Defendant does not offer further context or analysis. Based upon his failure to fully address this issue, the Defendant’s argument regarding an alleged illegal search and seizure is denied without prejudice. See United States v. Collins, 796 F.3d 829, 836 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that the parties, rather than the court, must research and construct available legal arguments). The Defendant may file a Motion to Suppress to fully address this issue.” United States v. Williams, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59904 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 6, 2020).
Defendant’s claim of falsity under Franks was at worst negligence. “Here, the district court did not err in finding that Thompson failed to meet this burden. To the extent that one statement in the affidavit misrepresented the source of the affiant’s information, as Thompson argues on appeal, there is no evidence that this was done intentionally or with a ‘high degree of awareness of its probable falsity.’” United States v. Thompson, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10729 (4th Cir. Apr. 6, 2020).*
Posted inBurden of pleading, Franks doctrine|Comments Off on N.D.Ind.: Merely saying in a motion to suppress def was arrested without probable cause doesn’t state grounds
Pro se prison inmate plaintiff fails to state claims for § 1983 relief including alleged arbitrary strip searches. With his disciplinary record, they aren’t arbitrary. He’s in a prison, after all. Wright v. United States, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59884 (W.D. N.C. Apr. 3, 2020):
Based on all the evidence, the consenter had apparent authority to consent to the search of the house. While she’d supposedly moved out, she had a key and still had stuff there, and the officers had no suggestion that she might have lacked authority to consent. Conner v. Vacek, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10714 (7th Cir. Apr. 6, 2020) [Sounds a lot like Illinois v. Rodriguez.]
After a remand to consider the full record, it’s clear the petitioner had a “full and fair opportunity to litigate” his search issue under Stone v. Powell, and he did, in fact, do so. Besides, it was right anyway. Thornton v. Goodrich, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10722 (10th Cir. Apr. 6, 2020).*
The seizure of defendant’s cell phone for child pornography as soon as it was discovered was reasonable, and a state search warrant was sought right after that. A federal search warrant four months later wasn’t stale. United States v. Grinder, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10725 (4th Cir. Apr. 6, 2020).*
Lawfare: Disease Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment by Alan Z. Rozenshtein (“Like governments around the world, the United States is struggling with the ‘coronavirus trilemma’: It wants to protect lives, ease social isolation, and protect privacy and civil liberties, but it can do only two of those at the same time. In particular, and as South Korea’s successful management of the coronavirus shows, extensive surveillance may be the only way to control the outbreak while preserving some degree of normalcy for economic and social life. I’ve argued that the longer the pandemic drags on, the more willing (and rightly so) people will be to trade in some of their privacy for the freedom to work and play. There is already significant support for location tracking among both policy experts and the general public, and we should expect this sentiment to increase.”)
Posted inSurveillance technology|Comments Off on Lawfare: Disease Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment
The state claimed that the officers had reasonable suspicion which wasn’t apparent to the court of appeals. Then a drug dog didn’t alert. That’s when the stop should have ended. The request to have a second dog sniff was unreasonable. State v. King, 2020-Ohio-1312, 2020 Ohio App. LEXIS 1269 (9th Dist. Apr. 6, 2020).
As the officer approached the stopped vehicle, he saw furtive movements. Defendant was extremely nervous, and the occupants’ stories made no sense. This was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Wilson, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10664 (8th Cir. Apr. 6, 2020).*
There was probable cause for search of defendant’s car under the automobile exception because of controlled buys. Even if not, inevitable discovery would apply because forfeiture proceedings had already been started. United States v. Mobley, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10710 (11th Cir. Apr. 6, 2020).*
Realtime GPS tracking information from a bank money pack taken in a bank robbery led police to a block in Wilmington, Delaware. It was reasonable for the police to cordon off the entire block and seize every car in it looking for the robbers. Montgomery v. State, 2020 Del. LEXIS 128 (Apr. 3, 2020) (Treatise § 23.14 n.2):
The 2017 orders for real time CSLI didn’t satisfy the timeliness requirement for probable cause, and they would be stale. However, back then, the circuit hadn’t approached the holding in Carpenter at all, and the good faith exception would be applied. United States v. Robinson, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59385 (E.D. N.C. Mar. 5, 2020), adopted, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58038 (E.D. N.C. Apr. 2, 2020) (USMJ’s opinion an excellent discussion of staleness and CSLI requests).
