W.D.Va.: No REP prison visit with nonlawyer wouldn’t be videorecorded on bodycam

Plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his prison visit with his brother being recorded on body camera of a nearby correctional officer. Saunders v. Vilbrandt, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 989 (W.D. Va. Jan. 2, 2025).*

“To the extent Hernandez argues Sergeant Skalisky’s drawing of his weapon or keeping his finger on the trigger during the search amounted to a section 1983 violation (regardless of whether he fired the weapon), that argument fails. Hernandez cites no cases to show that this conduct violates clearly established law. It may not be best practice to have a weapon drawn in these circumstances, but even routine traffic stops can sometime escalate into violent confrontations. [¶] Because Hernandez fails to satisfy the clearly established prong, he falls short of overcoming Sergeant Skalisky’s qualified immunity defense.” Hernandez v. Norton, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 4 (10th Cir. Jan. 2, 2025).*

Plaintiff sued his mortgage company in federal court to stop a foreclosure in state court. He included a Fourth Amendment claim. [Aside from a foreclosure not being a Fourth Amendment seizure, which is undecided] the Rooker/Feldman doctrine bars the entire action. Pastrana v. Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235287 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2024).*

Posted in Body cameras, Issue preclusion, Prison and jail searches, Qualified immunity, Video surveillance | Comments Off on W.D.Va.: No REP prison visit with nonlawyer wouldn’t be videorecorded on bodycam

LA Times: Is your car spying on you? What it means that Tesla shared data in the Las Vegas explosion

LA Times: Is your car spying on you? What it means that Tesla shared data in the Las Vegas explosion by Bernard Condon (“Your car is spying on you. [¶] That is one takeaway from the fast, detailed data that Tesla collected on the driver of one of its Cybertrucks that exploded in Las Vegas on Wednesday. Privacy data experts say the deep dive by Elon Musk’s company was impressive, but also shines a spotlight on a difficult question as vehicles become more like computers on wheels. [¶] Is your car company violating your privacy rights? [¶] ‘You might want law enforcement to have the data to crack down on criminals, but can anyone have access to it?’ said Jodi Daniels, CEO of privacy consulting firm Red Clover Advisors. ‘Where is the line?’ [¶] Many of the latest cars not only know where you’ve been and where you are going, but also often have access to your contacts, your call logs, your texts and other sensitive information thanks to cellphone syncing.”).

So your car’s computer and video should be subject to Carpenter. I’ve always suspected that Teslas are constantly monitored by their mothership.

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N.D.Ind.: Criminal complaint can’t be challenged under Franks after indictment

A criminal complaint can’t be challenged under Franks after indictment. United States v. Sole, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 908 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 3, 2025).*

Defendant’s stop for clearly overtinted windows was reasonable. Disagreement by witnesses over minor details didn’t matter. United States v. Rose, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 55 (8th Cir. Jan. 3, 2025).*

The officer responded to a call about a bar fight. Outside, observers directed him to a car, and he walked over as it was leaving. On the totality, he had reasonable suspicion for a stop. Spindle v. State, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 4 (Tex. App. – Ft. Worth Jan. 2, 2025).*

The state’s obtaining CSLI in 2013 didn’t violate defendant’s rights. He had a full and fair opportunity to litigate it per Stone. [Not mentioned is that it was five years before Carpenter.] Dejesus v. Royce, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 545 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2025).*

Posted in Cell site location information, Franks doctrine, Reasonable suspicion | Comments Off on N.D.Ind.: Criminal complaint can’t be challenged under Franks after indictment

LR Article: Back to the Future: Revisiting State Constitutions to Protect Against New Technological Intrusions

Matthew Radford, Back to the Future: Revisiting State Constitutions to Protect Against New Technological Intrusions, 81 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1641 (2024). Abstract:

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NJ: Search not suppressed because bodycam wasn’t turned on

New Jersey has a bodycam directive that was apparently violated by the officers not turning theirs on before a search. Failure to turn on the bodycams was not a constitutional violation, and the court refuses to suppress. In addition, “the trial court was not required to apply a ‘rebuttable presumption’ or draw a ‘negative inference’ against the State. Even so, the trial court did consider the ‘failure to record the audio demonstrating that officers knocked and announced.’ As we have noted, [Officer] Pichardo acknowledged that he should have activated his BWC earlier. The record shows, moreover, Pichardo was subjected to skillful cross-examination, after which the trial court found he was credible.” State v. Seligman, 2025 N.J. Super. LEXIS 2 (Jan. 3, 2025).

