Defendant abandoned his backpack when he ditched it in a motel stairwell when he was fleeing the police. United States v. Mayberry, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 300 (4th Cir. Jan. 7, 2025).
Leaving one’s backpack and a trashbag in the bushes was abandonment. United States v. Burnett, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 312 (7th Cir. Jan. 7, 2025).
Petitioner doesn’t get to see the name of the CI in the issuance of the search warrant. Aguasanta v. City of N.Y., 2025 NY Slip Op 00035 (1st Dept. Jan. 7, 2025).*
COA from denial of 2254 denied on petitioner’s Fourth Amendment ineffective assistance claim. He wouldn’t win on the merits. Carson v. Lumpkin, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 223 (5th Cir. Jan. 6, 2025).*
Defendant’s cell phone and its contents were still contraband and could not be returned, even if the phone was reset to its factory settings. United States v. Nestor, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 241 (3d Cir. Jan. 6, 2025).*
The fact a parole supervisor conducted the parole search and not a “parole officer” doesn’t make the parole search unreasonable. United States v. Barron, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 258 (10th Cir. Jan. 7, 2025).
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is more vague than the Complaint, and it seeks federal court intervention in a state criminal proceeding. Dismissed. Hood v. Truhlar, 15591, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1711 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2025).*
2255 denied: “Even if the search warrant incorporated the alleged misrepresentations and omissions that are not directly contradicted by the record, the search warrant would still be supported by probable cause.” United States v. Valentine, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235637 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 12, 2024),* adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 663 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2025).*
The cell phone search warrant here did not mandate return of the phone after the search. Due to staffing issues, the FBI didn’t get to finally search defendant’s phone for years, and it was searched years later. United States v. Banwari, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2132 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 6, 2025).*
“Following the logic of these cases, the fact that Defendant was apparently in technical violation of an apartment lease does not deprive him of standing to challenge the search in question. The evidence on the record indicates that Defendant was staying at the apartment with the express permission of his father. Furthermore, he was known to the management of the apartment building, and he regularly made rent and utility payments for the unit. There is no countervailing evidence that Defendant was ever ordered to leave the apartment or otherwise informed that he was not supposed to stay there, much less that he had been evicted from the apartment. Although the Government has demonstrated that Defendant was likely in technical violation of the lease agreement for his apartment, it is equally clear that he maintained his residence in the apartment with the express permission of his father, the lessee, and the implied authorization of the lessor. Accordingly, Defendant has standing to challenge the search that took place during the course of his arrest.” United States v. Osagbue, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1235 (D.P.R. Jan. 3, 2025).
Plethysmograph testing of a sex offender intrudes on privacy under the state constitution, but it is reasonable if for treatment only. Dominguez v. State, 2025 Wash. App. LEXIS 1 (Jan. 6, 2025)* (unpublished).
Defendant was a visitor at a house searched under a warrant, and the search of his vehicle outside was reasonable under the warrant and the automobile exception. United States v. Lopez, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1689 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 6, 2025).*
Posted inStanding|Comments Off on D.P.R.: Being in technical violation of a lease doesn’t deprive defendant of standing
Hidden bodycams used to record conversations in unmarked police cars between officers violated a reasonable expectation of privacy and likely Title III. Baker v. City of Pittsburgh, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2157 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2025).
The search of defendant’s vehicle was impliedly consented to. Defendant was stopped by federal wildlife officers on land next to a military training area. Whether the place where the search occurred was a military installation and he was subject to search by being found there doesn’t matter. United States v. Rodgers, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1449 (D. Alaska Jan. 6, 2025).*
Plaintiff’s § 1983 false arrest case was barred by his state indictment. Dye v. Casey B., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235539 (D.S.C. Dec. 3, 2024),* adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 943 (D.S.C. Jan. 3, 2025).*
There was probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest for violating an order of protection. Klein v. Daniels, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1701 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 2, 2025).*
Wired: License Plate Readers Are Leaking Real-Time Video Feeds and Vehicle Data (“This trove of real-time vehicle data, collected by one of Motorola’s [automated license-plate-recognition] systems, is meant to be accessible by law enforcement. However, a flaw discovered by a security researcher has exposed live video feeds and detailed records of passing vehicles, revealing the staggering scale of surveillance enabled by this widespread technology.”)
