CA5: 4A doesn’t require officer have an arrest warrant in hand or to have even read it

There is no Fourth Amendment requirement that the officer have read or have in hand an arrest warrant. United States v. Moore, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19668 (5th Cir. Aug. 6, 2024).

The officers’ use of force here was reasonable because plaintiff briefly pointed his gun at them before dropping it. Caraway v. City of Pineville, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19617 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2024).*

Defendant’s mother freely and voluntarily consented to police entry into their home when the officers were looking for him as a fugitive. United States v. Hankerson, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19633 (11th Cir. Aug. 6, 2024).*

The officer’s allegedly illegal search did not even appear in the search warrant application, so there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment. The affidavit otherwise shows probable cause. State v. Corrothers, 2024 N.C. App. LEXIS 611 (Aug. 6, 2024).*

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MT: SCA grants state courts authority to issue SWs for out-of-state data

Because the internet uniformly crosses state lines, the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), grants state courts additional jurisdiction over search warrants for information that is stored out of state. State v. LeVine, 2024 MT 169 (Aug. 6, 2024):

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Yes, I’m behind on postings

I’m in my ninth trial this year. Tenth next week.

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Reason: The Volokh Conspiracy, The Fifth Circuit Shuts Down Geofence Warrants—And Maybe A Lot More

Reason: The Volokh Conspiracy, The Fifth Circuit Shuts Down Geofence Warrants—And Maybe A Lot More by Orin S. Kerr:

An astonishing ruling, and one that creates splits on two differerent issues.

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New Law Review: Who’s Got Mail? The Fourth Amendment Impact of Pseudonyms

Timothy S. Iversen, Comment: Who’s Got Mail? The Fourth Amendment Impact of Pseudonyms, 31 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 961 (Spring 2024):

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WI: Initial PC and bail determination not critical stage, but if it becomes more, yes

While the probable cause and bail decision itself is not a critical stage, the post-arrest process of determining bail is the critical stage point where the right to counsel attaches. Here, an identification procedure was included. State v. Robinson, 2024 Wisc. App. LEXIS 654 (Aug. 6, 2024).

The officers’ use of force here was reasonable because plaintiff briefly pointed his gun at them before dropping it. Caraway v. City of Pineville, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19617 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2024).*

Defendant’s mother freely and voluntarily consented to police entry into their home when the officers were looking for him as a fugitive. United States v. Hankerson, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19633 (11th Cir. Aug. 6, 2024).*

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W.D.N.C.: While NCIC data error on warrant was “troubling,” the arrest was still in good faith

While there was an NCIC warrant entry error which was “troubling,” it has nothing to do with the good faith of the officers in executing it under Evans. United States v. Valdez, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138952 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 6, 2024).

“A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim ‘is properly understood as a Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure which incorporates certain elements of the common law tort.’ Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). To succeed, a plaintiff must show that the defendant ‘(1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in [the] plaintiff’s favor.’ Id. A party challenging the veracity of a warrant application must show that the officers made ‘material false statements in the warrant application’ either deliberately or with a ‘“reckless disregard for the truth,”’ Humbert v. Mayor & City Council of Balt. City, 866 F.3d 546, 556 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978)), or omitted from that application, ‘material facts with the intent to make, or with reckless disregard of whether they thereby made, the [application] misleading.’ Humbert, 866 F.3d at 556 (citation omitted).” Hicks v. Anne Arundel Cty., 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19616 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2024).*

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M.D.Pa.: Even summary denial of 4A claim in state court means Stone bar applies

Even a summary denial of a Fourth Amendment claim gets deference under Stone v. Powell. Burns v. Hainsworth, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138877 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2024).

