D.S.C.: Considering the totality, there was no RS for defs’ detention for a dog sniff

“After consideration of the testimony presented during multiple lengthy suppression hearings, a thorough analysis of the relevant caselaw, and a careful review of the dashcam video of the traffic stop, the court grants the motion to suppress. The court finds that there was no reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop to conduct the free-air dog sniff as required under Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). Furthermore, even if the officers did have reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop, the drug dog Rao (‘Rao’) did not ‘alert.’ And finally, even if Rao did ‘alert,’ the court finds that Rao was unreliable under Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013) such that its ‘alert’ did not establish probable cause to search the vehicle.” The government proffered numerous things as reasonable suspicion, and, considering them all, they are explainable, and there was no reasonable suspicion on the totality. United States v. Diaz, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58775 (D. S.C. Apr. 6, 2018)”
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NV: Even if PBT was a 4A violation, SW was moot because there was both PC and exigency for warrantless search

The trial court erred in suppressing the telephonic search warrant for defendant’s blood. Even if the PBT was unconstitutional, there was both probable cause and exigent circumstances without even considering it. State v. Sample, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 23, 2018 Nev. LEXIS 24 (Apr. 7, 2018).

Defendant’s current 2255 was but a successive petition raising the same issues as his original 2255, and it’s denied as a successor petition. United States v. Bacon, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57831 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2018).*

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The Hill: Manafort challenges evidence seized by Mueller (with link to motion and warrant affidavit)

The Hill: Manafort challenges evidence seized by Mueller by Jacqueline Thomsen (link to motion, affidavit, and warrant):
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CA6: When an anticipatory SW says delivery to X, X has to receive it for search to occur

When the triggering event in an anticipatory search warrant doesn’t occur, then the search can’t occur. Here it was to a named person. Somebody else accepting it isn’t acceptable. “In this case, requiring delivery to Perkins is the only common sense reading of the warrant’s triggering event. Hand-deliver ‘to Perkins’ means hand-deliver ‘to Perkins.’ This reading is hardly hypertechnical. [¶] By contrast, the government’s interpretation lacks common sense. In its view, there is no need to read the triggering event to require hand-delivery ‘to Perkins.’ Instead, we should just read it to say ‘to anybody inside the residence with apparent authority to accept delivery.’ But the replace-some-words canon of construction has never caught on in the courts.” United States v. Perkins, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 8520 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 2018):
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N.D.Ind.: A motion for new trial is too late to raise new grounds to suppress

Defendant litigated a motion to suppress and lost. In a motion for new trial, he raised new grounds, and this is rejected as untimely. United States v. Bishop, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57353 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 4, 2018).

Defendant’s stop at 2:45 am for swerving while cell phone was apparently being looked at was justified. State v. Williams, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 256 (Apr. 5, 2018).*

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N.D.Ohio: There was a fair inference business records would be at def’s house

When a white collar investigation is underway, the staleness inquiry is more flexible because records, as opposed to drugs, are regularly kept for a long time. It was reasonable here to conclude that business records would be found at defendant’s home because that’s not unusual and there was an indication some records had been removed from work. United States v. Hills, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57563 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 4, 2018):
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NJ: When driver can’t or won’t produce registration, a limited search for it is permissible

“Sufficient credible evidence supported the trial court’s determination that defendant was given an adequate opportunity to present the vehicle’s registration before the search commenced. When a driver is unwilling or unable to present proof of a vehicle’s ownership, a police officer may conduct a limited search for the registration papers in the areas where they are likely kept in the vehicle. When a police officer can readily determine that the driver or passenger is the lawful possessor of the vehicle-despite an inability to produce the registration-a warrantless search for proof of ownership will not be justified.” State v. Terry, 2018 N.J. LEXIS 468 (Mar. 14, 2018). From the syllabus:
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N.D.Ohio: Email SW completely lacked PC, then there were false statements and material omissions, too

The motion to suppress the search warrant for defendant’s emails is granted. “Nothing in the 2013 affidavit used to obtain the search warrant approaches probable cause.” And, “Therefore, the 2013 search warrant affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that the evidence resulting from it must be suppressed.” There was also false information in the affidavit: “For those reasons, the Court finds that it must strike the above-described false information and add the above-described omitted facts to the 2013 affidavit to determine probable cause. Because of Agent Boggs’s material false descriptions and omissions, if probable cause does not exist in the modified 2013 affidavit, the good faith exception cannot apply.” A 2015 search warrant was dependent on the first, and it is suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. United States v. Asgari, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56738 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 3, 2018).

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MD: Surreptitious recording of def’s statement on cell phone violated state wiretap act

A parent’s surreptitious recording of defendant on cell phone for use to make a sex offense against him was inadmissible under the state wiretap act. Holmes v. State, 2018 Md. App. LEXIS 310 (Apr. 6, 2018).* First paragraph:
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OR: State’s inventory argument wasn’t presented during the suppression hearing, so it’s waived

The state’s inventory argument was not presented during the suppression hearing, and it can’t rely on that argument on appeal. State v. Steele, 290 Ore. App. 675, 2018 Ore. App. LEXIS 41 (Mar. 7, 2018).

