Appellant shows no basis for construing pretextual stops under the state constitution differently than the Fourth Amendment. Riley v. State, 2025 Md. App. LEXIS 727 (Aug. 27, 2025).*
Defendant’s encounter with the officer here after one with mall security was consensual. United States v. Dessasure, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168056 (S.D. Ga. July 7, 2025),* adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167009 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 26, 2025).*
There was probable cause for defendant’s stop, contrary to his claim. State v. Cabiness, 2025-Ohio-3087 (5th Dist. Aug. 28, 2025).*
Petitioner’s claim he was entitled to a Franks hearing with newly discovered evidence fails because the part he’s contesting doesn’t matter to the probable cause determination. Rodgers v. United States, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168000 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 27, 2025).*
The Dallas Court of Appeals “concluded that the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle gave an officer probable cause to search the vehicle and its occupants, even though the odor of marijuana is indistinguishable from the odor of hemp.” This court follows that. Outlaw v. State, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 6914 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi – Edinburg Aug. 28, 2025)
“Therefore, in addition to Agent Namey’s experience and explanation, the affidavit’s discussion of the facts about Mr. Waulk’s arrest, including the high-speed chase, the refusal to exit the vehicle, the gun in Mr. Waulk’s waistband, and the evidence recovered from the vehicle further provided Magistrate Judge Pesto, when considering the totality of the circumstances, with a substantial basis for a finding of probable cause to issue the warrant to search the cell phones found in the car.” There was also justification for a DNA warrant. On the totality, there was probable cause for arrest and a search incident. United States v. Waulk, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168183 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2025).*
“Because we have already determined that the warrant affidavit contained sufficient information to support a finding of probable cause even when ignoring the statements at issue, Dykes was not entitled to an article 38.23 instruction.” Dykes v. State, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 6884 (Tex. App. – Dallas Aug. 28, 2025).*
Drug dog’s nose touching a car door handle was not a search. State v. Pendleton, 2025 Ida. App. LEXIS 38 (Aug. 29, 2025).
The defendant officer violated no reasonable expectation of privacy by accessing plaintiff’s public Facebook posts. Dicks v. Fipps, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168485 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 28, 2025).*
There was reasonable suspicion for this stop, and then more to continue it 22 minutes until the drug dog arrived. State v. McLain, 2025 ME 87 (Aug. 29, 2025).*
Defendant’s FST was justified by reasonable suspicion and didn’t unreasonably extend the stop. State v. Hicks, 2025 Kan. App. LEXIS 36 (Aug. 29, 2025).*
“Welch successfully challenged five statements in the search warrant affidavit, and the district court did not clearly err in rejecting his challenge to several additional statements. Having found that Welch made the necessary showing with respect to the five statements, the district court should have set the false or misleading material aside and then determined whether the remaining content was sufficient to establish probable cause. Franks, 438 U.S. at 156. The government concedes the district court erred by ‘correcting’ the affidavit with accurate information, as opposed to simply excising the false material. However, we conclude this error is harmless because we review the probable cause determination de novo, Dozier, 844 F.2d at 706, and find, excising the false and misleading information from the affidavit, there remained probable cause to issue the warrant.” United States v. Welch, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 22271 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2025).
It is well known that there is no staleness challenge to a search for possession of child pornography. The possibility of an accidental download is a trial defense, not one to the warrant. United States v. Hinrichs, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168550 (D. Neb. Aug. 29, 2025).*
Posted inFranks doctrine, Staleness|Comments Off on CA9: A successful Franks challenge means deletion of offending material and not addition of what was missing
Petitioner’s habeas claims include a Fourth Amendment claim barred by Stone. Steward v. Napoli, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169230 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2025).* Same: Bogan v. Christiansen, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 22218 (6th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025).
The state court applied Jardines to determine entry through an unlocked gate to get access to petitioner’s front door was a reasonable application of federal law. [Stone not discussed.] Popke v. Andes, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169183 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2025).*
Even where the Fourth Amendment claim arises at trial, Stone v. Powell applies to bar habeas relief. Robertson v. Guerrero, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168197 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2025).*
Defendant can’t bring his search and seizure claim in habeas. Even as in ineffective assistance of counsel, he can’t prevail because the search wasn’t unreasonable. Church v. Vannoy, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169370 (M.D. La. July 31, 2025),* adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168332 (M.D. La. Aug. 28, 2025).*
Search and seizure claims aren’t cognizable in habeas. Sanchez v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169455 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2025).*
Indiana adopts the drug dog rule that “a K9’s instinctive entry into a vehicle does not implicate the Fourth Amendment so long as it is not directed, encouraged, or facilitated by officers.” This one was, and without probable cause, and the search is suppressed. Ocampo v. State, 2025 Ind. App. LEXIS 286 (Aug. 29, 2025).
