D.Kan.: After entry to arrest parole absconder, the govt could rely on protective sweep, plain view, and plain smell doctrines to expand the entry

Officers had a parole absconder warrant to retake defendant. At his motel room door, they could smell marijuana inside. After the entry, the government could rely on protective sweep, plain view, and plain smell doctrines to expand the entry. Finally, the also had consent from defendant’s wife. United States v. Wheeler, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24030 (D. Kan. Feb. 14, 2018).*

The government having obtained defendant’s Facebook records by search warrant, the court grants the government’s motion to authenticate them. United States v. Giron, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24743 (D. Md. Feb. 15, 2018).*

The government applied for a search warrant for a urine sample to show that defendant was a daily user of marijuana, but it waited eight days after seizure of a gun from defendant do seek it. Because the government knew that defendant was a daily user, the search warrant wasn’t stale. United States v. Leick, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23832 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 14, 2018).*

Posted in Arrest or entry on arrest, Plain view, feel, smell, Probation / Parole search | Comments Off on D.Kan.: After entry to arrest parole absconder, the govt could rely on protective sweep, plain view, and plain smell doctrines to expand the entry

E.D.Mich.: It’s not prosecutorial misconduct to present evidence allegedly unlawfully seized to a GJ

It’s not prosecutorial misconduct to present evidence allegedly unlawfully seized to a grand jury. That was settled in Calandra in 1974. United States v. Boston, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23751 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 14, 2018).

“Accordingly, the court finds that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Defendant prior to any pat down of his person and seizure of the cellular telephones. The record also does not support a search of Defendant’s person and seizure of the cellular telephones on any other grounds. For these reasons, the court finds that Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated by his arrest and the subsequent search of his person and the seizure of his cellular telephones. Defendant, therefore, seeks suppression of the cellular telephones and the evidence obtained from the subsequent search of the telephones. [Doc. 57].” And that is granted. United States v. McRoy, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24176 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 2018) (R&R).*

Posted in Exclusionary rule, Probable cause | Comments Off on E.D.Mich.: It’s not prosecutorial misconduct to present evidence allegedly unlawfully seized to a GJ

techdirt: Appeals Court: Handcuffing A Compliant Ten-Year-Old Is Unreasonable But Deputy Had No Way Of Knowing That

techdirt: Appeals Court: Handcuffing A Compliant Ten-Year-Old Is Unreasonable But Deputy Had No Way Of Knowing That by Tim Cushing:

Time and time again, courts remind officers of the law don’t actually have to know the law to enforce the law. Yes, that’s how it all works out for citizens, who are just as frequently reminded ignorance of the law is no excuse. This has led to the prevalence of pretextual stops where minor traffic violations (that may not even be violations) are used to initiate long conversations with law enforcement officers with the end goal of obtaining consent for a search or to bring a drug dog onto the scene.

See CA4: Handcuffing a compliant child at school violated 4A, but officer gets QI.

Posted in Qualified immunity, Reasonableness | Comments Off on techdirt: Appeals Court: Handcuffing A Compliant Ten-Year-Old Is Unreasonable But Deputy Had No Way Of Knowing That

S.D.Ohio: Affidavit for SW judicially estopped govt to claim no standing

The affidavit for the search warrant alleged the house was defendant’s house. The government was judicially estopped from claiming otherwise in the proceeding without real evidence the affidavit was wrong. [I’ve been arguing this for years; see Treatise § 4.03.] Moreover, defendant’s guilty plea in state court on the same affidavit for the search warrant after a motion to suppress was filed and abandoned was not collateral estoppel because there was final resolution on the merits. United States v. Black, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24199 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2018):
Continue reading →

Posted in Burden of proof, Motion to suppress, Standing | Comments Off on S.D.Ohio: Affidavit for SW judicially estopped govt to claim no standing

Ct.Claims: Motion to dismiss denied: “plaintiffs sufficiently allege actions which are inconsistent with the exercise of police power”

Plaintiffs alleged a Fifth Amendment taking because the government took their truck to do a drug operation. The claim survives a motion to dismiss. “Because plaintiffs do not challenge the legality of the government’s action, we deny the jurisdictional challenge. Because plaintiffs sufficiently allege actions which are inconsistent with the exercise of police power, we also deny the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Craig Thomas Expeditors LLC v. United States, 2018 U.S. Claims LEXIS 94 (Feb. 16, 2018).

