Defendant lived on tribal lands with a co-occupant who was not Native American. Officers obtained two search warrants: one from a tribal court and one from a state court. The applications were identical. The state judge, however, wanted more information, so an additional affidavit was provided. That didn’t make the tribal warrant lack probable cause. Also, the good faith exception applied in any event. United States v. Holt, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11782 (10th Cir. Apr. 24, 2026).
Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not moving to suppress a search where defendant had no standing in the vehicle at issue. Defendant also complained about the lack of a Franks motion where there was nothing proffered. Vance v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87600 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 21, 2026).*
Plaintiff had apparent mental issues, and her resistance did not justify the force used against her. She had no weapon. Driscoll v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11624 (6th Cir. Apr. 23, 2026).*
Defendant voluntarily consented to a blood draw for DUII at the hospital despite having been in an accident and received pain medication. State v. Miller, 375 Or. 173 (Apr. 23, 2026).
There was probable cause to put a tracking device on defendant’s car by court order, and, in any event, the good faith exception applied. He appealed only the probable cause finding, which was affirmed. People v. Eastman, 2026 Colo. App. LEXIS 672 (Apr. 16, 2026).* (In most states, not appealing the good faith ruling would have ended the matter.)
Officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant because he was in a high crime area and feeling around his waist, covered with a letterman jacket tied by the sleeves, as a “security check” for a firearm. When they encountered him, he lied about it, too. United States v. Applewhite, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87751 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2026).*
On the government’s motion to alter or amend judgment, these health care fraud subpoenas to Seattle Children’s Hospital seek too much private patient information and are also found to be pretextual. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum No. 25-1431-016, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89932 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 23, 2026):
A filter team wasn’t required to examine seized photographs. Overseizure doesn’t make a search unreasonable unless it was flagrant, and this wasn’t. United States v. Alford, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87350 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 20, 2026).
“Even if the pre-warrant look was unlawful, the results of the subsequent search remain valid under the independent source doctrine. … The District Court found (and Chapman does not challenge) that the officers would have applied for the search warrant even without seeing Chapman’s belongings inside the apartment. Additionally, the warrant application established probable cause without the information gleaned from the officers’ look inside the apartment.” United States v. Chapman, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11417 (3d Cir. Apr. 22, 2026).*
An administrative subpoena for subscriber payment information on an internet account has no constitutional protection under Carpenter. Commonwealth v. Zealor, 2026 PA Super 81 (Apr. 22, 2026).*
In a school grounds dispute, a parent’s arm was grabbed for four seconds to move her through a doorway. “Under the circumstances, we cannot say that such de minimis force was ‘clearly’ excessive and unreasonable. … Dupuy knew that the Department was investigating potential child abuse and that it had instructed the school not to release the girl to the Carters’ custody. Carter was visibly upset, demanded custody of her child, and refused to comply with Dupuy’s instructions. For the safety of everyone involved, Dupuy removed Carter from the office. Once Carter was outside, Dupuy ceased all force. We hold that the force used by Dupuy was de minimis, and that Carter suffered no violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court thus erred in denying qualified immunity.” Carter v. Dupuy, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11159 (5th Cir. Apr. 20, 2026).
Defense counsel in the post-conviction hearing couldn’t remember why he didn’t file a motion to suppress a car because of a single GSR particle found two months after the crime. The court implies defendant’s standing was doubtful. His allegation of what he would have proved at a suppression hearing by calling his friends to show his connection to the car was potentially self-defeating because they could be questioned about his connection to the car. Instead, defense counsel crossed on the weight to be given the single GSR particle which was reasonable. Malcolm v. State, 2026 Ga. LEXIS 108 (Apr. 21, 2026).*
“Harris also questions the ‘credibility’ of the officers executing the search warrant because only 1 out of 10 officers … wore a body camera at any point during the search. But other than generalized complaints about the lack of body camera recordings and vague suspicions about what alleged misconduct those recordings might have contained if made, Harris does not allege any officer in fact engaged in coercive behavior off camera. Harris fails to show he suffered any prejudice from the absence of additional recording because he was present during the search and has personal knowledge of what occurred. And he does not identify any case in which a court concluded a defendant’s constitutional rights were violated due to the mere absence of video recordings.” United States v. Harris, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87267 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 2026).
Even assuming defense counsel was ineffective for not challenging the Google search warrant, defendant could not show what evidence was obtained from that warrant or how it was used at trial. The State’s cell phone location evidence came from separate, unchallenged carrier records. Without demonstrating how the challenged evidence affected the trial outcome, he cannot establish the reasonable probability of a different result required under Strickland. Bailey v. State, 2026 Ga. LEXIS 111 (Apr. 21, 2026).*
An illegal arrest doesn’t justify dismissing an indictment. He also did not show outrageous governmental conduct. United States v. Colfax, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11426 (9th Cir. Apr. 22, 2026).