2254 petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim barred by Stone. 1996’s AEDPA didn’t expand a right to habeas. Rodriguez v. AG of N.M., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 490 (D.N.M. Jan. 2, 2025).*

Nexus to defendant’s fraud scheme was shown to likely be at his house because of the officer’s experience shown in the affidavit that records of a fraud are often kept at home and the fact the home address was listed as a business address, too. United States v. Bock, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 492 (D. Minn. Jan. 2, 2025).*

Posted in Body cameras, Issue preclusion, Knock and announce, Nexus, Warrant execution | Comments Off on NJ: Search not suppressed because bodycam wasn’t turned on

OR: REP in cell phone lost when it was loaned to another

Defendant waived any reasonable expectation of privacy in this smartphone by loaning it to another [even under Oregon’s more stringent abandonment standards]. Here, it was completely out of his control because he loaned it to a young woman, and her mother found it in her room. State v. Zweygartt, 337 Or. App. 234 (Jan. 2, 2025). [Private search? Abandonment? Consent? If consent, no warrant needed? It was argued this was a bailment. That argument would have had weight if there were express or even implied conditions on the loan, like handing it over just to make a phone call.]

Defendant’s confession to a crisis hotline he was interested in young boys again and might act on those urges supported the search warrant for his stuff that produced child pornography. United States v. Zema, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 32934 (3d Cir. Dec. 31, 2024).*

On a certified question from the U.S. District Court in Maryland, the question was whether “reasonable grounds” for an Extreme Risk Protective Orders is probable cause or something else. The state’s reframing the question causes them to send it back. Willey v. Brown, 2024 Md. LEXIS 555 (Dec. 30, 2024).*

Defendant’s car was reasonably stopped for not stopping when at a sidewalk when pulling out of a parking lot. United States v. Robertson, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 2, 2025).*

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N.D.Miss.: ER staff’s search of def’s clothes was private search

Defendant was taken to the ER for gunshot wounds. The hospital staff took his clothes and looked in his pockets and then turned them over to the police. This was a private search. United States v. Coleman, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 230 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 2, 2025).

The district court decided defendant’s search claim on inevitable discovery by inventory; the search incident claim didn’t have to be decided. That was correct. United States v. Wilder, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 32843 (4th Cir. Dec. 30, 2024).*

The government’s late disclosure of a DNA expert is excused. Defendant knew there was a DNA search warrant long ago, and he confessed. No prejudice. United States v. Bauer, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234369 (D.N.M. Dec. 30, 2024).*

Defendant’s 2255 claim defense counsel was ineffective for not challenging the search of another’s property based on controlled buys is rejected. United States v. Wilbourn, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234424 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 20, 2024).*

Posted in Ineffective assistance, Inevitable discovery, Private search | Comments Off on N.D.Miss.: ER staff’s search of def’s clothes was private search

D.P.R.: Honest mistake in affidavit attempted to be corrected but no Franks violation here

The search warrant was in the S.D. Tex., and the affiant found a mistake before it was finalized that he communicated to the AUSAs involved. The correction, however, wasn’t made before he signed it, and he didn’t notice it. When the mistake was discovered, the electronics search was paused, and they went to the issuing court which determined that nothing needed to be done. The mistake was honest, maybe mere negligence, and it didn’t affect the probable cause determination. Franks motion denied. United States v. Baiyewu, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234922 (D.P.R. Dec. 27, 2024).*

The District Court denied a suppression hearing so defendant opted for a bench trial. That put the government to its proof on some of the elements of the crime, and that supported denial of acceptance of responsibility. United States v. Cheatwood, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 24 (4th Cir. Jan. 2, 2025).*

Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim that defense counsel didn’t properly challenge “his March 14 arrest is frivolous, meaning counsel could not have been deficient for failing to raise the challenge.” United States v. Perez, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106 (D. Minn. Jan. 2, 2025).*

Posted in Arrest or entry on arrest, Franks doctrine, Ineffective assistance | Comments Off on D.P.R.: Honest mistake in affidavit attempted to be corrected but no Franks violation here

