OH8: Smell of MJ in car alone no longer PC

The smell of marijuana in a car alone isn’t probable cause in Ohio anymore because of legalization, quoting State v. Gray, 2025-Ohio-4607, ¶ 61 (1st Dist. Oct. 3, 2025). State v. Tucker, 2026-Ohio-1045 (8th Dist. Mar. 26, 2026).

Challenging only the legal sufficiency of the warrant doesn’t entitle defendant to an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Virgen, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63086 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2026).*

Defendant’s arrest was justified by probable cause. The further search was attenuated from the arrest anyway. United States v. First, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63392 (D. Mont. Mar. 25, 2026).*

The lack of a video doesn’t make the traffic stop invalid. The officer’s testimony is credited. United States v. Perez-Mejia, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64231 (D. Minn. Mar. 26, 2026).*

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ID: POs may do protective sweeps of a house same any other officer

“Having considered the rationale justifying protective sweeps, we hold, as a matter of first impression, that probation officers conducting lawful compliance checks in a residence may conduct a protective sweep to the same extent and are subject to the same limitations as police officers in the same circumstances.” State v. Reyes, 2026 Ida. App. LEXIS 16 (Mar. 26, 2026).

Petitioner’s 2254 search claim is barred by Stone. Zimmerman v. Dir., Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just.-Corr. Insts. Div., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63210 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2026).*

“To the extent that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest, unlawful search and seizure, and excessive force are based on the Fourteenth Amendment, those claims must be dismissed. ‘[I]t is the Fourth Amendment, and not [the Fourteenth Amendment right to] substantive due process, under which a [Section] 1983 malicious prosecution claim must be analyzed.’ Wagner v. Hyra, 518 F. Supp. 3d 613, 635 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).” Passino v. Fulton Cnty., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62907 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2026).*

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ID: Inevitable discovery doesn’t always require independent investigation

“[W]e hold that a finding that there was a lawful separate or independent investigation underway is not a per se requirement in every case for the inevitable discovery doctrine to apply. While a separate, untainted investigation may be the simplest way to establish this exception, we conclude that there are other situations that may still make the discovery inevitable. However, as discussed below, to remove the taint of illegal activity, the government must still prove that the discovery was inevitable from situations not revealed by the unlawful activity itself.” Earlier: “Accordingly, we conclude that the State failed to establish that the use of handcuffs on Campbell was a reasonable precaution for the trooper’s safety. Campbell’s stop became a de facto arrest when the suspects were ordered to lie down and were handcuffed. Thus, we affirm this part of the district court’s analysis.” State v. Campbell, 2026 Ida. LEXIS 51 (Mar. 26, 2026), on reh. from 2024 Ida. LEXIS 62 (June 24, 2024).

The officer had probable cause to search for a gun, and, on opening the car door, could see marijuana shake, and that justified the further search of the car. United States v. Jenkins, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63336 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 2, 2026).*

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S.D.Fla.: Privacy Protection Act has a border search exception

The Privacy Protection Act has a border search exception. Madaio v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64418 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2026).

When defendant was stopped, the officers had reasonable suspicion the car had been involved in a shooting incident. United States v. Contreras-Albaladejo, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62206 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2026).*

There was probable cause for the search, and, even if not, the good faith exception applies. United States v. Pyle, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62561 (D. Idaho Mar. 23, 2026).*

Defendant lacked standing, so his counsel wasn’t ineffective for not challenging the search. Brooke v. State, 2026 Mo. App. LEXIS 229 (Mar. 24, 2026).*

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E.D.La.: RS def was armed in a NOLA firearms free zone

The officer had reasonable suspicion defendant was armed, but also in a firearm-free zone during Mardi Gras which was reasonably determined. United States v. Bryant, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62869 (E.D. La. Mar. 25, 2026).*

2255 petitioner’s guilty plea waived his claim the prosecutor knowingly used evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Graham, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62885 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2026).*

Defendant had the opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in state court, so Stone bars relief. White v. Thornell, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62944 (D. Ariz. Mar. 25, 2026).*

Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in recorded conversations with the confidential source who ratted him out to the police. United States v. Jensen, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63078 (D.N.M. Mar. 25, 2026).*

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N.D.Ind.: Police arriving during ongoing 911 call justified entry on exigency

Officers arrived at the house the subject of an open 911 call during the emergency, and that authorized entry. United States v. Bray, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63142 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 25, 2026).*

The court can’t tell from the body cams whether the injury on plaintiff was intentional or accidental. That’s going to be a question for trial. Steinhoff v. Malovrh, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 8627 (7th Cir. Mar. 24, 2026).*

Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim on habeas is barred by Stone. Wilfred H. v. Frame, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62003 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 27, 2026).*

Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails on the merits of consent. Cain v. Dir., Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just.-Corr. Insts. Div., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62028 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2026).*

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CA9: 48-hour delay in getting a warrant for a mailed package wasn’t unreasonable

A 48 hour delay in getting a warrant for a mailed package wasn’t unreasonable. United States v. Garza, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 8714 (9th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026).

