D.Mass.: Apt’s breezeway is curtilage, but officers get qualified immunity

The court concludes that plaintiff’s apartment’s breezeway is curtilage, but the officers get qualified immunity because there’s no case on point. They remained there after being told to leave. Sabey v. Butterfield, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52309 (D. Mass. Mar. 13, 2026):

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N.D.Ga.: A Franks violation isn’t shown to be reckless just because a factual mistake was repeated

“In his objections, Marshall adds other points to his substantial showing argument. First he argues recklessness can be inferred from the fact the agent made the same mistake twice: in the warrant affidavit and when interviewing Marshall ‘to convince him to confess.’ … The Court does not agree. She obtained the warrant the day before arresting and interviewing Marshall. That she had the same misinformation in her head two days in a row does not suggest intentionality or recklessness on either occasion. Perhaps Marshall’s argument makes more sense if one believes she was trying to convince him to confess by misleading him. But, as stated above, the audio tape of that interaction does not support his allegation. Special Agent Dervish was not hostile or disrespectful to Marshall, overly aggressive in challenging his statement, or feeding him false information throughout the interview. Her demeanor in the interview—calm and professional— supports the Court’s conclusion that no evidence suggests she intentionally or recklessly misrepresented the IP address.” United States v. Marshall, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51939 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 13, 2026).

Wisconsin DOC violates those on extended supervision on GPS monitoring when the signal stops without even inquiring whether there was equipment failure or other benign cause. The court certifies the proposed class. Robillard v. Knutson, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52203 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 13, 2026).*

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E.D.Cal.: AUSA avoids sanction for refusing to answer court’s 4A question in ICE case; the petitioner had already been released

AUSA in an immigration detention case was directed to respond to the detainee’s Fourth Amendment claim and completely failed, only repeating the government’s theory of the case. Petitioner was finally released. The AUSA doesn’t get sanctioned, but the court is troubled by the dissembling. Torre v. Lyons, DJC-CSK, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51525 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2026)*:

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OH2: Driver’s running away terminated the stop

The stop was for investigation of prostitution, and the driver fled. “The record reflects that Carter intended to place Williams in his cruiser for safety reasons and for investigating suspected prostitution—and not merely for checking Williams’s license or for the officer’s own convenience. Carter was denied the opportunity to do so when Williams fled. In other words, Williams’s flight terminated the traffic stop before it was ever extended, and Carter’s intentions were preempted when Carter ran. … Regardless of whether Carter intended to issue a citation or a warning, or neither, however, the stop was not prolonged before Williams fled. Video of the traffic stop supports this conclusion.” State v. Williams, 2026-Ohio-860 (2d Dist. Mar. 13, 2026).*

The encounter was not a stop and it was consensual. The officer parked near defendant but didn’t block him. The USMJ’s conclusion on disputed facts must govern. United States v. Moore, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 7494 (11th Cir. Mar. 13, 2026).*

The search of defendant’s bag after he was in a holding cell on a probation arrest was not justifiable as a search incident. [No mention of inventory; therefore, this will not go in the book supplement.] People v. Allen, 2026 NY Slip Op 50289(U) (Kings Co. Mar. 9, 2026) (unpublished).*

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OR: Stop for illegible temporary paper plate was objectively reasonable [and pretextual]

Defendant’s temporary paper plate was wrinkled and illegible, and that led to the stop. The car was also known to frequent drug houses. Stop still valid. State v. Martin, 347 Or. App. 680 (Mar. 11, 2026).*

The individual facts didn’t show probable cause, but collectively they did. Also, this was more than guilt by association. “The Court therefore agrees with Judge Carson that the circumstances of the defendant’s arrest are more consistent with Pringle than either Ybarra or Di Re, and the Court finds that Deputy Costa had probable cause to arrest the defendant.” United States v. Garcia, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50859 (D. Neb. Mar. 12, 2026).*

Defendant probationer’s positive tests were reasonable suspicion for a home search. United States v. James, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51549 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2026).*

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CA11: QI in excessive force cases can be raised for the first time mid-trial

Qualified immunity in excessive force cases can be raised for the first time mid-trial without it being waived. Edwards v. Grubbs, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 7500 (11th Cir. Mar. 13, 2026).

“However, Groth must show not only that the officers used force unreasonably, but also that ‘every reasonable officer would have realized that [the challenged] conduct violated the Fourth Amendment under our then-existing precedent.’ … The burden therefore rests on the plaintiff to identify published, controlling authority with closely comparable facts that would bind a panel of this court and place the constitutional question beyond debate at the time of the incident.” Davis v. Dean, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49953 (D. Md. Mar. 11, 2026).*

Sex acts between an officer and a previous detainee were not Fourth Amendment seizures. Other courts in this circuit agree, and they’re followed. A case from the Seventh Circuit would disagree, but it’s not followed. Resendiz v. Christian, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51932 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 12, 2026).*

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AL: When detainee doesn’t properly ID himself, the officer can demand proof of ID

