S.D.Ind.: No IAC for not better arguing GFE

Failure to better confront the good faith exception before conviction wasn’t ineffective assistance. Ramirez-Prado v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68941 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2026):

Ramirez asserts that Champion rendered ineffective assistance by failing to confront the good faith exception in his motion to suppress. For at least three reasons, this argument fails.

First, although Champion did not address the good faith exception in his motion to suppress, co-defendant Rafael Rojas-Reyes addressed the issue in his reply (See Crim. Dkt. 597). The Court denied Ramirez’s motion to suppress on the same grounds it used to deny his codefendants’ motion (Crim. Dkt. 616 at 1 (“For the reasons stated in the Court’s Order (Filing No. 612) denying Defendant Rafael Rojas-Reyes’ motion to suppress, the Court DENIES Defendant John Ramirez[]’s Motion to Suppress (Filing No. 594) based on the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.”)). There is no reason to believe Ramirez would have fared better if Champion also argued against the good-faith exception.

Second, Ramirez’s ineffective assistance claim relies on a legal argument that the Seventh Circuit has expressly dismissed, including on the direct appeal of this case. The Court cannot find that counsel performed deficiently by declining to raise an argument that the Seventh Circuit has since foreclosed.

Third, the “law of the case” doctrine forbids “a prisoner to relitigate in a collateral proceeding an issue that was decided on his direct appeal.” White v. United States, 371 F.3d 900, 902 (7th Cir. 2004). Ramirez and his co-defendants litigated the Fourth Amendment issue—including the good-faith exception—on direct appeal. The Seventh Circuit deemed their challenge unmeritorious. He has not identified a more recent change in the law that would allow this Court to upset that decision. Ramirez’s Fourth Amendment challenge is therefore denied.