Petitioner’s bank records were obtained by search warrant. They are third party records he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in. United States v. Rembert, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 8558 (3d Cir. Mar. 24, 2026).*

Police waiting two days to get a search warrant after lawfully seizing defendant’s cell phone wasn’t unreasonable. State v. White, 2026 Mo. App. LEXIS 207 (Mar. 24, 2026).*

Petitioner had his full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in state court and didn’t put anything on. [That’s on him.] Allen v. Brantley, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61226 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2026).*

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W.D.N.Y.: Def had standing in his work premises under Mancusi v. Deforte

Defendant had standing in his work premises under Mancusi v. Deforte. On the merits his Franks challenge fails: “Even assuming arguendo that any of the above challenged statements could be considered false or misleading, Defendants have put forth no credible evidence that Inspector Homer deliberately or recklessly misled the magistrate judge by misrepresenting the nature of the mailers.” United States v. Engler, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62189 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2026).

“In assessing probable cause for a malicious-prosecution claim, we consider only the information that was presented to the magistrate judge, either orally or in writing. Butler, 85 F.3d at 1113. So we can’t justify a seizure by reference ‘to information in an officer’s investigative file or mind absent a record that he submitted the file to or explained his thought processes to the magistrate judge.’ Id. (quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). Accordingly, ‘we consider only (1) the information that was before the magistrate …, minus (2) any material misstatements that [Keeton] might have made, plus (3) any material information that she omitted.’ Id.” And here there was probable cause. Davis v. Distephano, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 8607 (11th Cir. Mar. 24, 2026).*

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D.S.D.: The fact a protective sweep came up empty doesn’t mean it wasn’t justified

“The court finds that the government has met its burden of demonstrating that the protective sweep exception to the warrant requirement applies. Before the protective sweep, officers received reports that someone matching Mr. Day’s physical description and alias was threatening another individual with a gun—that is an articulable fact supporting the officers’ reasonable belief that weapons were present inside the apartment. Officers also anticipated “holding” Mr. Day’s apartment for an extended period, making them vulnerable to a possible attack if someone were inside the apartment. Hearing Tr. at 63. Further, Mr. Day took over 90 seconds to answer his door, during which time another individual could have hidden within the apartment. Hearing Tr. at 62. Finally, the BOLO from four days prior alleged Mr. Day committed a robbery with a female accomplice, which also gave police reason to fear another person might be inside Mr. Day’s apartment.” It doesn’t matter that nobody was found inside. United States v. Day, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61746 (D.S.D. Feb. 23, 2026).*

The stop was for a tinted covering over the license plate that made it hard to read. The question is not unreadability. The stop was reasonable. State v. Arnold, 2026-Ohio-998 (4th Dist. Mar. 19, 2026).*

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NPR: Your data is everywhere. The government is buying it without a warrant

NPR: Your data is everywhere. The government is buying it without a warrant by Jude Joffe-Block:

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N.D.W.Va.: Bare allegations of a Franks violation without a significant offer of proof is conjecture

Bare allegations of a Franks violation without a significant offer of proof is conjecture. Kokinda v. Foster, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60028 (N.D.W. Va. Mar. 23, 2026).*

Exigent circumstances justified the seizure of defendant’s cell phone, not just plain view, and probable cause was shown for the warrant. This search was by consent, and it was on a consent form he signed and it’s on bodycam. United States v. Yener, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60641 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2026).*

The alleged lack of probable cause for petitioner’s arrest has nothing to do with the subsequent search warrant. United States v. Moss, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 8471 (10th Cir. Mar. 23, 2026).*

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E.D.Mo.: Ubiquity of cell phones here satisfied nexus without stating it

This is about a search warrant issued in an arson investigation and defendant’s claim of lack of nexus. The ubiquity of cell phones means that the officers did not even have to state that they knew defendant had one. United States v. Reed, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60744 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 27, 2026), adopted 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59531 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 20, 2026).*

Defendant’s girlfriend did a private search of a flash drive she found which had child pornography on it. She took it to the police. They looked for a few minutes just to verify, and then they got a warrant for it. This did not appreciable exceed the private search [if at all]. State v. Schullo, 2026 Wisc. App. LEXIS 317 (Mar. 24, 2026).*

The use of a wrist lock for pain compliance to remove a protestor from the Vermont Capitol was not clearly established as excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. Zorn v. Linton, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 1471 (Mar. 23, 2026)* (per curiam. 6-3), reversing Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19 (2d Cir. 2025).

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C.D.Cal.: Bivens not extended to ICE workplace arrest

Bivens will not be extended to an ICE workplace arrest, per Egbert. Hernandez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61367 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2026):

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D.N.M.: 4A question for appeal significant enough to require bail pending appeal

Defendant’s search and seizure question for appeal on the independent source doctrine is significant enough to grant him release pending appeal. United States v. Haack, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60440 (D.N.M. Mar. 20, 2026).