Defendant’s argument ALPR tracking of her vehicle connecting it and her to a Hobbs Act bar robbery in New Orleans is akin to CSLI is rejected. There aren’t that many cameras in the city, and the information produced was really limited compared to CSLI. United States v. Cooper, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1466 (E.D. La. Jan. 6, 2025):
Violation of CalECPA has nothing to do with federal rights. United States v. Wenger, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1331 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2025).
At the time of the warrant, it was not established that the accused had to have knowledge of his status as a felon in possession. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim would not succeed. Lemp v. Majkrzak, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1369 (D. Md. Jan. 6, 2025).*
There was sufficient evidence that the take down of plaintiff was by excessive force because he wasn’t resisting. Heredia v. Roscoe, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 193 (1st Cir. Jan. 6, 2025).*
The Nevada Supreme Court’s resolution of petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim on habeas was a reasonable application of the Fourth Amendment and habeas relief is precluded. There were two valid warrants. Camacho v. Breitenbach, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1421 (D. Nev. Jan. 6, 2025).*
When police knocked at defendant’s door, he yelled “police” and turned back inside the house, they feared to warn others or destroy evidence. “Here, based upon the totality of the circumstances, the record shows that the officer had a reasonable basis from specific and articulable facts to believe that the immediate entry into Petitioner’s home was necessary to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” Collins v. State, 2025 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 3 (Jan. 3, 2025).
Denial of defendant’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity was not appealable. Here, there were fact questions about plaintiff’s exoneration and when defendants knew he was the wrong guy. Fallen v. McEnroe, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 181 (3d Cir. Jan. 6, 2025).*
“Considering the totality of the circumstances—including the officers’ observation of two suspected hand-to-hand drug transactions, the nuances of the involved parties’ behaviors during these transactions, and the reputation of the area in which these transactions occurred as a high drug and crime area—the officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle in which Hale was a passenger were involved in illegal drug activity.” United States v. Hale, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 184 (4th Cir. Jan. 6, 2025).*
Hypothetical future Fourth Amendment injury from a state AG’s civil investigative demand doesn’t confer Art. III standing. Obria Grp., Inc. v. Ferguson, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1166 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2025).
“Here, a common-sense review of the warrant affidavit shows that the magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude that probable cause existed. While the magistrate could not credit the informant as past-proven reliable, some indicia of the informant’s reliability were present, and independent police work provided a sufficient basis for finding probable cause. Delaware’s decriminalization of marijuana does not require police or magistrates to afford suspects the benefit of the doubt. Finally, there was a sufficient nexus between Defendants’ suspected criminality and the Residence to support a warrant for that address.” State v. Taylor, 2025 Del. Super. LEXIS 4 (Jan. 2, 2025).*
Petitioner’s proposed successor habeas includes a Fourth Amendment claim which is barred. In re Hensley, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 155 (6th Cir. Jan. 3, 2025).*
Despite the state stipulating to standing, it’s a threshold issue and the court finds no standing here. Defendant was a passenger in a car and kept some stuff in it, but he still lacked standing to contest this search. State v. Kelley, 2025 ME 1, 2025 Me. LEXIS 1 (Jan. 2, 2025).
“Even if Powell did have standing to challenge the warrant, the good-faith exception would preclude suppression. In addition to alleging probable cause to believe that Powell committed Hobbs Act robbery, the affidavit alleged that Powell violated the felon-in-possession statute …” United States v. Powell, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1111 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2025).*
2254 petitioner’s request for access to state search warrant materials not already in record is based on speculation and denied. Benson v. Smith, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 952 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 3, 2025).*
Posted inGood faith exception, Standing|Comments Off on ME: Standing is a threshold issue, and court could examine it despite the state’s stipulation
Tech Policy Press, California’s Surveillance Systems Have Once Again Become a Major Liability by Nicole A. Ozer & Matt Cagle (“In recent decades, surveillance has increased exponentially across California. Politicians and business leaders promised that the proliferation of cameras, automated license plate readers, drones, biometric recognition technology, and other electronic surveillance would increase public safety. It has not. In fact, with President-elect Donald Trump about to reassume office, the very systems that officials promised would keep us safe have become a major liability.”).
