“Enacted as part of California’s legalization of marijuana, Health and Safety Code section 11362.3, subdivision (a)(4) makes it an infraction to have an ‘open container’ of marijuana in a vehicle. The question before us is whether a small amount of loose marijuana scattered on the rear floor of a car violates that provision. We hold it does not. We further hold that the officers here lacked probable cause to conduct a search of the vehicle.” Sellers v. Superior Court, 2026 Cal. LEXIS 269 (Jan. 29, 2026).
This is one of dozens of pretrial detainee cases filed from a county jail alleging various things, one of which was that the judge issuing arrest warrants was not neutral and detached. Dismissed for absolute immunity. Argueta v. Noone, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 272668 (D.S.C. Dec. 30, 2025).*
Defendant was stopped in his own driveway after failing to signal. The officer looked in the windows for others, and he smelled marijuana, saw a little bit, and noticed the door panel had been removed and replaced. He asked defendant, and defendant admitted having a little on him. Now with probable cause, the officer searched the car, finding a gun in the door panel, and defendant was a convicted felon. The search was valid. United States v. Davalos, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 2615 (5th Cir. Jan. 29, 2026).*
Defendant was in a stolen car, so no standing at all under Byrd. (The convoluted issue of search incident after Gant with Fourth Circuit authority never revisited is avoided for now.) United States v. Tyson, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15809 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 28, 2026).
Protective sweep justified the brief warrantless entry into the house. Then the warrant was obtained. United States v. Kent, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16593 (W.D. La. Jan. 5, 2026).*
“Thus, by the time of Matusak’s arrest on February 1, 2018, it was clearly established that officers may not use significant force against arrestees who are compliant or non-resistant and non-threatening. While our case law specifically identified pepper spray and tasers as significant force, any reasonable police officer would know that fist and knee strikes to a suspect’s abdomen also constitute significant force. After all, ‘[a]n officer is not entitled to qualified immunity on the grounds that the law is not clearly established every time a novel method is used to inflict injury.’ Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d 217, 237 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).” Matusak v. Daminski, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 2526 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 2026).*
This drug dog only found drugs in 43% of alerts. That’s still enough for probable cause. Dogs can alert where drugs have been. Lack of success doesn’t mean false hits. State v. Barritt, 2026 Ida. LEXIS 16 (Jan. 29, 2026).
Touching the fog line is justification for a stop in Mississippi according to state and federal precedent. United States v. Gebrezghi, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17000 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 29, 2026).*
Controlled buys provided probable cause, so the failure to test marijuana baggies in a trash pull were neither prejudicial nor required. United States v. Wyatt, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16939 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 29, 2026).*
Defendant moved to suppress based on ALPR tracking. The data was gone. He moved to dismiss for destroying it, which was granted. Since it’s not a violation of his reasonable expectation of privacy, he can’t be prejudiced by it. Reversed. State v. Simonson, 2026 Wash. App. LEXIS 173 (Jan. 29, 2026) (unpublished):
ALPR readings cannot be compared to CSLI, and there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in those movements on the streets. Ford v. State, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 729 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi – Edinburg Jan. 29, 2026).
The affidavit for warrant was not conclusory. United States v. Biaou, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16070 (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 2026).*
There was nexus shown to the hotel room searched. People v. James, 2026 NY Slip Op 00406 (3d Dept. Jan. 29, 2026).*
The driver’s consent to search his truck included the purse of his female passenger. State v. Mort, 2026-Ohio-249 (7th Dist. Jan. 28, 2026).
Motion to suppress filed after sixth trial setting wasn’t timely. On the merits, the claim of lack of probable cause and nexus completely fails. United States v. Hardison, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15758 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 28, 2026).*
An exchange of emails with child pornography in them is probable cause to believe it would also be on their computers. United States v. Townsend, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15862 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2026).*
Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, including the Fourth Amendment, were too general on which to go forward. Johnson v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15877 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2026).*
The juvenile being ordered to walk backwards to the officer with hands up is a seizure, and here it was with reasonable suspicion. P.L. v. C.P.L. (In re C.), 346 Or. App. 499 (Jan. 22, 2026) (argued 18 months ago).
Merely handling a cell phone while driving is not reasonable suspicion the operator is violating the use of cell phone law. More is required. State v. Stone, 2026 Md. LEXIS 10 (Jan. 27, 2026).*
The court refuses to impose a negative inference on the officer’s testimony where this patrol car had no MVR. This is somewhat similar to not recording the act that led to the stop, for instance. State v. Williams, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 31 (Jan. 28, 2026).*
Mere violation of state statute on BAC tests doesn’t warrant suppression when the testing is otherwise reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Delatorre v. City of Ketchikan, 2026 Alas. App. LEXIS 12 (Jan. 28, 2026).*
Asking for a search warrant before opening the door is not obstructing governmental operations. The motion for directed verdict should have been granted. This is not active resistance. Keeton v. State, 2026 Ark. App. 53 (Jan. 28, 2026).
