PA: SW for entire house for activities of one living there included roommate’s separate room

“We granted discretionary review to determine whether a search warrant for an entire multi-bedroom residence shared by appellant, Dylan Scott Turpin, and his roommate, Benjamin Kato Irvin, was constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution even though the warrant was premised solely on the activity of Irvin. We conclude police had probable cause to search the entire residence and therefore the warrant was constitutionally permissible. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Superior Court.” The search was also valid under the state constitution which is even more protective of particularity. Commonwealth v. Turpin, 2019 Pa. LEXIS 5427 (Sept. 26, 2019):
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E.D.N.Y.: Given a 4A violation for lack of particularity, subjective good faith isn’t good enough for GFE

There was a failure of particularity in this document search warrant, which the government effectively concedes, and it falls back to the good faith exception to save it. The court concludes, however, in a long analysis, that the deterrent benefits of exclusion require suppressing the evidence in this case despite the subjective good faith of the search team that was briefed ahead of time on what to do. It’s not the defendant’s burden at the time of the search to point out the government’s errors. “Viewed objectively, the conduct of the officers acting under the circumstances described above, cannot be found to be in accord with a good faith belief that their actions were lawful.” United States v. Drago, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164588 (E.D. N.Y. Sept. 10, 2019), adopted, Sep 24, 2019 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164451 (E.D. N.Y. Sept. 24, 2019):
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NE: After stop concluded, “[H]ey, before you go, do you have a minute to talk to me?” led to consensual extension of stop

The officer, in effect, told defendant she was free to leave, but he kept talking. “Second, VanWinkle did not require compliance with her request. VanWinkle asked, ‘[H]ey, before you go, do you have a minute to talk to me?’ The question was casual, not authoritative. The question did not demand compliance; it simply asked for a willingness to consent.” Her sticking around was consensual. Because consent applies, the attenuation doctrine doesn’t. State v. Hartsell, 304 Neb. 82 (Sept. 20, 2019).

“Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the detention was independently supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion to await the drug-sniffing dog. Johnson had just left a house that the police were securing a warrant to search because it had been the site of drug trafficking earlier that afternoon. Johnson, who had a key to the front door, had just accessed the home. When questioned by Mack, Johnson did not disclose that he had just come from the Freeman home and provided several different answers to Mack’s questions. … Finally, Johnson had a large amount of cash in his pocket. These additional specific and articulable facts provided the officer with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify detaining Johnson beyond the initial traffic violation.” State v. Johnson, 2019-Ohio-3877, 2019 Ohio App. LEXIS 3939 (1st Dist. Sept. 25, 2019).*

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NYTimes: Opinion: How Mandatory Minimums Enable Police Misconduct

NYTimes: Opinion: How Mandatory Minimums Enable Police Misconduct by Scott Hechinger (“They drastically limit accountability for those with the power to take away a person’s liberty.”)

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AK: Inadequate briefing and failure to get ruling on 4A issue below is waiver

“To the extent Kuller is attempting to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to his probation conditions, this claim is waived due to inadequate briefing. … We also note that Kuller never directly raised a Fourth Amendment claim below and the superior court made no ruling. …” The issue is waived. Kuller v. State, 2019 Alas. App. LEXIS 137 (Sept. 25, 2019).*

Habeas petitioner’s Fourth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim is conclusory that he really didn’t consent and his co-defendant would corroborate it, and it doesn’t support relief. No facts are pleaded. Sanchez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 28916 (11th Cir. Sept. 18, 2019).*

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W.D.Mo.: Search incident permitted for offense of walking in the street at night

Search incident for walking in the street instead of on the sidewalk was permissible and that produced keys. Alternatively, officers had reasonable suspicion for a “protective patdown” based on other factors. United States v. Cunningham, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164331 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 14, 2019).* [How are keys evidence of walking in the street? Was that a custodial arrest offense?]

The CI made a controlled buy with a motive to help himself in his own cases. Sufficient reliability shown for probable cause. United States v. Roberts, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164333 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 5, 2019),* adopted, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162985 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 24, 2019).*

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S.D.W.Va.: The single question “are there any weapons in the car” doesn’t extend the stop in violation of Rodriguez

“Even assuming here that the single question, whether there were any weapons in the car, was not related to the mission of the traffic stop, the question did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it did not lengthen the traffic stop. … I cannot find that Lt. Board’s single question violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights and should invoke the extraordinary remedy of the exclusionary rule.” United States v. Smith, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164284 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 25, 2019).