“The parents do not dispute this evidence but argue that the district court erred by ‘neglect[ing] to focus’ on the ‘actual events at the time of the removal.’ They emphasize that when Detective Wilson removed the children, she did not see drugs or drug paraphernalia, the children were reasonably clean and well-nourished, and there was no ‘immediate evidence’ of drug exposure. But the ultimate question is whether her suspicion was reasonable at the time of removal—not whether evidence supporting it appeared contemporaneously. See Stanley, 899 F.3d at 629 (‘[W]hether there was reasonable suspicion of child abuse warranting removal must be determined by analyzing the totality of the circumstances at the time of the removal.’). The ‘totality of the circumstances’ includes evidence of child abuse Detective Wilson already ‘knew [of] at the time.’ See United States v. Slater, 979 F.3d 626, 629 (8th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). We do not ask an officer to turn a blind eye to recent, credible evidence of endangerment because there was not more evidence at the moment of removal.” Welter v. Wilson, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 22256 (8th Cir. Aug. 29, 2025).*
Posted inDog sniff, Reasonableness|Comments Off on IN: Drug dog’s instinctive entry into car is reasonable, but this was facilitated by the officer and wasn’t
Attempting to conceal an apparent gun in a high crime area contributed to reasonable suspicion. “The State argues that the court did not err. According to the State, the detective testified about his specific observations that gave rise to a reasonable suspicion and a justification for a Terry stop. These factors included the detective’s observations of Appellant blading his body to conceal a firearm, the visible bulge in his pocket, the apparent weight of the object as it moved, and the fact that the tactical team was operating in a known high-crime area.” Booker v. State, 2025 Md. App. LEXIS 735 (Aug. 28, 2025).*
The trial court’s determination that it did not believe the officers that an incoming text message stayed illuminated on defendant’s cell phone so it could be photographed was binding. The suppression of the cell phone search is thus affirmed. Commonwealth v. Carter, 2025 PA Super 190 (Aug. 29, 2025).*
FBI SWAT team’s knock-and-talk to arrest an MS-13 member for a kidnapping and murder was reasonable. United States v. Contreras, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 22277 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 2025).*
Plaintiff’s § 1983 search claim produced a damages verdict for $500 compensatory and $3500 punitive. The attorney’s fees award of $84,690.00 is granted. Pfalzgraf v. Reisner, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168405 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 28, 2025).
Cracked windshield and tinted windows justified the stop. United States v. Watts, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168522 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2025).*
The stop and search of the car were justified. The strip search at the station house likely wasn’t, but the officers get qualified immunity for that. Beatty v. Gardner, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168429 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2025).*
Tasing defendant during his arrest for noncompliance with officers after a traffic stop was not unreasonable considering the scene was chaotic. People v. Ford, 2025 Mich. App. LEXIS 7002 (Aug. 28, 2025).*
The officer said he searched the passenger’s purse in the car as part of the inventory and not as a search incident. In any event, she was a parole absconder, and it could be searched for that reason. State v. Thomas, 2025 UT App 133, 2025 Utah App. LEXIS 136 (Aug. 28, 2025).
The warrant here was with probable cause and executed in good faith. United States v. Hinrichs, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168550 (D. Neb. Aug. 29, 2025).*
Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not challenging the searches here because there was no basis and there was no basis for a Franks claim. No matter what, the good faith exception would apply. Wesley v. United States, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168720 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 29, 2025).*
Prisoner’s complaint about seizure of his legal papers is a conditions of confinement claim, not a Fourth Amendment claim, not cognizable in habeas. Smith v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168695 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025).*
Defendant’s consent to a full search of his vehicle included dismantling parts of it and using a portable x-ray to look in closed spaces. United States v. Talamante-Sanchez, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168814 (D.N.M. Aug. 29, 2025).
Plaintiff sovereign citizen’s Fourth Amendment claims in federal court weren’t raised in state court and are waived. Milton v. Ross, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169152 (D. Idaho Aug. 27, 2025).*
Collateral post-conviction attack via Fourth Amendment was waived by not appealing it in the first place. Pouncy v. United States, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168929 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 29, 2025).*
There was probable cause for the warrant in the first place. Alternatively, the good faith exception applies. United States v. Lyons, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168900 (D. Kan. Aug. 29, 2025).*
A court order issued under the Stored Communications Act was sufficient as a substitute for a warrant. United States v. Whittaker, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169034 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 7, 2025).
“Therefore, in addition to Agent Namey’s experience and explanation, the affidavit’s discussion of the facts about Mr. Waulk’s arrest, including the high-speed chase, the refusal to exit the vehicle, the gun in Mr. Waulk’s waistband, and the evidence recovered from the vehicle further provided Magistrate Judge Pesto, when considering the totality of the circumstances, with a substantial basis for a finding of probable cause to issue the warrant to search the cell phones found in the car.” United States v. Waulk, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168183 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2025).*
Plaintiff prisoner’s claim that there was a privacy violation in investigating a suspected credit card from originating from prison fails. Papazian v. Trate, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169269 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2025).*
Lexology: Constitutional Challenges to AI Monitoring Systems in Public Schools (“Two recent federal lawsuits filed against school districts in Lawrence, Kansas and Marana, Arizona highlight emerging legal challenges surrounding the use of AI surveillance tools in the educational setting. Both cases involve Gaggle, a comprehensive AI student safety platform, and center around similar allegations: students claim that their respective school districts violated their constitutional rights through broad, invasive AI surveillance of their electronic communications and documents. These lawsuits represent a new legal frontier in which traditional student privacy rights collide with school districts’ reliance on generative AI to monitor students’ digital activity.”)
