Under Collins, the automobile exception does not apply to a car parked in the owner’s garage. United States v. Dejoie, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64270 (M.D. La. Apr. 8, 2024).
“The exclusionary rule does not apply to ‘physical evidence that is the fruit of custodial interrogation conducted without Miranda warnings.’” United States v. Root, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63705 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 8, 2024)* (citing Pantane).
“Francis had all this information no later than four minutes into the stop. During that time frame, he had diligently undertaken tasks necessary to complete a traffic infraction investigation. Before all those tasks could be completed, he had reasonable suspicion to detain Caraballo pending a dog sniff of the vehicle.” United States v. Caraballo, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64486 (D. Conn. Apr. 9, 2024).*
Defendant submitted that the search of his house started at 5:00 am. The officers and virtually all the evidence showed it started at 6:10 am. The metadata on some photographs showed 5:16 am. The court finds the camera’s time hadn’t been adjusted for Daylight Savings Time. United States v. Rankin, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63929 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2024).
Defendant’s vehicle had a long expired tag. The stop was valid regardless of the other stated reason of a violation. The court credits that the decision to impound was made early on in the stop, and the inventory was reasonable. The written inventory policy was put into evidence. United States v. Davis, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63463 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 8, 2024).*
“The People have a lot to say about what Detectives Farrow and Johnson knew about petitioner, and relatively little to say about their reasons for believing evidence of crime or contraband might be found in the car. Their argument, so far as the car is concerned, boils down to the following: petitioner admitted driving to the apartment complex in the car, gang members frequently hide firearms in cars, and petitioner ‘could have had time to hide a firearm in his car before detectives arrived on scene.’ This argument fails.” This 41-minute detention was unreasonable. Mosley v. Superior Court, 2024 Cal. App. LEXIS 235 (3d Dist. Apr. 5, 2024).*
Failure to argue the state constitution to the trial court waived reliance on it on appeal. State v. Troutman, 2024 Wash. App. LEXIS 672 (Apr. 8, 2024).
There was reasonable suspicion for lengthening this detention from the fact the LPN didn’t match the vehicle and defendant had $5000 in cash on him. It created a reasonable inference that the vehicle was going to be used for a crime. United States v. Larche, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 8344 (11th Cir. Apr. 8, 2024).* [And that’s really thin.]
Defendant went along with a search warrant to take his DNA. “Sergeant Brown was present when MPD officer Robert Herring collected Defendant’s DNA through buccal swabs. Sergeant Brown described Defendant as calm at first but then he got irate, hostile, and ‘started screaming. He started attempting to push the panic alarm … inside of the interview room and started reaching for the computer[.]’ The officers were able to collect the swabs, and Sergeant Brown affirmed that he left a copy of the search warrant with Defendant.” (The opinion doesn’t say that this testimony was objected to.) State v. Givens, 2024 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 140 (Apr. 8, 2024).*
The officer punching a resisting arrestee gets qualified immunity. “But these cases are too factually dissimilar to put the officers on notice that their conduct was unconstitutional. Unlike Ames’s proffered cases, where the plaintiffs were not resisting, it is undisputed that Ames resisted the officers’ initial attempt to detain him, kicked Officer Payne, and clawed at Officer Conklin’s face. Ames points to no case holding that it is a violation of his constitutional rights for officers to use punches to detain a resisting arrestee.” Ames v. City of Tempe, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 8389 (9th Cir. Apr. 8, 2024).
The totality here shows that defendant was in custody when he was questioned for six hours. He was taken in handcuffs from home to the police station and Mirandized. United States v. Hitchings, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 8318 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 2024).* (It’s more detailed than that, but that’s the gist.)
Plaintiff was leaving the Lenox Mall area of Atlanta and had to move a barricade that was put up because of protests that were going on. That wasn’t illegal, and the stop of the car was without reasonable suspicion. Jackson v. City of Atlanta, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 8329 (11th Cir. Apr. 5, 2024).*
Posted inUncategorized|Comments Off on CA9: QI for punching a resisting arrestee
Defendant’s motorcycle was already stopped on the side of the road. The officer pulling up to check on him wasn’t a seizure. United States v. Melgoza, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 8384 (9th Cir. Apr. 8, 2024).