Petitioner’s successor habeas petition claim based on an alleged fabricated search warrant, even if credited, doesn’t show actual innocence or that it is newly discovered. In re Moya-Feliciano, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19591 (11th Cir. Aug. 5, 2024).*

Petitioner seeks a CoA on numerous 2254 claims. His Fourth Amendment claim is defaulted but barred by Stone in any event. It is a mere disagreement with the state court. Martin v. Scott, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19612 (6th Cir. Aug. 5, 2024).*

No ineffective assistance of counsel: “Nothing in the record suggests a factual or legal basis on which appellate counsel could have challenged the trial court’s ruling on direct appeal.’ Hayes v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138907 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2024).*

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CA9: Ptf’s protestations of innocence at arrest doesn’t undermine this arrest warrant

“Farber’s § 1983 claims also fail because she has not shown an underlying constitutional violation. Her arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the arresting officers ‘had a good faith, reasonable belief that [Farber] was the subject of the warrant.’ Rivera v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 745 F.3d 384, 389 (9th Cir. 2014). The Texas court issued the warrant for Farber, and her identifying information and physical descriptors matched the warrant exactly. Farber’s protestations of innocence, without more, did not make the officers’ beliefs unreasonable. See id.” It all turned out that Farber was mistakenly indicted in Texas. Farber v. City of L.A., 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19597 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2024). (And that’s not the City of L.A.’s fault, either.)

Under either version of events offered by the parties about this search, it was justified and reasonable, and the motion to suppress is denied. United States v. Dowell, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138730 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 6, 2024).*

“Murphy was on probation rather than parole. In the context of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has noted that parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, as parole is just a variation on imprisonment while probation is meted out in addition to imprisonment, not in lieu of it. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006).” United States v. Campbell, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19532 n.2 (7th Cir. Aug. 5, 2024).*

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Reason: The FBI Raided This Innocent Woman’s House. Will She Ever Get Justice?

Reason: The FBI Raided This Innocent Woman’s House. Will She Ever Get Justice? by Billy Binion (“The FBI detonated a flash grenade in the house and ripped the door from its hinges in a raid to arrest a man, Joseph Riley, accused of gang activity, who lived in a different house approximately one block over … Almost seven years have gone by, and Martin and Cliatt are still trying to find recourse for what happened that night. A federal lawsuit they filed continues to wind its way through the judiciary, although the courts have thus far immunized the government from having to pay any damages.”)

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W.D.Okla.: Search of hotel room lacked justification under community caretaking function; allied SW lacked PC

The search of defendant’s hotel room was without probable cause or any other justification for a warrantless search, here the community caretaking function. That search supported a warranted search, but it was necessary to the finding of probable cause for that, too. Thus, the search was unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the motion to suppress is granted. United States v. Douthard, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138676 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 5, 2024).*

Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not predicting Fourth Amendment future law, especially where the law isn’t clear. United States v. Plascencia, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138227 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 5, 2024).

Entering defendant’s car was valid as a prelude to an inventory. United States v. Jordan, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138249 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 5, 2024).*

Loper Bright and Dobbs have nothing to do with the Fourth Amendment or successive habeas petitions and CSLI. “Meanwhile, Gibson points to no new evidence of innocence.” Gibson v. United States, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19525 (7th Cir. Aug. 5, 2024).*

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AP: Prosecutors plan to charge former Kansas police chief over his conduct following newspaper raid

AP: Prosecutors plan to charge former Kansas police chief over his conduct following newspaper raid by John Hanna (“Two special prosecutors said Monday that they plan to charge a former central Kansas police chief with obstruction of justice over his conduct following a police raid last year on the local weekly newspaper. Prosecutors Marc Bennett and Barry Wilkerson concluded in their 124-page report that the staff at the Marion County Record committed no crimes before former Marion Police Chief Gideon Cody led a raid on its offices and the home of its publisher. They said police warrants signed by a judge to allow the searches contained inaccurate information from an ‘inadequate investigation’ and that the searches were not legally justified.”)

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DE: Inevitable discovery can’t be based on speculation

The state’s argument on inevitable discovery is really based on speculation, and that’s not enough. State v. Franks, 2024 Del. Super. LEXIS 561 (Aug. 1, 2024).

