CA10: RS didn’t dissipate during wait for drug dog

Reasonable suspicion here once developed didn’t dissipate before the 20-30 minute wait for the drug dog. United States v. Labs, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 5789 (10th Cir. Feb. 27, 2026).

By statute, “[t]he evidence admissible for meeting the State’s burden can be the same as that admissible in determining probable cause at a preliminary hearing or by a judge in issuing a search warrant.” State v. $12,039 United States Currency Seized from Kent, 2026 La. App. LEXIS 371 (La. App. 2 Cir Feb. 25, 2026).*

There was probable cause along with good faith on issuance of this warrant for seizure of animals from the complainant. In re Hirt, 2026-Ohio-681 (6th Dist. Feb. 27, 2026).*

The inventory of plaintiff’s car after a DUI arrest was reasonable. Ryles v. Cook, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41024 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 27, 2026).*

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W.D.Wash.: Habeas not remedy for immigration arrest without PC

Even if an immigration arrest lacked probable cause, habeas isn’t the remedy. Reyes v. Hermosilla, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41279 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 15, 2026)*:

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E.D.Cal.: Excessive damage in executing writ of possession can state claim

Excessive damage in executing a writ of possession can state a Fourth Amendment claim. Dayton v. Fairfield Mobile Home, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41228 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2026).

Vehicle finance company’s Fourth Amendment claim against the village’s retention of inoperable seized vehicles is dismissed in part. Unneeded property usually is returned to the owners. Santander Consumer USA, Inc. v. Vill. of Freeport, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41282 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2026).*

Painfully tight handcuffs isn’t shown by clearly established law to be excessive force where the plaintiff threatened the officer. Ennes v. Presque Isle Cty., 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 5954 (6th Cir. Feb. 27, 2026).*

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IL: Searching wallet in Terry frisk for weapons was unreasonable

Even assuming the frisk was for weapons, as the officer stated on the bodycam video, the search of defendant’s wallet exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk. People v. Molitor, 2026 IL App (2d) 240644, 2026 Ill. App. LEXIS 65 (Feb. 27, 2026).

2254 petitioner didn’t fairly present his Fourth Amendment claim to the state courts first, so he can’t raise it here. Flynn v. Wenzel, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40796 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2026).*

“The opportunity to raise Fourth Amendment claims, regardless of whether it is acted upon at the state level, is all that is required to preclude federal habeas review. … Even errors in adjudicating Fourth Amendment claims are not an exception to Stone’s bar. … Here, Petitioner had the opportunity to raise his Fourth Amendment challenges in state court, which precludes these claims.” Vandenabeelen v. Dir., Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just.-Corr. Insts. Div., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40836 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2026),* adopted, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38927 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2026).*

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D.Minn.: Preliminary injunction granted against immigration arrests under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a) because they violate 4A

Preliminary injunction granted against immigration arrests under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a) because they violate the Fourth Amendment. U.H.A. v. Bondi, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40545 (D. Minn. Feb. 27, 2026)*:

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TN: Three controlled buys in three days is PC

Three controlled buys three days in a row was probable cause for a warrant for defendant’s house. State v. White, 2026 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 95 (Feb. 27, 2026).*

“Here, a review of the affidavit demonstrates that it does contain specific factual averments, specifically that: (i) surveillance was initiated based on information of large-scale drug sales; (ii) agents saw the Defendant leave his residence and go directly to a meeting during which a hand-to-hand drug transaction occurred; (iii) the recipient of the hand-to-hand transaction admitted that she had purchased drugs from the Defendant; and (iv) approximately 21 grams of marijuana were recovered from the recipient’s vehicle. While additional facts establishing a definitive nexus between the Defendant’s residence and his drug distribution activities certainly would have bolstered the affidavit, courts should refrain from ‘second guess[ing] the magistrate who authorized the warrant’ when looking at the affidavit through the lens of the good-faith exception. … Rather, the question is simply ‘whether officers objectively could reasonably believe that there was’ such a nexus between the drug activity and residence.” And here the answer is yes. United States v. Robertson, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40354 (W.D. La. Feb. 26, 2026) (emphasis added).*

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D.N.M.: Suit over search in pending criminal case barred by Heck

Plaintiff’s first Fourth Amendment claim failed under Heck. He amended the complaint and still doesn’t overcome it. His claim of failure to train in serving search warrants is conclusory and doesn’t state a claim either. Flores v. Wood, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38505 (D.N.M. Feb. 25, 2026).*

Plaintiff’s complaint over his search and seizure is barred by Heck because he’s still in criminal court. Kumar v. Marino, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38991 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2026).*

Plaintiff tensed up to resist an arrest, and the officer used a takedown maneuver to gain control. He gets qualified immunity. Bigger v. Grubbs, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38204 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 20, 2026).*

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CA11: 4A doesn’t require “in the presence of the officer” for misdemeanor arrest

While Georgia law requires a misdemeanor offense be in the presence of the officer, the Fourth Amendment does not. The arrest was constitutionally valid. Middlebrooks v. Kasmar, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 5855 (11th Cir. Feb. 27, 2026).

