A lockbox in a backpack removed from defendant’s person when he was arrested was not subject to search incident. The state relied on Gant, but it applies to vehicles. Rivera v. State, 2024 Fla. App. LEXIS 8647 (Fla. 2d DCA Nov. 8, 2024).
Defendant’s objections to the R&R fail to show his standing or to undermine the probable cause finding. United States v. Qualls, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203024 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2024).*
Defendant’s arrest was with probable cause, and the decision to impound his vehicle and inventory it was reasonable. United States v. Raphael, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203450 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2024).*
Posted inInventory, Search incident|Comments Off on FL2: Search incident of lockbox in a backpack removed from def at time of arrest unreasonable
Just because a detainee is handcuffed, the potential threat hasn’t abated, and a frisk can occur. United States v. Jackson, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 28229 (3d Cir. Nov. 6, 2024).
The affidavit for the warrant for defendant’s home was based on probable cause and the good faith exception applied in any event. United States v. Williams, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203781 (D. Alaska Sep. 16, 2024) (R&R).*
Plaintiff pled guilty to traffic violations then sued in federal court over the stops which the court finds are barred by Heck. Pope v. Texas, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204054 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2024).*
Here there were three search warrants. The second built on the first, and the third on the second, leading to a computer search that was founded on defendant disposing of a body. “When considering the foregoing details together, there was probable cause to believe that a search of the defendant’s computer or external hard drives would yield relevant online communications between the defendant and the victim, or other relevant files concerning their relationship or the defendant’s mental state, to assist police in determining a motive for the killing or establishing the defendant’s intent. Thus, there was a sufficient nexus between the suspected crimes and the specific items sought.” Commonwealth v. Colina, 2024 Mass. LEXIS 472 (Nov. 7, 2024).
Defendant’s home was searched for evidence of violations of the Clean Air Act. The search was valid, but the interrogation in his own home was custodial, and he should have been Mirandized. United States v. Long, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203576 (E.D. Va. Nov. 7, 2024).*
Four day delay between seizure of defendant’s vehicle and the execution of the warrant to search it was not unreasonable. Also, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying admission of body camera footage that the court doesn’t see that it supported the contention that officers planted the drugs found in the car. The court reasoned it confused the issues under F.R.E. 403 and it was not an abuse of discretion. United States v. Camardese, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 28413 (9th Cir. Nov. 8, 2024).*
Defendant committed a traffic offense and was stopped. Officers had reasonable suspicion he left the scene of a fatal accident 11 days earlier, and officers wanted to talk to him about that. The stop was not pretextual because there was a factual basis for it. State v. Foster, 2024 Ariz. App. LEXIS 142 (Nov. 7, 2024).
“Based on the recited facts, we agree that a reasonable juror could conclude that Hughes was not suspected of having committed a serious crime, posed no immediate threat to the officers, was not attempting to flee from arrest, and was outnumbered. This is adequate to state a Fourth Amendment violation.” Hughes v. Herbster, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 28279 (3d Cir. Nov. 7, 2024).*
In this child pornography case, the police breached the door of defendant’s home because they feared erasure of all the data by resetting the cell phone. When they had the phone in hand, they told defendant to give the passcode, which he did. That is not even discussed on appeal. Malone v. State, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 7860 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi – Edinburg Nov. 7, 2024).*
Posted inCell phones, Excessive force|Comments Off on AZ: A traffic offense could be used to stop defendant to question him about a fatal accident 11 days earlier
“Here, the Court finds that the officers did not unreasonably extend the scope or duration of the stop. The officers were permitted to ask basic questions of Mr. Russell, including whether he had identification or whether he had any weapons in the vehicle, as well as running a search of his license.” “Mr. Russell insists that the stop should have concluded when he pointed out his temporary plate to Officer French …, but the officers were permitted to further investigate the possibility of a marijuana DUI after smelling marijuana both upon approaching the car and on Mr. Russell, as well as observing marijuana in the pocket of the driver-side door.” The plain view in the door, however, was based on the officer pushing it open further and it is excluded. United States v. Russell, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202361 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 6, 2024):
Asking a motorist about his or her destination during a traffic stop does not measurably extend the stop under Rodriguez. State v. Woods, 2024-Ohio-5301, 2024 Ohio App. LEXIS 3997 (4th Dist. Oct. 29, 2024).