ALPR in action

No law; license plate reader and video showed owner of car not driving: “Detective Smith also obtained footage from the Chevron across the street from Danny & Clyde’s, which allowed him to get a better look at the license plate ending in 8777, and Detective Smith said it was likely a Texas plate. He used the partial license plate number to conduct a query through the Automated License Plate Reader system, from which he obtained the full license plate number PKT8777. He then tracked its travel history before and after the robbery and got the name and photograph of the registered owner, Jose Gonzales. The vehicle was reported stolen on June 25, 2021, four days before the robbery. Detective Smith noted Gonzales did not appear to be the person depicted in the surveillance footage at Danny & Clyde’s.” State v. Martinez, 2024 La. App. LEXIS 2320 (La. App. 1st Cir Dec. 30, 2024).*

A mask mandate is not a seizure of the person. White v. Davenport, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234249 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2024).*

Defendant’s Facebook admissions he was a felon in possession of firearms and shooting guns was used to get the search warrant for his house. United States v. Ness, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 32911 (10th Cir. Dec. 31, 2024).*

Posted in Automatic license plate readers, Probable cause, Seizure | Comments Off on ALPR in action

M.D.Pa.: Despite state MMJ, smell of MJ still PC under federal law

Despite medical marijuana being legal in this state, the smell of marijuana from a car is still probable cause under federal law. United States v. Skouras, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 2025):

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PA: Arrest on a warrant requires the warrant be proved to exist

When an arrest warrant is served, it disappears from the system. Its existence can still be proved by someone with knowledge, but here it wasn’t. Therefore, the fruits of the arrest are suppressed for lack of proof of a valid arrest. Commonwealth v. Easter, 2025 PA Super 1, 2025 PA Super LEXIS 1 (Jan. 2, 2025) (2-1) [and look for this to go up]:

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D.Minn.: Disavowing ownership of the thing seized means no standing

“Here, Jackson appears to have denied any possessory interest in the SUV and the backpack. (Dkt. 22 ¶ 7 (‘Jackson was not the registered owner of the vehicle. He further claims all of the items in the vehicle and the backpack found in front of XXXX Fremont did not belong to him.’).) And as to the backpack and the evidence it contains, the Government is correct that Jackson abandoned the backpack during his flight by dropping it. (Gov’t Ex. 2 at 12:55-13:04; Gov’t Ex. 3 at 1:45-50.)” United States v. Jackson, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234647 (D. Minn. Nov. 15, 2024).*

The court of appeals affirmed the Fourth Amendment claim without giving reasons, and that binds federal habeas review. Whatever was the basis, counsel wasn’t ineffective. Hamilton v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234186 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2024).*

In camera review of CI information to see if the CI was acting as a governmental agent was not unlawful. State v. Grier, 2024 Minn. App. LEXIS 552 (Dec. 24, 2024).*

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M.D.Ga.: Riverside/Gerstein violation doesn’t justify suppression of evidence seized on arrest

A Riverside/Gerstein violation of not timely presenting probable cause to a magistrate doesn’t justify suppressing the evidence from the arrest. United States v. Jackson, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234511 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 2024):

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Motor Biscuit: Police hope you don’t know the “K9 unit” loophole used to search your car illegally

Motor Biscuit: Police hope you don’t know the “K9 unit” loophole used to search your car illegally by Henry Cesar (“Imagine getting pulled over for a broken taillight. The cop checks your license, hands you a ticket, and starts to leave. Then he stops, turns back, and says, ‘Mind if I bring my dog around your car?’ Suddenly, a routine stop turns into a drug search—no warrant required. Police often exploit this K9 unit loophole to skirt your Fourth Amendment rights. Here’s how it works—and what you can do to protect yourself.”)

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N.D.Okla.: Flashing a fake badge in public doesn’t support SW for house

Defendant was indicted for impersonating an officer and flashing a fake badge at a school pickup line. The search warrant for his house for more evidence of that is suppressed. No nexus is ever shown between that offense and his house. United States v. Williams, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233766 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 30, 2024).

