Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not challenging a will defendant wrote saying he’d kill his wife then himself found on his person at the time of arrest. At least inevitable discovery applied because it would have been found in booking inventory. MacKenzie v. Morrison, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 3699 (6th Cir. Feb. 18, 2025).*
Nexus was shown to defendant’s cell phone because the CI said that it was used to communicate with co-conspirators. United States v. Kelly, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28189 (D. Conn. Feb. 18, 2025).*
“Probable cause ‘is not a high bar,’ see Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 350, 338 (2014), and it has been met here. This is all the Constitution requires. The black Jaguar was tied to drug trafficking, and as far as the agents knew at the time of his arrest, Derrick Baldwin (and not Jarman Hargrove) owned it. Defense counsel’s suggestion notwithstanding, agents had sufficient probable cause to detain Mr. Baldwin, even if they didn’t witness him engage in suspicious hand-to-hand transactions at various gas stations or find his fingerprints on items recovered from the trash pull.” United States v. Baldwin, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28382 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 18, 2025).*
Defendant was stopped for overtinted windows and his furtive movements in and out of the car gave reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. State v. Reuschling, 2025-Ohio-516 (11th Dist. Feb. 18, 2025).
The statute excluding evidence unlawfully seized also is intended to restore noncontraband property. The state could appeal the latter, too. Here, it was Delta-8 THC gummies. State v. Islam, 2025 Ga. LEXIS 31 (Feb. 18, 2025).
There was reasonable suspicion to extend this traffic stop. Reece v. State, 2025 Ga. App. LEXIS 57 (Feb. 18, 2025).*
Cause was shown for an administrative search warrant for rental property safety issue. “[I]t is well settled that a municipality may obtain a warrant for administrative inspections of properties, and probable cause may be based upon a showing that reasonable legislative standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied. Said standards were satisfied in this case.” Dep’t of Dev. Servs. for the City of N. Canton Ohio v. CF Homes LLC, 2025-Ohio-522 (5th Dist. Feb. 18, 2025).*
The towing of defendant’s car left on the interstate without a valid LPN was reasonable. The officers didn’t have to permit him to find his own sources. The inventory was not proved to be pretextual. “But the departures from procedure on which Stamps relies fail to prove that the inventory search here was pretextual. True, Klepacz started his inventory search without actually writing anything down, searching the passenger compartment and the trunk for about ten minutes before Officer Cheatham appeared with the PD50-6 form. But Klepacz stated aloud the items that he found—information that was contemporaneously recorded by his body camera. And when Officer Cheatham returned with the form, he wrote down the information as Klepacz dictated it to him.” Stamps v. Commonwealth, 2025 Va. App. LEXIS 97 (Feb. 18, 2025).
The affidavit for warrant was not so devoid of facts that there wasn’t probable cause or that the good faith exception should apply. “The court disagrees with Mulamba’s argument that this suspicious behavior does not factor into the probable cause determination.” United States v. Milton, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27782 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 23, 2025).*
There was reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop, so defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not challenging it. State v. Burson, 2025-Ohio-499 (12th Dist. Feb. 18, 2025).*
Reason: Hawaii Can Auction Off Your Car Without Ever Convicting You by Dan Alban and Elyse Smith Pohl (“Civil forfeiture allows the government of Hawaii to take your property and sell it for profit without proving you did anything wrong.”)
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“The reason for Mr. Fallon’s assertion that this provision of the search warrant was false is that the reference to the “Fusion Center” obscured the fact that it was using facial recognition software from Clearview AI to identify Tolbert and provide the key information substantiating the search of his residence.”
Posted inFranks doctrine|Comments Off on legalai.com: Evidence Excluded In Murder Case for Failure to Disclose AI Use [from apparent Franks violation]
The Fourth Amendment doesn’t require that the search warrant be shown before execution. United States v. Tarr, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26832 (D. Me. Feb. 14, 2025).*
During execution of a search warrant for a business, defendant wasn’t in custody when questioned. United States v. Fachetti, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26899 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2025).*
In an employment arbitration, the arbitrator has no jurisdiction to decide Fourth Amendment claims. Asato v. Haw. Gov’t Emps. Ass’n & Dep’t of Educ. (In re Asato), 2025 Haw. App. LEXIS 70 (Feb. 14, 2025)* (unpublished).
Posted inCustody, Warrant execution|Comments Off on D.Me.: 4A doesn’t require that the search warrant be shown before execution
The Fourth Amendment does not require the recording of telephonic oaths. United States v. Larkins, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 3513 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2025).