The officer knew Dodge pickup trucks, and the registration on file didn’t match the vehicle year or engine sound. The stop was reasonable. United States v. Langston, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88446 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 21, 2026).*
The Fourth Amendment validity of an immigration arrest has nothing to do with deportability (I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza). Masabanda v. Anda-Ybarra, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88322 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2026).*
Based on a license plate and tint violation, officer stopped the car which smelled of marijuana. Defendants’ challenging behavior, physical resistance to detention, interference with law enforcement efforts, and ultimate flight from the scene gave the officers probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of a crime, so that the warrantless search of the vehicle was lawful under the automobile exception. People v. Henderickson, 2026 V.I. LEXIS 16 (Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2026).*
It doesn’t violate the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to execute a search warrant with a bodycam on. Defendant cites no authority, either. State v. Williams, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 183 (Apr. 22, 2026):
The government obtained defendant’s cell phone passcode by questioning him. Despite the potential Fifth Amendment violation, the court finds that the cell phone would have been opened by the government’s forensics team anyway, so inevitable discovery applies. United States v. Ahmad, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88794 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 2026).
Defendant’s stop may have been pretextual, but there was an objective basis for it. State v. Winslow, 2026 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 228 (Apr. 23, 2026).*
“After independent review, the Court is satisfied that Judge Markovich’s recommendation is sound. Agent Ramirez provided several distinct factors that contributed to his decision to stop Defendant’s vehicle: Defendant was driving near the border on a route known for smuggling, he was behaving nervously and seemed to be hyper-focused on Agent Ramirez’s vehicle, and the vehicle had characteristics of vehicles that, in Agent Ramirez’s training and experience, are often used for smuggling (e.g., it was an older vehicle with temporary plates and looked to be weighed down). Under the totality of the circumstances, these factors gave rise to reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Minfee, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85822 (D. Ariz. Apr. 20, 2026),* adopting 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57635 (D. Ariz. Mar. 19, 2026).*
This CSAM cell phone warrant was broad, but that’s a recognition that files could have false names to hide them. It was not unreasonable. United States v. Daniels, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11323 (3d Cir. Apr. 21, 2026):
Posted inCell phones, Overbreadth, Particularity|Comments Off on CA3: Cell phone warrant for CSAM could be broad because of possible hiding and misidentifying files
The search warrant for defendant’s phone showed nothing about probable cause to believe any evidence would be on it. The mere fact he likely carried the phone with him all the time isn’t enough. (But the court concedes maybe it’s not that hard to show nexus, but here there wasn’t any.) Gibbs v. United States, 2026 D.C. App. LEXIS 129 (Apr. 23, 2026) (argued Oct. 25, 2022):
Police entry onto defendant’s house and yard because his mother, who he lived with, was missing, and relatives called the police. After looking in the house for her, they found her decapitated in the back yard, then they got a search warrant. The initial entry was based on consent shown on bodycam. He knew of his right to refuse because he first asked about a warrant and then agreed. Inevitable discovery also applied because they were about to find her body in the back yard. (His insanity defense was rejected by the jury.) Johnson v. State, 2026 Miss. LEXIS 110 (Apr. 23, 2026).*
Plaintiff was a BLM protestor shot with a pepperball while peacefully protesting. Plaintiff’s excessive force verdict affirmed. Epps v. Christian, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11265 (10th Cir. Apr. 21, 2026).*
The trial court held that defendant’s DMV information wasn’t private, despite the stop, but it didn’t decide whether there was justification for the stop. Remanded for that. People v. Ehinmiakhena, 2026 NY Slip Op 02363, 2026 N.Y. LEXIS 532 (Apr. 21, 2026).*
There was reasonable suspicion for continuing this stop because the car had left a known drug house where a passenger got in with a bag from the house, they were driving to another drug house, the passengers were extremely nervous, and there was a search warrant out for one of the passengers. United States v. Lundholm, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11267 (9th Cir. Apr. 21, 2026).*
Plaintiff alleged a privacy interest in video viewing information where defendant “collected detailed video viewing information to package individuals into audiences based, for example, on their political leanings because they watched the State of the Union, or ‘liberal affinity news,’ or ‘conservative affinity news.’” Plaintiffs have shown standing for a potential violation from collecting detailed user information. Dellasala v. Samba TV, Inc., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88089 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2026)*:
In a case over OnStar’s data collection of driving information, GM’s motion to dismiss at this stage of the litigation is denied. While there is no reasonable expectation of privacy of what is seen on the highways, more is involved in this data collection. In re Consumer Vehicle Driving Data Tracking Collection, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88272 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 22, 2026)*:
The officer’s false statement he was present for a third controlled buy satisfied Franks and was excised. Defense counsel showed that it couldn’t have happened. The remainder says two controlled buys, and these were found to be isolated transactions, the last was 20 days before the warrant issued. Because drugs dissipate relatively quickly, the warrant was stale when it issued. Suppression affirmed. Commonwealth v. Mallory, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 689 (Apr. 21, 2026).
