CA5: Affidavit for SW here was thin, but not bare bones boilerplate; suppression reversed

Posted on April 4, 2026 by Hall

The affidavit for warrant here was thin, but not bare bones boilerplate. There was something to go on, and it’s enough for the good faith exception to apply. The district court erred in suppressing. United States v. Weaver, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 9614 (5th Cir. Apr. 2, 2026)*:

Continue reading →
Posted in Good faith exception | Comments Off on CA5: Affidavit for SW here was thin, but not bare bones boilerplate; suppression reversed

E.D.Pa.: Cell phone search suppressed for lack of nexus to alleged crime; everybody has a cell phone

Posted on April 3, 2026 by Hall

Cell phone search suppressed for lack of nexus. Merely having one isn’t enough. Everybody has one. United States v. Lacosta-Franco, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72244 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2026):

Continue reading →
Posted in Cell phones, Nexus | Comments Off on E.D.Pa.: Cell phone search suppressed for lack of nexus to alleged crime; everybody has a cell phone

OH8: Seeing gun magazine justified protective sweep of car for gun it could belong to

Posted on April 3, 2026 by Hall

Defendant was pulled over and officers could see the magazine to a gun. They asked if he had a gun in the car and he said “I don’t admit to that.” He said it was home. He was a known felon. It was reasonable to believe that the presence of the magazine indicated the presence of the gun, too. The protective sweep of the car was justified. State v. Franklin, 2026-Ohio-1189 (8th Dist. Apr. 8, 2026).

Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not pursuing a motion to suppress. Defendant only articulates one fact ignoring all the other evidence that it was all reasonable, and with a warrant. United States v. Jefferson, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71985 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 1, 2026).*

The force used to remove plaintiff from his car was justified. This started out as a traffic stop but escalated into obstruction of the officer. Barker v. City of Weatherford ex rel. Weatherford Police Dep’t, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 9562 (10th Cir. Apr. 2, 2026).*

Posted in Excessive force, Ineffective assistance, Protective sweep | Comments Off on OH8: Seeing gun magazine justified protective sweep of car for gun it could belong to

CA8: Password note near domestic partner’s computer was RS def on probation used that computer, too

Posted on April 3, 2026 by Hall

Passwords near a computer seen in a probation search around defendant’s domestic partner’s computer was reasonable suspicion defendant could have too. United States v. Berry, 24-2337 (8th Cir. April 3, 2026).*

Mandamus doesn’t lie to remedy petitioner’s constitutional claims. He has motions to suppress filed and handled, and he can appeal them. State ex rel. Alridge v. Sandusky Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 2026 Ohio App. LEXIS 1214 (6th Dist. Mar. 31, 2026).*

A prosecutor’s office can order a vehicle held onto as criminal evidence until they’re done with it without violating clearly established law. Rose v. Sapienza, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71775 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2026).*

Email in search warrant returns are admissible as statements of a party opponent via Fed. R. Evid. 802(d)(2)(D). United States v. Guanghua, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71871 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2026).*

Posted in Admissibility of evidence, Issue preclusion, Probation / Parole search, Rule 41(g) / Return of property | Comments Off on CA8: Password note near domestic partner’s computer was RS def on probation used that computer, too

E.D.Mo.: The city’s notice under a work order of a preservation program wasn’t a 4A seizure

Posted on April 3, 2026 by Hall

“In 2018, the City of St. Louis passed Ordinance 70794, which created the Preserve and Rehabilitate Program.” “Broadly speaking, the Complaint highlights—at a minimum—gross mismanagement under the Preserve and Rehabilitate Program. But when focusing specifically on the purported conduct of each named Defendant, there is not enough to state a claim. [¶] First, JAG4 fails to plead that its property was seized by Watson or anyone else. At no point does JAG4 assert that anyone took possession of its property or that Watson himself did anything to directly interfere with its property interests. Instead, JAG4 merely alleges that a notice was issued, it performed work on its own property, and the City never followed up even after the work was not completed.” Therefore, no Fourth Amendment seizure. Jag4, LLC v. City of St. Louis, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71862 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2026).*

The requirement that a person sign in before speaking at a local body’s meeting is not a violation of the First or Fourth Amendments. Sgaggio v. Carlos, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71704 (D. Colo. Feb. 23, 2026).*

The court sides with the officer that the window tint was illegally too dark as the basis for the stop. The report didn’t say “illegal tint.” United States v. Jackson, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71696 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2026).*

Posted in Administrative search, Reasonable suspicion, Seizure | Comments Off on E.D.Mo.: The city’s notice under a work order of a preservation program wasn’t a 4A seizure

