The seizing officer could not authenticate defendant’s notebooks as evidence at the trial. He had no knowledge about how they came into being. United States v. Sherman, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5696 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 12, 2025).
Defendant’s admission at the time of the search that the drugs in his workspace were his were admissible, and that was sufficient to support his conviction despite his denial when testifying. State v. Rollison, 2025-Ohio-72 (3d Dist. Jan. 13, 2025).*
“The Court cannot accept Mr. Wright’s assertion that removing his underwear in the emergency department, during his treatment for a drug overdose, was an unreasonable search. Although Mr. Wright contends that removing an overdose patient’s clothes is unnecessary and naloxone is the reasonable treatment, he offers no record evidence to show that it was unreasonable for HCMC medical staff to remove his underwear as part of their treatment plan for him—the issue was not a subject of this Court’s motions hearing whatsoever.” United States v. Wright, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 236845 (D. Minn. Nov. 25, 2024), adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4921 (D. Minn. Jan. 10, 2025).*
The fact a state nighttime search warrant doesn’t comply with state law doesn’t matter in federal court. It’s whether Rule 41 and the Fourth Amendment were complied with. Then, the defendant has to show prejudice. Also, the fact defendant had the “mental acuity” to attempt to deceive the officers during the search undermines defendant’s claim he didn’t have the acuity to consent. United States v. Vidal-Collazo, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5692 (D.P.R. Jan. 10, 2025).
“Avery actually presented his Fourth Amendment claim to the state trial court in his pretrial motion to suppress. He later presented his Fourth Amendment claim to the Michigan appellate courts. It is apparent that the state provided an opportunity for Avery to litigate his search-and-seizure issue and that nothing in the process frustrated that procedural opportunity. He may not now present his Fourth Amendment claim on habeas review.” Avery v. Burgess, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3799 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 8, 2025).*
Police executing a warrant on a business talked to employees and none of them were detained when they voluntarily talked to them. United States v. Johnson, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4083 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2025).*
A former judge of the Harris County Criminal Court was sanctioned by the Texas Supreme Court for issuing orders of protection barring the Sheriff from taking DNA samples from class A misdemeanants because the judge believed the statute requiring it was unconstitutional. Whether it is unconstitutional isn’t decided. In re Bynum, 2024 Tex. LEXIS 1182 (Spec. Ct. of Rev. Appointed by the Supreme Court of Texas Dec. 27, 2024).
Police executing a warrant on a business talked to employees and none of them were detained when they voluntarily talked to them. United States v. Johnson, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4083 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2025).*
This case involves CSLI in a fraud case, and defendant’s Franks challenge fails. On the whole, there was probable cause, even deleting the challenged information. United States v. Falcon, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3825 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2025).*
In a case involving whether whether he was a felon in possession for this underlying crime, defendant is precluded by the government’s motion in limine from arguing the government’s conduct violated the Fourth Amendment, too. United States v. Romero, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4212 (D. Alaska Jan. 8, 2025).*
Posted inAirport searches, Forfeiture|Comments Off on Reason: DEA ends airport gate searches after years of documented abuses of civil asset forfeiture
In a tax fraud case, there were six search warrants. Defendants challenge them all. Standing was in dispute, but doesn’t even have to be decided because there clearly is probable cause for all six, despite the claim that one piece of the probable cause was a look through a window seeing incriminating documents. There was still probable cause even without that. A hearing wasn’t even required because the disputed fact, the look through the window, wasn’t material. United States v. Charles, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 906 (8th Cir. Jan. 15, 2025).
“Whether an affidavit’s information is stale is a case-by-case analysis. … Under this analysis, ‘the length of time between the events listed in the affidavit and the application for the warrant’ is salient but not dispositive. Id. At its core, the staleness analysis turns on “‘the inherent nature of the crime”’ and whether an affidavit establishes that officers have a fair probability of finding evidence at the searched property when they search it. … In that vein, the Sixth Circuit has provided four factors to guide staleness inquiries: (1) ‘the character of the crime’; (2) ‘the criminal’; (3) ‘the thing to be seized’; and (4) ‘the place to be searched.’ … These factors are addressed below, demonstrating that the information in Detective Sauve’s affidavit was not stale.” United States v. Schalk, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3808 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 8, 2025).*
This case involves CSLI in a fraud case, and defendant’s Franks challenge fails. On the whole, there was probable cause, even deleting the challenged information. United States v. Falcon, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3825 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2025).*
Posted inFranks doctrine, Staleness, Standing|Comments Off on CA8: When there’s PC for a SW, standing doesn’t even have to be decided
Issuance of an NCO on defendant denies him standing when he was found in the premises he was ordered from. He has no reasonable expectation of privacy once ordered away. Prior cases in accord are not overruled. State v. Ortiz, 2025 Ida. LEXIS 2 (Jan. 8, 2025).
