Even if the passcode was obtained unreasonably, this iPhone would have been gotten into anyway. The officer had done it before on these earlier models, and that’s inevitable discovery. United States v. Fassero, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 265273 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2025).
A suppression hearing isn’t required merely when the sufficiency of the information in the affidavit is challenged. Fairly read, the affidavit shows probable cause. The good faith exception doesn’t even have to be considered. United States v. Favors, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 265628 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 24, 2025).*
Just “because the issuing judge and the affiant, law enforcement center, and/or jail share the same address” doesn’t state a Fourth Amendment claim. Owens v. Wilson, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 264582 (D.S.C. Nov. 21, 2025).*
The impoundment of plaintiff’s car being unreasonable, the inventory was not valid. Langham v. Spencer, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 33555 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2025).*
The officer here violated clearly established law by taking too long to apply for a warrant to search plaintiff’s cell phone. Plaintiff promptly sought its return, but that was denied because the officer hadn’t got a warrant yet. Langham v. Noyd, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 33559 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2025) (2-1, and unpublished).
“To summarize: (1) Mr. Kennard has not made the requisite showing that the affidavit includes any false statement, so there are no grounds to support a Franks hearing; (2) the affidavit contains facts setting out a sufficient evidentiary basis to associate the Whoppdog Instagram account with Mr. Kennard; and, (3) even if references to the Whoppdog Instagram account were excised from the affidavit, the remaining facts create sufficient probable cause for a search of the location data of the 6766 Phone.” There was also probable cause for the warrant for his place. United States v. Kennard, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 265189 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 23, 2025).*
There was reasonable suspicion for defendant being involved in drug trafficking when he was stopped. United States v. Bugg, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 264754 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 23, 2025).*
Pennsylvania’s automobile exception is more stringent than the Fourth Amendment requiring exigency. The state can’t end run a refusal to consent by impounding a car to get into it. Commonwealth v. Rosario, 2025 PA Super 286 (Dec. 23, 2025).
“First, the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion based on the information relayed through dispatch and the officers’ own observations. The complainant described a contemporaneous assault with a gun and provided distinctive identifying information (an orange Hyundai Accent hatchback) together with information about the location and general direction-of-travel. Within minutes and in close proximity of the reported assault, Sergeant Ayres encountered a vehicle matching that distinctive description. Any imperfections in the radio description, including the absence of a detailed ‘flash’ and the fact that the complainant did not describe all occupants, did not undermine reasonable suspicion given the vehicle’s unique color, temporal proximity, and corroboration.” United States v. Thomas, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 265262 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2025).*
“The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply to a warrantless vehicle search based solely on the smell of marijuana that occurred before we issued our opinion in State v. Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d 164 (Minn. 2023), which held that the odor of marijuana alone is insufficient to create probable cause to search a vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” (Syllabus) For nearly 30 years, it was telegraphed that marijuana smell alone wasn’t always going to be enough. State v. Douglas, 2025 Minn. LEXIS 720 (Dec. 24, 2025) (4-3):
Trump v. Illinois,2025 U.S. LEXIS 4766 (U.S. Dec. 23, 2025), involving the President calling up the National Guard in Illinois, the government failed to prove an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act. [At first, I elected to omit this, but is Kavanaugh’s concurrence an effort to redeem his “Kavanaugh stops” concurring opinion from September (see posts listed here)?] The majority opinion (6-3) on the stay application:
The search warrant on defendant’s social media accounts took longer to be executed than the ten days state statute provided for, but that wasn’t reason to exclude the product of the search. Despite the statutory violation, the real question is whether probable cause still existed at the time of execution, and it did. Drawing from Fourth Amendment case law and Rule 41, the federal rule would be the same. Bosworth v. State, 2025 Ind. App. LEXIS 425 (Dec. 23, 2025):
Posted inSocial media warrants, Staleness, Warrant execution|Comments Off on IN: Failure to execute social media warrant in 10 days per statute did not require suppression where PC still existed
“All of these questions lasted fewer than thirty seconds–they did not ‘measurably extend’ the stop. Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333. Ali cites no law that suggests that officers must address the traffic infraction before they may ask questions related to safety concerns.” United States v. Ali, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 265623 (D. Minn. Dec. 24, 2025).*
The affidavit for warrant supported the search for a cell phone that was used to illuminate sexual contact and thus likely record it. There was no Franks violation to have a hearing over. United States v. Blackwell, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 264032 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 24, 2025).*
“Defendant’s claim that the search warrant lacks probable cause is also meritless. The Affidavit meticulously details the events preceding the co-conspirators’ arrests on January 27, 2023. … Special Agent Oltman’s opinions and conclusions may properly be considered as a factor in the totality of the circumstances for evaluating whether there is probable cause to support a search warrant.” United States v. Hudson, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 264026 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 14, 2025),* adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 262361 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 2025).*
In the Comey attorney-client privileged search, the government was ordered to return the evidence, not destroy it. Another alternative is to deposit it with the court subject to another search warrant, if the government can get one. Richman v. United States, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 265242 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2025), prior opinion 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 256197 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2025) (posted here).