CA8: Cell phone in hands of drug dealer is nexus

Posted on April 3, 2026 by Hall

Probable cause for a drug dealer’s cell phone is shown because it’s now commonly a “tool of the trade.” United States v. Jones, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 9643 (8th Cir. April 3, 2026):

Continue reading →
Posted in Cell phones, Nexus | Comments Off on CA8: Cell phone in hands of drug dealer is nexus

D.D.C.: Video surveillance of public housing hallways is like a pole camera with no REP

Posted on April 3, 2026 by Hall

Plaintiff sued a public housing project which has sophisticated video surveillance but only in common areas. The court holds that it doesn’t rise to the level of the mosaic theory and is more akin to a pole camera. Pondexter-Moore v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69893 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2026).

This commercial vehicle inspection resulted in reasonable suspicion the driver was impaired. State v. Welch, 2026 Iowa App. LEXIS 281 (Apr. 1, 2026).*

This search claim that the citizen informant was unpreserved in the trial court, but, what little there is in the record means the issue is going nowhere. Citizen informants are almost always presumptively reliable. State v. Allen, 2026 Iowa App. LEXIS 314 (Apr. 1, 2026).*

There’s no hard and fast rule that a person with a weapon needs to be warned before deadly force will be used. Rosete v. City of Homestead, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70901 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2026).*

Posted in Excessive force, Informant hearsay, Pole cameras, Reasonable expectation of privacy, Reasonable suspicion | Comments Off on D.D.C.: Video surveillance of public housing hallways is like a pole camera with no REP

D.D.C.: Walker stopped on street by three officers was without RS

Posted on April 3, 2026 by Hall

Defendant was stopped walking and surrounded by three officers shining flashlights in his face, and all without reasonable suspicion. Only then did they discover a telling bulge from a weapon. Suppressed. United States v. Wilson, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69861 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2026).

Seizure of an older Android phone was justified by the warrant. Searcy v. State, 2026 Ind. App. LEXIS 99 (Mar. 30, 2026).*

A controlled buy from defendant’s house within the previous three days was probable cause to believe more would be there. United States v. Mooneyham, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69109 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 2, 2026).*

No particular dog alert is required for the Fourth Amendment. It’s what the totality shows. United States v. Conchas-Mancilla, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 9312 (5th Cir. Mar. 31, 2026).*

Posted in Dog sniff, Probable cause, Reasonable suspicion, Scope of search | Comments Off on D.D.C.: Walker stopped on street by three officers was without RS

W.D.Wis.: Failure to cross a trial witness about a search claim isn’t IAC

Posted on April 3, 2026 by Hall

Failure to cross-examine a trial witness about a potential Fourth Amendment violation is not ineffective assistance of counsel because a jury trial is not the place to resolve a search claim. Kawleski v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70540 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2026).

Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not better challenging the searches of his car. Counsel raised all the issues that were apparent. Sharp v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68788 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2026).*

The trial court erred in finding the officer’s unrefuted testimony defendant crossed the centerline justifying the stop. It was raining and night and the video wasn’t clear on anything, thus inclusive. State v. Caughenbaugh, 2026-Ohio-1153 (5th Dist. Mar. 30, 2026).*

“Locked containers” on the premises includes a safe. United States v. Isa, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70216 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2026).*

Posted in Ineffective assistance, Reasonable suspicion, Scope of search | Comments Off on W.D.Wis.: Failure to cross a trial witness about a search claim isn’t IAC

S.D.Ind.: No IAC for not better arguing GFE

Posted on April 2, 2026 by Hall

Failure to better confront the good faith exception before conviction wasn’t ineffective assistance. Ramirez-Prado v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68941 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2026):

Continue reading →
Posted in Good faith exception, Ineffective assistance | Comments Off on S.D.Ind.: No IAC for not better arguing GFE

CA8: DMV records showing car’s insurance couldn’t be verified justified stop to inquire

Posted on April 2, 2026 by Hall

DMV records showing car’s insurance couldn’t be verified justified stop to inquire. United States v. Mitchell, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 9185 (8th Cir. Mar. 31, 2026).