The order denying defendant’s motion for return of property was not shown to be a final order and thus not yet appealable. Whitney v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 128, 2018 Ark. App. LEXIS 121 (Feb. 14, 2018).*

Posted in Rule 41(g) / Return of property | Comments Off on Ct.Claims: Motion to dismiss denied: “plaintiffs sufficiently allege actions which are inconsistent with the exercise of police power”

Just Security: Microsoft Ireland: Extraterritoriality Step Zero

Just Security: Microsoft Ireland: Extraterritoriality Step Zero by Pamela Bookman:
Continue reading →

Posted in F.R.Crim.P. 41 | Comments Off on Just Security: Microsoft Ireland: Extraterritoriality Step Zero

VI: Govt couldn’t rely on inventory to justify search when the vehicle wasn’t impounded

Officer’s knowledge that defendant possessed a firearm was not reasonable suspicion in itself because one could possess a firearm in the VI, albeit with a license. When officers observed bullet holes in the car and defendant was nervous and evasive, there was reasonable suspicion. The search of defendant’s vehicle, however, was unreasonable for lack of exigency. Defendant as in the back of a police car. The government tried to justify the search as an inventory, but the vehicle was not taken into custody for there to be an inventory. People v. Freeman, 2018 V.I. LEXIS 15 (Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 2018).

Posted in Automobile exception, Inventory | Comments Off on VI: Govt couldn’t rely on inventory to justify search when the vehicle wasn’t impounded

E.D.Pa.: Govt adequately showed nexus that drugs were in def’s house

The government adequately showed nexus to search defendant’s house because it showed probable cause to believe he was an active drug dealer that likely was keeping his stash at home. United States v. Rosario, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2018):
Continue reading →

Posted in Nexus | Comments Off on E.D.Pa.: Govt adequately showed nexus that drugs were in def’s house

GA: Where no violation of clear statute, no Heien reasonable mistake of law defense for state

Defendant did not violate the traffic statute that the officer stopped him for. Therefore, Heien’s reasonable mistake of law and good faith doesn’t apply. Moreover, there is no good faith exception in Georgia. Harris v. State, 2018 Ga. App. LEXIS 67 (Feb. 14, 2018).

The circuit court erred in granting a defendant’s motion for return of property based on two attached documents where the state didn’t even get a chance to respond. The facts were in dispute on whether the money was evidence or forfeitable. The state claimed it was evidence for defendant’s drug trial. Clayton v. State, 2018 Fla. App. LEXIS 2235 (Fla. 2d DCA Feb. 14, 2018).

Posted in Reasonableness, Rule 41(g) / Return of property | Comments Off on GA: Where no violation of clear statute, no Heien reasonable mistake of law defense for state

CA11: Becoming defensive about some questioning during stop didn’t rise to RS

Being in a high crime area and then becoming defensive only when the officer asked defendant where his mother lived when it came up was not reasonable suspicion. Defendant’s frisk was unreasonable on the totality. Suppressing the gun found on him necessitates vacating his firearms conviction. United States v. Heard, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 3447 (11th Cir. Feb. 12, 2018).

“Although defendant was the driver and sole occupant of the Buick, and undoubtedly had a subjective expectation of privacy, he has not established a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Defendant had not been authorized by the owner of the vehicle to drive the Buick, and did not have a valid license to drive any vehicle. Such an unauthorized driver does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.” United States v. English, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23011 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2018).*

Posted in Reasonable suspicion, Standing | Comments Off on CA11: Becoming defensive about some questioning during stop didn’t rise to RS

CA9: Federal civil suit seeking to revisit Guam Superior Court PC determination barred by abstention

A federal suit to have the Guam Superior Court revisit its probable cause determination in a criminal case is barred by Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Santos v. Superior Court of Guam, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 3433 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2018).

Posted in § 1983 / Bivens | Comments Off on CA9: Federal civil suit seeking to revisit Guam Superior Court PC determination barred by abstention

IN: Hot pursuit into Kentucky did not violate state constitution

Defendant was more than reasonably suspected of committing a homicide in Indiana, and police got a line on him heading to Kentucky. A vehicle matching the description of his was seen on the nearest bridge to Kentucky shortly thereafter and Indiana law enforcement pursued him to Kentucky and arrested him. His arrest in Kentucky did not violate the Fourth Amendment because there was sufficient cause. It also did not violate the state constitution which the Indiana courts will interpret more broadly. Whitt v. State, 2018 Ind. App. LEXIS 56 (Feb. 14, 2018). As to the state constitution:
Continue reading →

Posted in Hot pursuit, Reasonable suspicion, State constitution | Comments Off on IN: Hot pursuit into Kentucky did not violate state constitution

MA: Two detectives joining into a traffic stop didn’t make it unreasonable or extend it

The stop was for a traffic offense, and two detectives stopped to participate. Their questions about smelling marijuana didn’t unreasonably extend the stop. Commonwealth v. Buckley, 2018 Mass. LEXIS 87 (Feb. 14, 2018):
Continue reading →

Posted in Reasonable suspicion, Reasonableness | Comments Off on MA: Two detectives joining into a traffic stop didn’t make it unreasonable or extend it

CA7: Controlled buy corroborated CI

“Although the factors [on CI reliability] go both ways, on balance they support the CI’s reliability. Most significantly, the deputies corroborated the CI’s story with their own investigation by conducting surveillance and executing a controlled buy.” United States v. Haynes, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 3380 (7th Cir. Feb. 14, 2018).*

Plaintiff’s Bivens claim for excessive force in roughly handcuffing a completely compliant arrestee by a park ranger in Death Valley stated a claim for relief. Motion to dismiss denied. Knickerbocker v. United States, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23603 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2018).*

Posted in Excessive force, Informant hearsay | Comments Off on CA7: Controlled buy corroborated CI

New Republic: Should Cops Be Allowed to Rip Up Your Stuff While Looking for Drugs?