“[A]n officer’s confiscation of a suspect’s keys during an investigative detention does not automatically escalate the stop into a custodial arrest.” Here, it was a DUI stop and taking the keys was for safety reasons. Bwondara v. State, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 9890 (Tex. App. – Ft. Worth Dec. 23, 2025).
Defendant was a police officer tried and acquitted in state court for the shooting death of Breonna Taylor. Then he was tried federally for a civil rights violation and convicted of violating her Fourth Amendment rights. He gets bail pending appeal. If he succeeds on one issue, he can’t be retried. If on the other, there’s a new trial. There is a strong presumption of detention, but government agrees this is extraordinary. United States v. Hankison, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 33314 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 2025).*
The proof of connection between defendant and the murder victim was so substantial, including defendant’s DNA practically everywhere, the CSLI doesn’t add much of anything. Tandy v. State, 2025 Ind. App. LEXIS 421 (Dec. 22, 2025).*
Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his space in a homeless shelter against a warrantless entry. People v. Maquila, 2025 NY Slip Op 25270, 2025 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 9887 (Kings Co. Dec. 17, 2025):
When claiming a witness wasn’t called at a suppression hearing as an ineffective assistance claim, there has to be an offer of proof as to what the witness would have testified to with a showing of how it would affect the outcome. Otherwise, the claim is speculative. Lenhart v. United States, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 33552 (6th Cir. Dec. 22, 2025).
Defendant was a police officer tried and acquitted in state court for the shooting death of Breonna Taylor. Then he was tried federally for a civil rights violation and convicted of violating her Fourth Amendment rights. He gets bail pending appeal. If he succeeds on one issue, he can’t be retried. If on the other, there’s a new trial. There is a strong presumption of detention, but government agrees this is extraordinary. United States v. Hankison, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 33314 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 2025).*
The proof of connection between defendant and the murder victim was so substantial, including defendant’s DNA practically everywhere, the CSLI doesn’t add much of anything. Tandy v. State, 2025 Ind. App. LEXIS 421 (Dec. 22, 2025).*
“Swanagan did not make an adequate preliminary showing that Budde’s interpretation of the water emoji was intentionally or recklessly false, so the district court did not clearly err in finding the affidavit truthful. Swanagan asserts that he ‘provided dictionary support that a water emoji had a common meaning of sexual relations’ and that ‘the government acknowledged that the water emoji could have other meanings’ besides methamphetamine.” United States v. Reed, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 33561 (6th Cir. Dec. 23, 2025).
Defendant’s claim that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him was “borderline frivolous.” United States v. Edwards, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 33003 (7th Cir. Dec. 17, 2025).*
“The Government is correct in its position that Fowlkes was not ‘ordered’ to talk to the officers. Officer Grier’s on-camera statement—‘walking away as soon as we walk up, what’s going on?’—was a question, not a command. The officers credibly testified that they did not demand that Fowlkes turn around and speak with them. One brief question did not transform the encounter into a seizure because ‘mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure.’ Bostick …” United States v. Fowlkes, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 260888 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2025).*
WaPo: Your chatbot keeps a file on you. Here’s how to delete it. by Geoffrey A. Fowler (“A clickable guide to fixing the complicated privacy settings from ChatGPT, Claude, Copilot, Gemini and Meta AI. … Try this: Log in to ChatGPT or Meta AI and type, ‘roast me based on my chat history.’ If it knows you well enough to skewer you, that’s one sign it’s time to lock down your artificial intelligence privacy.”). Now imagine a search warrant for your computer, which inevitably will include search history.
Rolling Stone: Trump’s DNA Dragnet: The Law That Turns Us All Into Suspects by Alex Ashley (“A little-used federal law is being activated in ways that could turn immigration screening into the backbone of a far-reaching DNA surveillance system.”)
Posted inDNA|Comments Off on Rolling Stone: Trump’s DNA Dragnet: The Law That Turns Us All Into Suspects
The search of this student was reasonable, and the student had no right to be warned before it was going to happen. Halasz v. Cass City Pub. Sch., 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 33093 (6th Cir. Dec. 18, 2025).
