NH: After reversal on bad search, state free to argue alternative grounds

After the defendant got his conviction reversed on appeal for an unreasonable search, the state was free to make an alternative argument to sustain the search, and here it was independent source and inevitable discovery, which the court finds. Law of the case didn’t bar the state from raising alternative grounds. State v. Robinson, 2017 N.H. LEXIS 103 (June 2, 2017).

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D.Ariz.: Body camera video and audio showed the officer was diligent and not prolonging the stop

“Indeed, as pointed out by the magistrate judge, the ‘body camera video and audio demonstrate that Trooper Duckett was working diligently in trying to locate Ms. Glenn’s license information, but it did take some time to find it.’” Finally, the officer had reasonable suspicion. United States v. Terry, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83195 (D.Ariz. May 31, 2017).

The affidavit for the search warrant for weapons wasn’t stale because it was based on ongoing weapons possession. United States v. Shipley, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83194 (D.Ariz. May 30, 2017).*

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OK: State can’t show refusal to consent as consciousness of guilt (surveying cases), but here it was harmless

In this death penalty appeal, the heavy weight of authority (surveying many cases) is that defendant’s refusal to consent cannot be used to show he is hiding evidence or to show consciousness of guilt. Some cases find it a due process issue. And, the state doesn’t really respond to this argument at all. Nevertheless, the court applying plain error review finds this harmless error on this record. Bosse v. State, 2017 OK CR 10, 2017 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 11 (May 25, 2017).

There was reasonable suspicion for detaining defendant 40 minutes for a drug dog based on the smell of burnt marijuana in his rental car and loose marijuana on the seat. [He was not the renter, his brother was, and standing isn’t mentioned.] State v. Church, 2017-Ohio-4103, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 2149 (5th Dist. May 30, 2017).*

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E.D.Va.: Potential fraud conspiracy provided inference for PC to search cell phones

There was probable cause for the search of defendant’s cell phones in his car. He fled from an attempt to make a purchase at a store with a stolen prepaid credit card. When his car was stopped, he consented to a search of the car that produced several prepaid cards still in their packaging. There was a reasonable inference of a fraud conspiracy for search for communications with the co-conspirators. There was a passenger in the car with him. In any event, the good faith exception would apply. United States v. Kumara, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82592 (E.D. Va. May 30, 2017).

Evidence about how the police entered defendant’s apartment wasn’t “newly discovered” for new trial purposes. Moreover, a motion for new trial can’t be used to relitigate the motion to suppress. United States v. O’Brien, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83259 (E.D. N.Y. May 31, 2017).

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someecards: Bragging drug dealer gets instant karma when cops raid his house on Facebook Live

someecards: Bragging drug dealer gets instant karma when cops raid his house on Facebook Live by Kelsey Solywoda:

A house in Jacksonville, FL was raided by police recently while the guy that lived there was in the middle of a Facebook Live, showing off all the sweet cash he’d gotten from selling drugs.

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MI: Predawn knock-and-talk was a trespass under Jardines; even Girl Scouts know better

Predawn (4 am in one case, 5:30 am in other) knock-and-talk was a trespass and violated social norms under Jardines. Implied license to enter the curtilage is time sensitive. People v. Frederick, 2017 Mich. LEXIS 1113 (June 1, 2017):
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OK: Def counsel not constitutionally required to be notified of DNA SW after prosecution began

A search warrant was obtained for defendant’s DNA after he was represented. The affidavit showed probable cause, and there was no requirement to advise defense counsel of the search warrant before execution. Frederick v. State, 2017 OK CR 12, 2017 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 10 (May 25, 2017).

Drugs were found on defendant and in his hotel room. The relatively small amount in the hotel room did not receive hardly any mention at trial. Therefore, the search of the hotel room, even if constitutionally erroneous, did not contribute to the verdict and it’s clearly harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. (With a long exposé on harmless error in Virginia and SCOTUS.) Commonwealth v. White, 2017 Va. LEXIS 78 (June 1, 2017).

