IN: Inventory here was valid despite fact car was first impounded but then not towed after all

The inventory search of this car in anticipation of impoundment was overall reasonable, despite the fact that the car ultimately was not impounded. It might prove pretext, but it didn’t here. [This is fact heavy, and interesting reading.] Stokes v. State, 2026 Ind. App. LEXIS 66 (Feb. 25, 2026) (2-1):

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DC: “police had probable cause to believe that Mr. Turner’s bullet-riddled car might contain bullet fragments from the shooting”

“There can be little question that the police had probable cause to believe that Mr. Turner’s car contained evidence of a crime. Four cars parked along the street, including Mr. Turner’s Lexus, were struck by bullets in a drive-by shooting. At the very least, police had probable cause to believe that Mr. Turner’s bullet-riddled car might contain bullet fragments from the shooting. During oral argument, Mr. Turner’s counsel agreed that there likely was probable cause to believe that the car contained evidence of the shooting in the form of ‘ballistics evidence.’ This alone satisfies the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” Jennings v. United States, 2026 D.C. App. LEXIS 75 (Feb. 26, 2026).

A named-citizen complaint to 911 reported that two men leaving the county fairgrounds on dirtbikes were driving drunk. An officer stopped them. The tip was determined to be reliable enough. People v. Anderson, 2026 Mich. App. LEXIS 1661 (Feb. 25, 2026).*

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N.D.Iowa: When an officer has PC for a stop and search, the 4A doesn’t require that it happen at the earliest possible time

When an officer has probable cause for a stop and search, the Fourth Amendment doesn’t require that it happen at the earliest possible time. It doesn’t become “stale” that fast, and here it was ongoing: driving on a suspended DL. [And, it can be delayed to see what else happens.] United States v. Harbach, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38363 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 25, 2026).

Defendant’s trial objection to a second cell phone extraction was evidentiary foundation, not unreasonable search, so that’s waived for appeal. State v. Augustus, 2026 La. App. LEXIS 369 (La. App. 5 Cir Feb. 25, 2026).*

“Defendant finally argues that the State failed to prove specific intent. However, video footage of defendant’s statement demonstrated that it was at the moment Detective Gai asked defendant to unlock the phone so the search warrant could be performed that he threw it on the floor and destroyed it. These facts support a finding that defendant knew the cell phone was relevant to the investigation of his involvement with the homicide, and he intended to ‘distort the results’ by destroying the cell phone. Accordingly, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for obstruction of justice.” State v. Hudson, 2026 La. App. LEXIS 365 (La. App. 5 Cir Feb. 25, 2026).*

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WI: Google’s scans of user content for CSAM is a private search

It’s a private search when Google scans user consent for child sexual abuse material (CSAM) and then it reports to law enforcement what it finds. It is not required to search, only to report what it finds. [Note that the court noted this was on a “sparse” record with stipulated facts, not that it would have made a difference.] State v. Sharak, 2026 WI 4 (Feb. 24, 2026):

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E.D.Tenn.: Traffic stop with shots fired call led to valid protective sweep of car for weapon on RS

“After reviewing the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the relevant law, the undersigned finds that the officers had both probable cause to believe Defendant had committed traffic violations and reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle in connection with the ‘shots-fired’ report. The undersigned further finds that the officers properly conducted a protective search of Defendant’s vehicle, and would have inevitably discovered the firearm, bullets, and casing during an inventory search. The undersigned therefore recommends the District Judge DENY Defendant’s suppression motion [Doc. 76].” United States v. Reece, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38709 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 25, 2026).

“Rowe’s Fourth Amendment Motion to Suppress is denied in its entirety because Officers Church and Feltner had probable cause to initiate the traffic stop based on Rowe’s speed and tinted windows; detained Rowe incidental to the traffic stop and had probable cause to search his car due to the odor of marijuana; and therefore the evidence obtained from his car is not fruit of the poisonous tree.” United States v. Rowe, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38022 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 24, 2026).*

Defendant abandoned his satchel by throwing it over a fence when confronted by the police about its contents. Grant v. United States, 2026 D.C. App. LEXIS 69 (Feb. 26, 2026).*

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MN: No REP in text message in recipient’s device

The sender of an electronic message has no reasonable expectation of privacy in it where it ends up. State v. Bonnell, 2026 Minn. LEXIS 69 (Feb. 25, 2026):