Now compare this: The affidavit for warrant didn’t show any nexus to defendant’s house, except for a passing reference that officers by experience know that drug dealers usually keep drugs or records at home. That was enough for the good faith exception to apply. [So officer’s experience can fill the gap to a belief in probable cause for defendant’s house.] United States v. Willis, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232921 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 26, 2024).*

Use of handcuffs during a traffic stop that produced a plain view of a gun wasn’t unreasonable before officers learned defendant was a felon in possession. The suppression order is reversed.
United States v. In, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 32835 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 2024).*

Posted in Nexus, Reasonable suspicion | Comments Off on N.D.Okla.: Flashing a fake badge in public doesn’t support SW for house

W.D.N.Y.: Incorrect AUSA assertion about which phone was searched had to be promptly clarified, not when he or she felt like it

Here, the AUSA was apparently confused in pleadings as to which cell phone was searched, a white or black one. When the AUSA learned that the wrong one was spoken of, he or she had a duty to promptly clarify–not wait until oral argument on the motion. [The word candor as in candor about the facts is never mentioned, but that’s what this is all about. RPC 3.3(a)(1).] United States v. Nash, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233418, 2024 WL 5239792 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2024). (This is also going into § 3:10 n.24 of Professional Responsibility in Criminal Defense Practice 2025-26 update (on Westlaw too).)

Defendant’s claim that the smell of raw cannabis in a car can’t form the basis of probable cause wasn’t presented below. State v. Rodriguez, 2024 Ohio App. LEXIS 4683 (5th Dist. Dec. 27, 2024).*

Defendant’s demeanor after the dog alerted on the car justified his patdown. State v. Denoncourt, 2024 Fla. App. LEXIS 9971 (Fla. 5th DCA Dec. 27, 2024).*

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E.D.Mo.: Even though threatened with obstruction if he didn’t, defendant consented to seizure of cell phone

The officer had probable cause to believe defendant took a video of a young girl in his house in the bathtub. Defendant was persuaded to turn over the phone and it was consensual. He was told that he might be subject to prosecution for obstruction if he didn’t, but it was still consensual. United States v. Evans, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233325 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 27, 2024):

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E.D.Ky.: § 1983 complaint against his state case is barred by Younger

Plaintiff’s § 1983 complaint against his state case is barred by Younger. Cuffee v. Cabuay, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233153 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 27, 2024).*

Defendant has no standing to challenge the search of another person’s cell phone. United States v. Brown, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233173 (D. Minn. Dec. 27, 2024).*

This officer’s re-entry into the residence after others left was by implied consent. State v. Langley, 33 Neb. App. 297 (Dec. 26, 2024).*

The affidavit for DNA warrant didn’t need to include how defendant became a suspect in something else when it showed probable cause here. State v. Spells, 2024-Ohio-6052 (2d Dist. Dec. 27, 2024).*

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DE: After the first SW was overbroad, officers got a second narrower warrant which had an independent source from the first

When the search warrant was found overbroad, a second warrant was issued based on the same information that was far narrower. It was valid because of its independent source. The alleged false statement in the DNA warrant wasn’t. State v. Matthews, 2024 Del. Super. LEXIS 823 (Dec. 23, 2024).

The motion to suppress was properly denied. Facebook employees inspected the image before it went to NCMEC, and the police view of the image was no more intrusive. United States v. Srogi, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 32679 (2d Cir. Dec. 26, 2024).*

Defendant’s arrest and search for being a felon in possession was objectively unreasonable because the officer didn’t know defendant was a felon when it happened, and no other exception applies. United States v. Stiles, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232825 (D. Or. Dec. 26, 2024).*

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OR: 3 am look at def’s car in driveway was unreasonable under state constitution

Officers approached defendant’s house by the driveway and came to the “back door” which was also a way into the house for ordinary visitors. The look at his car at 3 am exceeded implied consent to enter. “[A]t three o’clock in the morning, two officers walked onto defendant’s driveway, and circled his vehicle inspecting it for damage related to a hit-and-run. The implied consent exception cannot stretch that far, even accounting for a society in which certain types of unexpected contact are bound to occur. … More to the point, we can think of no purpose for the officers’ behavior in circling the vehicle other than a warrantless search. From the perspective of the homeowner, the officers’ behavior was unreasonable and alarming—a contact to which he did not consent.” State v. Leos-Garcia, 337 Or. App. 47 (Dec. 26, 2024) (decided under state constitution).

“The key to exigent circumstances is what officers reasonably believe. Quarterman, 877 F.3d at 798-99. Faced with the facts here, not every reasonable officer would know that it was unreasonable to believe that some immediate act was necessary to protect the safety of Kobe’s grandmother or themselves. Not every reasonable officer would know, in the particular circumstances of this case, that entering the house violated the Fourth Amendment. The right was not ‘clearly established.’ Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S. at 5. The district court correctly granted qualified immunity on the officers’ warrantless entry.” Dimock v. City of Brooklyn Ctr., 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 32676 (8th Cir. Dec. 26, 2024).*

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