USMJ recommends motion to suppress car search based on a dog alert should be granted because the handler prompted the dog and both the handler and dog entered the window and then the car before the dog alert. As to his house, there protective sweep was justified and there was probable cause. United States v. Brown, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1112 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 3, 2025):
“In sum, defendant is not entitled to credit against his sentence for time spent under home confinement as a condition of his bail release. Further, defendant’s time spent on home confinement did not constitute a seizure of his person under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Severino, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1108 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2025).
CoA denied. Defendant didn’t allege enough to show an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for anything, including his Fourth Amendment claim. “The police completed three controlled purchases of narcotics from Whittingham, which enabled them to obtain a search warrant. Upon executing the search warrant, police recovered suspected heroin, firearms, ammunition, narcotics paraphernalia, and nearly $25,000 in cash. With these facts and no realistic defense, ‘a reasonable defendant would not decide to throw a hail Mary’ at trial. Id. So, reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s rejection of this ineffective-assistance claim.” Whittingham v. United States, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 66 (6th Cir. Jan. 2, 2025).*
“[W]e believe that the totality of the circumstances illustrate that officers had probable cause to believe that appellant operated the vehicle while under the influence of narcotics and, thus, had probable cause for the blood draw and to arrest appellant.” State v. Linek, 2024-Ohio-6127 (4th Dist. Dec. 20, 2024).*
Plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his prison visit with his brother being recorded on body camera of a nearby correctional officer. Saunders v. Vilbrandt, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 989 (W.D. Va. Jan. 2, 2025).*
“To the extent Hernandez argues Sergeant Skalisky’s drawing of his weapon or keeping his finger on the trigger during the search amounted to a section 1983 violation (regardless of whether he fired the weapon), that argument fails. Hernandez cites no cases to show that this conduct violates clearly established law. It may not be best practice to have a weapon drawn in these circumstances, but even routine traffic stops can sometime escalate into violent confrontations. [¶] Because Hernandez fails to satisfy the clearly established prong, he falls short of overcoming Sergeant Skalisky’s qualified immunity defense.” Hernandez v. Norton, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 4 (10th Cir. Jan. 2, 2025).*
Plaintiff sued his mortgage company in federal court to stop a foreclosure in state court. He included a Fourth Amendment claim. [Aside from a foreclosure not being a Fourth Amendment seizure, which is undecided] the Rooker/Feldman doctrine bars the entire action. Pastrana v. Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235287 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2024).*
LA Times: Is your car spying on you? What it means that Tesla shared data in the Las Vegas explosion by Bernard Condon (“Your car is spying on you. [¶] That is one takeaway from the fast, detailed data that Tesla collected on the driver of one of its Cybertrucks that exploded in Las Vegas on Wednesday. Privacy data experts say the deep dive by Elon Musk’s company was impressive, but also shines a spotlight on a difficult question as vehicles become more like computers on wheels. [¶] Is your car company violating your privacy rights? [¶] ‘You might want law enforcement to have the data to crack down on criminals, but can anyone have access to it?’ said Jodi Daniels, CEO of privacy consulting firm Red Clover Advisors. ‘Where is the line?’ [¶] Many of the latest cars not only know where you’ve been and where you are going, but also often have access to your contacts, your call logs, your texts and other sensitive information thanks to cellphone syncing.”).
So your car’s computer and video should be subject to Carpenter. I’ve always suspected that Teslas are constantly monitored by their mothership.