Posted inSurveillance technology|Comments Off on Lexology: Constitutional Challenges to AI Monitoring Systems in Public Schools
An extraterritorial arrest does not violate the search and seizure provision of the state constitution, like it doesn’t under the Fourth Amendment. The remedies for statutory violations aren’t in the exclusionary rule. State v. Satterfield, 2025 Ida. App. LEXIS 37 (Aug. 26, 2025).
Officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain defendant about a mile from the scene of the robbery they were investigating. United States v. Whiting, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165259 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2025).*
Where there is probable cause, the good faith exception doesn’t need to be decided. State v. Brown, 2025 Wisc. App. LEXIS 777 (Aug. 26, 2025) (unpublished).*
There were two search warrants for cell phones. The first is void under the good faith exception because there was at best a hunch evidence would be found. The second is valid because it was based on an independent showing of probable cause. United States v. Dove, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163089 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 22, 2025).
A tip from a foreign law enforcement agency about a Massachusetts IP address trading in CSAM could be credited for probable cause. United States v. Shacar, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165584 (D. Mass. Aug. 26, 2025).
Because the CI’s role was so limited in the drug buy that led to the warrant, the defense doesn’t get discovery of the CI. Defendant’s not charged with the drug deal. State v. Manzella, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 6583 (Tex. App. – Houston (14th Dist.) Aug. 26, 2025).*
Under this warrant, once things (like safes) were seized from the house, the officers could search without another warrant. United States v. Kipling, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165267 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 26, 2025).*
Posted inInformant hearsay, Scope of search|Comments Off on D.Mass.: Foreign law enforcement agency could be credited as informant
The state violated no reasonable expectation of privacy by entering the public area of a business. Tucker v. State, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 6617 (Tex. App. – Ft. Worth Aug. 26, 2025).
Exigency not required for automobile exception search on probable cause. Hernandez v. State, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 6613 (Tex. App. – Ft. Worth Aug. 26, 2025).*
Failing to drive fully within one’s lane can justify a stop. Rivera v. State, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 6548 (Tex. App. – Amarillo Aug. 25, 2025).*
Plaintiff’s claim that a housing ordinance that requires a search warrant for inspections fails where it alleged warrants were issued without probable cause but gives no facts that that ever happened. 903 W. Wash. LLC v. City of Jackson, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164573 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2025).*
The government’s evidence was so weak that it decided to drop the case after Moore challenged the seizure in federal court. Moore got his money back, but he was still out thousands of dollars in legal fees until last week, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit ruled that he was entitled to compensation for those expenses.
Unlike criminal defendants, civil forfeiture targets have no right to court-appointed counsel, which helps explain why they usually give up without a fight. According to one estimate, more than nine out of 10 federal civil forfeiture cases are resolved without judicial involvement.
Challenging a forfeiture is a complicated and daunting process that is very difficult to navigate without a lawyer. But the cost of hiring one typically exceeds the value of the seized property, meaning forfeiture targets can lose even when they win.
Congress tried to address that problem by passing the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA), a 2000 law that says “the United States shall be liable for reasonable attorney fees” whenever a property owner “substantially prevails” in a federal forfeiture case. But when Moore got his money back and sought $15,000 to pay his lawyers, U.S. District Judge Thomas W. Thrash Jr. ruled that he was not entitled to compensation under CAFRA because he had not met that standard.
Posted inImmigration arrests, Stop and frisk|Comments Off on ATL: a “search so obviously unconstitutional that a ‘high school student’ would know it’s illegal”
It was a reasonable conclusion that defendant’s cell phone would have information about this shooting incident. It was reasonable to believe that he had his phone when driving. The time period was also reasonably limited. People v. Terrell, 2025 IL App (3d) 240567, 2025 Ill. App. LEXIS 1042 (Aug. 22, 2025):
The Harris drug dog reliability case applies only to warrantless searches. Here, Postal Inspectors used a drug dog on a suspicious package at the Cleveland sorting center, and then got warrant when the dog alerted. Harris is not an exception to the four-corner rule. United States v. McCarley-Connin, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 21566 (6th Cir. Aug. 22, 2025).
The plaintiffs here ran a HVAC business with multiple employees out of their residence garage, and it was business premises when the city showed up. Jasionowski v. Town of Whitestown, 2025 Ind. App. LEXIS 272 (Aug. 21, 2025).
A guilty plea is a waiver of defendant’s Fourth Amendment claims. United States v. Thompson, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 21554 (4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2025).*
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