New Republic: Should Cops Be Allowed to Rip Up Your Stuff While Looking for Drugs? by Matt Ford:

How the Supreme Court can curtail the destruction of private property during police searches

Posted in Scope of search | Comments Off on New Republic: Should Cops Be Allowed to Rip Up Your Stuff While Looking for Drugs?

wccftech: Sony Starts Sharing PlayStation 4 Data with the FBI – Begins with a Terror Investigation

wccftech: Sony Starts Sharing PlayStation 4 Data with the FBI – Begins with a Terror Investigation by Rafia Shaikh:
Continue reading →

Posted in Computer and cloud searches, E-mail | Comments Off on wccftech: Sony Starts Sharing PlayStation 4 Data with the FBI – Begins with a Terror Investigation

S.D.N.Y.: A Franks challenge that is nothing more than an argument about inferences doesn’t plead enough to get a hearing

A Franks challenge that is nothing more than an argument about inferences doesn’t plead enough to get a hearing. United States v. Defilippo, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22784 (S.D. N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018):
Continue reading →

Posted in Franks doctrine | Comments Off on S.D.N.Y.: A Franks challenge that is nothing more than an argument about inferences doesn’t plead enough to get a hearing

NY4: Scope of search claim defaulted by not presenting it to trial court

A facial challenge to a search warrant is a question of law, and no hearing is required. On the application, probable cause was shown along with the CI’s reliability. Defendant’s claim the search exceeded the search warrant is defaulted for failure to raise in the trial court. People v. Navarro, 2018 NY Slip Op 00938, 2018 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 948 (4th Dept. Feb. 13, 2018).

Which officer was operating a police car’s computer terminal during a traffic stop is really irrelevant to any issue. United States v. Buchheim, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23330 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 13, 2018).*

Plaintiff in his indigent § 1983 case claims the search that led to his arrest was unreasonable, but he pleads no standing to contest the search. In addition, “The court takes judicial notice of the case action summary for Heiken’s criminal cases as maintained on the Alabama Trial Court System, hosted at www.alacourt.com. See Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1041 n.18 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that a federal court may ‘take judicial notice of [the State’s] Online Judicial System’).” That was necessary to ferret out facts of the underlying state case. Heiken v. Meeks, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23429 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 13, 2018).*

Posted in Burden of pleading, Burden of proof, Standing | Comments Off on NY4: Scope of search claim defaulted by not presenting it to trial court

LA2: IAC claim was fact intensive and denied w/o prejudice to pursue in post-conviction

“After reviewing this record, we find that the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is not adequately developed in the record and would be more properly raised in an application for PCR. The defendant’s contention that the recording is inadmissible is based upon his assertion that it was recorded while he was being held in the patrol car without probable cause. Whether the defendant was being detained without probable cause is a fact-intensive inquiry and such an inquiry is missing from the record in this case. See State v. Miller, 2000-1657 (La. 10/26/01), 798 So. 2d 947.” State v. Wooten, 2018 La. App. LEXIS 232 (La. App. 2 Cir. Feb. 13, 2018).

Defendant’s 2255 ineffective assistance of counsel claim that the warrantless search of his home while he was on federal supervised released was raised on the merits before conviction, he lost, and he appealed. It can’t be raised again. United States v. Hilton, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22952 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2018).*

Posted in Ineffective assistance | Comments Off on LA2: IAC claim was fact intensive and denied w/o prejudice to pursue in post-conviction

E.D.Ky.: Subjective belief in implied consent to enter was unreasonable; motion to suppress granted

The officer’s subjective belief in implied consent was unreasonable. There was no implied consent, and the motion to suppress is granted, despite the R&R. “Here, it is undisputed that neither Officer Tackett nor Officer Stevens asked for permission to enter the Defendants’ home. … Rather, in response to and in compliance with the officers’ demand for the Defendants’ identification and the social workers’ request for a ‘pill count,’ Defendants walked into their home to retrieve the requested items. … The officers simply followed behind them.” United States v. Blackaby, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22204 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2018):
Continue reading →

Posted in Consent | Comments Off on E.D.Ky.: Subjective belief in implied consent to enter was unreasonable; motion to suppress granted