“On appeal, Birkley does not contest the district court’s reasons for dismissing the case, including its rationale that Birkley failed to state a claim because he conceded at his preliminary hearing that the police had probable cause for their actions. ‘Probable cause is an absolute bar to a claim of false arrest asserted under the Fourth Amendment and section 1983.’ … Because Birkley disputes neither his concession nor the court’s reliance on it to dismiss his suit, he has waived any argument, including one about judicial estoppel, …, opposing the court’s conclusion that his prior concession in state court defeats this case. … In his appellate brief, Birkley contends only that his arrest was invalid because the arrest warrant did not observe that he is a ‘Moorish National’ and it was not signed by an ‘Article III judge.’ These contentions are frivolous, see, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 1(b)(4); 4(a)-(b), and require no further comment.” Birkley v. Eade, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 374 (7th Cir. Jan. 8, 2025).*
“As to whether a clearly established constitutional right exists, the Court finds, and Defendants do not dispute, that Plaintiff enjoys a clearly established right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, and this includes the right to be from arrest without probable cause, and ‘the right to be free from searches [and seizures] predicated on an officer’s intentional or reckless submission of false statements in a warrant affidavit.’ … [¶] However, when considering whether Lawson violated such a constitutional right, the Court is left wondering what facts and evidence of record support Plaintiff’s claim, as he has failed to cite to the appropriate test for challenging qualified immunity based on a judicially signed arrest warrant, failed to cite to any evidence of record whatsoever, and failed to cite to any legal authority to support his position. Indeed, Plaintiff has failed to even allege any specific false statements or material omissions or other facts relevant to this Court’s analysis.” Helton v. Whitley Cty. Fiscal Court, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2327 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 7, 2025).*
A fire inspection of a warehouse that was being used as a residence was subject to the administrative warrant requirement. No exception applies. Hannan v. L.A. Cty. Fire Dep’t, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235999 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2024).
2254 petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim over his text messages was defaulted. He presented a different ground to the state court. Rumph v. Dixon, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235950 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2024),* adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1514 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2025).*
Petitioner’s 2255 seeks to relitigate his Fourth Amendment claim that was already lost in his 2255 and it’s treated as a successor petition and denied. Glover v. United States, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3072 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 7, 2025).*
There was at least some corroboration of the anonymous information, and that at least shows a substantial basis for crediting the probable cause for the police to rely on it. “[I]t [is] difficult to conclude that the warrant was so lacking in indicia of probable cause to render it facially deficient or reliance on it objectively unreasonable. Thus, the motion to suppress the evidence gathered as a result of the March 18, 2022 warrant is DENIED.” United States v. Bannick, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3047 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2025).*
There was probable cause for this child pornography warrant. Information about a Pinterest account that was five months old was not stale, and the images were adequately identified. United States v. Lynch, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2633 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 7, 2025).*
“Defendant fails to explain, and the Court fails to discern, any basis for a meritorious motion to suppress in this matter. Defendant, therefore, is not entitled to relief with respect to this assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Kennedy v. United States, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2556 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 7, 2025).*
CoA denied. “Beginning with Crawford’s claims concerning his counsels’ failure to investigate and move to suppress, reasonable jurists could not conclude that counsel performed deficiently or that Crawford was prejudiced. The affidavits and correspondence provided by Crawford’s attorneys refute his claim that they failed to thoroughly investigate the search warrant. Instead, they did so but concluded that a motion to suppress was unlikely to succeed and could lead to the withdrawal of the government’s plea offer and, in turn, a much longer sentence. [¶] And reasonable jurists would conclude that counsels’ decision not to pursue suppression was reasonable.” Crawford v. United States, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 319 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2025).*
The fact the search warrant paperwork wasn’t returned on time which made it void under state law isn’t relevant under the Fourth Amendment in federal court. Jackson v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235912 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 4, 2024), adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1654 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 6, 2025).