There was information from corroborated informant tips justifying the search warrant, and it was not stale. United States v. Alward, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39894 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2026).*

The car was in a woman’s name, and she had one set of keys and her phone was locked inside. She had common authority to consent to its search. A cell phone was seized incident to arrest, and probable cause developed that it could have evidence of commercial sex trafficking on it. United States v. Parker, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38812 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2026).*

There was no GPS installed on claimant’s vehicle. It was just surveilled. United States v. 1. Assorted Marijuana Grow Equip., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40277 (D. Colo. Feb. 18, 2026).*

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NH: Trial court didn’t err in allowing officer to testify to what geolocation information meant here: def was in victim’s house

The victim found an intruder in his home, and called the police. The intruder got away. The police sought geolocation information from Google on all phones at the house, and defendant’s phone came up. The officer called defendant. This was not called a geofence warrant, and the issue on appeal was the officer’s ability to testify to what the geolocation information meant. State v. Crosby, 2026 N.H. LEXIS 28 (Feb. 25, 2026):

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TX14: No REP in electronic monitoring while on pretrial release

Defendant on electronic monitoring as a bond condition has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the GPS information. Hawkins v. State, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 1874 (Tex. App. – Houston (14th Dist.) Feb. 26, 2026) (substituted opinion on rehearing):

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E.D.Mich.: Typo in SW affidavit didn’t justify Franks hearing

A single error in a warrant affidavit that should be characterized as a typo and not a false statement doesn’t justify a Franks hearing. United States v. McClain, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39891 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2026).

Defendant had no standing nor privacy interest in packages of suspected drugs that didn’t have his name on them. United States v. Ruiz, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39457 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2026).*

Defendant’s breath test was based on probable cause and he consented to it, knowing that he’d get a summons if .08 or higher or jailed if he refused. State v. Davis, 2026 ME 16 (Feb. 24, 2026).*

Defendant didn’t have standing in this vehicle searched for a weapon involved in an alleged gang shooting. United States v. Burns, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39563 (D.N.J. Feb. 26, 2026).*

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IN: Inventory here was valid despite fact car was first impounded but then not towed after all

The inventory search of this car in anticipation of impoundment was overall reasonable, despite the fact that the car ultimately was not impounded. It might prove pretext, but it didn’t here. [This is fact heavy, and interesting reading.] Stokes v. State, 2026 Ind. App. LEXIS 66 (Feb. 25, 2026) (2-1):

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DC: “police had probable cause to believe that Mr. Turner’s bullet-riddled car might contain bullet fragments from the shooting”

“There can be little question that the police had probable cause to believe that Mr. Turner’s car contained evidence of a crime. Four cars parked along the street, including Mr. Turner’s Lexus, were struck by bullets in a drive-by shooting. At the very least, police had probable cause to believe that Mr. Turner’s bullet-riddled car might contain bullet fragments from the shooting. During oral argument, Mr. Turner’s counsel agreed that there likely was probable cause to believe that the car contained evidence of the shooting in the form of ‘ballistics evidence.’ This alone satisfies the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” Jennings v. United States, 2026 D.C. App. LEXIS 75 (Feb. 26, 2026).

A named-citizen complaint to 911 reported that two men leaving the county fairgrounds on dirtbikes were driving drunk. An officer stopped them. The tip was determined to be reliable enough. People v. Anderson, 2026 Mich. App. LEXIS 1661 (Feb. 25, 2026).*

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N.D.Iowa: When an officer has PC for a stop and search, the 4A doesn’t require that it happen at the earliest possible time

When an officer has probable cause for a stop and search, the Fourth Amendment doesn’t require that it happen at the earliest possible time. It doesn’t become “stale” that fast, and here it was ongoing: driving on a suspended DL. [And, it can be delayed to see what else happens.] United States v. Harbach, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38363 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 25, 2026).