The police department did not make a valid and enforceable request for text messages from an officer. Moreover, a request for consent that was rejected is not a Fourth Amendment violation. Fla. State Lodge FOP, Inc. v. City of Pembroke Pines, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68264 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2026).*

Defendant moved to suppress warrantless GSR swabbing. Missouri requires a trial objection, too, and there wasn’t one. No plain error review even. State v. Marshall, 2026 Mo. App. LEXIS 236 (Mar. 31, 2026).*

Defendant’s claim that the searching officer admitted mistakenly oversearching another house in another case wasn’t sufficient newly discovered evidence to revisit the suppress motion here. United States v. Howard, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67984 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2026).*

Posted in Reasonable suspicion, Waiver | Comments Off on CA8: DMV records showing car’s insurance couldn’t be verified justified stop to inquire

CA9: First cell phone warrant was issued day after seizure; second a year later wasn’t unreasonable

Posted on April 2, 2026 by Hall

The day after defendant’s cell phone was seized, the government obtained a search warrant for it, and the warrant had a 90-day execution provision. Defendant concedes probable cause. The fact it took a year before a second warrant for the search of the phone was not unreasonable. United States v. Barnes, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 9251 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 2026).

The search warrant and affidavit are unsealed except for defendant’s address and DOB. United States v. Legardye, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67679 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2026).*

2255 petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim was raised and denied originally, and his vague assertions of a Fourth Amendment violation don’t state a claim. Also, his change of plea statement contradicts his habeas petition. Denied. United States v. Garrett, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68517 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2026).*

Posted in Cell phones, Ineffective assistance, Reasonableness, Warrant papers | Comments Off on CA9: First cell phone warrant was issued day after seizure; second a year later wasn’t unreasonable

MS: By denying living at the place searched, def lacked standing to challenge its search

Posted on April 1, 2026 by Hall

By denying living at the place searched, defendant lacked standing to challenge its search. Armstrong v. State, 2026 Miss. App. LEXIS 151 (Mar. 31, 2026).

In addition, “Bailey’s non-compliance with the deputies’ commands and expressions of suicidal intent—with an alleged gun, from behind a closed door— supported a reasonable belief that there was a need for force.” Bailey v. Simmons, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66985 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2026).*

“Indeed, the absence of invasive conduct here is notable. A personal seizure usually comes with at least some interrogation, pat-down, express restraint, isolation, securing of the scene, seeking of consent, physical search, or charges, etc. Derosha’s database check and use of Tate’s full name did not approach this level of invasive conduct. And Derosha did not make escalated use of the police vehicle. A reasonable person, trying to tell whether he were free to walk away from an officer in a marked vehicle, would look for the emergency lights or spotlight, listen for the siren or public-address speaker, or see whether the officer exited the vehicle. See Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 575; Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628 (discussing Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489U.S. 593, 597 (1989)); ….” Tate v. Derosha, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67612 (W.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2026).*

Posted in Excessive force, Seizure, Standing | Comments Off on MS: By denying living at the place searched, def lacked standing to challenge its search

E.D.Tenn.: CI’s being incorrect about which drug was involved wasn’t material

Posted on March 31, 2026 by Hall

The CI’s being incorrect about which drug was involved isn’t really a Franks violation. United States v. Mooneyham, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67746 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 30, 2026).

Plaintiff reasonably believed that one of the officers was sitting on him during the forced taking of DNA, so that officer doesn’t get summary judgment. Wilkins v. Palomino, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66570 (D. Colo. Mar. 27, 2026).*

Plaintiff “has no generalized Fourth Amendment right to ‘feel safe in her own home,’ and the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches. Lloyd v. Pennsylvania, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 9082 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2026).*

On the second appeal in this case, enough material facts are in dispute to justify denying qualified immunity (which the court also calls “QI”). Baker v. Coborn, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 9064 (5th Cir. Mar. 27, 2026).*

Posted in Excessive force, Franks doctrine, Informant hearsay, Qualified immunity, Search | Comments Off on E.D.Tenn.: CI’s being incorrect about which drug was involved wasn’t material

OH9: Arrest warrant for a co-occupant of the house permitted entry under Payton

Posted on March 31, 2026 by Hall

Officers had an arrest warrant for a co-occupant of the house, and that permitted their entry under Payton. State v. Cecil, 2026-Ohio-1100 (9th Dist. Mar. 30, 2026).

The record on who actually consented or had apparent authority is incomplete, and that denies relief. State v. Lirette, 2026 La. App. LEXIS 565 ( La. App. 5 Cir Mar. 27, 2026).*

An interlocutory appeal of denial of a suppression order is denied. “Neither the trial court nor the Defendant highlights any inconsistent orders or opinions on the issue, however. Again, appellate review of the trial court’s ruling can occur upon entry of final judgment, if necessary. This Court has repeatedly held that Rule 9 is not an appropriate vehicle for obtaining an advisory opinion on an issue which would otherwise be available for review later on direct appeal.” State v. Abernathy, 2026 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 166 (Mar. 30, 2026).* Similar is State v. Faulkner, 2026 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 165 (Mar. 30, 2026).*

Posted in Arrest or entry on arrest, Burden of proof, Issue preclusion | Comments Off on OH9: Arrest warrant for a co-occupant of the house permitted entry under Payton

CA7: A temporary “want” not based on PC or a judicial determination wasn’t a basis for entry

Posted on March 31, 2026 by Hall

The city here uses a “temporary” want, not based on probable cause, to enter plaintiff’s home. Plaintiff stated a claim for failure to train that a warrant is required, not something based on the officer’s action. Milbeck v. George, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 9090 (7th Cir. Mar. 30, 2026).

