VA: SW that included “evidence of occupancy” could peruse def’s journals; that led to SW for them

In executing a search warrant in a murder case, officers looking for evidence of occupancy authorized by the warrant perused defendant’s journals. Not finding evidence of occupancy, they found other potential leads and applied for a warrant to read the journals. Some became evidence at trial. That warrant was valid, and the police followed prior similar cases. Drumgold v. Commonwealth, 2026 Va. App. LEXIS 389 (July 21, 2026):

In Rosa, 48 Va. App. 93, this Court established the governing procedure where officers, executing a search warrant, encounter writings or files that may or may not fall within the warrant’s scope. There, police executed a search warrant for the defendant’s computer to look for files containing information on digital conversations between the defendant and a college student, relative to charges of distribution of controlled substances and providing alcohol to a minor. Id. at 95-96. During that search, officers viewed an image believed to be child pornography, immediately ceased their review of the picture files, and obtained a second warrant to search for sexually explicit images of children. Id. at 97. This Court found “no error in this procedure,” explaining that “[i]t is certain that some innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized.” Id. at 100-02 (quoting Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976)). Such perusal may continue only so far as that determination requires, and must cease once a writing’s inapplicability to the warrant is apparent.

The officers here followed that same procedure. Based on the size of Drumgold’s journals, the officers reasonably believed the journals might contain papers relating to the purchase and possession of firearms or to occupancy of the apartment, items listed in the second search warrant. After examining the journals cursorily and determining they contained no item responsive to the second warrant, the officers ceased reading and obtained a third warrant for the journals’ contents. That procedure mirrors precisely what this Court approved in Rosa.

Drumgold argues that the third search warrant circumvents the Fourth Amendment because it was supported only by contents observed during execution of the second warrant. Rosa forecloses that argument. Because the officers were permitted to examine Drumgold’s journals to determine whether they fell within the scope of the second warrant, the observations made during that examination provided a proper basis for the third warrant.

Finally, Drumgold contends that, because the officers had already collected documents indicating occupancy, there was no need for the police to examine the journals to find more documents relating to occupancy. Drumgold provides no authority for this assertion, and caselaw on the scope of warrants suggests that officers are not categorically barred from looking for additional items that fall within a warrant’s scope. See Jeffers v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 151, 156 (2013) (“Police officers executing a particularized search warrant need not read its scope either narrowly or broadly, only reasonably.”); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966) (“Law enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction.”). The warrant in this case did not limit the number of items the police were allowed to seize to satisfy the search warrant, and there does not appear to be any authority requiring the police to cease their search once some documents have already been found. Thus, the circuit court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, and we affirm its ruling as to Assignment of Error 2.