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CO: Prior illegal third party consent search of GPS in car unbeknownst to def wasn’t law of the case barring subsequent SW on independent evidence

Defendant was arrested for a sex offense, and, while in jail, his landlord kicked him out and his car was towed away and impounded by the police. The police used the towing company’s consent to search the GPS in his vehicle which corroborated the victims. Defendant moved to suppress the search of the GPS and prevailed. The state then got a search warrant for the GPS from a different judge without mentioning the prior suppression order and basing the request on independent evidence. The search warrant was issued and defendant moved to suppress again. This one was denied. The first suppression order based on a consent was not law of the case to the second search warrant based on an independent showing of probable cause. Yes, it would have been better to have told the issuing magistrate about the prior suppression order, but it isn’t fatal here. People v. George, 2017 COA 75, 2017 Colo. App. LEXIS 698 (June 1, 2017):
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OH5: Def didn’t shield his grow operation from flyover; consent to police to search voluntary

Defendant had a marijuana grown at his rural property, and the roof was partially open exposing the grow. Police flying over in a helicopter saw it, gave the GPS coordinates to officers on the ground who came to the house and drove up the driveway. They did not violate the curtilage by taking the normal path. Defendant consented to the search. There was no reasonable expectation of privacy from the flyover, and his claim that the GPS somehow violated his rights is utterly irrelevant [because it was in the helicopter, not on his car]. State v. Hart, 2017-Ohio-4079, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 2116 (5th Dist. May 31, 2017).

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OH1: Where inventory ordinance required police consider alternatives to impoundment, failure to do so leads to suppression

Cincinnati Municipal Code requires alternatives to impoundment be considered, and a failure to do so can void the inventory, as here. “Ultimately, nothing presented at the suppression hearing indicates that before ordering the inventory search, Officer Clarkson even considered the department’s restrictions on impoundments and inventory searches as set forth in the procedures, including the provisions concerning the driver’s ‘right’ to arrange for someone to remove the vehicle.” State v. Foster, 2017-Ohio-4036, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 2086 (1st Dist. May 31, 2017).

Defendant’s encounter with the officer on the street was consensual, and that led to a request for a frisk which caused defendant to admit he was armed. This was all by consent. State v. Thomas, 2017-Ohio-4068, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 2112 (8th Dist. June 1, 2017).*

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CA2: Protective sweep leading to plain view doesn’t require immediate seizure

Police entered the apartment with an arrest warrant for one occupant and found four living there. A gun and drugs were in plain view. During a protective sweep, a gun and cell phone were found in defendant’s room. They weren’t seized exactly then, but shortly later, and that was not unreasonable. With four people in the place, the police needed to sort out who was responsible for what, and it was certainly less intrusive to question them there rather than take them all in to the station house. They called in names and a separate warrant came back for defendant. “Drug trafficking is plainly a serious crime, one often accompanied by violence …. There was a clear need for the Officers to remain in the apartment long enough to ensure, inter alia, that persons engaged in drug trafficking were not released.” United States v. Delva, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9645 (2d Cir. June 1, 2017).

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CA9: Administrative stop of tractor-trailer was pretext for criminal investigation lacking RS; suppressed

Commercial vehicles are subject to administrative stops for compliance inspections without reasonable suspicion. When, however, the use of the stop is predicated on pretext for criminal investigation, the stop and its continuation require reasonable suspicion. Here, that was lacking, and defendant’s consent obtained after the truck had been detained a hour was involuntary. United States v. Orozco, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9659 (9th Cir. June 1, 2017):
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MA: Nervousness, evasive answers about travels, coming from a source city, and criminal history all not RS

Defendant’s stop for a traffic offense had to end when there was no reasonable suspicion. Here, the government’s arguments for reasonable suspicion are all unavailing: Nervousness, evasive answers about his travels, coming from a source city, and criminal history all not enough. Commonwealth v. Cordero, 2017 Mass. LEXIS 370 (June 1, 2017):
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SC: Catching up to def on street and telling him to produce ID was a seizure, here without RS