The state’s justifications for reasonable suspicion all fail: “We are persuaded that Mr. Davis’s conduct was largely innocent: Mr. Davis was located in a high-crime area because he lived there, the lack of shell casings and Mr. Davis’s nonsuspicious conduct should have dispelled any belief that he was responsible for the sound of gunfire, and Mr. Davis did not ‘blade,’ in fact, his body, but rather, cooperated with law enforcement questioning. We note, also, in passing, that, while the officers were apprehending Mr. Davis, additional shots (obviously fired by unknown individuals) were heard in the area. No shell casings were ever recovered from the area where Mr. Davis was standing.” The trial court should have suppressed. Reversed. Davis v. State, 2026 Md. App. LEXIS 306 (Mar. 20, 2026).*

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RI: Trial stipulation DNA on blanket was def’s obviates search claim

Defendant wasn’t prejudiced by defense counsel not moving to suppress DNA off a blanket found on a road when he’d stipulated to it being his DNA. [There’s also an obvious abandonment issue not even mentioned.] Tassone v. State, 2026 R.I. LEXIS 36 (Mar. 19, 2026).* (Defendant’s statement: “I stopped and threw the blanket and the shovel off the side of the road” where police found it. The shovel was used as a weapon with the victim on the blanket, and he apparently buried her still alive.)

“Morton’s counsel raised many of the same [suppression] arguments that Morton now contends he should have raised in the first place, and the circuit court rejected those arguments by denying the motion to suppress.” Then defendant pled guilty. No IAC. Morton v. Walters, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59554 (E.D. Va. Mar. 20, 2026).*

2254 petitioner’s search claim was litigated in state court and is barred by Stone; Harris v. Dotson, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59481 (W.D. Va. Mar. 19, 2026); and one exhaustively litigated is Smith v. Clement, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59510 (D. Idaho Mar. 19, 2026).

On nexus, the place searched was described as two miles from defendant’s house, and it was, in fact defendant’s property. United States v. Reed, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59531 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 20, 2026).*

Posted in Admissibility of evidence, DNA, Ineffective assistance, Issue preclusion, Nexus | Comments Off on RI: Trial stipulation DNA on blanket was def’s obviates search claim

D.N.D.: ALPR not a search

ALPR not a search. United States v. Lawrence, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56945 (D.N.D. Mar. 18, 2026).

Failure to show materiality for Franks requires the court to also consider the elements of the crime being investigated. United States v. Engler, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59277 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2026).

“The fact that handcuffs were initially used for officer safety purposes upon execution of the search warrant, does not determine custody status at the time of a later interview if the handcuffs have been removed.” United States v. Roncone, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59298 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2026).*

Posted in Automatic license plate readers, Burden of pleading, Custody, Franks doctrine | Comments Off on D.N.D.: ALPR not a search

D.Haw.: No constitutional right to an “adequate police investigation”

There is no constitutional right to an “adequate police investigation.” Hawkes v. Katayama, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59452 (D. Haw. Mar. 19, 2026):

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Cal.4: Ordering def out of house to arrest at gunpoint on RS unreasonable

Arresting defendant in his house but from outside with guns drawn and ordering him out on only reasonable suspicion was unreasonable. Where the arrestee is controls, not the officers. People v. Perez, 2026 Cal. App. LEXIS 176 (4th Dist. Mar. 20, 2026).

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss a state RICO indictment on five grounds, one of which was an invalid search. That’s not a valid ground to dismiss an indictment. People v. Nalty, 2026 Colo. App. LEXIS 356 (Mar. 12, 2026)* (unpublished).

Defendant only argues that the search was warrantless, but there was a warrant. He doesn’t argue lack of probable cause. United States v. Hill, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59509 (D. Neb. Mar. 19, 2026).*

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D.N.M.: Climbing over a locked gate to do a knock-and-talk violated curtilage, but QI applies

Climbing over a locked gate to do a knock-and-talk violated curtilage, but qualified immunity applies because the law isn’t clearly established. Dotson v. Acord, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57749 (D.N.M. Mar. 19, 2026).

Plaintiff runs a wildlife rehab place, and state officer sought a warrant for a whitetail deer fawn. Getting to the premises, they saw other things that concerned them, so they returned to the magistrate and amended the affidavit but apparently not the warrant. No matter: the affidavit was present with the warrant and they are read together. Shook v. S.C. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57811 (D.S.C. Jan. 29, 2026).

Defendant had the burden of showing a lack of a strategic basis for not challenging the search. People v. Mcennis, 2026 NY Slip Op 01635 (4th Dept. Mar. 20, 2026).*

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DE: Lack of binding authority for 5A cell phone thumbprint claim means it’s denied

Trial counsel didn’t challenge the use of defendant’s thumbprint to access his cell phone, acknowledging case law against it being testimonial. “It does not appear that either this Court or the United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue. Nor has Riley cited any authority for the proposition that obtaining a suspect’s fingerprint violates the Fifth Amendment. In the absence of binding authority supporting his claim, Riley has not established deficient performance or prejudice as to this claim.” The search was otherwise challenged below. Riley v. State, 2026 Del. LEXIS 120 (Mar. 19, 2026).

2255 petitioner’s claim only that the CI was fabricated isn’t enough for a Franks challenge. Whitlow v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59018 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 20, 2026).

There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in an IP address information. United States v. Smajlovic, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59147 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 20, 2026).*

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