FISA warrants have a presumption of validity [just like search warrant]. “While Ramic does not seek a Franks hearing at this time, his motion seeks disclosure of FISA materials to permit the filing of a motion to suppress.” United States v. Ramic, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62939 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 5, 2024).*
Defendant fails his Franks burden, and the warrant wasn’t stale. United States v. Wheeler, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63002 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2024).*
2255 petitioner’s claim that defense counsel didn’t properly investigate “custody” for Miranda purposes is denied. Custody was litigated and no prejudice shown. United States v. Johannssen, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63291 (D. Neb. Apr. 5, 2024).*
“Shaw raises three responses, but they are unavailing. First, he contends that the officers did not follow Wisconsin and local laws that instruct officers to obtain written authorization from a supervisor before a strip search. But a violation of state law or local policy is not itself a constitutional violation. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 170 L. Ed. 2d 559 (2008). Second, Shaw argues that the search was improper because it was based on statements from his passenger that were false. But the constitutionality of the officers’ actions ‘does not depend on the witness turning out to have been right.’ Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432, 439 (7th Cir. 1986). As long as reliance on the witness was reasonable, as it was here, it does not matter if the witness was wrong. See Askew v. City of Chicago, 440 F.3d 894, 895 (7th Cir. 2006). Third, Shaw contends that, after the visual strip search revealed no drugs, a body-cavity search was unnecessarily intrusive. But the police had a warrant for the body-cavity search, and that warrant was based on reliable grounds to suspect that Shaw hid drugs in his body after a visual search did not reveal them. Thus, the body-cavity search, which occurred in a private, secure setting, was reasonable in order to preserve potential evidence of a crime and protect public safety. See Campbell, 499 F.3d at 716-18.” Shaw v. Gordon, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 8264 (7th Cir. Apr. 5, 2024).
Defendant doesn’t dispute that there was reasonable suspicion for the stop. The question was whether there was reasonable suspicion for a frisk, and there was. United States v. Womack, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 8234 (4th Cir. Apr. 5, 2024).*
Defendant asserts that an unsigned warrant was executed. At best the record only shows that defendant’s copy was unsigned. People v. Smith, 2024 Mich. App. LEXIS 2625 (Apr. 4, 2024).*
A replevin action can’t be used to suppress evidence seized by search warrant. Glass v. Del. Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 2024-Ohio-1301, 2024 Ohio App. LEXIS 1235 (5th Dist. Apr. 4, 2024).
Defendant fails his Franks burden, and the warrant wasn’t stale. United States v. Wheeler, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63002 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2024).*
“The government now concedes that the affidavit supporting Gray’s arrest warrant was a bare bones affidavit. Because only a bare bones affidavit supported the seizures of the two firearms during Gray’s arrest, the district court erroneously denied the motion to suppress those firearms. However, the government convincingly argues that because the third firearm was seized under a separate search warrant, we should remand so that the district court can analyze whether law enforcement would have obtained such search warrant independent of the information gleaned during Gray’s arrest.” United States v. Gray, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 8284 (6th Cir. Apr. 5, 2024).*
“Shaw raises three responses, but they are unavailing. First, he contends that the officers did not follow Wisconsin and local laws that instruct officers to obtain written authorization from a supervisor before a strip search. But a violation of state law or local policy is not itself a constitutional violation. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 170 L. Ed. 2d 559 (2008). Second, Shaw argues that the search was improper because it was based on statements from his passenger that were false. But the constitutionality of the officers’ actions ‘does not depend on the witness turning out to have been right.’ Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432, 439 (7th Cir. 1986). As long as reliance on the witness was reasonable, as it was here, it does not matter if the witness was wrong. See Askew v. City of Chicago, 440 F.3d 894, 895 (7th Cir. 2006). Third, Shaw contends that, after the visual strip search revealed no drugs, a body-cavity search was unnecessarily intrusive. But the police had a warrant for the body-cavity search, and that warrant was based on reliable grounds to suspect that Shaw hid drugs in his body after a visual search did not reveal them. Thus, the body-cavity search, which occurred in a private, secure setting, was reasonable in order to preserve potential evidence of a crime and protect public safety. See Campbell, 499 F.3d at 716-18.” Shaw v. Gordon, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 8264 (7th Cir. Apr. 5, 2024).
Defendant doesn’t dispute that there was reasonable suspicion for the stop. The question was whether there was reasonable suspicion for a frisk, and there was. United States v. Womack, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 8234 (4th Cir. Apr. 5, 2024).*
Defendant asserts that an unsigned warrant was executed. At best the record only shows that defendant’s copy was unsigned. People v. Smith, 2024 Mich. App. LEXIS 2625 (Apr. 4, 2024).*
Defendant’s pants were seized incident to his arrest for murder because there was apparent blood on them. They were subject to being forensically tested without a separate warrant. Any reasonable expectation of privacy was lost with the seizure. People v. Serges, 2024 Mich. App. LEXIS 2616 (Apr. 4, 2024).
