The Appeal: Forty-Six States Paid for Violent, Racist Police Training. We Should Ban Pretextual Stops Instead.

The Appeal: Forty-Six States Paid for Violent, Racist Police Training. We Should Ban Pretextual Stops Instead. by Shirley LaVarco (“For decades, we’ve been told police officers just need training and resources to do their jobs correctly. These items, including cultural sensitivity training, implicit bias training, de-escalation training, and so on, cost billions every year. But we know from the senseless killings of Tyre Nichols, Sandra Bland, Philando Castile, and many others that no amount of training or resources will stop police from killing Black and brown people. Nor will it ensure that police treat people with dignity and respect. Worse still, the ‘training’ that cops already receive often glorifies violence, reinforces racist ideas, and is taught by officers with histories of misconduct.”)

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D.N.M.: No GFE for a Franks violation

Defendant met his Franks burden and showed a false statement in the affidavit for search warrant that was material to the probable cause finding. The statement was from the chief to the affiant. Finally, there is no good faith exception for a Franks violation. United States v. Norton, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44720 (D.N.M. Mar. 12, 2024).

The use of the word “certainty” in an affidavit for search warrant that was somewhat overstated is not a Franks violation. United States v. Clanton, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43518 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2024).

Suppression order affirmed. There simply were no facts showing probable cause for this search warrant. State v. Garcia, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 1813 (Tex. App. – Dallas Mar. 13, 2024).*

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PA: With PC, moving a car to a police location for a SW was reasonable

Probable cause was developed on the streets for search of defendant’s car for drug evidence when officers saw him take money, return to the car, get something small, and return to the payor, twice. Removing the car to a different location for obtaining and executing a search warrant for it was reasonable. Suppression order reversed. Commonwealth v. Floyd, 2024 PA Super 44, 2024 Pa. Super. LEXIS 87 (Mar. 13, 2024).

Defendant’s comments and nervous movements justified the officer in conducting a patdown. Brummett v. State, 2024 Ind. App. LEXIS 61 (Mar. 12, 2024).*

A replevin action for return of property resulted in summary judgment for the state. Reversed; the summary judgment procedure wasn’t complied with. Laramore v. Jacobsen, 2024 Mo. App. LEXIS 156 (Mar. 12, 2024).*

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CA6: The state’s violation of a prison policy doesn’t make a 4A claim

Plaintiff inmate “cannot state a claim for a violation of prison policy because prison policy directives are insufficient to create a liberty interest under the Fourth Amendment. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1983); ….” IFP motion denied. Pann v. Hadden, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 5832 (6th Cir. Mar. 11, 2024).

Habeas petitioner’s direct Fourth Amendment attack on his conviction is barred by Stone. Sutton v. Royce, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43483 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2024).* (Stone was decided in 1976, nearly 50 years ago, and this still comes up nearly everyday.)

The officers’ subjective intent about the arrest are irrelevant when there is probable cause. Marriott v. Persing, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 5964 (6th Cir. Mar. 11, 2024).*

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MO: Collective knowledge for RS doesn’t require that every witness be called at the suppression hearing

Collective knowledge for reasonable suspicion doesn’t require that every witness be called at the suppression hearing. “While Appellant seemingly takes issue with the fact that the officer who took Victim’s report did not also testify, the Hensley test only requires the state to prove the origin of the reasonable suspicion, which in this case was the Victim’s report of her stolen vehicle. Simply put, Victim’s testimony at trial that she reported her vehicle as stolen provided the original factual basis for reasonable suspicion to execute a permissible Terry stop of Appellant. See Norfolk, 966 S.W.2d at 367-68.” In the Int. of M.A.S., 2024 Mo. App. LEXIS 146 (Mar. 12, 2024).

Defendant’s probation officer had reasonable suspicion for a search. Alternatively, the district court held that the “special needs” doctrine permitted the search without it. There was reasonable suspicion so the other issue isn’t decided. United States v. Alfaro, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 5907 (2d Cir. Mar. 12, 2024).*

This child porn defendant sought discovery from the government about server seizures by Australia and the Netherlands. The U.S. government attempted to get that information, but they couldn’t get it. There’s no duty there. United States v. Mitrovich, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 5931 (7th Cir. Mar. 12, 2024).*

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W.D.Tex.: No REP in tent where def was trespassing

Where defendant was staying in a tent on TXDOT property with no trespassing signs, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy when an officer opened the tent flap and saw marijuana and a gun. He was a felon in possession. This is distinguishable from tents where the accused was permitted to set one up. United States v. Parkerson, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42975 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2024).

