PA: No REP in data on use of EBT card

Appellant’s argument that the search incident failed because of a lack of an arrest warrant wasn’t presented below so it’s waived. He had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the data on his EBT card that Wawa wouldn’t turn over to the police. Commonwealth v. Hoyle, 2025 Pa. Super. LEXIS 216 (May 16, 2025).*

“Officer Fuller’s testimony that he paced Upchurch speeding and saw him turning and changing lanes without signaling amply supports the initial stop.” Defendant’s furtive movement which turned out to be hiding a gun magazine was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Upchurch, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93680 (D. Ariz. May 16, 2025).*

Plaintiff sued the local police department, as well as others, for taking possession of his car after an accident. The PD and others moved to dismiss which plaintiff didn’t answer. Dismissed. Page v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92655 (N.D. Tex. May 15, 2025).*

Plaintiff doesn’t show a material misstatement of fact to support his civil Franks claim. Welsh v. Hester, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 11818 (5th Cir. May 15, 2025).*

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WA: 911 call about following a DUI was RS for stop

Officers could rely on a 911 call about an alleged drunk driver who was reporting what she was seeing. “Law enforcement officers may effectuate a Terry stop based on a 911 caller’s tip when the tip is reliable and contains a factual basis for reasonable suspicion of a crime. Both parts of the test are met here, because Gilliver’s report of an active DUI was made under circumstances indicating reliability, Officer BrinJones’s observations of erratic driving corroborated the allegations, and those observations combined with the facts communicated in the tip provided a sufficient factual basis for reasonable suspicion of DUI. Because the stop of Stearns’s vehicle was lawful, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate Stearns’s convictions.” City of Wenatchee v. Stearns, 2025 Wash. LEXIS 258 (May 15, 2025).

Defendant’s challenges to the denial of his motion to controvert the search warrant are unpreserved. Also, the warrant materials were received before the hearings. People v. Sampson, 2025 NY Slip Op 02999 (1st Dept. May 15, 2025).*

Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not challenging the search of abandoned property. Staley v. State, 2025 Ga. App. LEXIS 191 (May 15, 2025).*

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D.Vt.: Coast Guard’s reboarding boat was with PC

It was revealed there was a firearm on board, and a later warrants check revealed a conviction that was wrong. Yet, it turned out later there was yet another not mentioned. The Coast Guard reboarded and took the gun and arrested the felon in possession. The reboarding was with probable cause, even if it was required. United States v. Robistow, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94150 (D. Vt. May 14, 2025):

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TX5: Warrantless removal of GSR was reasonable

Warrantless swabbing for GSR from defendant’s hands was reasonable because of exigency because it could likely be immediately lost. Argumedo v. State, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 3375 (Tex. App. – Dallas May 16, 2025).

Defendant’s Franks claim is more like a hope to cross-examine to find something rather than an assertion of misstated facts. United States v. Coleman, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 11836 (7th Cir. May 15, 2025).*

Petitioner’s letter to the court is construed to be a Rule 41(g) motion for return of property and is docketed. United States v. Wysinger, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92716 (W.D. Va. May 14, 2025).*

Even if defense counsel was ineffective here (but wasn’t) and then a Miranda violation, “it’s difficult to conceive a different outcome in this case.” United States v. Brazier, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92748 (N.D. Ind. May 14, 2025).*

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Reason: New Montana Law Blocks the State From Buying Private Data To Skirt the Fourth Amendment

Reason: New Montana Law Blocks the State From Buying Private Data To Skirt the Fourth Amendment by Joe Lancaster (“The Big Sky State becomes the first to close the ‘data broker loophole’ allowing the government to get private information without a warrant.”)

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TX5: Def driving his boss’s truck by permission had standing

Defendant driving his boss’s truck by permission had standing. Here, the issue was the scope of his consent to search it. The trial court’s conclusion he only was agreeing that he wasn’t the owner of the truck was sustained on appeal. Suppression affirmed. State v. Sikes, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 3338 (Tex. App. – Dallas May 15, 2025).