An officer patrolling a high crime area at a motel on request of the owner because of drug deals and trespassing on the parking lot had reasonable suspicion. He saw defendant, engaged in a conversation which suggested he was there without any justification. He said he was meeting a friend but was unsure of the name and was waiting for her to come out. He admitted he’d just gotten out of the pen for bank robbery, and the officer saw a gun and high capacity drum magazine in the car. United States v. Cole, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 430 (5th Cir. Jan. 8, 2025).*
An identified informant has some built-in reliability. United States v. Jones, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3800 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 8, 2025).*
Reason: Nevada Judge to Nevada Cops: You Can’t Use This Loophole To Get Around Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform by C.J. Ciaramella (“In the first decision of its kind in Nevada, a judge ruled last week that state law enforcement can’t evade stricter requirements for seizing cash and property by partnering with the federal government. The plaintiff in that lawsuit, a Marine veteran named Stephen Lara, had nearly $90,000 in cash seized from him in 2021 by two Nevada Highway Patrol officers. The cops admitted to Lara that there was nothing illegal about carrying large amounts of cash. But they decided that Lara’s money was likely drug proceeds, and they coordinated with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to forfeit it through a process called civil asset forfeiture.”)
Posted inForfeiture|Comments Off on Reason: Nevada Judge to Nevada Cops: You Can’t Use This Loophole To Get Around Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform
Newer cases hold that a drug dog can’t differentiate between legal and illegal marijuana, so a dog alert doesn’t provide probable cause. Where the dog sniff occurred before that holding, however, it was reasonable under the good faith exception. Ford v. State, 2025 Fla. App. LEXIS 187 (Fla. 5th DCA Jan. 7, 2025).
There was at least a good faith basis to bring a criminal case when it was first initiated, and the fact they didn’t continue to investigate doesn’t undermine that initial probable cause. Bickham v. Czebiniak, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2496 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2025).*
A 2255 petition that only alleges that defense counsel failed to file a motion to suppress to challenge illegally seized evidence didn’t state a claim. What evidence? Davis v. United States, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3668 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 8, 2025).*
Summary judgment was properly granted on qualified immunity grounds because the law was not clearly established in 2015 that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment by entering the curtilage of a home through an unlocked gate and reaching out to arrest someone standing in plain view near the street. Sauceda v. Lopez, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 434 (5th Cir. Jan. 8, 2025).*
“While the officer observed Sheppard with a concealed weapon in a high crime area, under the revised statute making non-licensure an element of the crime of concealed carry, Sheppard’s mere possession of the concealed weapon did not constitute criminal activity. … [¶] Thus, we are compelled to conclude that the officers lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct the subject investigatory stop.” Sheppard v. State, 2025 Fla. App. LEXIS 221 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 8, 2025).
“The defendant’s valid waiver of his right to appeal forecloses appellate review of the denial of his motion to controvert a search warrant and to suppress physical evidence seized in the execution thereof.” People v. Dickerson, 2025 NY Slip Op 00108 (2d Dept. Jan. 8, 2025).*
“This record clearly demonstrates that Petitioner was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment Claims in the Delaware state courts. The fact that Petitioner disagrees with these decisions and/or the reasoning utilized therein is insufficient to overcome the Stone bar.” Montgomery v. Emig, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3608 (D. Del. Jan. 8, 2025).*
Suppression is not the remedy for a knock-and-announce violation. United States v. Bello, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 236255 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2024),* adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2332 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2025).*
Defendant had no standing to question the search of another person’s cell phone. Davis v. United States, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3668 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 8, 2025).*
Plaintiff’s arrest was based on the best possible information, and it was with probable cause. Garfias v. United States, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3615 (D. Or. Jan. 6, 2025).*
“But Deputy Gampfer’s investigation mistakenly linked Castellanos to the shady businessmen and snowballed into his misidentification, arrest, and two nights in jail. Although Deputy Gampfer’s investigation was less-than-ideal, his mistakes do not defeat the protection of qualified immunity.” Castellanos v. Gampfer, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3770 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2025).
