Defendants having an ATM machine in a shopping cart late at night during a BLM “disturbance” was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Pennycooke, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132128 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 2021).*
Since defendant concedes there was probable cause for this stop, the dog sniff was reasonable. United States v. Munoz, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131965 (E.D. Ky. July 14, 2021).*
Defendant’s fanny pack across his chest looked too heavy and was stretched. The officers testified credibly they couldn’t see the L-shape of a gun, but they could see what had to be the slide. “Officer Rios and Sergeant Counihan also noticed the unusual bulge and the weight of the item in the fanny pack and that it was being worn in an unusual manner, although neither alerted to a horizontal rigid line as had Officer Migliaccio. … Officer Migliaccio also noticed that Hagood was wearing blue—which he recognized as a color sometimes worn by rival gangs of the Bloods.” United States v. Hagood, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132085 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2021).*
Posted inReasonable suspicion|Comments Off on E.D.Pa.: Pushing shopping cart at night with an ATM in it was RS
The Crime Report: How Civil Asset Forfeiture Turns Authorities into ‘Bounty Hunters’ by Eva Herscowitz (“Civil asset forfeiture gives police officers the right to seize cash, cars and homes from people who haven’t been convicted of a crime, which is why it’s time to end this exploitative practice by passing laws that prohibit it, argues the USA Today Editorial Board. Intended to reduce crime by seizing the profits of drug dealers, civil asset forfeiture has become a legal way for officers to pocket the property of mostly poor and innocent people, the editorial says.”)
Posted inForfeiture|Comments Off on The Crime Report: How Civil Asset Forfeiture Turns Authorities into ‘Bounty Hunters’
The confrontation clause does not apply in suppression hearings. United States v. Bebris, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20974 (7th Cir. July 15, 2021).
The apartment’s search warrant was for evidence of drug sales from it. Those found there at the time are subject to frisk. People v. Rashid, 2021 NY Slip Op 04390, 2021 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4513 (3d Dept. July 15, 2021).
Transporting untaxed cigarettes from one reservation to another on non-Indian land is not illegal in NY, so the search of the truck’s cargo was unreasonable. Matter of White v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 2021 NY Slip Op 04394, 2021 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4505 (3d Dept. July 15, 2021).*
“Here, viewing the sequence of events as depicted in the videotapes, we conclude that no material facts are in genuine dispute and that a reasonable factfinder would necessarily find that the officers’ use of force was objectively reasonable.” Amons v. Tindall, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20960 (9th Cir. July 15, 2021).*
While the complaint is normally viewed for sufficiency, here it was contradicted by the video of the occurrence as in Scott. The officers acted reasonably and without excessive force. Klassen v. Gaines County, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 5631 (Tex. App. – Eastland July 15, 2021).*
Assuming a separate Fourth Amendment violation from email production in discovery to codefendants, it was reasonably believed to be consensual, so there’s no deterrence in suppressing. United States v. Reichberg, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20935 (2d Cir. July 15, 2021).*
Posted inE-mail, Excessive force|Comments Off on CA9 & TX 11: Video of use of force shows it reasonable
The fact AT&T wants cell phone search warrant for a Tennessee cell phone to be served at West Palm Beach, Florida for its convenience does not make the warrant without jurisdiction. The digital information could be accessed from anywhere, but this was AT&T’s requirement. State v. Hoskins, 2021 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 315 (July 15, 2021).
There was probable cause for the search warrant, so the good faith exception doesn’t even need to be addressed. That the CI was not on probation or parole but was really on supervised release isn’t found to be a knowingly false statement. It was negligent at worse. United States v. Jacobsen, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129976 (D. Neb. June 23, 2021),* adopted 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129452 (D. Neb. July 12, 2021).*
Defendant’s false accounts of an arson supported probable cause for search of his house for evidence. United States v. Draper, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20902 (6th Cir. July 14, 2021).*
The officer may have had reasonable suspicion as he approached the defendant, but, as he got closer, suspicion was dispelled. No reasonable suspicion for the stop. Motion to suppress granted. United States v. Chavous, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131326 (E.D. N.Y. July 14, 2021).