The issue here is whether defense counsel was ineffective for not raising an issue of the presence of an HBO film crew during the drug search. That was litigated in state post-conviction, and the claim failed on the merits. It can’t be relitigated here. Harmon v. Payne, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2371 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 7, 2025).*
Defendant agreed to forfeiture in his plea agreement, and he can’t get return of property now. United States v. Grabau, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2367 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 7, 2025).*
The defendant officer’s use of force to attempt to break up a fight was reasonable. Imbriano v. Murray, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2406 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2025).*
Officers were surveilling a van that they believed might have a connection to an unsolved homicide. They observed what appeared to be hand-to-hand drug transactions, and the van’s LPN was expired. They approached. There were others around the van, and plaintiff was handcuffed for safety. A drug dog was called for, and that took 45 minutes to arrive. The dog instinctively jumped in the open vehicle, but nothing was found. Defendant’s summary judgment is granted. If plaintiff suffered an emotional or other consequences from the dog sniff, he fails to show any damages. Aunhk Ra Aunhkhotep v. Kopfensteiner, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2625 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 7, 2025).
Plaintiff’s First and Fourth Amendment claims over being put in restricted housing unit in the state pen are dismissed. The Fourth Amendment doesn’t apply in a prison. Stansbury v. Harry, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2252 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2025).*
On the totality, defendant impliedly consented to the entry of the officers into his house by his nonverbal conduct. State v. Mitchell, 2025 Ida. App. LEXIS 1 (Jan. 7, 2025).*
Oregon’s conversational privacy statute (both sides have to know about recording) survives constitutional challenge because it is content neutral. Project Veritas v. Schmidt, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 281 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2025) (en banc).*
It’s not coercive to tell a suspect that the officer will get a search warrant if he doesn’t consent when there’s probable cause. State v. Gore, 2025 Wisc. App. LEXIS 7 (Jan. 7, 2025).
There was probable cause for defendant’s vehicle search under the automobile exception. United States v. Lopez, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235816 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 4, 2024),* adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1689 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 6, 2025).*
“The administration of the SFSTs in this case, while flawed, yielded sufficient clues of intoxication that, when combined with the officer’s other observations, established probable cause for Defendant’s arrest.” United States v. Villarreal, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2253 (W.D. La. Jan. 3, 2025).*
Despite plaintiff stopping his car, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established that firing at plaintiff after his vehicle collided and stopped, but still potentially posed a threat, violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Manery v. Lee, No. 24-1292, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 314 (7th Cir. Jan. 7, 2025).*
Posted inConsent, Probable cause, Qualified immunity|Comments Off on WI: Not coercive to tell def officer will get SW if he doesn’t consent when there is PC
Defendant abandoned his backpack when he ditched it in a motel stairwell when he was fleeing the police. United States v. Mayberry, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 300 (4th Cir. Jan. 7, 2025).
Leaving one’s backpack and a trashbag in the bushes was abandonment. United States v. Burnett, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 312 (7th Cir. Jan. 7, 2025).
Petitioner doesn’t get to see the name of the CI in the issuance of the search warrant. Aguasanta v. City of N.Y., 2025 NY Slip Op 00035 (1st Dept. Jan. 7, 2025).*
COA from denial of 2254 denied on petitioner’s Fourth Amendment ineffective assistance claim. He wouldn’t win on the merits. Carson v. Lumpkin, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 223 (5th Cir. Jan. 6, 2025).*
Defendant’s cell phone and its contents were still contraband and could not be returned, even if the phone was reset to its factory settings. United States v. Nestor, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 241 (3d Cir. Jan. 6, 2025).*
The fact a parole supervisor conducted the parole search and not a “parole officer” doesn’t make the parole search unreasonable. United States v. Barron, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 258 (10th Cir. Jan. 7, 2025).
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is more vague than the Complaint, and it seeks federal court intervention in a state criminal proceeding. Dismissed. Hood v. Truhlar, 15591, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1711 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2025).*
2255 denied: “Even if the search warrant incorporated the alleged misrepresentations and omissions that are not directly contradicted by the record, the search warrant would still be supported by probable cause.” United States v. Valentine, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235637 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 12, 2024),* adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 663 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2025).*
The cell phone search warrant here did not mandate return of the phone after the search. Due to staffing issues, the FBI didn’t get to finally search defendant’s phone for years, and it was searched years later. United States v. Banwari, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2132 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 6, 2025).*
“Following the logic of these cases, the fact that Defendant was apparently in technical violation of an apartment lease does not deprive him of standing to challenge the search in question. The evidence on the record indicates that Defendant was staying at the apartment with the express permission of his father. Furthermore, he was known to the management of the apartment building, and he regularly made rent and utility payments for the unit. There is no countervailing evidence that Defendant was ever ordered to leave the apartment or otherwise informed that he was not supposed to stay there, much less that he had been evicted from the apartment. Although the Government has demonstrated that Defendant was likely in technical violation of the lease agreement for his apartment, it is equally clear that he maintained his residence in the apartment with the express permission of his father, the lessee, and the implied authorization of the lessor. Accordingly, Defendant has standing to challenge the search that took place during the course of his arrest.” United States v. Osagbue, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1235 (D.P.R. Jan. 3, 2025).