“On appeal, Birkley does not contest the district court’s reasons for dismissing the case, including its rationale that Birkley failed to state a claim because he conceded at his preliminary hearing that the police had probable cause for their actions. ‘Probable cause is an absolute bar to a claim of false arrest asserted under the Fourth Amendment and section 1983.’ … Because Birkley disputes neither his concession nor the court’s reliance on it to dismiss his suit, he has waived any argument, including one about judicial estoppel, …, opposing the court’s conclusion that his prior concession in state court defeats this case. … In his appellate brief, Birkley contends only that his arrest was invalid because the arrest warrant did not observe that he is a ‘Moorish National’ and it was not signed by an ‘Article III judge.’ These contentions are frivolous, see, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 1(b)(4); 4(a)-(b), and require no further comment.” Birkley v. Eade, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 374 (7th Cir. Jan. 8, 2025).*
“As to whether a clearly established constitutional right exists, the Court finds, and Defendants do not dispute, that Plaintiff enjoys a clearly established right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, and this includes the right to be from arrest without probable cause, and ‘the right to be free from searches [and seizures] predicated on an officer’s intentional or reckless submission of false statements in a warrant affidavit.’ … [¶] However, when considering whether Lawson violated such a constitutional right, the Court is left wondering what facts and evidence of record support Plaintiff’s claim, as he has failed to cite to the appropriate test for challenging qualified immunity based on a judicially signed arrest warrant, failed to cite to any evidence of record whatsoever, and failed to cite to any legal authority to support his position. Indeed, Plaintiff has failed to even allege any specific false statements or material omissions or other facts relevant to this Court’s analysis.” Helton v. Whitley Cty. Fiscal Court, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2327 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 7, 2025).*
A fire inspection of a warehouse that was being used as a residence was subject to the administrative warrant requirement. No exception applies. Hannan v. L.A. Cty. Fire Dep’t, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235999 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2024).
2254 petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim over his text messages was defaulted. He presented a different ground to the state court. Rumph v. Dixon, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235950 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2024),* adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1514 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2025).*
Petitioner’s 2255 seeks to relitigate his Fourth Amendment claim that was already lost in his 2255 and it’s treated as a successor petition and denied. Glover v. United States, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3072 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 7, 2025).*
There was at least some corroboration of the anonymous information, and that at least shows a substantial basis for crediting the probable cause for the police to rely on it. “[I]t [is] difficult to conclude that the warrant was so lacking in indicia of probable cause to render it facially deficient or reliance on it objectively unreasonable. Thus, the motion to suppress the evidence gathered as a result of the March 18, 2022 warrant is DENIED.” United States v. Bannick, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3047 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2025).*
There was probable cause for this child pornography warrant. Information about a Pinterest account that was five months old was not stale, and the images were adequately identified. United States v. Lynch, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2633 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 7, 2025).*
“Defendant fails to explain, and the Court fails to discern, any basis for a meritorious motion to suppress in this matter. Defendant, therefore, is not entitled to relief with respect to this assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Kennedy v. United States, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2556 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 7, 2025).*
CoA denied. “Beginning with Crawford’s claims concerning his counsels’ failure to investigate and move to suppress, reasonable jurists could not conclude that counsel performed deficiently or that Crawford was prejudiced. The affidavits and correspondence provided by Crawford’s attorneys refute his claim that they failed to thoroughly investigate the search warrant. Instead, they did so but concluded that a motion to suppress was unlikely to succeed and could lead to the withdrawal of the government’s plea offer and, in turn, a much longer sentence. [¶] And reasonable jurists would conclude that counsels’ decision not to pursue suppression was reasonable.” Crawford v. United States, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 319 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2025).*
The fact the search warrant paperwork wasn’t returned on time which made it void under state law isn’t relevant under the Fourth Amendment in federal court. Jackson v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235912 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 4, 2024), adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1654 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 6, 2025).
The issue here is whether defense counsel was ineffective for not raising an issue of the presence of an HBO film crew during the drug search. That was litigated in state post-conviction, and the claim failed on the merits. It can’t be relitigated here. Harmon v. Payne, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2371 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 7, 2025).*
Defendant agreed to forfeiture in his plea agreement, and he can’t get return of property now. United States v. Grabau, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2367 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 7, 2025).*
The defendant officer’s use of force to attempt to break up a fight was reasonable. Imbriano v. Murray, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2406 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2025).*
Officers were surveilling a van that they believed might have a connection to an unsolved homicide. They observed what appeared to be hand-to-hand drug transactions, and the van’s LPN was expired. They approached. There were others around the van, and plaintiff was handcuffed for safety. A drug dog was called for, and that took 45 minutes to arrive. The dog instinctively jumped in the open vehicle, but nothing was found. Defendant’s summary judgment is granted. If plaintiff suffered an emotional or other consequences from the dog sniff, he fails to show any damages. Aunhk Ra Aunhkhotep v. Kopfensteiner, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2625 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 7, 2025).