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CA8: Duty to warn of use of police dog was clearly established

Officers sicced a police dog on plaintiff who was fleeing, but without warning. Use of a police dog usually requires a warning. “The warning requirement was clearly established by the time of Cameron’s arrest. As we stated in Adams, Kuha provided ‘fair notice’ that ‘the failure to give a warning and an opportunity to surrender violated clearly established law.’ 74 F.4th at 940. Defendants have failed to show that this case is an exception to that rule. Cameron has thus raised a genuine dispute of material fact whether Officer Meunsaveng violated a clearly established right by failing to warn before releasing Bero.” Also, leaving the dog on him until handcuffed was reasonable here. “Once officers completed handcuffing Cameron, Officer Meunsaveng removed Bero within roughly two seconds. ‘At most, one could argue that [Officer Meunsaveng] could have called the dog off a second or two sooner. But that kind of fine-sliced judgment call amid “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” circumstances just isn’t the stuff of a Fourth Amendment violation.’ See Ashford v. Raby, 951 F.3d 798, 804 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397). In total, Bero’s bite lasted roughly fifteen seconds. Given the totality of the circumstances, including ‘the short time frame at issue,’ Officer Meunsaveng acted reasonably in using Bero to hold Cameron until he was handcuffed. See Kuha, 365 F.3d at 601.” Cameron v. City of Des Moines, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 5692 (8th Cir. Feb. 26, 2026).

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CNS: Iowa accuses General Motors of not disclosing OnStar data sharing

CNS: Iowa accuses General Motors of not disclosing OnStar data sharing by Rox Laird (“General Motors failed to disclose to car buyers that driving data collected by the automaker’s OnStar program installed in its vehicles is sold to auto insurance companies and other third parties without consumers’ awareness or consent, Iowa claimed Thursday. OnStar is pitched by GM as improving driver safety by collecting a wide array of data, including speed, seatbelt usage, driving habits and location. What consumers are not clearly informed of, the Iowa attorney general claims, is that their vehicles were ‘secretly spying on them,’ and this data was sold to third-party data brokers who sold it to insurance companies that used the data to raise rates, deny coverage or cancel policies.”)

In short: All car computers are likely snitches.

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CNS: Judge finds IRS violated the law thousands of times by handing over taxpayer addresses to ICE

CNS: Judge finds IRS violated the law thousands of times by handing over taxpayer addresses to ICE by Ryan Knappenberger (“A federal judge on Thursday slammed the Internal Revenue Service for handing over confidential taxpayer information to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, saying it violated the law ‘approximately 42,695 times.’ In November, U.S. District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly halted the Trump administration’s effort to use identifiable information held by the IRS to further its mass deportation campaign, a decision now pending before the D.C. Circuit.”).

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N.D. Iowa: Drug dog’s 50% hit rate was reliable enough

Past cases in this circuit hold that even a drug dog’s 50% hit rate is sufficient for probable cause. “And other indications of the presence of illicit drugs can rehabilitate a less-than-reliable canine alert.” United States v. Harbach, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38363 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 25, 2026):

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CA6: Ptf’s expert in a civil Franks claim only provided a legal conclusion, and “That’s not enough”

Plaintiff in a civil Franks claim failed to show that the officer knowingly misrepresented facts. Of note, however, is that he used an expert witness on falsity which essentially only provided a legal conclusion. Chancellor v. Geelhood, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 5599 (6th Cir. Feb. 25, 2026):

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OH9: Smell of burnt MJ justified search even though officers found none

The smell of burnt marijuana justified the search of defendant’s car even though none was found. State v. Dejournett, 2026-Ohio-640 (9th Dist. Feb. 25, 2026).*

An empty beer can in the beverage holder doesn’t justify a search of the car. While there was reasonable suspicion for a stop, no probable cause here. State v. Noll, 2026 Iowa App. LEXIS 205 (Feb. 25, 2026).*

Officers had probable cause for a drug search of defendant’s vehicle, and they removed it to a police yard and got a warrant. They went “above and beyond” to get the warrant. United States v. Griffin, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37065 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2026).*

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GA: Def let someone use his computer, and they found letters they turned over to the police in a private search

Private search: Defendant let someone use his computer and that person found two incriminating letters which were turned over to the police. Bunn v. State, 2026 Ga. App. LEXIS 110 (Feb. 25, 2026).*

The parties agreed that references to the search warrant would be barred at trial, and they would only say “lawful search.” The state, however, violated that agreement. Here that could lead to jurors presuming guilt from another judge’s finding of probable cause. [Decided on cumulative error.] State v. Butler, 2026 N.J. LEXIS 172 (Feb. 25, 2026).