Plethysmograph testing of a sex offender intrudes on privacy under the state constitution, but it is reasonable if for treatment only. Dominguez v. State, 2025 Wash. App. LEXIS 1 (Jan. 6, 2025)* (unpublished).
Defendant was a visitor at a house searched under a warrant, and the search of his vehicle outside was reasonable under the warrant and the automobile exception. United States v. Lopez, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1689 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 6, 2025).*
Posted inStanding|Comments Off on D.P.R.: Being in technical violation of a lease doesn’t deprive defendant of standing
Hidden bodycams used to record conversations in unmarked police cars between officers violated a reasonable expectation of privacy and likely Title III. Baker v. City of Pittsburgh, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2157 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2025).
The search of defendant’s vehicle was impliedly consented to. Defendant was stopped by federal wildlife officers on land next to a military training area. Whether the place where the search occurred was a military installation and he was subject to search by being found there doesn’t matter. United States v. Rodgers, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1449 (D. Alaska Jan. 6, 2025).*
Plaintiff’s § 1983 false arrest case was barred by his state indictment. Dye v. Casey B., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235539 (D.S.C. Dec. 3, 2024),* adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 943 (D.S.C. Jan. 3, 2025).*
There was probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest for violating an order of protection. Klein v. Daniels, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1701 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 2, 2025).*
Wired: License Plate Readers Are Leaking Real-Time Video Feeds and Vehicle Data (“This trove of real-time vehicle data, collected by one of Motorola’s [automated license-plate-recognition] systems, is meant to be accessible by law enforcement. However, a flaw discovered by a security researcher has exposed live video feeds and detailed records of passing vehicles, revealing the staggering scale of surveillance enabled by this widespread technology.”)
Defendant’s argument ALPR tracking of her vehicle connecting it and her to a Hobbs Act bar robbery in New Orleans is akin to CSLI is rejected. There aren’t that many cameras in the city, and the information produced was really limited compared to CSLI. United States v. Cooper, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1466 (E.D. La. Jan. 6, 2025):
Violation of CalECPA has nothing to do with federal rights. United States v. Wenger, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1331 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2025).
At the time of the warrant, it was not established that the accused had to have knowledge of his status as a felon in possession. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim would not succeed. Lemp v. Majkrzak, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1369 (D. Md. Jan. 6, 2025).*
There was sufficient evidence that the take down of plaintiff was by excessive force because he wasn’t resisting. Heredia v. Roscoe, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 193 (1st Cir. Jan. 6, 2025).*
The Nevada Supreme Court’s resolution of petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim on habeas was a reasonable application of the Fourth Amendment and habeas relief is precluded. There were two valid warrants. Camacho v. Breitenbach, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1421 (D. Nev. Jan. 6, 2025).*
When police knocked at defendant’s door, he yelled “police” and turned back inside the house, they feared to warn others or destroy evidence. “Here, based upon the totality of the circumstances, the record shows that the officer had a reasonable basis from specific and articulable facts to believe that the immediate entry into Petitioner’s home was necessary to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” Collins v. State, 2025 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 3 (Jan. 3, 2025).
Denial of defendant’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity was not appealable. Here, there were fact questions about plaintiff’s exoneration and when defendants knew he was the wrong guy. Fallen v. McEnroe, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 181 (3d Cir. Jan. 6, 2025).*
“Considering the totality of the circumstances—including the officers’ observation of two suspected hand-to-hand drug transactions, the nuances of the involved parties’ behaviors during these transactions, and the reputation of the area in which these transactions occurred as a high drug and crime area—the officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle in which Hale was a passenger were involved in illegal drug activity.” United States v. Hale, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 184 (4th Cir. Jan. 6, 2025).*
Hypothetical future Fourth Amendment injury from a state AG’s civil investigative demand doesn’t confer Art. III standing. Obria Grp., Inc. v. Ferguson, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1166 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2025).