Plaintiff was arrested for drugs, held five months, then released. “We hold that the record evinces genuine disputes of material fact bearing on whether Harris, Sr. was arrested and charged without probable cause, and that the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity for the Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim. We further hold that a plaintiff who was not convicted of a crime, but was arrested and detained for several months, can still state a Fourteenth Amendment fabrication of evidence claim, and the district court erred in holding otherwise.” Harris v. Town of S. Pines, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19485 (4th Cir. Aug. 5, 2024).*

“The question before this Court is whether the evidence presented at the hearing and at trial preponderates against the trial court’s determination that the defendant voluntarily consented to the warrantless blood draw. Reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the evidence of the defendant’s physical and mental condition preponderates against a finding that the defendant possessed the capacity to consent, and therefore, the State failed to meet its burden.” State v. Allen, 2024 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 356 (Aug. 5, 2024).*

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CA5: Drug dog jumping in already open window not unreasonable

Drug dog’s spontaneously jumping in the vehicle window that was down when the stop began wasn’t directed by the officer and didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Wilson, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19424 (5th Cir. Aug. 2, 2024).

A reasonable officer in these circumstances would have used a Taser on a person yelling “get the fuck out of here” running around in a building in the dark. No Fourth Amendment violation, so “clearly established” doesn’t have to be decided. Odom v. Boisvert, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19442 (11th Cir. Aug. 5, 2024).*

Plaintiff’s claim of sexual assault and “having to get naked everyday” in prison doesn’t state a Fourth Amendment claim (Carnes v. Hall, 665 F. Supp. 3d 831, 842 (E.D. Ky. 2023) (citing Rogers v. City of Little Rock, Arkansas, 152 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1998))), but it is analyzed as an Eighth Amendment claim instead. Taylor v. Unknown Bush, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137107 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 2, 2024).*

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N.D.Ind.: Govt has burden to show first appearance more than 48 hours after arrest was reasonable

“Mr. Williams alleged enough facts to support an inference that his rights were violated. Mr. Williams contends that the County Sheriff violated his Fourth Amendment rights because he was jailed without a timely decision about whether there was probable cause to arrest him. … It is presumptively reasonable to hold a person in jail for up to 48 hours before there is a determination of probable cause. … But if a person is detained for more than 48 hours, the burden shifts to the government to show that the delay was justified by an emergency or an extraordinary circumstance.” Williams v. Kosciusko Cty. Sheriff, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137224 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 2, 2024).

“Here, as was the case in Mosley, the totality of the circumstances supported the officers’ reasonable suspicion. Two 911 callers reported hearing multiple shots fired in the same area. A third caller reported seeing two masked suspects near a red Saturn near where those shots were fired, while another vehicle drove off. That the suspects wore masks also indicated suspicious, perhaps criminal, activity. Though Winborn alleges the third caller could not concretely state whether the suspects committed a crime, we rejected a similar requirement in Mosley. See id. As mentioned, Winborn was located one block away from the reported scene, just two minutes after officers received information about the red Saturn. Moreover, when one of the officers began to approach the red Saturn, Winborn suspiciously insisted, ‘[y]ou’ve got the wrong car.’ [¶] While these facts separately could be consistent with innocent behavior, when taken together, they give rise to reasonable suspicion to justify the stop under the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Winborn, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19450 (8th Cir. Aug. 5, 2024).*

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NYTimes: Traffic Stop Data Can Shape Policy. It’s Often Missing.

NYTimes: Traffic Stop Data Can Shape Policy. It’s Often Missing. By Ben Blatt and Emily Badger (“Communities with good data often have different political and policy discussions than places where nonexistent data makes it hard for the public to know what’s going on. Data collection is also a police reform in itself. Data mandates tell the police that their actions are being tracked. As several researchers told us, the existence of data alone can change how the police behave.”)