The N.D. Ala. certified this question: “Under [Ala. Code 1975,] § 15-5-30, when a law enforcement officer asks a person for his name, address, and explanation of his actions, and the person gives an incomplete or unsatisfactory oral response, does the statute prohibit the officer from demanding or requesting physical identification?” No. Jennings v. Smith, 2026 Ala. LEXIS 28 (Mar. 13, 2026):

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Cal.6: GFE applies to California Electronic Communications Privacy Act searches

A dead co-conspirator’s phone was searched linking defendants to the crime. The police reasonably believed his mother had authority to consent to the phone. The California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA) (Cal. Pen. Code § 1546 et seq.) applies, and the AG concedes any Fourth Amendment standing requirement was legislated out. The good faith exception, however, applies to the consent issue. His mother was the only apparent next of kin, and she knew he was dead, and she accepted his other property from the police. People v. Anderson, 2026 Cal. App. LEXIS 150 (6th Dist. Mar. 13, 2026):

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CA7: Use of force during book-in here was subject to QI

Officers get qualified immunity for arrestee who was alleged to have resisted booking and was removed, while handcuffed behind his back, to an intake cell with a concrete bed, and he hit the floor with his face when “pushed” down. Raddant v. Douglas Cty., 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 7380 (7th Cir. Mar. 12, 2026)* [I quoted a lot of this one because I tried a criminal case against a jailer a lot like this. Directed verdict. They will take you down to the floor. That happened in my case, but my client wasn’t even there when it happened. His was in the cell later.]:

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D.Utah: Traffic stop on curtilage is still valid

A traffic stop on the curtilage affords police the ability to stop and inquire under Collins v. Virginia. “Curtilage is a concept that safeguards a person’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, but it is not a protective force field that shields a person from the consequences of committing a traffic infraction in front of a police officer simply because the driver then reaches the safety of home.” Hardy v. McGaha, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52525 (D. Utah Mar. 12, 2026).

Defendant contends that the officer was “deceitful” because he said he had reasonable suspicion and could apply for a warrant (which requires probable cause). However, defendant had no DL, so the vehicle could be towed anyway. Ultimately it was by consent. United States v. Gonzalez-Nieves, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52542 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2026).*

Defendant doesn’t tell the court how the Fourth Amendment was violated. People v. Clase, 2026 NY Slip Op 50297(U) (N.Y. Co. Mar. 10, 2026).*

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Army: PC shown for picture files in other apps on cell phone

There was probable cause to search the picture files in defendant’s cell phone beyond the app defendant used. It was reasonable to conclude pictures could be moved between places on the phone. United States v. Ingram, 2026 CCA LEXIS 119 (Army. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 2026) (unpublished).

Officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant to inquire about who he was, and he gave a false identity, so that was probable cause. State v. Martin, 2026 ME 24 (Mar. 10, 2026).*

“An officer’s visual estimate of a vehicle’s speed can be a sufficient basis to establish reasonable articulable suspicion justifying a stop.” Radar not required. State v. Rhoades, 2026 ME 23 (Mar. 10, 2026).*

Based on collective knowledge, defendant was stopped for driving without a license, and it was a valid stop. United States v. Lussier, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50120 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 11, 2026).*

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GA: State post-conviction petitioner arguing no “full and fair opportunity” to litigate 4A claim fails

Post-conviction petitioner trying to get around Stone on federal habeas fails. Gines v. State, 2026 Ga. LEXIS 87 (Mar. 12, 2026)*:

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CA10: Ptfs pled enough to get past QI on PC showing for social media warrant

Plaintiffs pled enough to overcome qualified immunity that the search warrants at issue here were objectively without probable cause including a social media warrant. Armendariz v. City of Colo. Springs, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (10th Cir. Mar. 12, 2026).

The government showed nexus in the warrant, and good faith would carry the day anyway. United States v. Bryant, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50281 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 11, 2026).*

Defendant argued both lack of nexus to him and the apartment that was searched, but it wasn’t his apartment and he doesn’t have standing. United States v. Wilkinson, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50870 (D. Minn. Mar. 12, 2026).*

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D.N.H.: Private entrance to third-floor apartment’s curtilage is the hallway leading to it

Plaintiff lived in a third-floor apartment in a building where only he had a key and access, and that was his curtilage. (Apparently the door was unlocked when this entry occurred.) The individual official entered without knocking and getting permission to enter, so there was no implied license. Becker v. N.H. HHS, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51193 (D.N.H. Feb. 19, 2026).

“The state courts offered Davis the opportunity to raise his Fourth Amendment claim and he fully availed himself of that opportunity. In a pre-trial hearing where he was represented by counsel, Davis challenged the validity of the warrantless entry into his home and the admission of evidence seized as a result of that entry. On appeal, Davis, represented by counsel, raised the Fourth Amendment challenge again. Both the trial court and the appellate court addressed Davis’s arguments, twice.” 2254 on this claim barred by Stone. Davis v. Dean, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49953 (D. Md. Mar. 11, 2026).*

2254 petitioner can’t relitigate his cell phone seizure and search on habeas. Kincaid v. Guerrero, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50111 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2026),* adopted, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73518 (W.D.Tex. Apr. 3, 2025).* Same as to a blood draw. Reaves v. Smith, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50341 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2026).*

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N.D.Tex.: Room searches in center for sexually violent predators same as a prison cell search

Plaintiff is sexually violent predator confined in the Texas Civil Commitment Center. Room searches there are governed by the same rationale as prison cell searches. Welsh v. Pearson, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50445 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2026).

