

The trial court’s order on impoundment and inventory is reversed for more findings. The impoundment might have been unnecessary because defendant wanted to have the vehicle towed. The unwritten inventory is too nebulous to understand, even with the discussion on bodycam. Huertas v. State, 2025 Ga. App. LEXIS 31 (Feb. 3, 2025).*

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D.S.D.: Tribal officers governed by 4A and Indian Civil Rights Act

“The Fourth Amendment, not ICRA, applies here. For one thing, BIA officers are federal officers empowered by federal statute to act. For another, even if Dillon and Flute subjectively believed they were enforcing tribal law—which the Court is convinced of—they still had independent federal authority to arrest Bromwich for possessing marijuana. This is true despite South Dakota condoning medical-marijuana, and federal funding limitations placed on the Department of Justice to discourage enforcing the federal prohibition. Cannabis remains federally prohibited as a Schedule I drug. The federal officers were exercising their federal powers when interacting with Bromwich. The Fourth Amendment is the instrument to analyze Bromwich’s motion. But no matter, ICRA adopts Fourth Amendment precedent. So the distinction has no difference.” United States v. Bromwich, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 238961 (D.S.D. Dec. 20, 2024).

On appeal from the R&R:

Even if Dillon and Flute were acting under tribal law, “[t]he Supreme Court has recognized that tribal law enforcement authorities possess ‘traditional and undisputed power to exclude persons whom they deem to be undesirable from tribal lands,’ and therefore have ‘the power to restrain those who disturb public order on the reservation, and if necessary to eject them.'” … “Because such power ‘would be meaningless if tribal police were not empowered to investigate [the undesirable conduct], tribal police must have such power.'” … Therefore, Dillon and Flute did not violate Bromwich’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure because they had the authority to investigate Bromwich’s drug possession and determine whether to eject him from the reservation.

United States v. Bromwich, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17753 (D.S.D. Jan. 29, 2025). And, even if there wasn’t probable cause for defendant’s arrest, his active resistance was an independent crime that justified it.

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CA9: Knock-and-announce failure doesn’t lead to suppression

Knock-and-announce failure doesn’t lead to suppression. United States v. Benlevi, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 2452 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2025).

Police were called to a motel where a vehicle was illegally parked in a handicapped zone for an hour allegedly dealing drugs to hotel occupants. The police approach of the car was valid under Terry, and drugs were seen in plain view. Johnson v. State, 2025 Miss. App. LEXIS 48 (Feb. 4, 2025).*

Petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claims in state court, so he can’t bring them in habeas. CoA denied. Butler v. Campbell, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 2458 (6th Cir. Feb. 3, 2025).*

The district court had no jurisdiction over petitioner’s Rule 60 motion for newly discovered evidence about his search, so CoA denied. Price v. United States, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 2460 (6th Cir. Feb. 3, 2025).*

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D.Minn.: Rehashing 4A argument to USMJ isn’t a proper objection to the R&R

Defendant’s general objections to the R&R on his search claims don’t attempt to show the alleged errors in the USMJ’s reasoning and just rehashed the original arguments. Overruled, and adopted. United States v. Shaka, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19267 (D. Minn. Feb. 4, 2025).*

The government carried its burden of consent. “The dispositive facts that require denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress are that Mrs. Ramos gave the NYPD written and verbal consent to search her apartment, and there is no evidence of coercion by the police that would render her consent involuntary. … There is no dispute that Mrs. Ramos signed a Consent Form. See GX1; Tr. at 123:9 (Mrs. Ramos: ‘I signed it.’). It states that she ‘voluntarily consent[ed] to a complete search’ of her apartment. GX1. The Consent Form that Mrs. Ramos indisputably signed also advised her of her rights to ‘refuse’ and to ‘revoke’ her consent, in whole or in part, at any time. GX1. Further, at the hearing, the defendant’s own witness, Tiffany Mercado, testified that the police ‘asked’ for and received Mrs. Ramos’ verbal consent to search the closet where they found the rifle and ammunition the defense seeks to suppress.” United States v. Ramos, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18056 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2025).*

A tracking order to install a tracker on a package left outdoors expected to be moved again permitted entry into the backyard of an apartment house to place it. Also, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in that backyard. United States v. Bell, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19151 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2025).*

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OH5: Drug dog officer’s touching car to redirect dog wasn’t a search

The officer’s briefly touching the vehicle’s exterior to redirect the canine’s focus did not constitute a search. The dog’s certification and training were sufficient to establish its reliability, absent conflicting evidence from the defendant. This traffic stop was not unconstitutionally extended because the canine sniff did not add time to the stop. The dog was already present before all occupants had exited the vehicle. State v. Bond, 2025-Ohio-360 (5th Dist. Feb. 3, 2025).