By letting the CI into his home for a drug buy, the defendant consented to the entry and it did not violate the Fourth Amendment or the state constitution. State v. Powell, 2018-Ohio-1276, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 1400 (4th Dist. Apr. 3, 2018).

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CA8: Stop of car apparently leaving scene of crime was valid

There was reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop based on the fact the vehicle matched the description of one leaving the scene of a robbery by time and proximity, too. United States v. Daniel, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 8504 (8th Cir. Apr. 4, 2018).

The officer pulled defendant’s car over because he was able to corroborate limited details of the CI’s tale. The passenger got out and headed right to the trunk, and that justified officer actions for safety reasons. State v. Hurtt, 2018-Ohio-1263, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 1383 (4th Dist. Apr. 2, 2018).*

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S.D.Ohio: This SW affidavit was adequate and different than co-def’s SW affidavit where it was suppressed

The affidavit for the search warrant as to this defendant adequately demonstrated probable cause. The fact the codefendant’s search warrant lacked probable cause isn’t binding on this search warrant. United States v. Damondo, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57204 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 4, 2018).

The child pornography search warrant here was not issued without probable cause, nor was it not particular. “The warrant detailed the types of items to be seized at Carroll’s home, all of which were reasonably tailored to the child pornography investigation. Carroll contends that the warrant permitted a general search of his home, but the warrant afforded the officers little latitude when it authorized the seizure of computers, related storage devices, and other media which might contain evidence of child pornography. The warrant was supported by probable cause, and the warrant reasonably described the place to be searched and the items to be seized. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress the evidence seized during its execution.” United States v. Carroll, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 8628 (11th Cir. Apr. 5, 2018).*

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D.Minn.: Statement is suppressed, but def’s giving up passcode to cell phone is not

While defendant’s statement is suppressed, his giving up the passcode to his cell phone is not, so the search of the cell phone was by consent. United States v. Jackson, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55965 (D. Minn. Feb. 27, 2018):
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MI: Exclusionary rule doesn’t apply in child protective proceedings

The exclusionary rule does not apply in child protective proceedings. In re Kirschner, 2018 Mich. App. LEXIS 1093 (Apr. 3, 2018):
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D.Neb.: Def’s Franks IAC claim fails for lack of any allegations of fact

“Lloyd makes four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Those claims border on the ridiculous.” As to his Fourth Amendment IAC claim for not making a Franks challenge, he alleges nothing was false. United States v. Lloyd, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55399 (D. Neb. Apr. 2, 2018).*

The state showed there was probable cause in the warrant for defendant’ blood. State v. Hale, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110 (Apr. 4, 2018).*

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CA6: Decedent’s putting gun to head during execution of SW at his house justified deadly force against him

Officers executing a search warrant had the target pull a gun and put it to his head, so one shot him, and he died. There was a factual dispute about whether the officers properly knocked-and-announced before entry, but that’s not material: “Even assuming the agents issued no verbal commands or warnings to Evans, the sudden and immediate nature of the serious threat remains the same. The moment Evans began to unholster the revolver, the agents were faced with a life-threatening situation. It was objectively reasonable for Scown to conclude at that moment that Evans presented a serious physical threat to the agents in the bedroom, given their close proximity and his erratic behavior.” Evans v. United States, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 8376 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 2018).

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OH9: Running drug dog around car during computer check didn’t delay the stop

Running a drug dog around defendant’s car while the computer check is going on didn’t delay the stop. State v. Torres, 2018-Ohio-1173, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 1274 (9th Dist. Mar. 30, 2018).

The inclusion of a generalized along with a specific description didn’t make the search warrant general. Also, there was probable cause for issuance of the warrant. State v. Rich, 2018-Ohio-1226, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 1317 (2d Dist. Mar. 30, 2018).*

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MN: Getting out of a car, looking at officer, then walking away was hardly RS

Defendant’s stop, handcuffing, and questioning was without reasonable suspicion based on his looking at officers and walking away. State v. Davis, 2018 Minn. App. LEXIS 162 (Apr. 2, 2018) (“he looked at me” or “he didn’t look at me” has been alleged to be reasonable suspicion; officers claim it’s whatever they need at the moment to justify the stop):
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TX1: Search incident and inventory invalid for failing to signal; as to inventory, the inventorying officer is a necessary witness

A drug officer called a patrol officer to stop defendant. After he failed to promptly signal a turn, he was stopped, handcuffed, and his car was searched. “The search of Appellant’s vehicle incident to his arrest for failing to signal a lane change and a turn exceeded the proper scope of a warrantless search incident to that arrest” under Gant. “We hold the State failed to carry its burden of establishing the search qualified as an inventory pursuant to an impoundment of a vehicle.” The inventorying officer wasn’t called at the suppression hearing. Marcopoulos v. State, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 2351 (Tex. App. – Houston (1st Dist.) Apr. 3, 2018).

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IL: Hospital employee seizing def’s clothing from private room at police request violated 4A

Police enlisting a hospital employee to enter defendant’s hospital room to take his clothing violated his reasonable expectation of privacy and made the employee a police agent. The seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. People v. Gill, 2018 IL App (3d) 150594, 2018 Ill. App. LEXIS 195 (Apr. 3, 2018):
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