The officer’s conduct was not reckless or deliberate to avoid the good faith exception. United States v. Milton, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27265 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 14, 2025).*
“Regarding the alleged failure to investigate and challenge evidentiary claims, Mr. Monsen asserts that the government violated his Fourth Amendment rights, his counsel should therefore have filed a motion to suppress, that such motion would have been successful, and the government would then have no basis to bring charges to which Mr. Monsen could plead guilty. However, Mr. Monsen fails to provide sufficient details as to the alleged Fourth Amendment violation to allow the Court to assess the legitimacy of this claim. Without such details, Mr. Monsen has failed to clearly demonstrate that but for his counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty.” United States v. Monsen, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27454 (D. Utah Feb. 14, 2025).*
An officer outside his territorial jurisdiction making an arrest does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Virginia v. Moore. “As previously stated, Appellant does not challenge that Morgan had probable cause to stop him, or that the search of his vehicle was defective. The record demonstrates the traffic stop and search comported with the tenets of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress.” Thompson v. State, 2025 OK CR 4, 2025 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 4 (Feb. 13, 2025).
“Unfortunately for Mr. Tarr, his aversions regarding an ‘illegal search’ in his case fail to meet this standard for ‘clear error.’ First, the Government correctly points out that Mr. Tarr provides only the most skeletal of allegations regarding the basis of the alleged illegality. He does not state at which search, the first or the second, the police purportedly failed to show him a warrant, does not claim relevant material (or any material at all) was seized from the shed during the allegedly illegal search, and does not aver the shed was outside either warrant’s scope. He also failed to provide any legal authority in support of his proposition that, in Maine, state police officers must exhibit a search warrant prior to undertaking the authorized search.” [And that wouldn’t matter under Moore anyway.] United States v. Tarr, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26832 (D. Me. Feb. 14, 2025).*
The government says it doesn’t intend to use challenged evidence, so the motion to suppress is moot. If the government changes its mind, defendant can reassert it. United States v. Combs, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25641 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2025).*
Defendants pled in state court, and those cases became part of a larger RICO case in federal court. Their guilty pleas were waivers in state court but did not have preclusive effect on raising a Fourth Amendment claim in the RICO case. United States v. Williams, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25915 (E.D. La. Feb. 13, 2025).*
There’s no specific amount of time to elapse for a stop to be unreasonable under Rodriguez. All things considered, this was reasonable for six minutes. Other cases in this circuit have upheld them at 14 minutes. United States v. Devalois, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 3556 (7th Cir. Feb. 14, 2025):
The fact the officer can’t tell the difference between hemp and marijuana doesn’t mean there wasn’t probable cause by plain smell. The stop was justified by the community caretaking function because he was asleep at an intersection. State v. Jones, 2025 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 86 (Feb. 14, 2025).
The search warrant for this property was based on information that was believed to be true, but turned out not to be, as in plaintiff was out of the place four days before the search. Qualified immunity not even discussed. “Accepting as true Thomas, Sr.’s, meager factual allegations, he fails to state a claim for false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution. Because the Court already permitted Thomas, Sr., an opportunity to amend his false arrest and false imprisonment claims, and he neglects to cure their deficiencies, the false arrest and false imprisonment claims are dismissed with prejudice.” Thomas v. Hyler, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26710 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2025).*
“In the circumstances presented, Defendants’ conduct—briefly pointing guns at Houck while he was arrested pursuant to a federal warrant—was objectively reasonable and so did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Because Houck’s Section 1983 claim is thus implausible, I will dismiss it.” In addition, qualified immunity applies. Houck v. United States, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26742 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2025).*
“As to the pole cameras, we hold that their use did not violate Williamson’s Fourth Amendment rights. The pole cameras surveilled areas exposed to the public, and the fact that they recorded non-stop is of little relevance—the Constitution does not forbid the government from using technology to conduct lawful investigations more efficiently.” United States v. Gregory, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 3431 (11th Cir. Feb. 13, 2025).* (This issue was overruled without even citing a case.)
“Here, in considering Canales’s motion to suppress, the trial court only addressed the consent Canales gave at the time he was read the implied consent notice. The trial court does not mention, address, or analyze the circumstances surrounding Canales’s blood draw and whether he gave actual consent to the blood draw after suffering the panic attack and receiving medical care. Accordingly, we remand this case for the trial court to address whether Canales gave actual consent to the procuring and testing of his blood, which requires a determination of the voluntariness of the consent under the totality of the circumstances including the circumstances surrounding Canales’s blood draw.” Canales v. State, 2025 Ga. App. LEXIS 55 (Feb. 14, 2025).*
Petitioner’s name was in the search warrant but the property searched wasn’t his and he never stayed there, so he lacked standing. Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not challenging the search. Carpenter v. State, 2025 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 90 (Feb. 14, 2025).*
This cell phone search warrant was not particular and without probable cause as to “app data,” but it was as to text messages. “If this unlawful provision was the only provision of the warrant that authorized a search for Facebook Messenger messages, we would agree with Macasaet’s argument. But the search for these messages was also authorized by the provision of the warrants that allowed police to search for ‘text messages.’ Macasaet’s argument that his Facebook Messenger messages should have been suppressed is based in part on his view that the challenged messages were not ‘text messages.’ But in this case, the superior court found that the affidavit established probable cause to search applications containing text messages and that, because Facebook has messaging capabilities, the probable cause extended to such messages.” Defense counsel conceded during the suppression hearing that the warrant’s provisions were severable, and part might be suppressible and some not. MacAsaet v. State, 2025 Alas. App. LEXIS 13 (Feb. 14, 2025). (In addition, the court finds a Miranda violation too, but it’s harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.)