State habeas petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim was barred by Stone because he had the opportunity to raise it in state court. Gardiner v. Howard, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11124 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 2026).*
In a tax case, there was nexus to defendant’s home office for a warrant for records. The tax business operated from there. United States v. Conner, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85414 (D. Colo. Apr. 17, 2026).*
Defendant’s arrest for a hand-to-hand drug sale justified a search incident. Guzman v. State, 2026 Md. App. LEXIS 456 (App. Apr. 17, 2026).*
The use of the word “fugitive” to describe defendant wasn’t shown to be a Franks violation. He insisted he wasn’t a fugitive. It wasn’t shown to be reckless or knowing. United States v. Brown, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11017 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 2026).*
Defendant’s stop was with reasonable suspicion. The warrant for his house was based on a CI whose information was corroborated. United States v. Sheehan, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11013 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 2026).*
“Even if Officer Tapia’s act of opening the door constituted a Fourth Amendment violation, suppression would not be warranted because the challenged evidence was discovered through an independent source:” plain view. United States v. Aguirre, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11090 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2026).*
The officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant because, already on alert from the late-night dispatch call about a suspicious vehicle, the officer observed every person in defendant’s car respond strangely to an approaching police car as two passengers took off running and defendant, who was in the driver’s seat, began backing out of the parking space, ignoring the car’s open back door. Defendant’s own actions, combined with the panicked flight of his companions, strongly suggested that he was engaged in unlawful conduct he wished to hide from police. District of Columbia v. R.W., 2026 U.S. LEXIS 1858 (Apr. 20, 2026) (per curiam)
Posted inReasonable suspicion, SCOTUS|Comments Off on SCOTUS: Call about suspicious vehicle led to passengers’ flight and bad driving, and that was RS for a stop
This was a traffic stop, and defendant had a suspended license. She was able to call her son to come to drive her and the car home, and she would not be arrested. The officer’s taking 12 seconds to ask about drugs didn’t unreasonably prolong the stop. It was going to take a while longer anyway. Commonwealth v. Knight-Walker, 2026 Va. LEXIS 27 (Apr. 16, 2026).
Under the totality of circumstances, the use of deadly force here was unreasonable under clearly established law. The district court didn’t have Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 80-83 (2025), to rely on, but no matter. Byers v. Painter, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 10976 (4th Cir. Apr. 17, 2026).*
The state showed logical nexus between defendant’s cell phone and his girlfriend’s murder he was accused of. The state established that the phone was with him all the time before and after it happened, so it was a valid inference he had it then. Heck v. State, 2026 Del. LEXIS 160 (Apr. 17, 2026).*
Here, the application for the search warrant was considered on the detention question. No motion to suppress yet filed (or would one be?). United States v. Evans, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31755 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 17, 2026).
Defendant’s valid stop was for a loud muffler, confirmed by the bodycam. State v. Crowley, 2026-Ohio-1402 (5th Dist. Apr. 17, 2026).*
The USMJ found in the R&R that petitioner had meaningful review of his Fourth Amendment claim in state court. His objections to the USDJ are too general to be meaningful. Mendonca v. Warden, Madison Corr. Inst., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84785 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 17, 2026).*
Defendant was stopped for driving too long in the passing lane without passing anyone. The district court found the stop reasonable. The stop was extended from the smell of marijuana [in Colorado]. Ultimately defendant consented to a search, which was found voluntary. People v. McGee, 2026 Colo. App. LEXIS 614 (Apr. 2, 2026).*
Defendant was subjected to two stops. The first was for suspicion of disorderly conduct, but no arrest was made and he was released because no further reasonable suspicion developed. A second stop was based on the first, and there still was no reasonable suspicion. State v. Smith, 2026 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 214 (Apr. 17, 2026).
The trial court abused its discretion in suppressing defendant’s statements made in his front yard while a search was going on inside his house. He was not in custody. State v. Russell, 2026 OK CR 15 (Apr. 16, 2026).*
Defendant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for defense counsel not telling him that the same judge that denied the motion to suppress with adverse credibility determinations would be trying his bench trial. Denied. United States v. Murphy, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84139 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2026).*
Successor petitioner’s claim that he subsequently learned of allegedly new information to challenge his search is denied. He knew back in the beginning. In re Mendoza, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 10941 (11th Cir. Apr. 16, 2026).*
Posted inCustody, Reasonable suspicion|Comments Off on TN: RS didn’t develop to continue stop; second stop based on first suppressed
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