Habeas petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to argue a search issue but gives no basis to support it. Pizarro v. United States, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93089 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2025).*

“Bussey’s arguments are unconvincing. If Bussey’s proposed changes to the affidavit were made, the affidavit would merely show that the employer signed the letter and that investigators had conversations with Burnam, in which Bussey was not mentioned. These alterations would not materially impact probable cause. Therefore, I overrule Bussey’s objections to this portion of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.” United States v. Bussey, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92983 (S.D. Ga. May 14, 2025).*

Probable cause was shown for this anticipatory warrant. United States v. Ruiz-Ruiz, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92867 (D.P.R. May 13, 2025).*

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NY3: Judge who issued SW not barred from handling trial

Defendant’s claim that the judge issuing the search warrant couldn’t preside at the trial was not preserved because there was no objection. It would have failed anyway. People v Coston, 2025 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3046 (3d Dept. May 15, 2025).

Defendant was stopped for an obscured LPN. The officer could smell marijuana. Defendant didn’t properly identify himself. The stop and detention were valid. Adams v. State, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 3349 (Tex. App. – Ft. Worth May 15, 2025).*

Defendant didn’t preserve the issue whether the drug dog trespassed into the open window of the vehicle. Jackson v. State, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 3364 (Tex. App. – Ft. Worth May 15, 2025).*

The officer had reasonable suspicion to prolong this stop. While the story given about travel plans was reasonable, defendant’s hesitations, nervousness, and failing to get his papers supported reasonable suspicion. United States v. Penman-Keever, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93312 (S.D. Ill. May 15, 2025).*

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SCOTUS: Barnes v. Felix: The “totality of circumstances” in excessive force cases includes the entire encounter, not just the moments before force was used

The “totality of circumstances” in excessive force cases includes the entire encounter, not just the moments before force was used. Barnes v. Felix, 2025 U.S. LEXIS 1834 (May 15, 2025) (SCOTUSBlog). From the Syllabus:

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OR: Cell phone SW was fatally overbroad for scope of search

This cell phone warrant was based on probable cause, and it was particular as to drug related information with a specific time period. However, it was overbroad because it, as the state argued, essentially let the state seize anything else that it found on the phone as a plain view, and that made fatally overbroad. State v. Gaskill, 340 Or. App. 459 (May 14, 2025):

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OH5: Obvious typo in SW paperwork can be overlooked

Obvious typographical error in search warrant papers can be overlooked. State v. Crisp, 2025-Ohio-1718, 2025 Ohio App. LEXIS 1690 (5th Dist. May 13, 2025).

Walking away from a police encounter is permitted, but here the officers had reasonable suspicion based on the fact this was a notorious open air market and they’d taken drugs off of some of the participants before. On the totality there was reasonable suspicion. State v. K.B., 2025 La. LEXIS 708 (La. May 9, 2025).*

Opening a car door enough to cause the interior lights to come on was a search, but it was based on probable cause already developed enough for the automobile exception. United States v. Rimson, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90853 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 9, 2025).*

The search warrant for appellant’s email account was properly authorized and with probable cause. The good faith exception and plain view applies to other things found during the email search. United States v. Clark, 2025 CCA LEXIS 208 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. May 13, 2025).*

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D.Neb.: Suits against parole board also subject to Heck bar

Suits against parole board members about parole issues are subject to the Heck bar. Also, “Parole board members are absolutely immune from suit, in their individual capacities, when considering and deciding parole questions. Figg v. Russell, 433 F.3d 593, 598 (8th Cir. 2006).” Cox v. Bd. of Parole, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90522 (D. Neb. May 13, 2025).