There was reasonable suspicion to stop defendant who was parked in early morning hours at a construction area and then fled when the officer returned to check on him. United States v. Pearce, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 5811 (10th Cir. Mar. 11, 2024).*

Petitioner’s 2254 claim was barred by Stone v. Powell. It was litigated below. Scyphers v. Andrewjeski, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42612 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 2024).*

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MO: Search incident to 96 hour mental health hold was reasonable

Defendant was picked up on a warrant for 96 hour mental commitment hold. The search incident to that was reasonable. “[T]he deputies’ search of Salcedo, incident to Salcedo being taken into custody pursuant to a warrant under section 632.305 for transport to a mental health facility, was reasonable.” State v. Salcedo, 2024 Mo. App. LEXIS 136 (Mar. 12, 2024).

2255 petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim is denied having been raised and reraised repeatedly. Mirabal v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42711 (D.N.M. Mar. 8, 2024)

If the officer made a mistake in stopping defendants because of an alleged turn into what lane violation, it was reasonable under Heien. United States v. Marsh, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 5860 (6th Cir. Mar. 12, 2024).*

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VA: Roadside partial strip search too intrusive and unreasonable

A roadside search ended up with officers searching in the back of defendant’s underwear looking for an object that could be felt but not retrieved because he clenched his buttocks. His shorts fell down but not his underwear. It was drugs found at the jail. This strip search on the roadside was too intrusive. Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 2024 Va. App. LEXIS 137 (Mar. 12, 2024):

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AR: Computer crash losing drug dog’s performance record doesn’t doom search

The loss of the drug dog’s performance record from a computer crash didn’t make the dog’s alert on the highway unreasonable because those records are of marginal importance. The circuit court resolved credibility questions. No inference of spoliation will be made here. Finally, the court notes the Arkansas Supreme Court interprets reasonable suspicion and probable cause the same. Whiting v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 176 n.2, 2024 Ark. App. LEXIS 179 (Mar. 13, 2024).

An NYS Trooper telling plaintiff to put on a mask in the men’s bathroom at a Thruway rest area doesn’t state a Fourth Amendment claim. Bennett v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41756 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2024).*

Defendant’s claim that mall security footage would have shown no probable cause for the search warrant because defendant acted in self-defense fails. It’s hardly conclusive. United States v. Holder, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42423 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 19, 2024).*

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Lawfare: Data Broker Sales and the Fourth Amendment

Lawfare: Data Broker Sales and the Fourth Amendment by Aaron X. Sobel (“Why the Fourth Amendment doesn’t actually prevent the government from purchasing personal data from data brokers.”)

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OH3: Parole search authority is statutory, not coerced consent

The parole search statute governs parole searches. It is not a matter of coerced consent. State v. Harrison, 2024-Ohio-884, 2024 Ohio App. LEXIS 816 (3d Dist. Mar. 11, 2024).

Civil Franks violation: “The omission of the full timeline is material because a corrected affidavit fails to establish even arguable probable cause. If the affidavit’s omissions are corrected, then the Hubbards were alive for hours after Sylvester was inside the home for the last time. And nothing in the affidavit explains how Sylvester could have strangled the Hubbards and started a fire from inside the house shortly before 4:00 a.m. on July 3 when he never reentered Deborah’s home after 9:00 p.m. on July 2. No person of reasonable caution reading a corrected version of Detective Barnett’s affidavit could think there was a substantial chance that Sylvester killed the Hubbards and set fire to the house. Quite the opposite: any ‘reasonable law officer [with knowledge of the omitted information] would have known’ that submitting the affidavit that Detective Barnett submitted ‘would lead to [an arrest] in violation of federal law.’ Madiwale v. Savaiko, 117 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Haygood v. Johnson, 70 F.3d 92, 95 (11th Cir. 1995)).” The omitted information probably will lead to a denial of qualified immunity. Reversed. Sylvester v. Fulton Cty. Jail, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 5797 (11th Cir. Mar. 11, 2024).*

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D.Ariz.: Govt’s civil discovery demands don’t implicate the 4A

When the government is sued, its discovery demands do not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Arizona Yage Assembly v. Barr, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42197 (D. Ariz. Feb. 22, 2024).

