An unlit license plate light was enough for a stop. “Because Defendant had already been issued a traffic citation and then proceeded to initiate further conversation with Officer Monte about her husband’s drug-related activities, the court finds that, under the circumstances, the traffic stop became a consensual encounter. Defendant, not Officer Monte, extended the duration of the stop to voluntarily disclose information regarding her husband’s drug activities.” United States v. Hodge, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95595 (M.D. Pa. June 21, 2017).*
Defendant argues against the factual findings underlying the trial court consent findings and fails. “In short, the trial court found that the factual predicates to Appellant’s suppression claim were simply not true; i.e., that Appellant was not so intoxicated or deficient in English that his waiver and consent were not freely given. Our independent review of the record supports these findings, and we are, therefore, bound by them.” Commonwealth v. Quiles, 2017 PA Super 197, 2017 Pa. Super. LEXIS 459 (June 23, 2017).*
Omission of a non-identification of defendant as a robber was not material for Franks. “Even viewing the omitted non-identification as a material omission, probable cause for the search did not rise or fall on the identification of Dorman as the robber; rather the link was between the Dodge Charger and the robbery, Dorman and the Charger, and Dorman and 2317 Chester Street … Dorman speculates that law enforcement officers ‘fear[ed]’ inclusion of the sales clerk’s statement ‘would jeopardize a probable cause finding.’ … MPD Detective Scott Brown, who prepared the affidavit, testified that he chose not to include the sales clerk’s statement in his affidavit because ‘it didn’t help the search warrant’ because the sales clerk was uncertain, but it also ‘didn’t hurt the search warrant’ because the clerk said Dorman’s photograph had some resemblance to the robber. … Dorman’s rank speculation is far from the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ required to demonstrate that the officer knowingly or recklessly omitted this statement, much less overcome the district court’s contrary finding on clear error review.” United States v. Dorman, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 11159 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 2017).
The alleged reasonable suspicion for extending defendant’s traffic stop was the CI’s information which is found insufficient. The state’s alternative basis of defendant’s alleged “jumpiness” was never presented to the trial court. There are no findings on that, it is waived, and the motion to suppress should have been granted. “Lewis has correctly pointed out that the evidence presented at the suppression hearing did not support the trial court’s ruling that reasonable suspicion existed based on the confidential informant’s tip.” State v. Lewis, 2017 Kan. App. LEXIS 47 (June 16, 2017).*
The stop was with reasonable suspicion for two lane changes without signaling. Defendant seemed under the influence. Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not moving to suppress because it would have been denied. City of Cleveland v. Maxwell, 2017-Ohio-4442, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 2496 (8th Dist. June 22, 2017).*
Respondent was the subject of a petition to establish paternity, and he claimed that the statute to order DNA testing required the Fourth Amendment be complied with. “Here, Rogers argues that in order to prove a reasonable possibility of paternity, the state must have some corroborating evidence beyond Thompson’s claim that he is the father. Thus, we are called to determine if a mother’s allegations of a sexual relationship, without some corroboration, can establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.” Here, respondent kept the relationship secret so the mother has a reasonable explanation for not having corroboration. They were together sexually for a long time, and that’s enough. State v. Rogers, 2017 La. App. LEXIS 1131 (La.App. 2 Cir. June 21, 2017).
Defendant was told he was not in custody when he was interrogated, and that led to consent. While he was not told of the right to refuse consent, he did understand he could end the interview at any time. The first three factors of consent favor it, and the last is neutral. On the totality, he consented. United States v. Atkins, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94206 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2017).*
The state showed the impoundment policy was standardized and complied with. It wasn’t necessary at the time to seek out somebody else to retrieve the car from the roadside when both the driver and passenger were arrested. State v. Tronca, 2017 Iowa App. LEXIS 620 (June 21, 2017): Continue reading →
Defendant was stopped at a game checkpoint and admitted to placing his daughter’s tag on a deer he shot. He was not “in custody” when he confessed. State v. Maile, 2017 MT 154, 2017 Mont. LEXIS 350 (June 23, 2017).
Defendant argued in the trial court that an 8 year old couldn’t consent to a search of his house. After the police were at the door, his mother consented to the search. The mother’s consent was never addressed in the trial court, and the defendant thus waived it for appeal. State v. Dahl, 2017 Ida. App. LEXIS 41 (June 22, 2017).*
Officer’s intentionally delaying the ticket writing process until the drug dog was on its way was intentional delay without reasonable suspicion under Rodriguez. United States v. Rodriguez-Escalera, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95848 (S.D. Ill. June 21, 2017): Continue reading →
The bodycam didn’t pick up the officer’s voice, which is “troubling,” but the trial court credited the officers’ testimony defendant consented, and that’s enough to have to affirm on consent. State v. Klinger, 2017 Iowa App. LEXIS 633 (June 21, 2017).*
The affidavit in support of defendant’s motion for new trial was based on a witness affidavit that did not directly address her alleged consent of the property searched. Therefore, the motion fails. United States v. Denton, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10765 (11th Cir. June 19, 2017).*
The court finds the officer not credible that the defendant picked up a gun and put in his pocket and there was thus no reasonable suspicion for his detention. United States v. Cruz-Montañez, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96079 (D. P.R. June 21, 2017).
“After the accident, Marland did not initially consent to having his blood drawn. However, after his arrival at the hospital and a conversation with his fiancé, he indeed did consent, according to the testimony of two witnesses who were in the room at the time. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court relied on competent and credible testimony in finding that Marland consented.” State v. Marland, 2017-Ohio-4353, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 2419 (3d Dist. June 19, 2017).*
Off-duty police officer’s in person tip of possible drunk driver was reasonable suspicion for stop. United States v. Hernández-Ayala, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95387 (D. Md. June 21, 2017).
“[T]his Court also finds under the totality of the circumstances that the warrant to search the Nadine residence was supported by probable cause. The Confidential Source’s reliability and credibility were established in the affidavit. Also, the officers watched Ball as he engaged in drug activity with the Source. Clearly, the affidavit was supported by probable cause.” The good faith exception also would apply. United States v. Ball, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95309 (W.D. Tenn. June 21, 2017).*
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't."
—Me
“I still learn something new every day.”
—Pete Townshend, The Who 50th Anniversary Tour, "The Who Live at Hyde Park" (Showtime 2015)
"I can't talk about my singing. I'm inside it. How can you describe something you're inside of?"
—Janis Joplin
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays
down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its
application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect
results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at
bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping
government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having
and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that
the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and
safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing
can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