This murder search warrant was not stale. It was based on information developed in December 2022 corroborated by DNA and other evidence in June 2023. State v. Barnes, 2025 Del. Super. LEXIS 37 (Jan. 29, 2025).*

Defendant’s request for a Franks hearing is denied. Even with omissions, there remained probable cause. United States v. Witmer, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17909 (D. Mont. Jan. 31, 2025).*

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IN: Cell phone ping to locate missing 13-year-old was with exigent circumstances

The ping of defendant’s cell phone to find him when a 13-year-old girl went missing was based on exigency under state statute. Brooks v. State, 2025 Ind. App. LEXIS 19 (Jan. 31, 2025).

All the factors supported reasonable suspicion: CI tip, flight, high-crime area, other evasive conduct. United States v. Rodgers, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17258 (W.D. La. Jan. 22, 2025).*

While recognizing that staleness in child pornography cases can have an nearly unlimited lifespan, “the Court is mindful that there is some limit on the bounds of evidence not becoming stale, even in the child pornography context, it finds this case does not cross the line.” There was probable cause and the good faith exception applies. United States v. Scherer, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17475 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2025).*

There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in an LPN from being checked. United States v. Winters, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17401 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 31, 2025).*

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NY4: Def proved IAC for failure to move to suppress cell phone search

Defendant satisfied his burden showing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in defense counsel’s failure to move to suppress his cell phone search. People v. Conley, 2025 NY Slip Op 00597 (4th Dept. Jan. 31, 2025).*

The order suppressing the search warrant for lack of probable cause is affirmed. The trial court faulted the chain of custody of the result of the trash search. People v. Scullin, 2025 NY Slip Op 00559 (4th Dept. Jan. 31, 2025).*

Defendant’s presence in a room with drugs two years before the search in question didn’t prove his knowledge here. People v. Henderson, 2025 NY Slip Op 00537 (4th Dept. Jan. 31, 2025).*

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TN: Ptf’s actions at DV call justified officers’ greater force

The totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the domestic violence call, appellant’s armed presence near the scene, his rapid movement towards the officers while armed, and the short timeframe, made the officers’ use of deadly force objectively reasonable from the perspective of a reasonable officer. Officers need not wait for a suspect to point a gun before using deadly force if they reasonably perceive a threat of severe harm. Holland v. Cheatham Cty., 2025 Tenn. App. LEXIS 28 (Jan. 28, 2025).

Petitioner’s successor petition on ineffective assistance of counsel is denied. That’s not proper grounds. In re Davis, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 2197 (11th Cir. Jan. 30, 2025).*

“Here, it is uncontroverted that Mitchell abandoned his bicycle, together with the attached brown satchel and its contents, before Deputy Sams was able to catch and physically seize him. … Furthermore, although Mitchell later admitted to deputies his ownership of the items in his jacket, he conspicuously refused to speak up or answer any questions about the satchel. … In other words, when offered the opportunity to reassert his ownership in the previously abandoned brown satchel and its contents, Mitchell remained mum.” United States v. Mitchell, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16316 (W.D. La. Jan. 13, 2025),* adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15339 (W.D. La. Jan. 28, 2025).*

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KS: Def voluntarily disclosed his cell phone passcode to the officers when the officer said he’d get a warrant

Defendant voluntarily disclosed his cell phone passcode to the officers when the officer said he’d get a warrant for it. State v. Harris, 2025 Kan. LEXIS 5 (Jan. 31, 2025):

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ID: State completely failed to support justification for inventory

“The record is devoid of evidence to support the conclusion that Detective Uhrig’s decision to impound Smith’s car was reasonable under the circumstances.” The inventory depending on the legality of the impoundment. Reversed. State v. Smith, 2025 Ida. LEXIS 8 (Jan. 30, 2025).