The question is whether the package was delivered before the warrant was served. “Mr. Calligan hasn’t [shown deficient performance] here. Conclusory assertions that the officers’ testimony about being aware a package was to be delivered to the home means they must have believed they were executing an anticipatory warrant isn’t enough. Nor would it change the calculus of probable cause. [¶] Trial counsel’s performance regarding the motion to suppress was reasonable.” Calligan v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62089 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 3, 2024).*
The homeowner here, already known to the police, could consent to entry by the police to talk to an occupant. That supported a plain view. State v. Fitch, 2024-Ohio-1295 (2d Dist. Apr. 5, 2024).*
Posted inDNA, Search incident|Comments Off on MI: Pants seized incident to arrest can be forensically tested without a SW
Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress because it was reasonable to conclude defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in email attachments with the email provider where the terms of service also said there was none. Vandyck v. United States, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 8216 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2024).
“Ruiz argues that ‘[b]ecause the residence was searched absent a search warrant and without an applicable exception to the search warrant requirement the search was unreasonable.’ ECF No. 50 at 1. The Court disagrees for three reasons. First, the officers lawfully discovered drugs in plain view during their protective sweep of the home. Second, even if the protective sweep was unlawful, Yingling and other Task Force members still had authority to search Ruiz’s home based on his parole status. Lastly, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rules applies.” United States v. Ruiz, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61831 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 1, 2024).*
Defense counsel’s failure to appeal denial of a motion to suppress isn’t ineffective assistance of counsel where it never could succeed on the merits. United States v. Carter, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61954 (E.D. Va. Apr. 3, 2024).*
A five-day delay between seizure of a cell phone and the search warrant to get into it was reasonable. United States v. Thomas, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 8165 (8th Cir. Apr. 5, 2024).
“Considering the factors outlined in Golinveaux, Schnitker’s own demeanor and appearance of comprehension suggest his consent [to taking DNA samples] was voluntary and that SA Moule was reasonable in believing it was voluntary.” United States v. Schnitker, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62608 (D.S.D. Apr. 3, 2024).*
Defendant, fleeing from police, stashed his backpack in bushes. That was abandonment, even if he hoped to recover it after release from jail. United States v. Starr, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62112 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 4, 2024).*
Posted inAbandonment, Cell phones, Consent, DNA|Comments Off on CA8: 5-day delay between seizure of a cell phone and the SW to get into it was reasonable
Prison search case: “Plaintiff alleges that his clothes were ripped off during the assault, he was left naked on the floor with his boxers barely on, and the C.E.R.T. Defendants searched him ‘without any [l]egitimate penological purpose for the strip search ….’ … These allegations, accompanied by the physical abuse and racial slurs Plaintiff allegedly endured during the C.E.R.T. Raid, are sufficient at this stage to plead that the search was not reasonably related to any legitimate penological interest. … Accordingly, Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for unreasonable search against the C.E.R.T. Defendants in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Rodriguez v. Burnett, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62405 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2024).*
Defendant, fleeing from police, stashed his backpack in bushes. That was abandonment, even if he hoped to recover it after release from jail. United States v. Starr, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62112 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 4, 2024).*
The question is whether the package was delivered before the warrant was served. “Mr. Calligan hasn’t [shown deficient performance] here. Conclusory assertions that the officers’ testimony about being aware a package was to be delivered to the home means they must have believed they were executing an anticipatory warrant isn’t enough. Nor would it change the calculus of probable cause. [¶] Trial counsel’s performance regarding the motion to suppress was reasonable.” Calligan v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62089 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 3, 2024).*
The affidavit for the warrant for defendant’s house also provided nexus to defendant’s car. When it was driven away from the house just before the search, the police decided to stop and search it. That search was valid under the automobile exception. United States v. Clayton, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 8123 (5th Cir. Apr. 4, 2024).
“Ruiz argues that ‘[b]ecause the residence was searched absent a search warrant and without an applicable exception to the search warrant requirement the search was unreasonable.’ ECF No. 50 at 1. The Court disagrees for three reasons. First, the officers lawfully discovered drugs in plain view during their protective sweep of the home. Second, even if the protective sweep was unlawful, Yingling and other Task Force members still had authority to search Ruiz’s home based on his parole status. Lastly, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rules applies.” United States v. Ruiz, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61831 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 1, 2024).*
Defense counsel’s failure to appeal denial of a motion to suppress isn’t ineffective assistance of counsel where it never could succeed on the merits. United States v. Carter, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61954 (E.D. Va. Apr. 3, 2024).*
Defendant was on pretrial release with a curfew at the home of his third-party custodian. Officers came for a compliance check and knocked at the door. Getting no answer, they went to the back door. They were lawfully on his property. The third-party custodian could consent to the entry and search. Heath v. People of the V.I., 2024 V.I. 17, 2024 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 16 (Mar. 27, 2024).