“Before the agents made contact with Spears, he had walked several hundred feet without the agents engaging him, indicating he was free to continue walking. By increasing their speed to catch up with Spears, the agents indicated to Spears he was no longer free to continue walking away. This is especially true considering that when the agents stopped Spears, they asked for his identification and whether he was engaged in illegal activity. Thus, in light of all the circumstances surrounding this incident, we conclude a reasonable person in Spears’s position would not have felt free to walk away, and Spears was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” “At the time Spears was seized, the agents had observed Spears and Williams, get off a bus known by the agents to be patronized by criminals, retrieve four large bags, and appear nervous while paying close attention to the agents. This evidence is insufficient to support a conclusion the agents had a ‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.’ Anderson, 415 S.C. at 447, 783 S.E.2d at 54 (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273).” State v. Spears, 2017 S.C. App. LEXIS 48 (May 31, 2017).

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Law.com/Daily Report: Students Subjected to Invasive Body Searches Sue South Georgia Sheriff

Law.com/Daily Report: Students Subjected to Invasive Body Searches Sue South Georgia Sheriff by R. Robin McDonald:

An Atlanta lawyer representing students subjected to invasive body searches during a mass-and warrantless-drug sweep at a South Georgia high school says the local sheriff who orchestrated the sweep conducted “900 illegal, suspicionless searches.”

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Stop and frisk created by SCOTUS 49 years ago today

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), was decided 49 years ago today, June 2d. The stop and frisk occurred on October 31, 1963. The Ohio Court of Appeals Eighth District opinion is interesting for its historical value: State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App.2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114, 117 (1966) (finding justification for a stop and frisk in the common law), aff’g State v. Chilton, 32 Ohio Op. 2d 489 (Ct. Common Pl., Cuyahoga Co. 1964).

Once after doing a CLE in Cleveland, probably 2007, the Federal Public Defender took me to the scene at East 14th Street and Euclid Avenue. Across the street at the intersection from the former jewelry store is this plaque:
McFaddin.
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TX14: Use of a spotlight on a boat was not a seizure

The use of a spotlight on a boat at night was not a seizure. Neale v. State, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 5008 (Tex. App. – Houston (14th Dist.) June 1, 2017):
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TN: TN SCt has to adopt Herring under exclusionary rule; Ct.Crim.App. can’t

Despite the Tennessee Supreme Court’s recent changes in exclusionary rule jurisprudence, the court has not yet adopted Herring on good faith reliance on an out of date list. This court will not do it–that court has to. State v. McElrath, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 451 (May 31, 2017):
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PA: Once SW issues for clothes and DNA removed, no further warrant needed for DNA testing

DNA lawfully seized from defendant’s clothes did not require a separate warrant to test it. Defendant doesn’t have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his victim’s DNA on him. Once DNA is lawfully taken, there is no longer any reasonable expectation of privacy in them from further testing. Commonwealth v. Smith, 2017 PA Super 170, 2017 Pa. Super. LEXIS 391 (May 31, 2017).

“In sum, because Hynes refused to submit to the chemical testing requested by the arresting officer pursuant to OCGA § 40-5-55, he was not entitled to an independent test, and the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress the results of the blood test performed pursuant to a search warrant.” Hynes v. State, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 229 (May 31, 2017).*

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TX4: Juvenile consented to search of room but parent objects; it’s the parent’s call

A juvenile was detained on suspicion of burglary, and the officers went back to his house. The juvenile consented, but the parent objected, and that was binding on the officers because of the control a parent has over a child. Also, defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes when incriminating statements were made. In re S.C., 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 4930 (Tex. App. – San Antonio May 31, 2017).

Defendant contended defense counsel was ineffective for not challenging the involuntariness of his consent [which was doubtful at best]. Instead, it was evident that police had probable cause and the automobile exception they could rely on. Thibodeaux v. State, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 4907 (Tex. App. – Amarillo May 30, 2017).*

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