Similar: “Officers may question the driver about subjects unrelated to the traffic stop so long as those questions do not extend the stop’s duration.” United States v. Baniel, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 28203 (5th Cir. Nov. 6, 2024).*
“Moreover, the appellate court’s discussion of probable cause and the scope of the warrant demonstrates that there are multiple grounds on which a motion to suppress could have been denied in the trial court. It is therefore clear that petitioner cannot establish the reasonable probability of a different result had counsel brought a motion. Indeed, even if the cellphone evidence had been excluded, what is needed to establish prejudice on a Strickland claim is reasonable probability of a different verdict. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 (describing prejudice standard as a probability sufficient to undermine the court’s confidence in the verdict). This is not a case in which the granting of a motion to suppress dooms the government’s ability to prove its case in chief.” Stone v. Warden, Mule Creek State Prison, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202315 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2024).*
“The [Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission officers] had authority to stop the boat to inspect licenses, registration, and safety equipment. State v. Casal, 410 So. 2d 152, 155 (Fla. 1982) (‘In sum we find that the state’s interest in random stopping and brief detention of motorboats for the limited purpose of checking fishing permits, registration certificates and safety equipment outweighs a person’s interest in being completely free from such limited intrusion. In light of the absence of less restrictive alternatives which would accomplish the state’s goals, spot checks of motorboats are not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’); State v. Starkey, 605 So. 2d 963, 965 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (‘A person’s expectation of privacy in a motorboat is less than the same expectation of privacy in an automobile.’); … During this encounter, another occupant of the boat voluntarily opened the boat’s cooler without a request by the FWC officer and the illegal catch was in plain view.” State v. Vinokurov, 2024 Fla. App. LEXIS 8595 (Fla. 3d DCA Nov. 6, 2024), on rehearing from 2024 Fla. App. LEXIS 6714 (Fla. 3d DCA Aug. 28, 2024).
Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not arguing that the officer was outside his jurisdiction at the time of the stop because that’s not even a Fourth Amendment issue. United States v. Lopez, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202038 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 6, 2024).*
Posted inReasonable expectation of privacy, Reasonableness|Comments Off on FL3: There is a lower expectation of privacy in a boat than in a car; stop for license, registration, and safety inspection was reasonable
When defendant filed a motion to suppress, the government sought a second search warrant for the same telephone not using the prior information. The USMJ holds the second warrant shows probable cause but the independent source doctrine not satisfied. On review, the USDJ finds the independent source doctrine satisfied by other information. United States v. Vernelus, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202031 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2024)*:
The electronic search categories any digital storage devices in this search warrant are not particular under the state constitution. Remanded for determination of remedy. State v. Curry, 336 Or. App. 72 (Nov. 6, 2024):
Affirmed per curiam. The concurring opinion: The facts concerning the stop and search in the appeal brief demonstrate a serious lack of candor which the state didn’t even challenge. All counsel included was his cross-examination and omitted the state’s direct which showed the basis for the stop. Shelgren v. State, 2024 Fla. App. LEXIS 8543 (Fla. 1st DCA Nov. 6, 2024) (concurring opinion).*
Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective at trial for not calling defense counsel who litigated the motion to suppress for not calling a witness when review is limited to the four corners of the affidavit. United States v. Walker, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201164 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 5, 2024).*
The officer conducted a valid plain view by walking past defendant’s car and seeing the gun. State v. Smith, 2024-Ohio-5280 (7th Dist. Oct. 29, 2024).*
The court assumes defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his private Facebook messages, but holds he did not in his non-private ones. Still, the government successfully argued that it had exigent circumstances for Facebook to reveal messages under a SCA request under § 2702(a). He was being investigated for attempting to aid terrorist organizations against the United States. United States v. Chhipa, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201647 (E.D. Va. Nov. 5, 2024):
Posted inEmergency / exigency, Social media warrants|Comments Off on E.D.Va.: Govt showed exigency for access to public Facebook messages in terrorism investigation
Prison strip search was not unconstitutional. “Shepard has failed to allege facts to support that the November 2022 search was unreasonable. She acknowledges that such searches are routinely conducted before an inmate leaves the correctional institution for outside medical appointments. Searches under such circumstances do not violate the Fourth Amendment. … And Shepard’s allegations demonstrate only that Dreischalik was giving her instructions during the search as part of her inspection. Although Dreischalik’s alleged language may have been coarse, her comments were not so derogatory, unprofessional, or vulgar as to raise constitutional issues.” Shepard v. Overmeyer, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201399 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2024).*
The stop was with reasonable suspicion of a traffic offense, and the officer smelled marijuana coming from the car right away. He could shine his flashlight inside, enabling a plain view, and a patdown of the passenger produced marijuana by plain feel. United States v. Graham, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200755 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2024).*
Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective at trial for not calling defense counsel who litigated the motion to suppress for not calling a witness when review is limited to the four corners of the affidavit. United States v. Walker, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201164 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 5, 2024).*
Defendant’s attempts to block the officer’s view of the interior of his car was reasonable suspicion. State v. Thomas, 2024 Mo. LEXIS 335 (Nov. 5, 2024):
A warrantless raid on a business alleged to have a First Amendment political retaliatory motive survives a motion to dismiss. “Taking the Complaint’s allegations as true, we think that Hernandez’s organizing a raid of Bellas to suppress political speech—‘actions reminiscent of a bygone era,’—qualifies as conduct ‘so egregious that [Hernandez] did not need case law to know what he allegedly did was unlawful,’ Bailey, 843 F.3d at 484 (cleaned up).” “But even if that weren’t the case, binding caselaw from the Eleventh Circuit shows with ‘obvious clarity’ that this sort of retaliation is constitutionally prohibited.” Tundidor v. Hernandez, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200922 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2024). [Really bad facts for the defendants, and so Florida.]