Traffic stops can be based on reasonable suspicion, not just probable cause. State v. Howard, 2025 Fla. App. LEXIS 3618 (Fla. 5th DCA May 9, 2025).*

A light bar on a three wheel off road vehicle was reasonable suspicion for a stop. Roland v. La. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2025 La. LEXIS 712 (La. May 9, 2025).*

Ex parte applications for search warrant are explicitly recognized. Adelson v. State, 2025 Fla. App. LEXIS 3620 (Fla. 1st DCA May 9, 2025).*

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S.D.N.Y.: SW can issue to find evidence of a conspiracy

Defendant challenges this search warrant which refers to seeking potential evidence of a conspiracy where the officer only has evidence of overt acts. On the totality, the court finds probable cause and nexus and that the warrant is not overbroad. After all, the warrant is to seek evidence, and it doesn’t have to be based on proof that the possessor is guilty of a crime. United States v. Welch, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90982 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2025):

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TX14: Nexus here established by logical inference

The record supported nexus for search warrants for cell phone apparently used to coordinate between two cars that were driving for an hour in a shopping mall parking lot looking for a robbery target. It was logically the only way they were communicating. Granting deference to the warrants, the court finds nexus. Moore v. State, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 3250 (Tex. App. – Houston (14th Dist.) May 13, 2025).

“[W]e affirm the district court’s denial of all three motions. First, because Chatstep and Microsoft were not acting as governmental agents, the Fourth Amendment does not protect Rosenschein from their conduct. Further, even if Chatstep and Microsoft were governmental agents, Rosenschein’s Fourth Amendment claim fails because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in images he uploaded to a reportable internet chatroom with strangers. Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rosenschein’s motion to require production of NCMEC’s reporting system because Rosenschein had the opportunity to access that information through the examination of witnesses.” United States v. Rosenschein, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 11383 (10th Cir. May 12, 2025).*

Confiscation of defendant’s cell phone during his trial was not shown to have prejudiced him at trial. Also, the overruling of Chevron deference in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), has nothing to do with this case. United States v. Staples, 2025 DNH 060, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88676 (D.N.H. May 9, 2025).*

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MA: SCOTUS isn’t getting ready to get rid of community caretaking function

Because the trial court decided the suppression motion on issues not raised by the parties, the defense gets to argue things he didn’t raise below. The facts here supported the community caretaking function, and the court rejects his suggestion that SCOTUS is ready to jettison it. Commonwealth v. Page, 2025 Mass. App. LEXIS 39 (May 13, 2025).

The record supports the trial court’s crediting of the officer’s testimony that defendant was speeding and that supported the stop. State v. Pullom, 2025 Ohio App. LEXIS 1672 (3d Dist. May 12, 2025).*

Defendant’s patdown for weapons was supported by the record. State v. Pullom, 2025 Ohio App. LEXIS 1668 (3d Dist. May 12, 2025).*

Defendant’s stop was justified. “The totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that Mr. Buckingham had been driving under the influence of alcohol.” State v. Appellant, 2025-Ohio-1688 (9th Dist. May 12, 2025).*

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Reason: Revised Version of “Data Scanning and the Fourth Amendment”

Reason: Revised Version of “Data Scanning and the Fourth Amendment”; Now up to date. by Orin S. Kerr:

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Harvard L. Rev.: Comment: Long Lake Township v. Maxon

Comment: Long Lake Township v. Maxon, 138 Harv. L. Rev. 1941 (2025):

While technology advances, do Fourth Amendment rights keep pace to preserve privacy? Or do they get left behind? Regardless of the answer, it would be helpful to at least know how courts view the matter. Yet since 2005, when the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began certifying drones and our skies began to darken if only by the slightest shade, courts have remained rather quiet about whether government drone surveillance constitutes an unreasonable search. And when squarely confronted with that question, the Michigan Supreme Court ducked. In Long Lake Township v. Maxon, Michigan’s high court short-circuited its Fourth Amendment analysis of drone surveillance by concluding that, even if the municipality did conduct an unreasonable search, the exclusionary rule was inapplicable. As Americans grow increasingly concerned with drones, so much so that Saturday Night Live’s Bowen Yang took to the Weekend Update desk dressed as a drone himself, courts should be offering answers on whether drone surveillance constitutes an unreasonable search. While the answer to that question may be beyond the scope of this comment, it should not have been beyond the scope of the Michigan Supreme Court.

