Mandamus to get search warrant materials from 1998 denied: “Insua’s instant petition is lacking because it does not conform to Montana statutes. He has not filed a verified petition or included an affidavit, pursuant to § 27-26-201, MCA. Insua has not served the District Court against whom the writ is directed. Section 27-26-205, MCA. Moreover, his petition is not appropriate for mandamus. Insua has not demonstrated that he is entitled to the performance of a clear legal duty in his request for a search warrant.” Insua v. Twenty-First Judicial Dist. Court, 2020 Mont. LEXIS 526 (Feb. 18, 2020).
The court credits that one of the officers reasonably believed defendant was armed and he delayed the frisk slightly for safety reasons. The officer used code language to other officer so he’d know, too. The stop was valid and the frisk was with reasonable suspicion. United States v. Churchill, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27835 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2020).*
“Just as numerous courts have stated nervousness cannot be a reliable indicator of criminal activity, loudly asserting one’s right to terminate an encounter with officers does not provide reasonable suspicion for continued investigation of suspected criminal activity.” United States v. Arrington, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27765 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 19, 2020):
“Other media” in a search warrant includes cell phones. United States v. Oliver, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 5035 (8th Cir. Feb. 19, 2020):
“Mr. Lynn does not raise a non-frivolous issue for appeal. Below, the District Court granted summary judgment to the defendant officers because it concluded Mr. Lynn’s Fourth Amendment claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. … [¶] The District Court rightly concluded that Mr. Lynn’s Fourth Amendment claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment in his criminal case. After his arrest by the defendant officers, Mr. Lynn was tried and convicted of various drug offenses and a firearms offense in state court. Before trial, Mr. Lynn sought to suppress the fruits of the search of his hotel room and the recording of his phone call. The trial court denied this motion and overruled Mr. Lynn’s later objections to the evidence on the grounds that the search was illegal. Thus, ‘[b]ecause the state court did squarely adjudicate the issue of the lawfulness of the search, [Mr. Lynn’s] section 1983 suit is nothing but a prohibited appeal of the state-court judgment.’ See Datz, 51 F.3d at 254. For these reasons, there is no non-frivolous argument that the District Court could have entertained Mr. Lynn’s § 1983 claims.” Lynn v. Quinn, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 5038 (11th Cir. Feb. 18, 2020).
The tracking warrant issue date was mistaken. The court finds it was the latter of two dates, and the tracking occurred for only five days, within the requirements of Rule 41(e)(2)(C). Whether the tracking warrant complied with state law is irrelevant in federal court. United States v. Isget, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27394 (D. Mont. Feb. 18, 2020).
2255 petitioner’s IAC search claim fails: “even if counsel had made the additional arguments proffered by Petitioner, the motion to suppress would still have been denied.” Pierce v. United States, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27203 (D.S.C. Feb. 18, 2020).*
A shooting occurred in a Taco Bell parking lot, apparently a drug deal gone bad. Three cell phones were found in the car. The police searched them without a warrant and one was defendants. The state argued abandonment (which it clearly was, leaving a cell phone at a crime scene in flight), and also reasonableness because the search was limited to finding the identity of the owner. The court goes with the latter. State v. Moore, 2020 S.C. LEXIS 14 (Feb. 19, 2020):
Appeal.org: Commentary: The Enduring Trauma of Stop-and-Frisk by Jamal Trulove (“As a Black child in San Francisco, I learned early that mine and others’ bodies meant nothing to those supposedly tasked with our protection.”)
There is no Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy in VA medical records, vis-a-vis another government agency. United States v. Grant, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27270 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2020):
“Modern cell phones are unique devices, capable of storing vast amounts of personal data. To guard against governmental invasion of this information, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution generally requires explicit authorization to search a cell phone through a court-issued warrant. Like other warrants, a cell phone warrant must be based on probable cause of criminal activity and must limit the scope of the cell phone search to the probable cause determination. Because the cell phone search at issue in this case did not comport with these criteria, we reverse.” State v. Fairley, 2020 Wash. App. LEXIS 355 (Feb. 18, 2020).
The state search warrant was for “any and all electronic data processing and storage devices.” While the warrant did not include cell phones, a smartphone is internet capable and has vast storage. Therefore, it reasonably included defendant’s smartphone. In addition, the good faith exception applies. United States v. Pospisil, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27075 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 18, 2020).
The USMJ determined that defendant made his burden of showing material falsity in the boilerplate information in the affidavit for search warrant and granted a Franks hearing. In a really long opinion, the USDJ agrees with the falsity but finds it wasn’t material to the probable cause showing and overrules the R&R. United States v. Cloyd, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26962 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 18, 2020) (one can’t help but think that maybe the hearing would have been easier in the long run):
The Mercury News: Caltrans settles claims of unconstitutional homeless ‘sweeps’ for $5.5 million by Marisa Kendall (“In a deal with statewide implications, Caltrans has agreed to pay $5.5 million to settle claims that the agency illegally destroyed the property of homeless residents camped on its land.”)