Radar confirmed defendant was speeding, and lack of video evidence doesn’t warrant suppression. United States v. Perez-Mejia, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65927 (D. Minn. Feb. 9, 2026).*

CoA denied. One issue is a Franks claim, but the petition wasn’t timely. Castle v. United States, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 9028 (6th Cir. Mar. 27, 2026).*

2255 petitioner’s claim his cell phone was searched without a warrant fails. The first mention of that was in the government’s brief on direct appeal saying the phone was searched with a warrant. Reynoso v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66211 (D.N.M. Mar. 26, 2026).*

Posted in Arrest or entry on arrest, Franks doctrine, Reasonable suspicion | Comments Off on CA7: A temporary “want” not based on PC or a judicial determination wasn’t a basis for entry

IA: Backpack carried into premises by visitor just before SW executed was within scope of warrant

Posted on March 30, 2026 by Hall

Police were watching a Des Moines house waiting to execute a search warrant. Defendant showed up and entered the house with a backpack. Then they entered on the warrant. The backpack was within the particular description in the warrant. When the police entered, the backpack was in a corner of the room on the floor. Ybarra dealt with the search of a person on the premises, but this was a container on the premises within the scope of the warrant. If it were on him, the result likely would have been different. (Incidentally, defendant disclaimed ownership of the backpack. Abandonment is discussed but not relied upon.) State v. Porter, 2026 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 37 (Mar. 27, 2026):

Continue reading →
Posted in Particularity, Scope of search | Comments Off on IA: Backpack carried into premises by visitor just before SW executed was within scope of warrant

AL: No RS for pulling up behind legally parked car with blue lights on to inquire; smell of MJ suppressed

Posted on March 29, 2026 by Hall

There was no reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop in a residential neighborhood when he was lawfully parked and doing nothing wrong. The officer pulled behind him with emergency lights on. That’s not always a seizure, but here it was. When the car door was opened, the officer smelled marijuana. D.D.B. v. State, 2026 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 11 (Mar. 27, 2026).

The affidavit for warrant fairly showed probable cause for a search warrant for money laundering. The warrant affidavit was based on the criminal complaint. The good faith exception would apply in any event. United States v. Patel, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65657 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2026).*

Plaintiff’s speeding in a construction zone was probable cause for his stop. Nichols v. Martinez, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65849 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2026).*

Petitioner’s 2254 Franks claim by a motion to reconsider is denied. That’s not the vehicle. Besides, he points only to the trial court’s holding in an unpublished state appeal that is procedurally different and just inapplicable. [Stone not mentioned.] McCray v. Truitt, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65855 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2026).*

Posted in Good faith exception, Plain view, feel, smell, Probable cause | Comments Off on AL: No RS for pulling up behind legally parked car with blue lights on to inquire; smell of MJ suppressed

E.D.Pa.: “computer(s), smart device(s), cellular phone(s), gaming console hardware(s), software, digital storage media, and their associated peripherals” is particular

Posted on March 29, 2026 by Hall

In a child pornography case, “computer(s), smart device(s), cellular phone(s), gaming console hardware(s), software, digital storage media, and their associated peripherals” is particular enough. United States v. Margerum, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65406 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2026):

Continue reading →
Posted in Computer and cloud searches, Particularity | Comments Off on E.D.Pa.: “computer(s), smart device(s), cellular phone(s), gaming console hardware(s), software, digital storage media, and their associated peripherals” is particular

PA: Having a gun in your car is not RS, but lying about not having one is when the officer sees it

Posted on March 29, 2026 by Hall

Even a collection of innocent facts can be reasonable suspicion on the totality. Here, defendant’s lie about being armed in his car was reasonable suspicion. If the only issue was possession of a firearm, precedent says that’s not reasonable suspicion. But, lying about not having a gun, and then getting out of the car with one sticking out of your pocket is reasonable suspicion. Commonwealth v. Toliver, 2026 PA Super 63 (Mar. 26, 2026):

Continue reading →
Posted in Reasonable suspicion | Comments Off on PA: Having a gun in your car is not RS, but lying about not having one is when the officer sees it