Plaintiff’s complaint about an arrest without probable cause was really just picking around the edges, and it did not undermine that there was, in fact, probable cause for the arrest. “We can assume arguendo—although not decide—that the additional omissions and errors raised in the response to the motion to dismiss should have been considered by the district court. We hold that the affidavit—when the omissions are added and when the mistakes are corrected—still establishes arguable probable cause. All of the mistakes and omissions identified by Kemp—both those alleged in the complaint and those belatedly asserted in Kemp’s response to Pogorzelski’s motion to dismiss—do not undermine the more powerful evidence identified by Pogorzelski that implicated Kemp. We find very persuasive the evidence of the timing of Kemp and the victim’s interactions and Kemp’s negative response upon learning that the victim was a transgender woman. Kemp was the last known person to be with the victim and he was upset to learn that she was transgender.” Kemp v. Pogorzelski, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 3411 (11th Cir. Feb. 13, 2025).*
“But clearing the low bar of reasonable suspicion requires little more. Police need not ‘carry around and use burdensome equipment to measure light transmittance.” United States v. Wallace, 213 F.3d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting People v. Niebauer, 263 Cal. Rptr. 287, 295 (Ct. App. 1989)). The record must simply demonstrate a particularized and objective basis for believing that the degree of window tinting violates the law.” United States v. Salas, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26515 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2025).*
The fact the officer allegedly falsified the affidavit for search warrant doesn’t impose liability on the city because plaintiff doesn’t show there’s a pattern or practice of the city. Austin v. Mosley, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 3286 (6th Cir. Feb. 10, 2025).*
Officers came to take possession of a vehicle on a writ, and they didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment doing so. Also, plaintiff voluntarily gave it up. Cranfill v. SC Home Builders Self Insurers Fund, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25614 (D.S.C. Jan. 24, 2025),* adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23373 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 2025).*
Posted in§ 1983 / Bivens, Consent, Reasonable suspicion|Comments Off on S.D.Cal.: Officer doesn’t need a window tint meter in hand to justify a stop for overtinted windows
The Second Circuit upheld the search in this case and threw in an alternative ground, the good faith exception. On habeas, that did not violate the “party presentation” rule where the parties decide the issues to litigate, not the court. United States v. Elder, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26410 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2025):
Posted inStandards of review, Uncategorized|Comments Off on W.D.N.Y.: CA2’s deciding search issue in direct appeal with GFE, too, did not violate “party presentation” rule
Plaintiff was arrested for a double murder on probable cause. The officers continued investigating [as they should] and exculpated him, and he was released after 65 days in jail with charges dropped. He sued the officers for the arrest, but they had probable cause at the time, also considering the “practicalities of the moment.” They also get qualified immunity. Jackson v. Carin, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 3410 (4th Cir. Feb. 13, 2025):
In 1977, 48 years ago, SCOTUS held in Pennsylvania v. Mimms that officers could order a motorist out of the car during a traffic stop, and that’s not unreasonable today. [We’re still seeing challenges to that for extending a stop unreasonably under Rodriguez, and none of them succeed on that ground alone, obviously, because delay than that is required. I’ve been ignoring them, but for this one.] United States v. Risper, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26004 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2025).*
The motion to suppress here challenged the government’s photographing notes on a cell phone during a search. The government says it won’t be using that at trial, so the motion is moot. United States v. Combs, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25641 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2025).*
Petitioner had his full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim and lost on the merits. It’s barred on habeas by Stone. Root v. Howard, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 3128 (6th Cir. Feb. 10, 2025).*
Officers shooting a barking dog during a DV entry was covered by qualified immunity. Owen v. Prator, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24901 (W.D. La. Feb. 11, 2025).*
The R&R recommended suppression of the geofence warrant. It is adopted. The warrant caused a wholesale search and was based on what appears to be a slipshod effort. Even the good faith exception didn’t apply. United States v. Fuentes, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25900 (E.D. Okla. Feb. 13, 2025), adopting 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 239693 (E.D. Okla. Sep. 3, 2024). From the R&R:
No trespassing sign at plaintiff’s driveway didn’t make the animal control officer’s entry onto the driveway a Fourth Amendment violation. Also, “[t]he argument that a land patent exempts Shaw’s property from the law is frivolous.” Shaw v. Hall, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 3417 (7th Cir. Feb. 13, 2025):
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