Defendant’s trial objection to a second cell phone extraction was evidentiary foundation, not unreasonable search, so that’s waived for appeal. State v. Augustus, 2026 La. App. LEXIS 369 (La. App. 5 Cir Feb. 25, 2026).*

“Defendant finally argues that the State failed to prove specific intent. However, video footage of defendant’s statement demonstrated that it was at the moment Detective Gai asked defendant to unlock the phone so the search warrant could be performed that he threw it on the floor and destroyed it. These facts support a finding that defendant knew the cell phone was relevant to the investigation of his involvement with the homicide, and he intended to ‘distort the results’ by destroying the cell phone. Accordingly, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for obstruction of justice.” State v. Hudson, 2026 La. App. LEXIS 365 (La. App. 5 Cir Feb. 25, 2026).*

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WI: Google’s scans of user content for CSAM is a private search

It’s a private search when Google scans user consent for child sexual abuse material (CSAM) and then it reports to law enforcement what it finds. It is not required to search, only to report what it finds. [Note that the court noted this was on a “sparse” record with stipulated facts, not that it would have made a difference.] State v. Sharak, 2026 WI 4 (Feb. 24, 2026):

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E.D.Tenn.: Traffic stop with shots fired call led to valid protective sweep of car for weapon on RS

“After reviewing the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the relevant law, the undersigned finds that the officers had both probable cause to believe Defendant had committed traffic violations and reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle in connection with the ‘shots-fired’ report. The undersigned further finds that the officers properly conducted a protective search of Defendant’s vehicle, and would have inevitably discovered the firearm, bullets, and casing during an inventory search. The undersigned therefore recommends the District Judge DENY Defendant’s suppression motion [Doc. 76].” United States v. Reece, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38709 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 25, 2026).

“Rowe’s Fourth Amendment Motion to Suppress is denied in its entirety because Officers Church and Feltner had probable cause to initiate the traffic stop based on Rowe’s speed and tinted windows; detained Rowe incidental to the traffic stop and had probable cause to search his car due to the odor of marijuana; and therefore the evidence obtained from his car is not fruit of the poisonous tree.” United States v. Rowe, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38022 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 24, 2026).*

Defendant abandoned his satchel by throwing it over a fence when confronted by the police about its contents. Grant v. United States, 2026 D.C. App. LEXIS 69 (Feb. 26, 2026).*

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MN: No REP in text message in recipient’s device

The sender of an electronic message has no reasonable expectation of privacy in it where it ends up. State v. Bonnell, 2026 Minn. LEXIS 69 (Feb. 25, 2026):

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CA8: Duty to warn of use of police dog was clearly established

Officers sicced a police dog on plaintiff who was fleeing, but without warning. Use of a police dog usually requires a warning. “The warning requirement was clearly established by the time of Cameron’s arrest. As we stated in Adams, Kuha provided ‘fair notice’ that ‘the failure to give a warning and an opportunity to surrender violated clearly established law.’ 74 F.4th at 940. Defendants have failed to show that this case is an exception to that rule. Cameron has thus raised a genuine dispute of material fact whether Officer Meunsaveng violated a clearly established right by failing to warn before releasing Bero.” Also, leaving the dog on him until handcuffed was reasonable here. “Once officers completed handcuffing Cameron, Officer Meunsaveng removed Bero within roughly two seconds. ‘At most, one could argue that [Officer Meunsaveng] could have called the dog off a second or two sooner. But that kind of fine-sliced judgment call amid “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” circumstances just isn’t the stuff of a Fourth Amendment violation.’ See Ashford v. Raby, 951 F.3d 798, 804 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397). In total, Bero’s bite lasted roughly fifteen seconds. Given the totality of the circumstances, including ‘the short time frame at issue,’ Officer Meunsaveng acted reasonably in using Bero to hold Cameron until he was handcuffed. See Kuha, 365 F.3d at 601.” Cameron v. City of Des Moines, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 5692 (8th Cir. Feb. 26, 2026).

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CNS: Iowa accuses General Motors of not disclosing OnStar data sharing

CNS: Iowa accuses General Motors of not disclosing OnStar data sharing by Rox Laird (“General Motors failed to disclose to car buyers that driving data collected by the automaker’s OnStar program installed in its vehicles is sold to auto insurance companies and other third parties without consumers’ awareness or consent, Iowa claimed Thursday. OnStar is pitched by GM as improving driver safety by collecting a wide array of data, including speed, seatbelt usage, driving habits and location. What consumers are not clearly informed of, the Iowa attorney general claims, is that their vehicles were ‘secretly spying on them,’ and this data was sold to third-party data brokers who sold it to insurance companies that used the data to raise rates, deny coverage or cancel policies.”)

In short: All car computers are likely snitches.

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CNS: Judge finds IRS violated the law thousands of times by handing over taxpayer addresses to ICE

CNS: Judge finds IRS violated the law thousands of times by handing over taxpayer addresses to ICE by Ryan Knappenberger (“A federal judge on Thursday slammed the Internal Revenue Service for handing over confidential taxpayer information to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, saying it violated the law ‘approximately 42,695 times.’ In November, U.S. District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly halted the Trump administration’s effort to use identifiable information held by the IRS to further its mass deportation campaign, a decision now pending before the D.C. Circuit.”).

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