“In this case, Officer Spratt asked defendant, ‘I just want to make sure you don’t got no weapons or nothing. Can you do me a favor? Can you put your hands behind your back so we can make sure our safety is fine.’ Hr’g Tr. at 32. Defendant appeared to consent by first nodding his head, and then following the officer’s request to put his hands behind his back. Despite this appearance of acquiescence, defendant argues that any consent was not voluntary due to the coercive nature of the encounter. We note that lack of voluntariness was not raised in defendant’s motion to suppress, but it was argued briefly at his hearing and the district court addressed it in its ruling.” This was on video. Moreover, the officer had reasonable suspicion for the patdown regardless of the consent. United States v. Wilson, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10622 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 2020) (2-1).*
There was no reasonable suspicion to extend the stop for the officer’s questions about weapons and consent to search. There was no probable cause for the automobile exception to apply, and the product of the search can’t justify it. Suppression of the search of the car granted. United States v. Shakur, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59381 (E.D. Va. Apr. 3, 2020).
Defendant was in custody and thus was entitled to a warning of his right to refuse consent to search his backpack, which the police failed to do as required by state case law. Denial of suppression reversed. Atkins v. State, 2020 Ind. App. LEXIS 132 (Apr. 3, 2020).*
Fact questions remained after defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s § 1983 case on the reasonableness of defendant’s use of force. The video isn’t as clear on the issue as he says. Therefore, no qualified immunity and the appeal is dismissed. Banas v. Hagbom, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10597 (6th Cir. Apr. 1, 2020).*
The search warrant for defendant’s car was specific as to the car and it’s contents, but didn’t include a cell phone found in defendant’s pocket when the car was stopped. State v. Zadeh, 2020 Md. LEXIS 173 (Apr. 3, 2020).
The seizure of defendant’s emails between him and his lawyer didn’t violate the Sixth Amendment when adversary proceedings had not yet begun – defendant wasn’t indicted for more than a year later. United States v. Smith, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59335 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 3, 2020):
The police likely exceeded the private search of a computer, but the product will not be suppressed. A search warrant was issued, and the police relied on it in good faith. The private search doctrine as to computers is more relaxed. United States v. Fall, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10589 (4th Cir. Apr. 3, 2020):
Posted inComputer and cloud searches, Private search|Comments Off on CA4: Police exceeding private search of a computer isn’t treated the same as other private searches
When defendant was stopped and found to have a suspended license, the normal incidents of a traffic stop are accordingly extended, and that didn’t make waiting for a drug dog unreasonable. Olmeda v. Commonwealth, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 40 (Apr. 3, 2020).
Plaintiff prison inmate sued over the use of excessive force against him. The district court concluded his bruising was only de minimus injury, and the correctional officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Pierre v. Padgett, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10508 (11th Cir. Apr. 3, 2020).
The affidavit for search warrant detailed a year long investigation and hand-to-hand transaction, surveillance details of defendant buying 3 kg of cocaine. It was protracted and continuing and that means it wasn’t all stale. United States v. Hubbard, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58512 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 2020),* adopted, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57407 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 1, 2020).*
A purported protective sweep of defendant’s car for a weapon was not justified by any facts, and neither was a search of an envelope which would hardly contain a weapon. Neither was there probable cause for the automobile exception. “In the light of these facts and guided by our precedent about the kinds of circumstances sufficient to support probable cause, no reasonable and prudent officer on the scene could have concluded that a fair probability existed (not that it was just conceivable) that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in West’s truck or in the envelope. That West, in a routine traffic stop, looked repeatedly at his mirror at the officer who had stopped him and opened his fist over an envelope — without more — is not enough to give rise to probable cause supporting a warrantless search of West’s truck.” United States v. West, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10529 (11th Cir. Apr. 3, 2020).
