Vice: Police Are Tapping Into Ring Cameras to Expand Surveillance Network In Mississippi

Vice: Police Are Tapping Into Ring Cameras to Expand Surveillance Network In Mississippi by Edward Ongweso Jr (“The police department in Jackson, Mississippi is partnering with two companies to stream surveillance footage from Ring cameras in a 45-day pilot program.”)

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CA6: State officer assisting a federal search is the subject of assault under 18 U.S.C. § 1114

A state officer assisting federal officers in a search can be the subject of assault while executing a warrant under 18 U.S.C. § 1114. United States v. Scurry, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 35068 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2020).

Defendant officers appeal a denial of a motion to dismiss a § 1983 case on qualified immunity. Plaintiffs complained that the home was unreasonably destroyed in a 14 hour fruitless search for a relative. The district court, relying on plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint, denied qualified immunity. This is a dispute over which facts are credited at this point, and there is no jurisdiction for this appeal. Thomas v. Bauman, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 35095 (6th Cir. Nov. 3, 2020).*

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CA4: Baltimore’s aerial surveillance program doesn’t violate 4A

Baltimore PD’s Aerial Investigative Research program (AIR) does not violate the reasonable expectation of privacy of Baltimore residents, and denial of the preliminary injunction is affirmed on appeal. Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Dep’t, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 35070 (4th Cir. Nov. 5, 2020):

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New Yorker: How a C.I.A. Coverup Targeted a Whistle-blower [on “intelligence laundering”]

New Yorker: How a C.I.A. Coverup Targeted a Whistle-blower by Ronan Farrow (“When a Justice Department lawyer exposed the agency’s secret role in drug cases, leadership in the intelligence community retaliated.”):

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CA2: NY Family Court orders can suffice as SWs

“New York Family Court orders provide an independent basis for police officers to enter peoples’ homes. We have repeatedly recognized that, ‘[i]n child-abuse investigations, a Family Court order is equivalent to a search warrant for Fourth Amendment purposes.’ Southerland v. City of New York, 680 F.3d 127, 144 n.15 (2d Cir. 2012) …” Shaheed v. Kroski, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 34985 (2d Cir. Nov. 3, 2020).*

The suspicionless parole search of defendant’s place was reasonable. United States v. Frazier, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206440 (E.D. N.Y. Nov. 4, 2020).*

An asserted basis for the stop and search in the trial court that the vehicle defendants were in was stolen is not pursued on appeal by the state because there was no evidence at all the car was stolen. Another basis, reasonable suspicion that the occupants matched the description of robbers of a 7-11, is rejected on appeal as lacking a factual basis. State v. Nyema, 2020 N.J. Super. LEXIS 225 (Nov. 5, 2020).*

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W.D.Wash.: Single citation of 4A in state court didn’t exhaust state claim

For those attempting to understand habeas, and I’m not sure I’m one: A single citation to the Fourth Amendment in a state brief didn’t qualify as exhaustion of the claim for § 2254(d). Berniard v. Obenland, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205986 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 3, 2020)*:

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S.D.N.Y.: Householder had common authority over def’s room to at least enter

A pair of shoes in plain view in defendant’s room in somebody else’s house were validly seized. The householder had sufficient common authority to at least consent to enter the room. It was not defendant’s primary residence. The officer’s reliance on common authority over the property was reasonable. United States v. Gilmore, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205998 (S.D. N.Y. Nov. 2, 2020):

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W.D.Ky.: When there is PC and the automobile exception applies, the 4A doesn’t require a drug dog be used

The officer had probable cause on the totality for a vehicle search under the automobile exception. It wasn’t required that the drug dog that was there be used, too. United States v. Moralez, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206109 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 4, 2020).

A knock-and-talk in a child pornography investigation led to defendant’s consent entry and seizure of his cell phone. United States v. Mason, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206136 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 4, 2020).*

Defendant was stopped for abrupt lane change violations. The officer could smell burnt marijuana. “Mr. Pina told Trooper Rasala to ‘go ahead and search’ the truck-an unequivocal statement of consent. Mr. Pina’s denial that he made this statement isn’t credible. He and his codefendant effectively corroborated law enforcement’s testimony here, excepting only whether Mr. Pina committed a lane violation or consented to the search.” United States v. Pina, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206115 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 4, 2020).*

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AZ: CSLI order here in 2014 wasn’t a “warrant” but it complies with GFE

Also in a death penalty case, defendant’s CSLI was obtained by court order four years before Carpenter. The court finds that, while it wouldn’t treat the “order” as the functional equivalent of a search warrant [“reasonable grounds” wasn’t probable cause; and some would disagree; depends on state law apparently], the good faith exception applies. The state constitution also doesn’t require a higher standard because this isn’t a search of the home. In any event, the good faith exception applies. State v. Smith, 2020 Ariz. LEXIS 308 (Nov. 4, 2020).

Removing the challenged information from the affidavit still leaves probable cause. Therefore, the district court didn’t err in denying a Franks hearing. United States v. Kendrick, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 34865 (5th Cir. Nov. 3, 2020).*

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D.Neb.: PC for def’s vehicle leaving the scene of a shooting led to nexus to his house

“As explained, witnesses saw a dark colored vehicle speeding away from the scene of the May 27, 2020 shooting and at least two witnesses believe the vehicle was a Nissan. At the same time, police surveillance puts Defendant’s gray Nissan within blocks of alleged shooting. And private surveillance captured a vehicle resembling the Nissan travelling at a high rate of speed near the scene. Even without anything more, the warrant provided sufficient probable cause for the search of Defendant’s residence and the gray Nissan.” “Police and private surveillance, and the eyewitnesses accounts describing the car involved in the shooting, are sufficient to create probable cause that evidence of a crime would could reasonably be located in the Nissan and in the defendant’s residence-the location from which the vehicle originated prior to the shooting and to which it returned after the shooting.” Any omissions weren’t important to finding probable cause. United States v. Izaguirre, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205955 (D. Neb. Nov. 4, 2020).*