The Heck bar applies to state tort claims, too. C.A.L. v. State, 2026 N.J. LEXIS 73 (Jan. 27, 2026).
Failure to move to suppress in the trial court and get a ruling is waiver. Finney v. State, 2026 Del. LEXIS 33 (Jan. 28, 2026).*
Defendant’s BAC consent may not have complied with statute, but it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, all things considered. State v. Melcher, 2026 Iowa App. LEXIS 57 (Jan. 28, 2026).*
LAT: LAPD would delete nearly 12 million body camera videos under proposed policy change by Libor Jany (“The Los Angeles Police Department is seeking a policy change that would allow millions of videos collected from officers’ body-worn and dashboard-mounted cameras to be deleted, leaving oversight officials worried that useful footage might be lost in the purge. In a presentation to the Board of Police Commissioners on Tuesday, the LAPD’s chief information officer, John Furay, detailed new data retention guidelines that would allow certain footage to be destroyed after five years. Exceptions would be made for videos from all police shootings, as well as any potential evidence in a court case or internal investigation.”)
Posted inBody cameras|Comments Off on LAT: LAPD would delete nearly 12 million body camera videos under proposed policy change
The impoundment of defendant’s car and his backpack from an apartment complex parking lot was not shown to be within the standardized procedures of the department. That’s the government’s burden. Motion to suppress granted. United States v. Majedi, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14588 (D.N.M. Jan. 27, 2026).*
In a “rough ride” case, there was no case law close enough to say that the law was clearly established. Johnson v. Edwards, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 2057 (7th Cir. Jan. 27, 2026).*
Defendant’s stop for a broken taillight lacked reasonable suspicion because there was at least some red light showing, and that satisfies Colorado law. United States v. Forrest, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14154 (D. Colo. Jan. 20, 2026).*
There was no reasonable expectation of privacy under the Florida wiretapping statute in a recorded business zoom call over FDA regulatory matters of the business. Aguila v. RQM+ LLC, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14013 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026).*
In a pharmacy fraud case, there was no showing of nexus to pharmacists’ cell phones. Motion to suppress cell phones is granted. Also, under Franks, with an omission a higher standard of intent to mislead applies. Also, the affidavit is viewed as a whole, no line-by-line. United States v. Haney, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14804 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 27, 2026).*
There was plenty for nexus to defendant’s house. “Even if a probable cause nexus did not exist, a hypothetical hard to square with existing precedent, the good faith exception would apply.” United States v. Sullivan, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14829 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 27, 2026).*
After the ticket was issued, reasonable suspicion existed: “Any one of these factors, standing alone, would be insufficient to support reasonable suspicion. In isolation, no single fact is dispositive of wrongdoing. However, when they are considered together, as required by the totality of the circumstances test, reasonable suspicion is met. Specifically, it was reasonable that Sergeant Kilpela suspected Ms. Conchas was trafficking narcotics. Thus, although the mission of the traffic stop had concluded when Sergeant Kilpela requested her consent to search the vehicle, it did not violate the Fourth Amendment to extend the seizure.” United States v. Conchas, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15022 (D. Mont. Jan. 27, 2026).*
CNS: Maryland man argues arrest using cellphone tracking device violates the Fourth Amendment by Sydney Haulenbeek (“His attorney argued the police ‘basically seized’ his phone with the equipment police used to locate him. [¶] “A Maryland man arrested after police used a device mimicking a cellphone tower to find his phone — and him — argued before a Fourth Circuit panel Tuesday that police needed a warrant. The Baltimore Police Department, which was attempting to arrest Kerron Andrews on charges of triple attempted murder after a shooting during a drug deal, secured a court order allowing them to use a cell-site simulator to obtain his real-time location information in May 2014. The police’s court order did not satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, Andrews said, and the officers are not protected by qualified immunity because they did not disclose their plan to use a specific device when seeking the order.”)
[I usually don’t mention pending matters until they’re ruled on, but some just need to be mentioned as a heads up.]
WaPo: Families of men killed in boat strikes sue Trump administration by Mariana Alfaro & Dan Lamothe (“The families of two Trinidadian men killed in October during a U.S. strike on boats off the coast of Venezuela filed a wrongful-death lawsuit against the Trump administration on Tuesday. The lawsuit is the first filed against the White House in federal court in response to President Donald Trump’s lethal attacks on boats that the administration alleges were carrying illegal drugs to the United States. In the suit, the families of the two men accused the U.S. government of conducting extrajudicial killings and of falsely characterizing the men as drug smugglers. They asserted that their intent is to hold the Trump administration accountable for what they and many legal experts say is an unjustifiable use of deadly military force.”)