“Here, a common-sense review of the warrant affidavit shows that the magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude that probable cause existed. While the magistrate could not credit the informant as past-proven reliable, some indicia of the informant’s reliability were present, and independent police work provided a sufficient basis for finding probable cause. Delaware’s decriminalization of marijuana does not require police or magistrates to afford suspects the benefit of the doubt. Finally, there was a sufficient nexus between Defendants’ suspected criminality and the Residence to support a warrant for that address.” State v. Taylor, 2025 Del. Super. LEXIS 4 (Jan. 2, 2025).*
Petitioner’s proposed successor habeas includes a Fourth Amendment claim which is barred. In re Hensley, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 155 (6th Cir. Jan. 3, 2025).*
Despite the state stipulating to standing, it’s a threshold issue and the court finds no standing here. Defendant was a passenger in a car and kept some stuff in it, but he still lacked standing to contest this search. State v. Kelley, 2025 ME 1, 2025 Me. LEXIS 1 (Jan. 2, 2025).
“Even if Powell did have standing to challenge the warrant, the good-faith exception would preclude suppression. In addition to alleging probable cause to believe that Powell committed Hobbs Act robbery, the affidavit alleged that Powell violated the felon-in-possession statute …” United States v. Powell, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1111 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2025).*
2254 petitioner’s request for access to state search warrant materials not already in record is based on speculation and denied. Benson v. Smith, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 952 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 3, 2025).*
Posted inGood faith exception, Standing|Comments Off on ME: Standing is a threshold issue, and court could examine it despite the state’s stipulation
Tech Policy Press, California’s Surveillance Systems Have Once Again Become a Major Liability by Nicole A. Ozer & Matt Cagle (“In recent decades, surveillance has increased exponentially across California. Politicians and business leaders promised that the proliferation of cameras, automated license plate readers, drones, biometric recognition technology, and other electronic surveillance would increase public safety. It has not. In fact, with President-elect Donald Trump about to reassume office, the very systems that officials promised would keep us safe have become a major liability.”).
USMJ recommends motion to suppress car search based on a dog alert should be granted because the handler prompted the dog and both the handler and dog entered the window and then the car before the dog alert. As to his house, there protective sweep was justified and there was probable cause. United States v. Brown, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1112 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 3, 2025):
“In sum, defendant is not entitled to credit against his sentence for time spent under home confinement as a condition of his bail release. Further, defendant’s time spent on home confinement did not constitute a seizure of his person under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Severino, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1108 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2025).
CoA denied. Defendant didn’t allege enough to show an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for anything, including his Fourth Amendment claim. “The police completed three controlled purchases of narcotics from Whittingham, which enabled them to obtain a search warrant. Upon executing the search warrant, police recovered suspected heroin, firearms, ammunition, narcotics paraphernalia, and nearly $25,000 in cash. With these facts and no realistic defense, ‘a reasonable defendant would not decide to throw a hail Mary’ at trial. Id. So, reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s rejection of this ineffective-assistance claim.” Whittingham v. United States, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 66 (6th Cir. Jan. 2, 2025).*
“[W]e believe that the totality of the circumstances illustrate that officers had probable cause to believe that appellant operated the vehicle while under the influence of narcotics and, thus, had probable cause for the blood draw and to arrest appellant.” State v. Linek, 2024-Ohio-6127 (4th Dist. Dec. 20, 2024).*
Plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his prison visit with his brother being recorded on body camera of a nearby correctional officer. Saunders v. Vilbrandt, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 989 (W.D. Va. Jan. 2, 2025).*
“To the extent Hernandez argues Sergeant Skalisky’s drawing of his weapon or keeping his finger on the trigger during the search amounted to a section 1983 violation (regardless of whether he fired the weapon), that argument fails. Hernandez cites no cases to show that this conduct violates clearly established law. It may not be best practice to have a weapon drawn in these circumstances, but even routine traffic stops can sometime escalate into violent confrontations. [¶] Because Hernandez fails to satisfy the clearly established prong, he falls short of overcoming Sergeant Skalisky’s qualified immunity defense.” Hernandez v. Norton, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 4 (10th Cir. Jan. 2, 2025).*
Plaintiff sued his mortgage company in federal court to stop a foreclosure in state court. He included a Fourth Amendment claim. [Aside from a foreclosure not being a Fourth Amendment seizure, which is undecided] the Rooker/Feldman doctrine bars the entire action. Pastrana v. Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235287 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2024).*
by John Wesley Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer and
Search and seizure law consultant
Little Rock, Arkansas
Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