The affidavit for search warrant for defendant’s phone actually lacked probable cause, but the trial court found the good faith exception applied. On appeal, that finding was not against the preponderance of the evidence. Vasquez v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 65 (Feb. 5, 2025).* (The conviction was reversed on other grounds.)

The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies, and thus evidence obtained from Carter’s real-time cell site location information should not be suppressed, because law enforcement officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the federal Stored Communications Act, which explicitly permitted this. State v. Carter, 2025 S.C. LEXIS 14 (Jan. 29, 2025).*

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MS: Admitted “general crime control” roadblock still upheld based on part-time officer’s inexperience

While the officer in charge of the DL roadblock (highway safety) essentially admitted it was for general crime control (see Edmund v. City of Indianapolis), the court goes with the DUI arrest being valid. The officer “was the most inexperienced law enforcement officer for the Town of Puckett. That’s not his fault. That’s just the nature of what it is. He started in January of 2023. He’s a part-time worker. He does other work primarily. This is a part-time job for him.” Kendrick v. State, 2025 Miss. LEXIS 23 (Jan. 30, 2025). This is reminiscent of the Barney Fife exception to the Fourth Amendment.

On a turn signal violation: “… the question is not whether Moore was affected by Defendant’s turn; the question is whether Moore had probable cause to believe that he may have been affected. Moore was the only vehicle traveling in the area. He was traveling directly behind Defendant. Moore did not need to turn his vehicle or stop abruptly — or stop at all — due to Defendant’s failure to use a turn signal.” United States v. Bailey, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15485 (N.D.W.Va. Jan. 29, 2025).*

The body cam video shows defendant consented to the search of his vehicle and didn’t seek to limit it in any way. State v. Warren, 2025-Ohio-256 (7th Dist. Jan. 28, 2025).*

No 2254 CoA for defendant’s Fourth Amendment litigated in state court on plain error review. Youngblood v. Corrigan, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 2076 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 2025).*

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CA3: There is no REP in the exterior of a package in transit

The initial detention and exterior inspection of the parcel sent to defendant did not implicate his Fourth Amendment rights because it occurred within the guaranteed delivery window. He had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the exterior of the parcel given to a mail carrier. His only possessory interest was in the timely delivery of the parcel, which was not infringed during the initial detention. Then, officers obtained a search warrant and had reasonable suspicion to further detain the parcel after discovering methamphetamine within the delivery window. United States v. Ali-White, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 2112 (3d Cir. Jan. 30, 2025).*

The affirmation of counsel doesn’t satisfy the Second Circuit’s rule of a standing affidavit from the defendant. United States v. Rivera-Valentin, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16236 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2025),* adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15131 (W.D. N.Y. Jan. 28, 2025).*

The search of defendant’s car was justified by the smell of marijuana and the passenger’s consent to look for his keys. State v. Falcon, 33 Neb. App. 331 (Jan. 28, 2025).*

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NY Erie Co.: State prosecutors have no control over federal officers involved in state search for discovery purposes

State prosecutors aren’t necessarily obliged to give over information on federal officers present at a state search considering they have no control over them and their testimony may be hard fought via Touhy letters and they may have nothing additional to add. People v. Adams, 2025 NY Slip Op 25019, 2025 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 409 (Erie Co. Jan. 28, 2025).

Where a motion to suppress would not have succeeded, defense counsel can be ineffective for not moving to suppress. McGrier v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 238619 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 17, 2024),* adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13915 (S.D. W.Va. Jan. 27, 2025).*

Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective on his parole search question. “Fortson cannot establish either prong of the Strickland standard because had prior counsel made this argument at the hearing, it would have failed.” United States v. Fortson, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15520 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 29, 2025).*

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AR: Questions about legality of search before jury properly excluded under 403

Where the trial court denied the pretrial motion to suppress, cross-examination of the officer about the legality of the search was properly denied on objection by the state as potentially misleading to the jury. Damon v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 50, 2025 Ark. App. LEXIS 59 (Jan. 29, 2025).