Posted inExcessive force, National security|Comments Off on WaPo: Families of men killed in boat strikes sue Trump administration
The exclusionary rule does not apply in animal cruelty forfeitures, distinguishing One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania. Mogensen v. Cty. of Rockbridge, 2026 Va. App. LEXIS 46 (Jan. 27, 2026).
Defendant’s stop for a broken taillight lacked reasonable suspicion because there was at least some red light showing, and that satisfies Colorado law. United States v. Forrest, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14154 (D. Colo. Jan. 20, 2026).*
There was no reasonable expectation of privacy under the Florida wiretapping statute in a recorded business zoom call over FDA regulatory matters of the business. Aguila v. RQM+ LLC, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14013 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026).*
There was probable cause for the stop and search of defendant’s car before the pretextual stop. Therefore, it was all valid. United States v. Nieves, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 272309 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2025).*
Defendant’s stop was with reasonable suspicion of speeding two miles over the speed limit, then he crossed the fog line twice before the stop. But the CI provided probable cause for a stop anyway. United States v. Lombida, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13790 (D.S.C. Jan. 26, 2026).*
Looking in defendant’s vehicle while closing the door was a plain view. United States v. Shaw, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13454 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2026).*
Defendant consented to the search of his cell phone, and giving the password. He contends it was limited to a Reddit thread, which it was. The next day the officer got a warrant for the phone, and it was with probable cause. United States v. Nigro, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 272270 (D.S.D. Dec. 11, 2025).*
Failure to conduct a preliminary hearing to establish probable cause is mooted by defendant’s conviction after trial. People v. Chambliss, 2026 IL 130585, 2025 Ill. LEXIS 7 (Jan. 23, 2026).
“Lucas claims that Rubenstahl violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force during an arrest or investigatory stop. … But we need not decide whether a constitutional violation occurred because Lucas has not shown that her arrest violated clearly established law. In other words, Lucas has not shown that she had a clearly established right to be free from arm-pulling, a takedown, or a knee-to-the-back during the particular circumstances of her arrest.” Lucas v. City of Reynoldsburg, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 1837 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 2026).*
Defendant’s Franks challenge fails because of a lack of a substantial preliminary showing. And, even if he could satisfy that, he can’t show materiality. United States v. Luxon, No. 25-20742, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13118 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2026).*
Posted inExcessive force, Franks doctrine|Comments Off on IL: Failure to conduct a preliminary hearing for PC mooted by conviction
Being told you’d be arrested for trespassing if you didn’t leave isn’t a seizure. Keith v. Romain, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13105 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2026).
Police responded to a bar on a ShotSpotter report, but it was for naught. No shots fired. While there, they saw defendant stumbling in the parking lot. That and a traffic offense justified the stop. Commonwealth v. McCuiston, 2026 Ky. App. LEXIS 13 (Jan. 23, 2026).*
Plaintiff was convicted of assaulting a VA police officer and the video shows he clearly did, and that undermines his claim he was arrested without probable cause. Wohlrabe v. Brown, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 1832 (7th Cir. Jan. 23, 2026).*
The CI’s photographs were objected to at trial (apparently for lack of foundation). Other photographs came in. Defendant wasn’t denied confrontation. State v. McCurdy, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 24 (Jan. 22, 2026).”
WaPo: How officers used new ICE memo to forcefully enter a Minneapolis home by Arelis R. Hernández (“With long guns pointed in her direction, Teyana Gibson repeatedly demanded that federal immigration officers show her a warrant as she stood between them and her immigrant husband inside her Minneapolis house. ‘What are you doing?’ she yelled, as the officers burst through the front door with a battering ram, according to a cellphone recording of the chaotic encounter on Jan. 11. Officers handcuffed Garrison Gibson — a Liberian national who for years had reported for regular check-ins with Immigration and Customs Enforcement — and took him away in a government vehicle. Then they handed Teyana Gibson, who is a U.S. citizen, a photocopy of a document that purported to give them the legal authority to enter and search her home without consent. But it was not a judicial warrant authorized by a federal judge — rather, the document was an administrative warrant signed by an ICE supervisor, according to court documents.”).
All things considered, what happens when they argue the good faith exception? The good faith exception requires a judicial warrant. Remember Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971)? There the warrant was issued by the Attorney General, not a neutral and detached magistrate within the judicial process:
The classic statement of the policy underlying the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment is that of Mr. Justice Jackson, writing for the Court in Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-14:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate, instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity, and leave the people’s homes secure only in the discretion of police officers …. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.
Johnson was 1948.
Posted inUncategorized|Comments Off on WaPo: How officers used new ICE memo to forcefully enter a Minneapolis home
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!” ---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