There was probable cause for the warrant even with removal of the challenged information. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate for the defendants. Talley v. City of Little Rock, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129819 (E.D. Ark. July 13, 2021).*
There was probable cause for search warrant for defendant’s house. While defendant questioned the veracity of the CI, there was more than that on which to base it. United States v. Curry, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129851 (S.D. Ohio July 13, 2021).*
The attachments made the warrant particular. United States v. Bowers, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130712 (W.D. Pa. July 8, 2021).*
Collective knowledge of the DEA and the local police supported the stop, but the stopping officer waiting for a traffic offense to justify the stop. United States v. Edwards, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130794 (N.D. Ga. July 8, 2021).*
Lev Parnas seeks discovery of Rudy Giuliani’s later search warrant return for his own emails. Denied as cumulative. He already has them. United States v. Parnas, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131253 (S.D. N.Y. July 14, 2021).*
Officers conducting the stop acted reasonably, and any delay was reasonable because of a disturbance nearby. United States v. Moore, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130838 (S.D. Fla. June 4, 2021).*
Three days before this stop, the officer ran defendant’s LPN and saw there was a PV warrant for defendant. When he was seen this time, he was stopped, and that led to a vehicle search based on search incident and the automobile exception. Either support it. [No mention of any parole search justification.] United States v. Stokes, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131105 (W.D. Mo. June 8, 2021),* adopted 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130035 (W.D. Mo. July 13, 2021).*
A mistake as to where a phone call originated (Rapid City or NC) wasn’t material for Franks purposes. United States v. Stewart, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131139 (D.S.D. July 14, 2021).*
“Movant argues that the warrantless search and seizure of the victim’s blood-stained clothing violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that his trial counsel’s failure to challenge the search and seizure was ineffective assistance because ‘there exists more than a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different[.]’ (Doc. 40 at 39) Movant fails to explain how the seizure and use at trial of the victim’s bloodstained clothing would likely have altered the outcome of his trial.” More to the point, the search was lawful. [And how would he have standing in the clothing of his victim?] United States v. Sloan, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130969 (D. Ariz. July 13, 2021).
State law is irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis. But, there’s nothing for the state judge issuing the search warrant to conclude that a couple of things maybe showing personal use rises to the level of evidence of drug trafficking on the premises. However, the warrant was severable, and there was probable cause to search for a weapon possessed by a felon, and that supported a plain view. Finally, the good faith exception saves the warrant application because it was not bare bones. United States v. Astorga, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130703 (D. N.M. July 13, 2021).*
Posted inGood faith exception, Ineffective assistance|Comments Off on D.Ariz.: 4A IAC claim fails for failing to show how outcome would change and because 4A wasn’t violated
Extended pole camera surveillance not a Fourth Amendment violation. United States v. Tuggle, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20841 (7th Cir. July 14, 2021). If you have a pole camera case, you need to read this. What follows is part of the introduction:
“A reasonable jury could find that Deputy Edmonds’s post-arrest incident reports contained knowing or reckless falsehoods. Drawing all inferences in favor of Ernest, Deputy Edmonds knew that Ernest never pointed his gun at her and that Ernest did not know she was a police officer. And these falsified statements facilitated the continued prosecution of Ernest without probable cause. If a jury finds that Deputy Edmonds deliberately or recklessly made false statements in her report, she violated Ernest’s clearly established right to be free from malicious prosecution.” Kirk v. Calhoun Cty., 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20835 (6th Cir. July 12, 2021).
“In this case, based on the video of the entire incident in question, no reasonable juror could conclude that any officer used excessive force in restraining Brown to take a buccal swab, pursuant to a facially valid warrant, after he repeatedly refused to permit them to do so.” Brown v. Upper Darby Police Dep’t, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20838 (3d Cir. July 14, 2021).*
Failure to object to admission of the search warrant papers into evidence at trial was waiver. People v. Mack, 2021 NY Slip Op 04377, 2021 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4456 (2d Dept. July 14, 2021).*
“The Supreme Court reversed our judgment in this case and remanded to this Court for further proceedings. United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021). The District Court did not decide the following question: If—as the Supreme Court held—the tribal officer otherwise possessed the relevant authority, ‘whether the officer had probable cause for a search or arrest, or reasonable suspicion for an investigatory detention.’ United States v. Cooley, 919 F.3d 1135, 1145 (9th Cir. 2019). Accordingly, the case is hereby REMANDED to the District Court to address that question. See id. (“We rely on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to analyze the validity of a search or seizure under [the Indian Civil Rights Act].”) (citing United States v. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2005)).” United States v. Cooley, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20810 (9th Cir. July 14, 2021).*
Posted inAdmissibility of evidence, Waiver|Comments Off on NY2: Failure to object to SW papers admitted into evidence at trial was waiver
“Defendant’s history of drug possession together with his acknowledgement of recent drug use do not give rise to reasonable grounds to request his consent to search his person or his car at the time of the stop. The state failed to show that Scaglione and thus, Galinski, had reasonable grounds to believe that defendant violated his release agreement by possessing methamphetamine, or that a search of defendant’s car would reveal evidence of such a violation.” State v. Canepa, 313 Or. App. 505, 2021 Ore. App. LEXIS 977 (July 14, 2021).