The obtaining of defendants CSLI before Carpenter was lawful then, and the good faith exception applies. Ramos v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41938 (D. Md. Mar. 11, 2024).*

Defendant’s traffic stop was justified at its inception, although it turned out there was no violation. Still, the officer had reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop based on a known and reliable CI’s information. United States v. Swartz, No. 2:23-CR-00047-DCLC-CRW-3, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42327 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 11, 2024).*

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MA: “Any persons present” clause in SW permitted search of one who left before search but hung around

“We conclude that a search warrant authorizing a search of ‘any person present’ allows a search of any person present in the property to be searched during the execution of the search warrant, including persons present during the execution but who exit the property before the police announce the search to the residents, at least where those persons remain in the vicinity of the property and in the view of the police at all times prior to the search.” Commonwealth v. Cintron, 2024 Mass. App. LEXIS 36 (Mar. 11, 2024).

“The Court finds that the Informant was reliable and that officers presented the Magistrate Judge with sufficient corroborating evidence. The Affidavit noted, for instance, that the Informant had been reliable in several prior narcotics investigations. Affidavit, ¶ 9A. While the Affidavit provided no specific evidence regarding the Informant’s identity or the extent of the Informant’s prior tips, the Court finds that the details of the Informant’s tip, many of which officers were able to corroborate, indicated that the Informant was a credible source.” United States v. Cooper, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41449 (D. Del. Mar. 7, 2024).*

Defendant did not make his “substantial preliminary showing” for Franks that the statements in the search warrant affidavit were recklessly false. The omitted information does not undermine the probable cause showing. United States v. Holder, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41513 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2024).*

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D.N.M.: Geofence warrant relied on in good faith

A geofence warrant was used to gather information to attempt to find the robber of a postal worker. Geofence warrants are novel, the defendant may not have shown standing, and the government gets to rely on the good faith exception. United States v. Kirkendoll, No. 1:22-cr-00361-MLG, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41567 (D.N.M. Mar. 8, 2024):

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GA: SW for blood draw specifically didn’t mention testing

Where the search warrant for defendant’s blood only permitted drawing the blood and not testing it, testing it required another warrant. State v. De La Paz, 2024 Ga. App. LEXIS 98 (Mar. 8, 2024).

Defendant’s conviction was based in part on a warrant for thermal imaging of his grow operation. His post-conviction complained of a low helicopter flyover. That claim fails for lack of a credible factual basis. State v. Snyder, 2024-Ohio-861 (2d Dist. Mar. 8, 2024).*

The smell of marijuana is enough to justify search under the automobile exception. United States v. Demar, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40577 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 26, 2024).*

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N.D.Ala.: By the time the drug dog entered the car, there already was PC

The drug dog entered the car on the second attempt. But defendant left the door open, and the smell of marijuana was evident. The officer held the dog back in case there was something hazardous in the car. Still, not enough because there already was probable cause before the dog sniff. United States v. Green, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41124 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 12, 2024).

The officer’s testimony is credited: “As a threshold matter, the Court finds that Agent Santiago-Martínez’ demeanor during the hearing was measured and appropriate under the circumstances and he did not appear to be defensive in any way. Indeed, his in-court testimony was sufficiently detailed such that it appeared as though, at times, he was reliving the events in his head as he was testifying to them on the stand.” None of the discrepancies in the warrant application are material to the probable cause finding, so the Franks challenge fails. United States v. Miranda-Rodríguez, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41393 (D.P.R. Mar. 1, 2024).*

Probable cause was shown for the warrant for this hotel room, and nexus was shown. Even if it wasn’t, the good faith exception applies here. United States v. Cooper, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41449 (D. Del. Mar. 7, 2024).*

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E.D.Pa.: In a cell phone search, cached data was within the “electronic data or memory features” of the phone as provided by the SW

Cached data on defendant’s cell phone is included in “[a]ll documents, including in electronic form, and stored communications including … photographs, videos, and any other electronic data or other memory features contained in the devices and SIM cards[.]” The search was within the terms of the warrant. United States v. Daniels, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40740 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2024).