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CA6: Confusing caselaw on nexus to a home means GFE applies

Confusing caselaw on nexus to a home means good faith. “The affidavit established that Stewart was part of a continuous and ongoing drug-trafficking operation—it tied Stewart to a five-pound shipment of methamphetamine, a separate transaction for two ounces of methamphetamine, and a scheme to purchase $13,130 of drugs from Nashville. But the affidavit contained no direct evidence linking Stewart’s trafficking activities to his house. At the time of the search, cases in this circuit came out differently on whether this evidence sufficed for probable cause.” United States v. Turnerhttp://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/24a0343n-06.pdf, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19408 (6th Cir. Aug. 2, 2024).

Defendant’s Fourth Amendment forfeiture arguments were not raised below thus denying the state the opportunity to make a record. State v. Washburn, 2024 VT 45 (Aug. 2, 2024).*

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FL5: With MMJ, smell of cannabis is no longer RS, conflicting with FL2

“Here, under the totality of the circumstances, Accra did not develop reasonable suspicion of criminal activity because the degree of suspicion that attached to the observed conduct is too insignificant. … The record is devoid, in testimony or otherwise, of any circumstances that would have led a reasonable officer to believe that Baxter was unlawfully possessing cannabis at the inception of the investigatory detention. To justify a detention, there must be some context or other factors that, in combination with the potentially lawful activity, creates reasonable suspicion.” “Because it is no longer ‘immediately apparent’ that the smell of cannabis is synonymous with criminal activity, it cannot be the sole basis supporting reasonable suspicion for an investigatory detention. Instead, the smell of cannabis is a factor that may be considered under the totality of the circumstances. However, because Accra reasonably relied on binding precedent at the time of the arrest, we affirm. We further certify conflict with the stated holding in Owens [v. State, 317 So. 3d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)].” Baxter v. State, 2024 Fla. App. LEXIS 6030 (Fla. 5th DCA Aug. 2, 2024).

The officers testified credibly that defendant failed to stop for a stop sign, which he admitted because of mechanical problems with the car. The fact officer 2 didn’t see it doesn’t mean officer 1 didn’t. United States v. McCoy, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137216 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 2, 2024).*

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CA4: Dist.Ct.’s denial of injunction against taint team search protocol not appealable

The target of a search sought District Court intervention over a taint team’s search protocol, and it denied an injunction. There was no appellate jurisdiction to take that issue up. In re Search Warrants Issued February 18, 2022 (United States v. Doe), 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19344 (4th Cir. Aug. 2, 2024).

Since the search of the apartment defendant was a guest in was valid, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on standing didn’t matter. Dunbar v. United States, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19295 (6th Cir. Aug. 1, 2024).*

A 911 call and more about a bar fight was reasonable suspicion. “Considering these informational sources together, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that Langston was about to engage in criminal activity — public fighting, potentially with a gun on hand.” United States v. Langston, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19353 (1st Cir. Aug. 2, 2024).*

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DC: Illegal stop led to finding weapon, and it was not attenuated

Defendant was subjected to a stop that violated the Fourth Amendment. Information from that stop sufficiently led to a search of a dwelling producing a gun. That was fruit of the poisonous tree. There was a first search that could be said was not a product of the illegal stop. After the stop, they searched again and found what was overlooked. That was connected to the stop. James v. United States, 2024 D.C. App. LEXIS 282 (Aug. 1, 2024). (This case was under submission for 34 months. It also has a 2019 appellate case number. Was James in custody this whole time?)

“[I]t was not clearly established in June 2020 that an officer may not use pepper spray to arrest someone who is suspected of a serious crime, has made several violent threats, and is noncompliant. Officer Hemsted is entitled to qualified immunity.” Drew v. City of Des Moines, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 19265 (8th Cir. Aug. 2, 2024).*

Six months from a NCMEC report and a child pornography search warrant was not stale. Other state cases were longer. State v. Edwards, 2024 ME 55 (Aug. 1, 2024).* (Once again, no case I’ve ever seen finds staleness in a child porn warrant. As I’ve said before, I had a client once who had his stuff for 40 years.)

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