Cal.6th: SW for house for CP didn’t permit search of second house found behind it

Police linked an IP address at the residence of the owner in San José to child pornography, and they obtain a search warrant for the Reynolds residence, garages, and outbuildings. They searched Reynolds’ place for child pornography and didn’t find anything. Behind the house, they discovered another residence where defendant lived. They decided to search that residence under the original warrant. The trial court suppressed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The warrant did not authorize the search of defendant’s house, too, and the good faith exception did not apply. People v. Nguyen, 2017 Cal. App. LEXIS 525 (6th Dist. June 7, 2017):
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WaPo: Colorado housing officials invite cops to perform warrantless searches on poor people

WaPo: Colorado housing officials invite cops to perform warrantless searches on poor people by Radley Balko

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N.D.Ala.: Nailed down plywood sheet wasn’t subject to removal under protective sweep but other exigency for search shown

Police entered because of a hostage situation. Removal of a nailed down plywood cover wasn’t valid as a protective sweep, but it was under exigent circumstances. United States v. Cooks, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83992 (N.D.Ala. April 28, 2017), adopted, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82811 (N.D. Ala. May 31, 2017).

Defendant was in a rented car that wasn’t rented by him, and his passenger was subject to an arrest warrant. The officer told him to “hold tight” while he checked on whether the state with the warrant would extradite. When he found out that they would, he was willing to let defendant drive off in the rented car as a courtesy. The delay was reasonable and didn’t involve his rights. As for a dog sniff, “[u]nder the circumstances, the officers had reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop (if it was prolonged at all) to conduct the sniff.” United States v. Simeon, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83991 (N.D.Ala. March 26, 2017), adopted, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82813 (N.D. Ala. May 31, 2017).*

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VT: SWs for animals are different than for other property; more likely subject to exigency

Search warrants for animals are different than for other property in that they are alive and more likely subject to exigent circumstances because animal welfare is always a consideration. When executing a warrant for two animals, others apparently in distress can be seized. State v. Sheperd, 2017 VT 39, 2017 Vt. LEXIS 64 (June 2, 2017):
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CA5: 15 minute delay between traffic offense and stop wasn’t constitutionally “stale”

15 minute delay between traffic offense and stop wasn’t constitutionally “stale.” Also, collective knowledge applies to reasonable suspicion. United States v. Zuniga, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9958 (5th Cir. June 5, 2017).

The smell of alcohol after driving the wrong way on a one-way street was probable cause for a search warrant for BAC. Luckenbach v. State, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 5148 (Tex. App. – Houston (14th Dist.) June 6, 2017).*

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UT: Police did not extend the stop by asking for consent before the purpose of the stop was complete

Police did not extend the stop by asking for consent before the purpose of the stop was complete. “One officer, after checking to make sure Scott was ‘okay and safe,’ introduced himself to Taylor and ‘asked him if there was anything dangerous, illegal, of any kind in the vehicle.’ Taylor responded no, and then the officer ‘asked him if he minded if [the police] searched the vehicle.’ Taylor consented to that request before the records check was complete.” State v. Taylor, 2017 UT App 89, 2017 Utah App. LEXIS 89 (June 2, 2017).

Officers approached a pickup truck on a storage unit property to at least inquire because of thefts in the area. They parked near the truck and approached defendant. Defendant said that the unit was his. The LPN on the truck was expired. Officers told defendant to call somebody else to come and get him because the truck shouldn’t be driven. One thing led to another and defendant admitted to having a meth “rig” inside. The admission was enough to search the truck. People v. Shoen, 2017 CO 65, 2017 Colo. LEXIS 444 (June 5, 2017).*

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IN: Unchallenged SW that led to tax assessment made seizure reasonable

“In their second amended complaint, the Garwoods did assert a Fourth Amendment claim. … It is unclear what became of it, as it was still live when the State moved for summary judgment and survived that motion. In any event, it was not tried. Given that the entry onto and seizure of the Garwoods’ property was done under a duly issued search warrant of Marion Superior Court, such a claim would have failed on its face.” Garwood v. State, 2017 Ind. App. LEXIS 238 (June 5, 2017), prior opinion, Garwood v. Ind. Dep’t of State Revenue, 939 N.E.2d 1150 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2010).

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NJ: Blocking car and shining light into car then approaching car was an investigative detention

“Defendant was faced with an investigative detention once the officer blocked in her vehicle, directed the patrol car’s alley light to shine into her car, and then approached her driver’s-side window to address her. Under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would feel the constraints on her freedom of movement from having become the focus of law enforcement attention. Accordingly, an investigative detention had begun. Reasonable articulable suspicion did not ripen prior to the officer’s subsequent exchanges with defendant.” State v. Rosario, 2017 N.J. LEXIS 584 (June 6, 2017).

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WaPo: Lawsuit: Mass search of Georgia high school students included genital touching, exposure of female students’ breasts

WaPo: Lawsuit: Mass search of Georgia high school students included genital touching, exposure of female students’ breasts by Radley Balko:
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More news on CSLI cert grant

MIT Technology Review: Warrantless Tracking of Cell Phone Location Data by the Police Could Get Harder
EFF: Supreme Court Will Hear Significant Cell Phone Tracking Case
techdirt: Supreme Court To Consider Fourth Amendment Implications Of Cell Site Location Info
Digital Trends: The US Supreme Court will soon decide a critical cellphone privacy case
NYTimes Editorial: Privacy in the Cellphone Age

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CA6: Realtime cell phone GPS tracking of a fugitive for 7+ hours was not a “search”

Realtime cell phone GPS tracking of a fugitive for 7+ hours was not a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, following United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 781 (6th Cir. 2012). United States v. Riley, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9900 (6th Cir. June 5, 2017):
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Michigan Lawyers Weekly: Fitbit data, other digital evidence used by prosecution in murder case

Michigan Lawyers Weekly: Fitbit data, other digital evidence used by prosecution in murder case by Nicole Black:

This case is particularly interesting since there was so much digital data used by the prosecution to refute the defendant’s version of the events leading to his wife’s death.