The affidavit for the search warrant here showed probable cause and nexus to defendant’s premises. United States v. Rutherford, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205739 (D. Mass. Nov. 4, 2020).*

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TX: SW for forensic evidence in def’s truck was particular enough

Defendant was convicted of capital murder in the death of a police officer. He and his vehicle were linked by probable cause to the shooting. The search warrant was sufficiently particular for his truck for forensic evidence of the shooting. Even if there wasn’t probable cause, the other evidence linking him to the shooting made it harmless. Gonzalez v. State, 2020 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 921 (Nov. 4, 2020):

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MA: SW for CSLI for too much time was severable

The search warrant for too many hours of CSLI was overbroad: “The collection of extended CSLI data raises significant constitutional concerns.” Three hours is all that could be shown was necessary. The overbroad part, however, could be severed, and suppression of the relevant parts was inappropriate because there was no prejudice to defendant from that. Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 2020 Mass. LEXIS 723 (Nov. 4, 2020):

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Jurist: Michigan voters approve warrant requirement for electronic data searches

Jurist: Michigan voters approve warrant requirement for electronic data searches by Daniel Klapper (“Michigan voters Tuesday approved an amendment to the state constitution that will require law enforcement to get a warrant for electronic data searches. The amendment prohibits searches and seizures of electronic data and electronic communications without a warrant, establishing clear guidelines for law enforcement.”)

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E.D.Pa.: Each factor of RS alone might not be enough but totality was

“While Mr. Muldrow rightly points out the tip, his evasive behavior, and the neighborhood each standing alone, would not create reasonable suspicion, all of these factors together with Sergeant Stephan’s observation Mr. Muldrow appeared to have a gun and hid something in a bush after seeing a patrol car sufficiently gives rise to reasonable suspicion and justify a Terry stop.” United States v. Muldrow, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204999 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2020).*

An apparent heavy object in defendant’s coat pocket was logically a firearm, and that was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Bankins, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 34817 (D.C.Cir. Nov. 3, 2020).*

Seizing plaintiff’s trailer for lack of a VIN after officers couldn’t find one was reasonable. Davis v. City of Alvarado, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 34740 (5th Cir. Nov. 3, 2020).*

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S.D.Ohio: Not IAC to fail to call co-arrestee at suppression hearing to testify to facts of search

It wasn’t ineffective assistance of counsel for defense counsel to decline to call Smith who was also arrested at the same time to corroborate his version of events of the search. Counsel believed that Smith wouldn’t withstand reasonable cross-examination because of self-incrimination. Moreover, Smith would have been contradicted by multiple police officers on those facts. Stoermer v. Warden, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204435 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 2, 2020):

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E.D.Tenn.: Leaving suitcase in an open grassy area is a loss of a REP in it

Defendant left his suitcase in an open grassy area, and that was a waiver any reasonable expectation of privacy in it. See United States v. Wilson, 984 F. Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. Ky. 2013) (leaving suitcase in a cemetery was a loss of any reasonable expectation of privacy). United States v. Smith, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204154 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 2, 2020).

“Defendant lacks standing to contest the parole officers’ search of the gun safe because he repeatedly denied ownership of it. …. Defendant cannot challenge the officers’ retrieval of a firearm and a black bag that he discarded just before his arrest because he had not yet been seized.” United States v. Crawford, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 34524 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 2020).*

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S.D.Tex.: Def’s fumbling with papers and not knowing owner of the car he was driving and where he was was RS

A flapping paper tag that couldn’t be easily seen was reasonable justification for defendant’s stop. The stop was continued with reasonable suspicion. United States v. Carrizales, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204252 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2020).* As to reasonable suspicion:

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CA6: GPS tracking warrant litigated in state court couldn’t be habeas issue

Defendant’s habeas claim that the application for the GPS tracking warrant was based on false information was barred by Stone v. Powell. Neil v. Forshey, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 34461 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 2020).*

Defendant’s successive habeas petition raises the same Fourth Amendment claim that has already been rejected, and this is too and must be dismissed. In re Hammond, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 34540 (11th Cir. Nov. 3, 2020).*

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WV: SW not needed to seize cell phone from a person, even when it’s expected to be found

The warrantless seizure of defendant’s cell phone was reasonable. The officers didn’t need to get a search warrant before taking it off his person. State v. Deem, 2020 W. Va. LEXIS 706 (Oct. 20, 2020).

The officer’s prior knowledge of suspect’s description and dress at the time of the crime made the incriminating nature of defendant’s sneakers immediately apparent. United States v. Thomas, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203456 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2020).*

Defendants were on three years community control after a conviction for animal abuse at a shelter. A suspicionless probation search of the shelter was permitted. State v. Brown, 2020-Ohio-5140, 2020 Ohio App. LEXIS 3981 (11th Dist. Nov. 2, 2020).*

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E.D.Pa.: When dwelling was found to be multi-unit, the search was limited to the proper one; ER should not be applied because the officer acted in complete good faith

Defendant failed to make a substantial preliminary showing for Franks purposes that the officer recklessly disregarded the fact there could be two residential units in the building he was seeking the search warrant for. He reviewed property records and Google maps and still didn’t see that it was a multi-unit dwelling. The exclusionary rule should not apply to his efforts. The warrant also did not violate particularity because warrant sought to search the entire dwelling. Once the officer realized there were two dwelling units, the search was limited to the proper one. Exclusion is inappropriate here, and the good faith exception also applies. United States v. Bernard, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203826 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2020):

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