There was probable cause for the warrant, so the good faith exception doesn’t even come up. Thompson v. State, 2025 Ind. App. LEXIS 418 (Dec. 17, 2025).*
There’s no significant conflict between the affidavit for warrant and the video it relies on, so there’s no Franks violation. Correcting the affidavit still leaves probable cause. United States v. Dozier, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261587 (D. Conn. Dec. 18, 2025).*
There was probable cause for the arrest, or at least reasonable suspicion for the stop. United States v. Hutcherson, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261576 (D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2025).*
The state failed to call the first officer reporting defendant to the second under the collective knowledge doctrine, but that didn’t result in a reversible denial of confrontation. The second officer’s own observations supported it. State v. Simon, 2025-Ohio-5660 (2d Dist. Dec. 19, 2025).
The USMJ did not flip the burden of proof on the suppression issues against the defendant. The searches were proper. United States v. Hudson, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 262361 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 2025).*
The Monell complete failure to train on Fourth Amendment issues should also apply to First Amendment and plaintiff doesn’t state a claim. Hershey v. City of Bossier City, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 33259 (5th Cir. Dec. 18, 2025).*
One doesn’t maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in blood drawn under a warrant. Vij v. State, 2025 Ga. App. LEXIS 577 (Dec. 19, 2025).*
“Whether GPS monitoring as a condition of probation is a reasonable search turns in part on its duration, and the Commonwealth bears the burden of demonstrating that GPS monitoring is reasonable for the entire ordered duration. Notwithstanding the requirement in G. L. c. 265, § 47, that a defendant sentenced thereunder shall be subject to GPS monitoring ‘at all times for the length of his probation,’ a judge may order GPS monitoring only for a duration, if any, that the judge determines to be reasonable, even if the resulting period of GPS monitoring is shorter than the defendant’s probationary term.” Commonwealth v. Arnold, 2025 Mass. LEXIS 632 (Dec. 17, 2025).
The warrant was particular and the affidavit showed probable cause. United States v. Blackwell, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 262696 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 19, 2025).*
“The magistrate judge’s report persuasively establishes why Nosovitch’s arguments about the sufficiency of indictments, search warrants, and seizures are not correct. But even if he could establish a Fourth Amendment violation, it would not justify suppressing evidence.” United States v. Nosovitch, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 262693 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 19, 2025).*
Defendant was in the Navy with NATO forces and questioned by Belgian authorities under their law for murder of his wife. This was not an improper joint investigation because both Belgium and the United States had jurisdiction over his crime. United States v. Becker, 2025 CCA LEXIS 574 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 17, 2025) (unpublished but potentially persuasive anyway).
The traffic stop led to reasonable suspicion: “Here, based on Browne’s training and experience he identified indicators of suspected criminal activity including dark window tint, the evasive maneuver of pulling into the turnpike plaza and quickly reemerging, excessive nervousness, and Patterson’s contradictory statements regarding whether Browne had previously stopped him. While investigating the suspected criminal activity, Browne’s investigation into the initial purpose of the traffic stop, the window tint violation, was also ongoing.” State v. Patterson, 2025-Ohio-5671 (6th Dist. Dec. 19, 2025).*
No rational fact finder could find there was reasonable suspicion here, and the judgment is reversed. Hernandez v. State, 2025 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 946 (Dec. 19, 2025).*
Posted inForeign searches, Reasonable suspicion|Comments Off on N.-M.Ct.Crim.App.: Joint investigation by Belgium and Navy in NATO forces of murder of service member’s spouse by the service member was not improper
The issuing judge taking ten minutes to review an affidavit for warrant does not show that he or she abandoned the role of a neutral and detached magistrate. [I can usually see probable cause in an affidavit in 30-45 seconds. And remember that judges issuing search warrants see hundreds a year.] United States v. Panetti, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 262436 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025).
Alluding to a Fourth Amendment argument, without briefing it is waiver. Hester v. Chester Cty., 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 33271 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 2025).*
Failure to object before or at trial leaves this Fourth Amendment claim subject to plain error, and it’s not. Johnson v. State, 2025 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 53 (Dec. 19, 2025).*
The vehicle search here was valid either as a protective sweep or the vehicle exception. As to the search of the house, the alleged failure to properly knock-and-announce wasn’t an error justifying suppression of evidence under Hudson. Removing any challenged information from the affidavit still leaves probable cause, false or not. United States v. Smith, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 262445 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2025).*
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
