Stop and frisk created by SCOTUS 49 years ago today

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), was decided 49 years ago today, June 2d. The stop and frisk occurred on October 31, 1963. The Ohio Court of Appeals Eighth District opinion is interesting for its historical value: State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App.2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114, 117 (1966) (finding justification for a stop and frisk in the common law), aff’g State v. Chilton, 32 Ohio Op. 2d 489 (Ct. Common Pl., Cuyahoga Co. 1964).

Once after doing a CLE in Cleveland, probably 2007, the Federal Public Defender took me to the scene at East 14th Street and Euclid Avenue. Across the street at the intersection from the former jewelry store is this plaque:
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Terry is most certainly the most cited search and seizure case because it applies to reasonableness, the ultimate search and seizure question, and the scope of search being tied to its justification. Terry, 392 U.S. at 18-19:

This Court has held in the past that a search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope. Kremen v. United States, 353 U. S. 346 (1957); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. 19*19 United States, 282 U. S. 344, 356-358 (1931); see United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 586-587 (1948). The scope of the search must be “strictly tied to and justified by” the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 310 (1967) (MR. JUSTICE FORTAS, concurring); see, e. g., Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364, 367-368 (1964); Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 30-31 (1925).

Id. at 19-20:

And in determining whether the seizure and search were “unreasonable” our inquiry is a dual one—whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.