Qualified immunity applies to this cell phone search of another officer’s viewing of that which the first officer had a right to look at. Lewis v. Walley, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 5963 (5th Cir. Feb. 23, 2026).*

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E.D.Va.: WaPo SW: gov’t squandered deference by failing to cite Privacy Protection Act

WaPo reporter search warrant: The government failed to even acknowledge the Privacy Protection Act of 1980 in its warrant application. “The government’s conduct has disturbed that baseline posture of deference” that it always gets. In re Search of the Real Prop., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38139 (E.D. Va. Feb. 24, 2026):

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D.S.D.: Volatile home situation justified sweep for gun

A volatile situation in the house justified an exigency search (or sweep) of other rooms for a weapon. United States v. Boyd, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38079 (D.S.D. Feb. 23, 2026).*

2254 petitioner’s CSLI claim and trial were all before Carpenter, and the holding was correct on existing law. Stone bars relitigating it. It was correct at the time, and petitioner used the state procedures to challenge it. Ruiz v. Walker, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34191 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2026).*

County magistrate had state authority to issue search warrant anywhere in the county. United States v. Whitaker, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36307 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2026).*

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IL: Probationer’s ankle monitor search put him at scene of murder

A codefendant was on probation, and a search warrant was used to get information from his ankle monitor. That put him at the scene of a murder. People v. Irby, 2026 IL App (4th) 241389 (Feb. 23, 2026).*

Separate exigency not required for an automobile exception search. Martinez v. State, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 1776 (Tex. App. – San Antonio Feb. 25, 2026).*

Plaintiff’s $18M suit that his illegal search and arrest led to his incarceration is barred by Heck. Sheffey v. Nev. Dep’t of Corr., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36048 (D. Nev. Feb. 4, 2026).*

Defendant was stopped as a potential witness to a shooting or as involved when his story of why he was around the scene didn’t make much sense. United States v. Dougherty, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36291 (D.S.D. Jan. 7, 2026).*

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W.D.Okla.: Def bears no burden on applying crime-fraud exception to his cell phone search

The government seized this Oklahoman’s cell phone and searched it with a warrant. Oklahoma is largely marijuana legal. Pleading the crime-fraud exception, the government bears the burden of segregating the valid conversations from the federal conspiracy allegations. Defendant bears no burden in searching his own phone. United States v. Stacy, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37623 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 24, 2026).

The IRS sought information from Finland under a tax treaty, and it was all done in good faith. The IRS had the authority to make the inquiry, and the burden on the defendant to overcome it is heavy. Koivukangas v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37619 (D.S.D. Feb. 20, 2026).*

The smell of burnt marijuana justified this automobile exception search. United States v. Prado, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37859 (D. Colo. Feb. 24, 2026).*

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S.D.Fla.: No dog alert shown on video

Defendant’s stop in front of his house on the curtilage was a valid stop. A dog sniff was based on reasonable suspicion but the court finds no valid alert. The search of the car came after an ambiguous statement from the dog handler, and the video shows no alert. United States v. Burgess, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37539 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2026):

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E.D.Mo. sustains geofence warrant

Noting Chatrie is pending and that the Eighth Circuit hasn’t ruled, but has in something close, the court denies suppression of a geofence warrant. United States v. Washington, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37462 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 4, 2026)*:

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CA6: Administrative search that is a ruse for a criminal search was clearly established as 4A violation

An administrative search that is a ruse for a criminal search was clearly established at the time this one happened. Qualified immunity denied. Generis Ent., LLC v. Donley, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 5197 (6th Cir. Feb. 19, 2026).

Not the court’s words, but: Defendant’s arguments about alternative theories about the meaning of the facts in the affidavit for warrant amount to speculation and not even an offer proof for a Franks violation. United States v. Knight, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35378 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2026).* Of similar tenor: United States v. Gogolack, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35413 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2026),* a connected case, with different speculation.

Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a backpack he apparently dumped in hiding from the police. United States v. Méndez-Rodríguez, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35561 (D.P.R. Feb. 20, 2026).*

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