Posted inSurveillance technology, Video surveillance|Comments Off on LA Times: Is your car spying on you? What it means that Tesla shared data in the Las Vegas explosion
A criminal complaint can’t be challenged under Franks after indictment. United States v. Sole, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 908 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 3, 2025).*
Defendant’s stop for clearly overtinted windows was reasonable. Disagreement by witnesses over minor details didn’t matter. United States v. Rose, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 55 (8th Cir. Jan. 3, 2025).*
The officer responded to a call about a bar fight. Outside, observers directed him to a car, and he walked over as it was leaving. On the totality, he had reasonable suspicion for a stop. Spindle v. State, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 4 (Tex. App. – Ft. Worth Jan. 2, 2025).*
The state’s obtaining CSLI in 2013 didn’t violate defendant’s rights. He had a full and fair opportunity to litigate it per Stone. [Not mentioned is that it was five years before Carpenter.] Dejesus v. Royce, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 545 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2025).*
New Jersey has a bodycam directive that was apparently violated by the officers not turning theirs on before a search. Failure to turn on the bodycams was not a constitutional violation, and the court refuses to suppress. In addition, “the trial court was not required to apply a ‘rebuttable presumption’ or draw a ‘negative inference’ against the State. Even so, the trial court did consider the ‘failure to record the audio demonstrating that officers knocked and announced.’ As we have noted, [Officer] Pichardo acknowledged that he should have activated his BWC earlier. The record shows, moreover, Pichardo was subjected to skillful cross-examination, after which the trial court found he was credible.” State v. Seligman, 2025 N.J. Super. LEXIS 2 (Jan. 3, 2025).
2254 petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim barred by Stone. 1996’s AEDPA didn’t expand a right to habeas. Rodriguez v. AG of N.M., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 490 (D.N.M. Jan. 2, 2025).*
Nexus to defendant’s fraud scheme was shown to likely be at his house because of the officer’s experience shown in the affidavit that records of a fraud are often kept at home and the fact the home address was listed as a business address, too. United States v. Bock, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 492 (D. Minn. Jan. 2, 2025).*
Defendant waived any reasonable expectation of privacy in this smartphone by loaning it to another [even under Oregon’s more stringent abandonment standards]. Here, it was completely out of his control because he loaned it to a young woman, and her mother found it in her room. State v. Zweygartt, 337 Or. App. 234 (Jan. 2, 2025). [Private search? Abandonment? Consent? If consent, no warrant needed? It was argued this was a bailment. That argument would have had weight if there were express or even implied conditions on the loan, like handing it over just to make a phone call.]
Defendant’s confession to a crisis hotline he was interested in young boys again and might act on those urges supported the search warrant for his stuff that produced child pornography. United States v. Zema, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 32934 (3d Cir. Dec. 31, 2024).*
On a certified question from the U.S. District Court in Maryland, the question was whether “reasonable grounds” for an Extreme Risk Protective Orders is probable cause or something else. The state’s reframing the question causes them to send it back. Willey v. Brown, 2024 Md. LEXIS 555 (Dec. 30, 2024).*
Defendant’s car was reasonably stopped for not stopping when at a sidewalk when pulling out of a parking lot. United States v. Robertson, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 2, 2025).*
Defendant was taken to the ER for gunshot wounds. The hospital staff took his clothes and looked in his pockets and then turned them over to the police. This was a private search. United States v. Coleman, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 230 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 2, 2025).
The district court decided defendant’s search claim on inevitable discovery by inventory; the search incident claim didn’t have to be decided. That was correct. United States v. Wilder, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 32843 (4th Cir. Dec. 30, 2024).*
The government’s late disclosure of a DNA expert is excused. Defendant knew there was a DNA search warrant long ago, and he confessed. No prejudice. United States v. Bauer, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234369 (D.N.M. Dec. 30, 2024).*
Defendant’s 2255 claim defense counsel was ineffective for not challenging the search of another’s property based on controlled buys is rejected. United States v. Wilbourn, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234424 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 20, 2024).*
by John Wesley Hall Criminal Defense Lawyer and Search and seizure law consultant Little Rock, Arkansas Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!” ---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