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SCOTUS: cert granted in CSLI case; third-party doctrine to be revisited, but how will it turn out?

Carpenter v. United States, 16-402 (granted June 5, 2017)
Issue: Whether the warrantless seizure and search of historical cell-phone records revealing the location and movements of a cell-phone user over the course of 127 days is permitted by the Fourth Amendment.

WaPo: Supreme Court to decide if a warrant is needed to track a suspect through cellphone records by Robert Barnes
Politico: Supreme Court to rule on cellphone location privacy by Josh Gerstein
NYTimes: Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Cellphone Tracking Case by Adam Liptak

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SD: Jury instruction on refusal of UA in a drug case was proper

At the Sturgis motorcycle rally, an officer noticed a couple enter a porta potty at 1 am. Finding this unsual, he went up and listened. He heard something that barely suggested they weren’t using the facilities for the intended use or even sex. He knocked on the door, and the man came out. Defendant remained inside sitting and had a plastic bag in hand which she dropped into the waste below. The officer retrieved it. It was reasonable to knock, and opening the door was consent. The bag was abandoned into the feces and urine below. She refused a urine test, and the state got a jury instruction on her refusal as being evidence of guilt. “In South Dakota, the same is true for drug offenses. State v. Mattson, 2005 S.D. 71, ¶ 45, 698 N.W.2d 538, 552 (‘[T]he refusal by a defendant of an officer’s legitimate request to take a urinalysis … is admissible at trial … even if the defendant is not warned that [her] refusal will be admissible at trial.’).” State v. Stanley, 2017 SD 32, 2017 S.D. LEXIS 66 (May 31, 2017).

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TN: No appeal of right for return of property under state 41(g) without successful motion to suppress

Where defendant pled guilty and did not raise a suppression issue, he could not, three years later, move for return of property under state rule 41(g) as a matter of right. The court of appeals held that the 41(g) motion could be filed anytime, and it can’t. “Rule 41(g) as written is not an open-ended vehicle for the return of seized property; it applies only when the seized property is the subject of a successful pretrial motion to suppress.” It is different than federal rule 41(g), and state procedural rules bar return here. State v. Rowland, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 325 (June 2, 2017). State v. Rowland\, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 880 (Oct. 30, 2015) reversed (posted here).

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N.D.Tex.: Defendant doesn’t show that the officer’s waving his hand near the car was a handler cue to the dog

Defendant doesn’t show that the officer’s waving his hand near the car was a handler cue to the dog. It was part of the dog training. The stop wasn’t unreasonably extended because defendant wasn’t answering questions, and he even produced a Homeland Security badge. The amount of time was reasonable spent attempting to dispel reasonable suspicion. United States v. Shen, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83559 (N.D. Tex. June 1, 2017).

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E.D.Mich.: Pole camera surveillance of curtilage and front of building for a year and 5 weeks wasn’t unreasonable

Defendant had a building that burned, and he moved out, conducting clean up and repairs. He was still considered by the FBI to be running drugs from there. The FBI installed a pole camera across the street that operated from 8-8 and later from 8am-9pm and still later from 6am to 11pm with continuous surveillance for a year and five weeks stored on a computer. First, defendant didn’t have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises after the fire because the building was so dilapidated and nothing of consequence of his remained there. Second, the use of the pole camera from across the street did not enable the government to see anything that passersby would not see. The length of surveillance did not make it unreasonable. United States v. Pratt, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84471 (E.D. Mich. June 2, 2017).

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E.D.Ky.: Affidavit for SW that didn’t mention time or continuation of drug possession was stale

Affidavit for search warrant that did not specify time and numbers of occurrences was stale. “Here, the affidavit simply states that the informant told Chief Bird that Defendant had a rock of crystal methamphetamine weighing about seven or eight ounces in his possession. This statement evinces a one-time occurrence and does not indicate a regenerating conspiracy. The affidavit does not otherwise indicate that Defendant was involved in ongoing criminal activity. There is, of course, a statement that Defendant was on house arrest and had previous drug trafficking ‘charges.’ But this does not indicate ongoing criminal activity because the basis for the house arrest is not described and the past ‘charges,’ as opposed to convictions, are undated and not tied to any circumstance existing at the time the affidavit was made. Accordingly, the nature of the crime was not sufficiently potentially recurring, and this first factor favors staleness.” The good faith exception does not apply. United States v. Higginbotham, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84918 (E.D. Ky. March 8, 2017).

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E.D.Tenn.: Householder had no apparent authority to consent to a search of a metal box she identified as somebody else’s

Householder’s consent did not apply to a search of a metal box the householder said belonged to someone else. “While it is undisputed that the officers had authority to search Cuff’s residence based on her consent, the Court finds that Cuff did not have actual or apparent authority to consent to the officers’ search of the unopened metal box because Cuff specifically told officers the box belonged to Defendant.” United States v. Gibson, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83632 (E.D. Tenn. June 1, 2017).

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D.N.M.: Where search of backpacks in car was unreasonable, each def only had standing as to his own bag

Defendants were involved in a rollover accident on a New Mexico interstate highway. Another person came to pick them up after they called. The officer on the scene insisted on searching each of the bags that they pulled out of the car to be sure that the bags they had didn’t belong to the owner of the car. The search was illegal, but each defendant only has standing as to his own bag, not that of the co-defendant. United States v. Peery, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83015 (D.N.M. Jan. 13, 2017), adopted, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82644 (D.N.M. May 31, 2017).

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