The state concedes lack of reasonable suspicion and the case is remanded. State v. Horner, 313 Or. App. 385, 2021 Ore. App. LEXIS 985 (July 14, 2021).*
Defendant found allegedly trespassing at night justified his stop and frisk. United States v. Stokes, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130035 (W.D. Mo. July 13, 2021).*
Defendant’s guilty plea waived his opportunity to contest seizure and forfeiture of cash found in his house. United States v. Hernandez, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130624 (D. Idaho July 12, 2021).*
Posted inReasonable suspicion, Waiver|Comments Off on OR: History of drug possession and admission to recent use not RS for person or car
Denial of red flag petition reversed for lack of findings. “The Extreme Risk Protective Order Act of 2018 (the Act), New Jersey’s ‘red flag law,’ empowers a court to remove firearms from a person who ‘poses a significant danger of bodily injury to … self or others’ by possessing them. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-24(b). In this case, the Law Division, after a plenary hearing, denied a law enforcement officer’s petition for a final extreme risk protective order (FERPO) that would have compelled D.L.B. to surrender her firearms. The State contends on appeal that it showed by a preponderance of the evidence that D.L.B. posed the requisite danger to self or others. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-24(b). Because the trial court did not admit critical evidence, did not require or ensure the State presented information and evidence upon which it relied in support of its petition, and did not make essential findings of fact, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.” In re D.L.B., 2021 N.J. Super. LEXIS 95 (July 14, 2021).*
New York’s state process for a motion to suppress is adequate for Stone v. Powell, and it’s up to a litigant to invoke it or not. Barksdale v. Crawley, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129860 (W.D. N.Y. July 13, 2021).*
The government made an “Application request[ing] an order compelling Sabre, a travel technology firm, ‘to provide representatives of the FBI complete and contemporaneous ‘real time’ account activity’ for an individual subject to an arrest warrant—what the government refers to as a ‘hot watch’ order.” Forbes Media sought access. The matter is not disclosed for the time being. This all writs act case is dismissed. Forbes Media LLC v. United States, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130510 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2021).
Defendant handling apparently untaxed cigarettes from his trunk was probable cause and justified a search under the automobile exception. United States v. Williams, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130193 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 2021).*
Government mind reading in prison as a Fourth Amendment claim doesn’t pass the frivolousness test of PLRA screening. Mendez v. Kallis, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130217 (D. Minn. May 27, 2021).*
12 day delay in searching a seized cell phone wasn’t unreasonable. United States v. Bradley, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130218 (W.D. Mo. June 2, 2021).*
At the completion of the traffic stop related inquiries, the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, and the result of the continued detention is suppressed. United States v. Owens, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130244 (D. Me. July 13, 2021).*
A chain of custody dispute from a search isn’t proper in a motion to suppress. That’s a trial issue. State v. Mackey, 2021 La. App. LEXIS 1068 (La. App. 5 Cir. July 12, 2021).
“Plaintiff Sally Gaetjens sued various local government officials for entering and condemning her home and confiscating her thirty-seven cats, all without a warrant. She’s right that the Fourth Amendment would usually prohibit such conduct. But emergencies breed exceptions—and this case is littered with emergencies. [¶] Namely, Gaetjens went missing in action, and Defendants had reason to believe that she was experiencing a medical emergency. Plus, when Defendants attempted to check her home, they deemed it so noxious that it posed a public-safety risk. Given these exigencies, the Fourth Amendment did not require Defendants to wait for judicial approval before acting. We thus affirm the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants.” Gaetjens v. City of Loves Park, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20699 (7th Cir. July 13, 2021).
There was reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop near the border based on a traffic offense and numerous other factors on the totality, including a handprint in the dust on the trunk indicating the trunk was opened and closed after driving on dirt roads. United States v. Rodriguez, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129625 (D. N.M. July 12, 2021).*
The parole search here lacked reasonable suspicion, but it was justified by the special needs exception to the warrant requirement. “Because a search undertaken by a parole officer of a parolee to detect parole violations is ‘reasonably related to the parole officer’s duties,’ such a search is ‘permissible’ under the Special Needs framework and accordingly ‘comport[s] with the Fourth Amendment.’ Grimes, 225 F.3d at 259 n.4; see Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d at 181 (explaining that a parole officer’s duties include ‘detect[ing] and prevent[ing] parole violations for the protection of the public from the further commission of crimes’). The district court erred in holding that reasonable suspicion was required in this context.” United States v. Braggs, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20623 (2d Cir. July 13, 2021). (One can argue about reasonable suspicion being present.)