The affidavit for warrant showed a fair probability of nexus between defendant and the place to be searched. Prior investigation had already linked him to the place. United States v. Beasley, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 7812 (7th Cir. Apr. 2, 2024).*
2254 petitioner’s successor habeas petition is denied. It alleges no new facts or law. On his Fourth Amendment claim, he said that an officer took his shoe and placed it at the crime scene. Whether as a Fourth Amendment or tampering with evidence claim, it’s not a valid basis. In re Simpkins, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 8052 (11th Cir. Apr. 3, 2024).*
Posted inConsent, Knock and talk, Nexus|Comments Off on VI: In a pretrial curfew check, third-party custodian can consent to entry and search
“Even where a search warrant has been previously obtained, it is axiomatic that such ‘warrant exists and is required not simply to permit, but to circumscribe police intrusions’ …. Here, the search warrant that had been previously obtained authorized the search of defendant’s person but did not authorize a manual body cavity search. Notably, the warrant application made no such request. Moreover, although exigent circumstances bypassing the warrant requirement may be shown where ‘the drugs were in imminent danger of being destroyed, disseminated or lost, or that defendant was in medical distress”’ …, no such showing has been made here. We find that the search of defendant was conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment and, thus, that the recovered drugs should have been suppressed.” People v. Chase, 2024 NY Slip Op 01837, 2024 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1877 (3d Dept. Apr. 4, 2024).
Short of police harassment, supervised release searches don’t require warrants. Here, defendant doesn’t even allege harassment. United States v. Grant, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60116 (W.D. La. Apr. 1, 2024).*
The search of defendant’s person conducted over his thermal underwear was reasonable and not too intrusive. United States v. Aziz, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60398 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2024).*
Defendant rented a hotel room for two nights. He was warned no illegal conduct. After the first night, the motel operator entered to clean the room. The mattress had been moved, so the operator lifted it to move it back seeing a backpack. He opened the backpack thinking that a prior occupant had left it. It was defendant’s and he saw drugs. He called the police. The motel operator could declare the room vacant under state law and consent to the search. United States v. Winder, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 8023 (8th Cir. Apr. 4, 2024).
Counsel’s failure to attempt to notify a parent of a juvenile hearing was based on judicial deception because the truth would not have resulted in taking the kids away. “In this case, Vazquez and Johnson’s acts of judicial deception ‘were not made under pressing circumstances requiring prompt action, or those providing ambiguous or conflicting guidance,’ such as when a law enforcement officer is faced with a sudden threat of deadly force in a public setting.” Rieman v. Vazquez, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 7760 (9th Cir. Mar. 5, 2024).*
Minor mistakes in the affidavit for warrant were neither material nor prejudicial to defendant. CoA denied. Harris v. United States, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 7797 (6th Cir. Apr. 1, 2024).*
Posted inConsent, Franks doctrine, Qualified immunity|Comments Off on CA8: Motel operator could consent to search for drugs he found cleaning room, and defendant didn’t even know
In the reasonable suspicion calculus, the fact defendant had a gun six days earlier can be a factor in reasonable suspicion now. United States v. Minners, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 7734 (10th Cir. Apr. 2, 2024).
Plaintiffs were loaded on to planes and flown to Martha’s Vineyard and dumped. They stated a Fourth Amendment claim by being misled about the trip. “The Supreme Court has held, however, that ‘[t]he Fourth Amendment can certainly be violated by guileful as well as by forcible intrusions into a constitutionally protected area.’ Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966); ….” Alianza Americas v. DeSantis, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59893 (D. Mass. Mar. 29, 2024).*
“Defendant argues strenuously that there are several false statements contained in the affidavits used to support the search warrants at issue in the case. For the reasons expressed below, Defendant has made no substantial preliminary showing that the affiant knowingly and intentionally, or recklessly, included false statements in the affidavits.” “None of the alleged conflicting information contained in the affidavits upon which Defendant relies establish that the victims’ statements are in fact false, or that the affiant included them with an intent to mislead. Even though some of the information provided by the minor victims give the appearance of being inconsistent or contradictory, key details of their statements were corroborated by independent investigation of law enforcement.” United States v. Richards, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59979 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 1, 2024).*
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