Posted inProtective sweep|Comments Off on CA11: Protective weapons search of car or an envelope in the car unjustified by any facts
The officer here had reasonable suspicion on the totality to extend the stop aside from the fact the two adults in the vehicle had no drivers licenses and the insurance card didn’t match them. The officer’s looking at the undercarriage of the vehicle didn’t require probable cause. Drugs were seen hidden over the spare tire. United States v. Sanchez, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10537 (8th Cir. Apr. 3, 2020):
A 911 call wasn’t anonymous because the number called from was captured. “‘Some factors that significantly support the reliability of an anonymous tip include: “eyewitness knowledge”; a “contemporaneous report”; the fact that an event is startling; and use of the 911 emergency system, which allows for tracing of calls.’ Id. at ¶ 35, quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 399-401, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014).” State v. Rutherford, 2020-Ohio-1309, 2020 Ohio App. LEXIS 1238 (2d Dist. Apr. 3, 2020).
Defendant made a Franks challenge which was litigated and lost and which was raised again day 15 of the trial. “The Court strenuously reminded counsel that he continued to pursue such defense since the Franks hearing, despite the denial of his Franks motion, and ignoring the stipulation among the parties as well as the Court’s holding that the search of Delgado’s apartment and any testimony pertaining to police corruption would not be raised at trial.” He doesn’t show prejudice for ineffective assistance of counsel. Galán-Olavarria v. United States, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58361 (D.P.R. Mar. 30, 2020).*
District court did not plainly err in imposing a suspicionless search condition separate from federal law that normally requires reasonable suspicion. United States v. Sulik, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10450 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 2020).
“Nothing in the record suggests that Allen’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the seizure of evidence from Alvarez’s apartment, and therefore Allen cannot show deficient performance.” So no ineffective assistance of counsel. United States v. Allen, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58237 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 28, 2020).*
Pro se plaintiff appealing the dismissal of his Fourth Amendment claim, “does not address the court’s reasons for dismissal; he has, therefore, abandoned his claims.” The suit involved a claim against his defense counsel in state court which was not specified. Thompson v. Roussell, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 10458 (5th Cir. Apr. 1, 2020).*
Defendant’s alleged unlawful detention by the feds didn’t create a Fourth Amendment claim to suppress his statement to state officials while in custody. Police had at least four other ways to find defendant’s cell phone number, which they did to match it up, so the probable 2008 illegal search of the cell phone was not unconstitutional or unreasonable because of inevitable discovery. After the murder, the police conducted several searches with warrants. One three days later wasn’t stale. They didn’t get all they were looking for in the first warrant and came back with another. People v. Fayed, 2020 Cal. LEXIS 2090 (Apr. 2, 2020).
Failure to stop at a stop line is probable cause for a stop. State v. Posey, 303 Ore. App. 246, 2020 Ore. App. LEXIS 484 (Apr. 1, 2020).*
Posted inProbable cause, Staleness|Comments Off on Cal.: Forgetting to take something under SW and getting another and coming back in days didn’t make it stale
An LPN check that comes back showing owner’s DL was revoked justifies a stop unless the officer has reason to believe the driver is not the owner. Kansas v. Glover, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 2178 (Apr. 6, 2020):
Posted inReasonable suspicion, SCOTUS|Comments Off on SCOTUS: LPN check that comes back showing owner’s DL was revoked justifies a stop unless the officer has reason to believe the driver is not the owner
Just Security: How Much Liberty Must We Give Up? A Constitutional Analysis of the Coronavirus Lockdown Proposals by Ahilan Arulanantham (“Benjamin Franklin once said that ‘those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.’ But what would Franklin have given up to secure a lot of permanent safety – to stop a highly lethal microbe that has already killed thousands of people? Like so much else in our world, his maxim now faces a severe test from the coronavirus.”)
Posted inUncategorized|Comments Off on Just Security: How Much Liberty Must We Give Up? A Constitutional Analysis of the Coronavirus Lockdown Proposals
Defendant’s stop likely was without reasonable suspicion, but he fled from the car after the stop and tossed a bag of drugs under another car. That was abandonment. United States v. Wilkins, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58058 (D.Mass. Apr. 2, 2020).
Defendant made no effort to show standing in cell phones left in a car that was abandoned on flight from it. Even if he could, they were abandoned. United States v. Matthews, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58032 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2020).*
Prior observation of a hand-to-hand drug deal from defendant’s car then the smell of marijuana was probable cause for a search under the automobile exception. State v. Terry, 2020 Del. LEXIS 120 (Apr. 2, 2020).*
Posted inAbandonment, Automobile exception|Comments Off on D.Mass.: Although stop might have been unreasonable, def fled from car and abandoned his drugs
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