Allegations in the affidavit for warrant show that defendant was using her cell phone to communicate about the crime. That factually supports the warrant. It is not just based on the “ubiquitousness” of cell phones in modern life. Commonwealth v. Lowery, 2021 Mass. LEXIS 435 (July 13, 2021).
While a search warrant for a motel room, a more transient place than a home, might get stale faster, this one didn’t considering the nature of the allegations. “[B]ased on the totality of the circumstances, the evidence was not stale after only two days.” United States v. Key, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129497 (S.D. Ga. June 24, 2021).*
Defendant consented to delivery of a flash drive to HSI in case of hiring undocumented workers. United States v. Kuzelka, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129175 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2021).*
The affidavit for the search warrant for defendant’s computers was hardly bare bones. “Considering Detective Yates’s attestations, and ‘all of the circumstances’ surrounding the issuance of the Computer Search Warrant, see Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23, the Court finds that the Yates Affidavit did not contain mere conclusory statements and provided sufficient indicia of probable cause such that an executing officer’s belief in the existence of such probable cause was not completely unreasonable. The Court further finds that Defendant has not shown how additional clarifying details, such as what a Tor Browser is, were necessary in light of the circumstances surrounding and context of the Yates Affidavit.” United States v. Hanes, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129364 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2021).*
Posted inSurveillance technology|Comments Off on MLive: Michigan man misidentified by facial recognition technology warns Congress of risks posed by police surveillance
“A seizure reasonable at its inception because it is based upon probable cause may become unreasonable as a result of its duration. The duration of the seizure pending the issuance of a search warrant must still be reasonable, and reasonableness is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances. There is unfortunately no bright line past which a delay becomes unreasonable. Thus, in some contexts, a delay as short as 90 minutes may be unreasonable, while in other contexts, a delay of over three months may be reasonable.” Here, the 12 day delay was reasonable because the investigation was still ongoing. United States v. Bradley, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128990 (W.D. Mo. July 12, 2021).
“[W]ith Rakas still being good law, the Court is bound by Eleventh Circuit precedent that holds that a passenger with no possessory interest in the vehicle lacks standing to challenge the search of the interior of that vehicle. United States v. Dixon, 901 F.3d 1322, 1338-39 (11th Cir. 2018) ….” United States v. Markeith, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129159 (N.D. Ga. May 19, 2021).*
The body camera video here showed that defendant was likely armed by the “L-shaped” object in his pants pulling on them. “Drawing on his experience, Officer Davis concluded that the object was a firearm based on its size, shape, and weight. That was a reasonable conclusion, grounded in Officer Davis’s experience and ‘common sense.’ Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.” United States v. Murray, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129174 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2021).*
Posted inCell phones, Reasonableness, Standing|Comments Off on W.D.Mo.: How long is too long a wait for search of a seized cell phone: reasonableness controls
Shooting victim or suspect? Officers couldn’t tell and that was reasonable suspicion. “Here, the officers knew that two black males were shooting firearms, and Defendant and Jackson were two black males who had been involved in the shooting. While the officers knew that Defendant and Jackson were witnesses to a crime, they did not know if their involvement went further; that is, the officers did not know if Jackson or Defendant were one or both of the men who had been shooting firearms. And given the nature of the crime involved, a concern for officer and public safety was reasonable. Therefore, the Court holds that the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct the frisk.” United States v. Beasley, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128991 (W.D. Mo. July 12, 2021).
“The exclusionary rule is generally not available in immigration proceedings, but we hold that once an alien makes a prima facie showing of an egregious regulatory or Fourth Amendment violation warranting suppression and submits specific evidence that the government’s evidence is tainted, the government has the burden and opportunity to rebut that claim of taint. The IJ erred in failing to credit B.R.’s specific evidence of taint. We grant B.R.’s petition for review on this issue and remand for further development of the record.” B.R. v. Garland, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20528 (9th Cir. July 12, 2021).
Posted inImmigration arrests, Reasonable suspicion|Comments Off on W.D.Mo.: Shooting victim or suspect? Officers couldn’t tell and that was reasonable suspicion.
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