Informant hearsay was extensively corroborated, so plaintiff’s suit against the search with the warrant fails. Annappareddy v. United States, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 1863 (4th Cir. Jan. 28, 2025).*

Ancient Roman statue was seized from a NYC art gallery by the Manhattan DA’s office getting a warrant for its return to Italy. Italy is immune, and the DA gets qualified immunity. The gallery bought it for $150,000. Safani Gallery, Inc. v. Italian Republic, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2025).*

Defendant shows no possessory interest in a gun seized from a car he was a passenger in and has no standing. United States v. Webber, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14706 (W.D. Va. Jan. 27, 2025).*

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E.D.Mo.: Putting def’s cell phone into airplane mode wasn’t a search

Putting defendant’s cell phone into airplane mode wasn’t a search. The name “Red” was seen on the screen. There was independent probable cause for the cell phone warrant. United States v. Hudson, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14952 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 2025).

This was a search warrant for documentary evidence not mentioning firearms, but the police came upon firearms subject to plain view and could seize them. United States v. King, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15070 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 27, 2025).*

“‘It is well established that a police seizure and inventory is not dependent for its validity upon the absolute necessity for the police to take charge of property to preserve it.’” Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not challenging the inventory because it was valid. Fowler v. State, 2025 Ga. App. LEXIS 20 (Jan. 28, 2025).*

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OH5: When the trial court sustains a search on two grounds and only one is appealed, the decision will be affirmed

When the trial court sustains a search on two grounds and only one is appealed, the decision will be affirmed. State v. Alexander, 2025-Ohio-236 (4th Dist. Jan. 23, 2025).

In an animal seizure case, state law requires a post-seizure administrative hearing. Bakos v. Roach, 2025 Cal. App. LEXIS 39 (3d Dist. Jan. 29, 2025).*

The affidavit could have provided more detail about the CI, but it still cleared the bar for probable cause. United States v. Guzman, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 1968 (6th Cir. Jan. 27, 2025).*

Plaintiff had his truck stolen, and he reported it. He recovered the truck but the same LPN was on it and still in the system because he didn’t tell them. The stop for being in a stolen truck was reasonable. Cook v. Boss, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 1966 (6th Cir. Jan. 27, 2025).*

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WA: Long on vehicle protective sweeps not overruled by Gant

Michigan v. Long on protective sweeps of vehicles when a weapon is reasonably feared was not overruled by Gant. State v. Howard, 2025 Wash. App. LEXIS 151 (Jan. 28, 2025).

The protective sweep would have been invalid but for valid consent by the person in control. Commonwealth v. Brinkley, 2025 PA Super 24 (Jan. 28, 2025).*

This is a NYC housing dispute that includes a Fourth Amendment claim. The Fourth Amendment claim seems to be real stretch here, and, in any event, it can be adjudicated in state court. Therefore, Younger applies. 216 E. 29th St. Tr. v. City of N.Y., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15267 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2025).*

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TN: Domestic and road rage call is a “serious crime” when evaluating officer’s use of force

When evaluating an officer’s use of force in responding to a domestic and road rage call involving a weapon, it is considered a serious crime. The use of force here was reasonable. Holland v. Cheatham Cty., 2025 Tenn. App. LEXIS 28 (Jan. 28, 2025).*

“Even if reasonable suspicion had not firmly been established at the time of the stop, Defendant’s behavior during the stop, considered in conjunction with Trooper Pope’s knowledge of the drug-trafficking investigation, certainly did so. Most notably, Defendant lied to Trooper Pope.”
United States v. Harrington, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13983 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 27, 2025).*

Removing the alleged unlawful information from the search warrant application from defendant’s unreasonable stop in the Anchorage airport still leaves probable cause. The good faith exception also applies. United States v. Williams, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14308 (D. Alaska Jan. 27, 2025).*

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ABA: Considering Face Value: The Complex Legal Implications of Facial Recognition Technology

Michael Christopher Naught, Considering Face Value: The Complex Legal Implications of Facial Recognition Technology (ABA Criminal Justice Jan. 20, 2025):

The increasing adoption of FRT and AI necessitates careful examination of their legal and ethical ramifications. These cutting-edge technologies raise complex issues surrounding the use of facial recognition technology in law enforcement, analyzing its impact on individual rights, and exploring the ongoing efforts to strike a balance between security and privacy.

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