The officer stopped plaintiff’s car because it was looked quite similar to one he was told to watch out for because it was stolen. He didn’t realize it wasn’t the right car until after plaintiff resisted and a dog was deployed against plaintiff. The force used was not excessive. Benfer v. City of Baytown, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 27907 (5th Cir. Nov. 1, 2024).*
There was an anonymous report of bad driving, and the officer observed some of it, and that justified the stop. Mack v. State, 2024 Mo. App. LEXIS 788 (Nov. 5, 2024).*
Plaintiff’s federal suit against a bankruptcy trustee was barred by the Barton doctrine. It had to be brought within the bankruptcy case. Juravin v. Fla. Bankr. Tr., 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 28043 (11th Cir. Nov. 5, 2024).*
Thirteen months of pole camera surveillance of the public areas outside defendant’s home were reasonable under United States v. Tuggle, 4 F.4th 505, 511 (7th Cir. 2021), and the court declines to reconsider that case. The officers saw no more than ones on a stakeout [not to mentioned digital storage of everything and facial recognition of others]. United States v. House, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 28045 (7th Cir. Nov. 5, 2024).
Defendant’s patdown during a traffic stop was justified. He didn’t stop immediately, and after he did he was ordered out of the car and the officer could see a bulge in the pocket of his hoody. United States v. Young, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200623 (W.D. La. Oct. 18, 2024).*
Defendant persuades the court that nexus was lacking for the search warrant for defendant’s Facebook information, but it’s harmless on the totality. State v. Mitchell, 2024 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 493 (Nov. 4, 2024).*
Posted inNexus, Pole cameras, Stop and frisk|Comments Off on CA7: 13 months of pole camera surveillance was not unreasonable
“Contrary to Defendant’s view, the positive CODIS hit did not ‘only amount[] to an investigative lead at best ….’ It is well-established that a blood match from a reputable, national database that links a defendant to a crime scene establishes sufficient probable cause to issue a warrant.” United States v. Combs, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200404 (D. Utah Nov. 4, 2024).
Defendant possessed body armor and forensic analysis was deemed necessary. A search warrant for a CT scan of the body armor was issued. This issue only came up in whether the forensic expert was to be permitted. United States v. Sawyers, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200026 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 4, 2024).*
“Based on our precedent and the contents of the defendants’ body camera footage, we conclude that the individual officers’ use of deadly force was reasonable in light of the circumstances they faced. Once Thomas approached some of the officers and pointed his gun at them, the individual officers clearly had probable cause to believe that he posed a serious threat to the officers on scene. Accordingly, they did not use excessive force in shooting Thomas.” Swinford v. Santos, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 27878 (11th Cir. Nov. 4, 2024).*
The affidavit for warrant was unsigned by the officer but he had been sworn before the warrant issued. The good faith exception saves this search. United States v. Hampton, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200326 (D. Alaska Nov. 4, 2024)
Defendant’s traffic stop was reasonably extended because he didn’t have his DL and a warrant surfaced for him. United States v. Birry, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199550 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2024).*
In defendant’s appeal, the merits of the good faith question was decided 2-1, and rearguing it as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim goes nowhere because he still loses on the merits. Smith v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199681 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2024).*
The collective knowledge doctrine applies to the officer making a traffic stop at the request of the DEA even when they don’t tell him why to make the stop. United States v. Greatsinger, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199769 (D. Conn. Nov. 4, 2024).*
Posted inExcessive force, Warrant execution|Comments Off on Reason: Cop who fired blindly into Breonna Taylor’s home is convicted of violating her constitutional rights
A ground to suppress a search belongs in a motion to suppress, not to dismiss the indictment. United States v. Bailey, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198707 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2024).
The search warrant didn’t provide the address of the place to be searched, but it included a photograph, and the right place was searched. Particularity was satisfied. United States v. Gumbs, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199320 (D. Conn. Nov. 3, 2024).*
Defendant’s spontaneous admission of a criminal offense when he got out of his car was probable cause. State v. Creech, 2024-Ohio-5245 (12th Dist. Nov. 4, 2024).*
Plaintiff’s traffic court Fourth Amendment claims are barred by limitations and because it lacks any factual basis. Dibenedetto v. Coley, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 27858 (2d Cir. Nov. 4, 2024).*
by John Wesley Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer and
Search and seizure law consultant
Little Rock, Arkansas
Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)