Defendant had no standing in the place searched with the exception of his personal locker. As to defendant’s Franks challenge, the challenged information does not undermine the probable cause finding. The good faith exception also applies. United States v. Pooley, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41188 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2024).*

This officer gets qualified immunity for shooting decedent who was fighting with the officer attempting to arrest him. “But on this record, we see no basis to conclude Mr. Holmes was restrained (and not resisting) when Officer Somers used lethal force. Though Ms. Couser maintains otherwise, her version of the facts is not supported by the evidence. … [¶] We thus agree with the district court that the third Graham factor supports Officer Somers.” Couser v. Somers, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 5605 (10th Cir. Mar. 8, 2024).*

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KS: No basis for a stop of car in a local park under “public safety exception”

A public safety stop is well recognized, deriving from Cady. “In this case, however, the facts do not support a valid safety stop. The deputy stated he was concerned because it was dark, it was late, the car was parked in a ‘secluded’ area, there was a single occupant inside the car, there had been prior safety incidents in the area in past years, people often do illegal activity in that area, and that he didn’t know what McDonald was thinking. On examination, we find these facts insufficient to allow a warrantless seizure.” Denial of suppression reversed, and court of appeals affirmed. State v. McDonald, 2024 Kan. LEXIS 27 (Mar. 8, 2024).

Defendant was stopped for a loud exhaust system. He calls it a “trivial reason” for a stop, but it’s still a legitimate one under the vehicle code. People v. Fields, 2024 IL App (4th) 210194-B, 2024 Ill. App. LEXIS 518 (Mar. 8, 2024).*

“Under these circumstances, it was objectively reasonable for the officers conducting the search to believe that probable cause for the warrant existed and to rely in good faith on the warrant as issued. Thus, assuming (without deciding) that the search warrant was infirm, Defendant’s motion to suppress fails under the good faith doctrine. Therefore, the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant will not be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.” United States v. Pritchett, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40896 (D. Del. Mar. 8, 2024).*

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Cal.2d: Questions posed during a traffic stop while waiting for the records check do not extend the stop

Questions posed during a traffic stop while waiting for the records check to come back do not extend the stop. People v. Felix, 2024 Cal. App. LEXIS 154 (2d Dist. Mar. 7, 2024).

Defendant’s bad search claim as part of a motion for new trial is not based on newly discovered evidence and is denied. United States v. Fredrickson, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 5529 (7th Cir. Mar. 7, 2024).*

Defendant’s stop for a temporary tag in an over tinted window that couldn’t be seen was justification for the stop. The smell of marijuana provided reasonable suspicion to continue the stop. Defendant’s ruse claim fails. State v. Kelsey, 2024-Ohio-806 (6th Dist. Mar. 1, 2024).*

The court talks about probable cause but then elides into the good faith exception, and that supports the warrant. United States v. Lynch, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40182 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 7, 2024).*

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D.N.D.: Defs showed no connection to the premises as overnight guests to have standing

Defendants had no real connection to the place searched to have standing. “There was no evidence presented to support the Defendants’ allegation that they had permission from the owners (Stevens and Levings) to stay in the home as overnight guests. In fact, no evidence was presented to support the idea that the owners gave permission for the Defendants to be inside the home for any period of time. There is no evidence the Defendants had a previous relationship with Stevens or Levings. At the suppression hearing, testimony revealed that Williams and Fast did not have belongings in the house to support the contention that they were staying at the residence as overnight guests.” United States v. Williams, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40429 (D.N.D. Mar. 7, 2024).*

The finding of the state court on this habeas petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim fails on both the merits and the unreasonable application provision of 2254(d). In re Kaba, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40362 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2024) (Chin, Circuit Judge on assignment).*

Habeas petitioner raised his Fourth Amendment claim in state court and lost, and she can’t relitigate it under Stone. Holdren v. Administrator, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40471 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2024).*

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