A dead co-conspirator’s phone was searched linking defendants to the crime. The police reasonably believed his mother had authority to consent to the phone. The California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA) (Cal. Pen. Code § 1546 et seq.) applies, and the AG concedes any Fourth Amendment standing requirement was legislated out. The good faith exception, however, applies to the consent issue. His mother was the only apparent next of kin, and she knew he was dead, and she accepted his other property from the police. People v. Anderson, 2026 Cal. App. LEXIS 150 (6th Dist. Mar. 13, 2026):
1.The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to searches under CalECPA.
CalECPA “does not require the suppression of any electronic information. Rather, it authorizes any person in a trial, hearing, or proceeding to move to suppress any electronic information obtained or retained in violation of the Fourth Amendment or CalECPA.” (Price, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 58.) Thus, the Court of Appeal in Price concluded the good faith exception applicable to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule also applies to CalECPA violations. (Price, supra, at p. 60.) (Cf. People v. Clymer (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 140 327 Cal. Rptr. 3d 828 [citing Price in stating the good faith exception “arguably” applies to CalECPA violations]; Meza, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 546, fn. 17 [declining to address the issue]; id. at p. 547b (statement by Liu, J., dissenting from denial of review) [“It is not clear whether [the good faith] exception applies to violations of CalECPA, and there are plausible arguments on both sides of the question”].)
In addition, the Court of Appeal in People v. Campos (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1281, 1295 317 Cal. Rptr. 3d 429 concluded CalECPA does not require suppression of evidence for all violations of the statute, though the court did not specifically address the good faith exception. The court in Campos noted both CalECPA’s legislative history and the statute’s statement that suppression motions are to be reviewed in accordance with section 1538.5. (Campos, supra, at p. 1295.) Section 1538.5 “does not establish or alter any substantive ground for suppression of evidence or return of property.” (§ 1538.5, subd. (n).) Thus, the Campos court concluded that evidence is not automatically excluded when it was obtained in violation of CalECPA. (Campos, supra, at pp. 1296–1298.) The court in Price cited a similar rationale, reviewing several CalECPA provisions to conclude that “[n]one of these provisions direct a court to impose a particular remedy for a CalECPA violation; they leave the determination of the appropriate remedy to the court considering the suppression motion, civil action, or petition alleging the CalECPA violation.” (Price, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 59.)
We find Price well reasoned. We agree CalECPA does not require suppression of all evidence obtained in violation of the act. Instead, the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to CalECPA violations. As the Court of Appeal in Price concluded, the language of CalECPA—which does not mention the good faith exception one way or the other—does not show “that the Legislature intended such a sweeping change to this well-established exception without express clarity.” (Price, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 59.) “The Legislature is presumed to know existing law, including case law [citation], and nothing in CalECPA suggests that the legislation was intended to vitiate’” case law establishing the good faith exception in the Fourth Amendment context. (Price, supra, at p. 60.)
Legislative history supports our conclusion. As the court in Campos observed, when CalECPA legislation was first introduced, section 1546.4, subdivision (a) would have provided that “‘no evidence obtained or retained in violation of this chapter shall be admissible in a criminal … proceeding .…“‘ (Sen. Bill No. 178 (2015–2016 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 9, 2015.)“ (Campos, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 1295.) ”According to a report from the Assembly Committee on Public Safety, the California State Sheriffs’ Association opposed the bill on multiple grounds, including the following: ‘“[W]e are concerned about the breadth of the exclusionary provisions of proposed section 1546.4. Whether evidence should be admitted or not should be based on a motion to suppress under … section 1538.5 and should be based on violations of the Fourth Amendment. Technical violations of the ‘chapter’ that do not implicate a person’s right to privacy should not result in the suppression of evidence.”’ (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 178 (2015–2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 7, 2015, p. 12.)“ (Id. at p. 1296.) The Legislature removed the language in section 1546.4 requiring suppression of all evidence obtained in violation of CalECPA and substituted language stating that a motion to suppress shall be made, determined, and subject to review under section 1538.5, evincing ”a rejection of the proposal to exclude all evidence obtained in violation of the CalECPA.“ (Campos, supra, at p. 1296.) The court in Clymer cited the same legislative history in concluding it ”arguably suggests“ the good faith exception remains operative under CalECPA. (Clymer, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 140.)
Our review of the legislative history similarly supports the conclusion that CalECPA does not require suppression for any violation of the act, and the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule remains operative under CalECPA. Anderson and Allen point to nothing in the act’s legislative history to indicate a contrary conclusion.
Anderson and Allen argue the principles for suppressing evidence obtained in violation of wiretap laws should apply to CalECPA violations. In support of this argument, they cite People v. Jackson (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 129 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136, which concluded evidence obtained under federal or state wiretap laws cannot be admitted under the good faith exception applicable to the exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations. (Jackson, supra, at pp. 153–154.) We conclude Jackson does not support their argument.
. . .
Therefore, consistent with Price, we conclude that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to searches challenged under CalECPA.
. . .
2.Law enforcement acted in good faith by relying on the consent of Lampley’s mother to search the phone.
We review the application of the good faith exception de novo, examining whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known the search was illegal despite the consent obtained. (See Price, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 50.) “‘[T]he government has the burden to prove facts warranting application of the good faith exception.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
When the officer obtained Lampley’s mother’s consent to search the phone, he informed Lampley’s mother that Lampley was deceased. Because Lampley had died, he was no longer the authorized possessor of the phone. At that point, law enforcement acted in objective good faith in believing Lampley’s mother as Lampley’s “next of kin” was an authorized possessor of the phone. Law enforcement understood Lampley’s mother to be Lampley’s “next of kin,” and they later released other personal property of Lampley to Lampley’s mother. Nothing in the appellate record indicates anyone else besides Lampley’s mother had a stronger claim to possession of the phone. Any deterrence rationale does not support suppressing the evidence in situations where law enforcement reasonably believes a family member is the authorized possessor of a deceased person’s electronic device. In addition, as the Attorney General notes, no case law existed concerning the definition of “authorized possessor” at the time law enforcement obtained consent to search the phone, and nothing in the statutory definition should have caused law enforcement to believe Lampley’s mother was not authorized to consent to the phone’s search. (See Price, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 51 [good faith exception applied because at the time a geofence warrant was issued, no published cases existed analyzing the constitutionality of such warrants].)
