Montana applies the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy case to informational privacy, here a worker’s comp case. By filing a worker’s comp claim, the claimant did not waive all privacy rights in medical records. Malcomson v. Liberty Northwest, 2014 MT 242, 2014 Mont. LEXIS 506 (September 10, 2014):
[*P29] We made clear in Nelson that Montana’s right of informational privacy, “at a minimum, encompass[es] the sanctity of one’s medical records.” Nelson, 283 Mont. at 242, 941 P.2d at 448. The State’s arguments fail to appreciate that this constitutional right encompasses a “fundamental” right “to control circulation of personal information.” Nelson, 283 Mont. at 241, 941 P.2d at 448 (quoting Cutter v. Brownbridge, 183 Cal. App. 3d 836, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)). That a worker consents to release of relevant medical information does not mean the worker loses all privacy interests in how that information is circulated or disseminated. The right to control circulation of private information would be lost if the individual does not know what healthcare information is being circulated or to whom.
A crosswalk sting [seeing if motorists would stop for pedestrians] led to defendant’s stop and he was under the influence. The stop was valid. State v. Haugland, 2014 Ida. App. LEXIS 94 (September 8, 2014).*
A traffic stop can be based on a drug officer’s report to a patrol officer that the vehicle was speeding. Here also there was information from reliable named non-criminally related sources the vehicle would be carrying drugs. United States v. Spears, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127729 (S.D. W.Va. September 5, 2014).*
The nuanced argument that defense counsel was ineffective for not asking for an in camera Franks hearing was unavailing where defendant got a full hearing in court. There is no prejudice. Belcher v. United States, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128075 (S.D. W.Va. March 5, 2014).*
“Defendant argues the search warrant giving rise to the charges in the Indictment was defective because the ATF does not have authority to conduct state narcotics investigations.” The connection between guns and drugs is well known, and the ATF can investigate drug crimes. United States v. Jennings, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124904 (E.D. Mich. September 8, 2014):
Under the Code of Federal Regulations, the ATF is responsible for investigating:
(1) criminal and regulatory violations of the Federal firearms, explosives, arson, alcohol, and tobacco smuggling laws;
(2) the functions transferred by subsection (c) of section 1111 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 …
(3) any other function related to the investigation of violent crime or domestic terrorism that is delegated to the Bureau by the Attorney General.
28 U.S.C. § 599A(b) (emphasis added). Thus, one of the primary directives of the ATF is to focus its investigations on individuals who commit violent crime. The nexus between firearm related violence and drug trafficking is well established. See United States v. Hardin, 248 F.3d 489, 499 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that guns are “‘tools of the trade’ in drug transactions.”); Federal Register, Volume 77, No. 166, page 51698 (Aug. 27, 2012) [AG Order No. 3341-2012]; Federal Register, Volume 79, No. 42, pg. 12061 (Mar. 4, 2014) [AG Order No. 3421-2014]; 28 C.F.C. § 0.130(b)(2).
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has resolved numerous direct appeals involving narcotics investigations conducted independently by the ATF, and ATF agent investigative authority has never been challenged. See United States v. Coleman, 188 F.3d 354 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Wagner, 289 F. App’x 57 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Harge, 428 F. App’x 511 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chapman, 112 F. App’x 469, 472 (6th Cir. 2004).
The Hill: Apple: New iPhones can’t be unlocked – even with a warrant by Julian Hattem:
Apple says iOS 8 will protect users’ data from the government, and even from Apple itself.
The Hill: Holder launches national review of racial bias among cops by Ben Goad:
Attorney General Eric Holder on Thursday announced a review of racial bias within the nation’s law enforcement agencies, further expanding the federal response to last month’s fatal police shooting of an unarmed black teen in Missouri.
WaPo: Tech firm tries to pull back curtain on surveillance efforts in Washington by Ashkan Soltani and Craig Timberg:
As a black sedan pulled into downtown Washington traffic earlier this week, a man in the back seat with a specially outfitted smartphone in each hand was watching for signs of surveillance in action. “Whoa, we’ve just been hit twice on this block,” he said, excitement rising in his voice, not far from FBI headquarters.
Then as the car passed the Federal Trade Commission’s limestone edifice, “Okay, we just got probed.” Then again, just a few minutes later, as the car moved between the Supreme Court and the Capitol, he said, “That’s the beginning of an interception.”
This court held 19 years ago that treating an administrative search like a criminal raid violated clearly established rights. It said so again in 2007. Now, for the third time, it is confronted with a SWAT-like swarming of barber shops looking for licensing violations, and this, too, violates clearly established rights. Berry v. Leslie, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17782 (11th Cir. September 16, 2014):
A drug testing and search condition of a delinquent’s parents and home was in effect a year before there was a refusal on Fourth Amendment grounds. The objection comes too late. If the order was unconstitutional, which it might have been as to the parents, it was waived by not objecting or appealing at the time it was entered, not after being held in contempt a year afterward. People v. Dorsey (In re Dorsey), 2014 Mich. App. LEXIS 1665 (September 9, 2014).
Defendant was stopped by the Puerto Rico police for suspicion of driving a stolen car, and he was directed to open the hood so the VIN number on the engine could be checked. Officers could see a gun in his waistband, and that justified his frisk. United States v. Tiru-Plaza, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17388 (1st Cir. September 9, 2014).*
Defendant’s motion to suppress is denied after he admits that nothing was seized to be suppressed. United States v. Walker, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124638 (M.D. Ga. September 8, 2014).* [Then why was it filed?]
On a health care fraud wiretap, the government lawfully used Hindu translators as “contractors” assisting in the wiretap, and attorney-client privileged calls were properly filtered out. No violation of either Title III or the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Patel, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17463, 2014 FED App. 0706N (6th Cir. September 8, 2014)*:
As a general rule, drug dealers keep their drugs at home, and that’s sufficient to get a search warrant for their home. Here, however, the affidavit falls far short of showing that defendant was a drug dealer. He was just a user. Moreover, the Third Circuit has already held warrant showing like this are insufficient to invoke the good faith exception. United States v. Rodriguez, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124814 (E.D. Pa. September 8, 2014):
The search warrant was not stale. It had pretty old background information that alone would be stale, but it provided recent information as well, and that was sufficient to overcome staleness. United States v. Thomas, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125410 (S.D. Ohio September 8, 2014);* United States v. Magee, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126246 (D. Me. September 8, 2014).*
A Sears loss prevention employee observed defendant pulling things off a shelf without checking prices and then attempted to present a check that was declined, and he offered no other form of payment. One thing led to another and an officer was called and defendant fled and was tackled running away. Six months later, defendant was seen again driving by the officer who ran a DL check on defendant and the license was suspended. The officer stopped defendant and arrested him for the suspended DL. The inventory for the tow revealed forged checks and forgery equipment, and the inventory was valid. United States v. Goodwin, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125589 (D. Utah September 8, 2014).*
The smell of marijuana on the person is probable cause. The court refuses to engage in a distinction between strong or moderate smell and whether it needs to be corroborated by another officer. State v. Crosby, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 881 (September 9, 2014).*
When defendant was asked about whether he was armed, he became excessively nervous and started sweating. This was reasonable suspicion to the officer. During the patdown, the rock of crack was immediately apparent to the officer. State v. Mathis, 2014-Ohio-3803, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 3727 (9th Dist. September 3, 2014).
Yes, this affidavit for a search warrant could have been more detailed, but it still provides probable cause on the totality. United States v. Bergen, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122543 (M.D. Fla. September 3, 2014), adopting United States v. Bergen, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124610 (M.D. Fla., May 20, 2014)*: