“Claybron argues that the omission of the confidential informant’s background information weighed so heavily on her credibility that, had it been considered, the warrant would not have issued. ‘We review the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error and we give deference to the inferences drawn from those facts by law enforcement officers, the court that issued the search warrants, and the trial court.’ United States v. Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765, 773 (8th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). In order to succeed on this claim, Claybron must demonstrate: 1) either that the exclusion of the background information was intended to mislead the issuing court or that the information was omitted with reckless disregard for the affidavit’s veracity and also 2) that if the information had been included, the court would not have found probable cause. Id. at 774. Claybron has failed to establish either of these two elements. The omission of this information is not “so suspect that it necessarily vitiates probable cause,” see United States v. Ketzeback, 358 F.3d 987, 991 (8th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted), and indeed was reasonable to protect the identity of the confidential informant. In any event, Claybron can show no prejudice, as independent facts corroborated the information provided by the confidential informant. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s rulings concerning the search warrants.” In addition, the stop of his vehicle was not unreasonably prolonged. United States v. Claybron, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 23272 (8th Cir. Nov. 20, 2017).