Even if it was pointless, a prison strip search is almost always constitutional unless it is harassing. Williams v. Melvin, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49658 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 9, 2026).*

The probable cause for the warrant was a controlled buy, and defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not challenging it. United States v. Bartleson, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49616 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 2, 2026).*

Plaintiff was barred from a library for six months. He claimed false statements were used, akin to a Franks violation. Doesn’t work in First Amendment cases. Credico v. Carmel Clay Pub. Libr., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49899 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 11, 2026).*

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D.Ariz.: PC for forfeiture is similar to PC for a warrant

Probable cause for forfeiture is similar to probable cause for a warrant. United States v. Tetherus, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49868 (D. Ariz. Mar. 11, 2026)*:

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Cal.2: Officers didn’t need to periodically reassess exigency

Exigency here did not need to be periodically reassessed. “Once inside, police were not required to interrupt their efforts to seek a warrant. Officers on the scene must be able to devote their full attention to the threat they face. The Fourth Amendment did not require them periodically to reassess whether the exigency persisted throughout the standoff. … Exigencies can persist while police pursue time-consuming courses of action. …” People v. Valencia, 2026 Cal. App. LEXIS 143 (2d Dist. Mar. 10, 2026).

“Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Houston, a reasonable officer would have recognized that using such intrusive and aggressive means to detain Houston and unreasonably prolonging her detention was unlawful and violated her clearly established constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.” Houston v. Reeves, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 7002 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2026).*

Officers had probable cause that defendant has slapped a woman while holding a gun on her. “And by the time officers searched Woods’s car, there was a fair probability that they would find the gun there. The officers knew from the victim’s and her daughter’s statements that the gun was last seen in Woods’s possession. But they didn’t see the gun on Woods’s person, near the victim or her daughter, or in any of the complex’s parking lots. Nor did they find the gun after conducting a canine search and patting down Woods. That left the one place the police knew Woods had just been: his car.” United States v. Woods, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 7023 (6th Cir. Mar. 10, 2026).*

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DE: Second warrant after first general warrant was independent source for search

The trial court held the warrant for defendant’s cell phone was a general warrant for overbreadth but the independent source doctrine saved the second search warrant after the first search. “All Delaware Superior Court cases addressing the instant issue support the proposition that a second warrant for a cellphone obtained after a general or overly broad warrant is valid if the information supporting probable cause was discovered independently from the prior general or overly broad warrant. Highlighting the reasoning presented in Carter, Clark, and Taylor, the court emphasized that the information used to obtain the second Matthews warrant was independent and without any basis from evidence obtained in the first warrant. The court therefore found the independent source doctrine applied to the second warrant.” State v. Azofeifa-Ramirez, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 117 (Mar. 10, 2026).

Plaintiff’s claim including fraudulently obtaining a search warrant was barred by claim preclusion. The same claim had been litigated in state court with the same parties. Ramachandran v. City of Los Altos, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 6995 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2026).*

There was sufficient nexus between the offense under investigation and defendant’s motel room and car. Additional facts learned from the motel room search supported the car search. State v. Harris, 2026-Ohio-801 (4th Dist. Mar. 5, 2026).*

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CT: Exclusionary rule does not apply in animal welfare cases which are civil

The animal control officer did a welfare check on animals at a house and entered the curtilage to look in a window. The exclusionary rule does not apply in animal welfare cases. NE Conn. Council of Gov’ts Animal Servs. ex rel. Hutchins v. Donovan, 2026 Conn. App. LEXIS 80 (Mar. 10, 2026), citing State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly, 228 Conn. App. 458, 325 A.3d 1159, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 933, 327 A.3d 386 (2024), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 119 (2025).

A warrant for a firearm in defendant’s house issued three weeks after a road rage incident was not stale. [Guns are almost never stale.] United States v. Becker, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 6864 (10th Cir. Mar. 9, 2026).

Defendant’s refusal pretrial to turn over his passport or provide fingerprints without a search warrant is something the court can consider in the pretrial release inquiry. United States v. Snyder, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48229 (D.N.D. Mar. 9, 2026).*

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CA4: Surveillance video of def carrying suitcase showed his standing in it

Surveillance footage showed defendant carrying his suitcase, and that shows he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in it under Bond. United States v. Garcia, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 6876 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 2026).

Consent was to look inside at an immigration checkpoint and then there was probable cause to look in containers. United States v. Ponce, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 6889 (5th Cir. Mar. 9, 2026).*

There’s no reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s information in the DMV database, and that led to finding a warrant on the car owner and then further questions about who defendant was. State v. Anderson, 2026 UT App 29 (Mar. 5, 2026).

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