Plaintiff’s First and Fourth Amendment claims over being put in restricted housing unit in the state pen are dismissed. The Fourth Amendment doesn’t apply in a prison. Stansbury v. Harry, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2252 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2025).*
On the totality, defendant impliedly consented to the entry of the officers into his house by his nonverbal conduct. State v. Mitchell, 2025 Ida. App. LEXIS 1 (Jan. 7, 2025).*
Oregon’s conversational privacy statute (both sides have to know about recording) survives constitutional challenge because it is content neutral. Project Veritas v. Schmidt, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 281 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2025) (en banc).*
It’s not coercive to tell a suspect that the officer will get a search warrant if he doesn’t consent when there’s probable cause. State v. Gore, 2025 Wisc. App. LEXIS 7 (Jan. 7, 2025).
There was probable cause for defendant’s vehicle search under the automobile exception. United States v. Lopez, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235816 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 4, 2024),* adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1689 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 6, 2025).*
“The administration of the SFSTs in this case, while flawed, yielded sufficient clues of intoxication that, when combined with the officer’s other observations, established probable cause for Defendant’s arrest.” United States v. Villarreal, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2253 (W.D. La. Jan. 3, 2025).*
Despite plaintiff stopping his car, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established that firing at plaintiff after his vehicle collided and stopped, but still potentially posed a threat, violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Manery v. Lee, No. 24-1292, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 314 (7th Cir. Jan. 7, 2025).*
Posted inConsent, Probable cause, Qualified immunity|Comments Off on WI: Not coercive to tell def officer will get SW if he doesn’t consent when there is PC
Defendant abandoned his backpack when he ditched it in a motel stairwell when he was fleeing the police. United States v. Mayberry, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 300 (4th Cir. Jan. 7, 2025).
Leaving one’s backpack and a trashbag in the bushes was abandonment. United States v. Burnett, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 312 (7th Cir. Jan. 7, 2025).
Petitioner doesn’t get to see the name of the CI in the issuance of the search warrant. Aguasanta v. City of N.Y., 2025 NY Slip Op 00035 (1st Dept. Jan. 7, 2025).*
COA from denial of 2254 denied on petitioner’s Fourth Amendment ineffective assistance claim. He wouldn’t win on the merits. Carson v. Lumpkin, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 223 (5th Cir. Jan. 6, 2025).*
Defendant’s cell phone and its contents were still contraband and could not be returned, even if the phone was reset to its factory settings. United States v. Nestor, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 241 (3d Cir. Jan. 6, 2025).*
The fact a parole supervisor conducted the parole search and not a “parole officer” doesn’t make the parole search unreasonable. United States v. Barron, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 258 (10th Cir. Jan. 7, 2025).
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is more vague than the Complaint, and it seeks federal court intervention in a state criminal proceeding. Dismissed. Hood v. Truhlar, 15591, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1711 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2025).*
2255 denied: “Even if the search warrant incorporated the alleged misrepresentations and omissions that are not directly contradicted by the record, the search warrant would still be supported by probable cause.” United States v. Valentine, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235637 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 12, 2024),* adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 663 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2025).*
The cell phone search warrant here did not mandate return of the phone after the search. Due to staffing issues, the FBI didn’t get to finally search defendant’s phone for years, and it was searched years later. United States v. Banwari, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2132 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 6, 2025).*
“Following the logic of these cases, the fact that Defendant was apparently in technical violation of an apartment lease does not deprive him of standing to challenge the search in question. The evidence on the record indicates that Defendant was staying at the apartment with the express permission of his father. Furthermore, he was known to the management of the apartment building, and he regularly made rent and utility payments for the unit. There is no countervailing evidence that Defendant was ever ordered to leave the apartment or otherwise informed that he was not supposed to stay there, much less that he had been evicted from the apartment. Although the Government has demonstrated that Defendant was likely in technical violation of the lease agreement for his apartment, it is equally clear that he maintained his residence in the apartment with the express permission of his father, the lessee, and the implied authorization of the lessor. Accordingly, Defendant has standing to challenge the search that took place during the course of his arrest.” United States v. Osagbue, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1235 (D.P.R. Jan. 3, 2025).
Plethysmograph testing of a sex offender intrudes on privacy under the state constitution, but it is reasonable if for treatment only. Dominguez v. State, 2025 Wash. App. LEXIS 1 (Jan. 6, 2025)* (unpublished).
Defendant was a visitor at a house searched under a warrant, and the search of his vehicle outside was reasonable under the warrant and the automobile exception. United States v. Lopez, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1689 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 6, 2025).*
Posted inStanding|Comments Off on D.P.R.: Being in technical violation of a lease doesn’t deprive defendant of standing
by John Wesley Hall Criminal Defense Lawyer and Search and seizure law consultant Little Rock, Arkansas Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!” ---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.