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FL1: Judge issuing SW not barred from presiding over trial

Reviewing search warrant applications is a core function of a judicial officer, and that does not qualify as an improper ex parte communication requiring the trial judge to recuse. Writ of prohibition denied. Adelson v. State, 2025 Fla. App. LEXIS 3620 (Fla. 1st DCA May 9, 2025).

When the driver could not be identified, asking for his SSN was reasonable. So was asking the passengers for their names. United States v. Morgan, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88170 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 1, 2025).

The dashcam didn’t show the failure to signal, but the camera was on the passenger side of the patrol car, and it had a different view from the driver. The officer’s testimony is credited. United States v. Vann, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 11318 (6th Cir. May 8, 2025).*

The record does not support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim against defense counsel on a suppression issue, and Stone bars any free standing Fourth Amendment claim on habeas. United States v. Grant, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89323 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 18, 2025).*

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CA7: Skeletal 4A claim doesn’t support relief

A caution about pleading in a § 1983 Fourth Amendment case: Plaintiff loses because of his skeletal claims in the complaint. “We express no opinion on whether the officers needed to handcuff Petersen, transport him in a police vehicle to a police station, and hand him over to an interview team to complete their stated mission of ascertaining Petersen’s identity, determining whether Petersen had a firearm, and investigating the situation without interference. See United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1016-17 (7th Cir. 2011) (‘We have previously found that using handcuffs, placing suspects in police cars, drawing weapons, and other measures of force more traditionally associated with arrests may be proper during an investigatory detention, depending on the circumstances …. [But] in some situations, maintaining the status quo while obtaining more information … might be the most reasonable action to take.’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). We also express no opinion on whether, to get Erato’s name, check if he had a gun, and investigate the scene without his interference, the officers needed to handcuff him, take his belongings, transport him in a police vehicle to a police station, and interview him. And we express no opinion on whether Petersen or Erato’s detentions morphed into full-blown arrests. In the end, it does not matter whether the record supports these conclusions because the skeletal arguments on which Plaintiffs rely are insufficient to support their Fourth Amendment claims. United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991) (‘[P]erfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived ….’); United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (‘A skeletal “argument,” really nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim.’ (citation omitted)).” Moderson v. City of Neenah, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 11281 (7th Cir. May 9, 2025).*

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AK: No PC shown for cell phone search in a Medicaid fraud case

In a Medicaid fraud case, the state did not show probable cause to believe evidence would be found on the cell phone of the Medicaid provider. The search warrant was also not particular for the cell phone. The warrant authorized seizure of computer media in the dentists’ office. Lookhart v. State, 2025 Alas. App. LEXIS 46 (May 9, 2025):

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MI: Exigency for seeking cell phone consent doesn’t require actual knowledge def might destroy evidence on it

Defendant consented to seizure of his cell phone after officers learned there might be child sexual abuse material on it. A search warrant later issued. All this was reasonable. The officer doesn’t have to have evidence that defendant might delete information from the phone before seeking to secure it. People v. Evans, 2025 Mich. App. LEXIS 3621 (May 8, 2025).

“[T]he district court correctly determined that Officer Zavaleta’s initial detention of Darling did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Zavaleta knew that Darling was in a small group and had reason to believe that another member of that group was armed and had been brandishing the firearm. This provided a reasonable objective basis for Zavaleta to briefly detain the group.” Darling v. Zavaleta, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 11264 (11th Cir. May 8, 2025).*

Defendant is charged with vehicular manslaughter. A search warrant was issued for the interior of the vehicle: “The court’s common-sense review of the validity of the search warrant is limited to whether the issuing court reasonably determined that probable cause existed for its issuance. … The sworn affidavit in support of the warrant was signed by the lead detective on the case, a 17-year veteran of the NYPD assigned to the Collision Investigation Squad. The warrant is sufficiently narrow and particular in its scope, requesting the seizure and search only of the Defendant’s vehicle involved in the crash and the interior items which are relevant to the details of Defendant’s driving and his identity as the driver. The affiant’s basis of knowledge for the information in the affidavit was derived from his own observations, experience, and investigation as well as investigation by other police officers ….” People v. Hill, 2025 NY Slip Op 25109 (Queens Co. May 6, 2025).*

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