Defendant atypical then evasive moves and nervousness and then lying about his bus trip and then attempting to flee was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Rodriguez, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164143 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 2, 2019), adopted, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165481 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 25, 2019).*

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N.D.Fla.: No 4A requirement a car left in a parking lot on def’s arrest couldn’t be towed and inventoried

The driver of the vehicle was a serial violator of the state statute on driving on a suspended license. When he was caught this time, the vehicle was on a parking lot and the officer elected to have it towed, which resulted in an inventory. The SOP for inventory didn’t deal with this specific issue. “Moreover, no Fourth Amendment principle required Deputy Calabro to leave the ownerless vehicle in the private business parking lot, even though it was safely parked.” United States v. Curtis, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164254 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2019).

After a traffic stop, in a milk crate in the backseat were two gun cases. That justified securing them, and that led to a felon in possession charge. United States v. Scott, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164209 (E.D. La. Sept. 25, 2019).

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CA3: Smell of burnt MJ and passenger rolling a blunt warranted stop and frisk for weapons

Defendants’ stop and frisk was reasonable. Their car was parked in a convenience stop parking lot, the motor was running, and the driver was apparently inside. The passenger was rolling a blunt, suggesting more marijuana in the car, and the officer as bystander could smell burnt marijuana. When the driver appeared out of the convenience store, he was stopped and frisked for weapons because weapons are commonly associated with drug crimes. United States v. Rodriguez-Mercado, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 28964 (3d Cir. Sept. 25, 2019).

It’s a close case, but the court concludes on the totality of circumstances that there is reasonable suspicion for a stop of a car that picked up bus passengers in WV and drove back to Ashland KY when the bus stopped in Ashland on the way there. It was a common technique of drug couriers seeking to avoid detection in that area in the officers’ “extensive experience.” They had no explanation for doubling back. United States v. Robinson, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164010 (Sept. 25, 2019).*

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GA: Downloading entire cell phone in rape case where time line and text messages were only issues wasn’t prejudicial

Defendants were arrested for kidnapping and raping an unconscious woman they took out of a Savannah nightclub, and they were caught in the act when a bystander called the police. Police seized one cell phone after the interrogation and got a search warrant for the phone because he claimed he was texting his girlfriend from the front seat while the rape was going on in the back seat of the car. The search of the cell phone was reasonable. Defendant also raised that the search warrant was overbroad because it authorized search of the entire contents. The officers, however, knew exactly what they were looking for and focused only on that. The computer forensics witness testified at trial there was a complete download of the phone, but they only bothered with that which related to the time around the crime. The phone search was in 2014, and defendant doesn’t show that it was possible then to only download part of the phone. Here, the issue arises from an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and defendant doesn’t show that the result would be different if a more specific Fourth Amendment challenge had been made. [Also, even if there was an over-search, the narrowing of the actual search for trial, the usual remedy, showed no prejudice.] Reyes-Castro v. State, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 530 (Sept. 25, 2019).

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CA11: Ptf arrested on incorrect computer entry had 4A rights violated, but defs get QI

Plaintiff paid his fine for a speeding ticket and that was to avoid probation. The probation officer was in court and heard all that. Some clerk, however, entered into the computer system that he was on probation. Plaintiff was later arrested for violating probation, and he protested at the jail that he paid his fine and shouldn’t be on probation. A jailer called the probation officer who confirmed and he was released. Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated, but the defendants get qualified immunity for arrest on incorrect information in the system. Washington v. Rivera, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 28944 (11th Cir. Sept. 25, 2019).

“The district court held … that it was not clearly established at the time of the shooting that a police officer could not lawfully use deadly force against an armed individual who (1) had reportedly been firing a shotgun inside a public park, (2) did not react to an approaching officer’s command to drop his weapon, and (3) turned toward the officer while still holding the shotgun in his hands.” This was qualified immunity. Rose v. City of Utica, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 28932 (2d Cir. Sept. 25, 2019).*

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IN: In a probation search of one under home confinement, only common areas or def’s specific area can be searched; MJ and gun found in common area

Defendant was placed on home confinement as a result of his conviction, and there was a search waiver provision. He was living in someone else’s house. Assuming only the common areas and those under defendant’s specific control are subject to search and not the specific space of the host (which the court seemingly endorses), the search here was in a common area and was valid. Officers smelled burnt marijuana on entering and saw marijuana in plain view. A handgun was found in the common area. The search was valid under the totality of circumstances. McElroy v. State, 2019 Ind. App. LEXIS 424 (Sept. 25, 2019):
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Felony charges in Alameda Co. for LEO recording call between juvenile suspects and their lawyers

SF Chronicle: Judge moves forward felony eavesdropping case against Alameda sheriff’s sergeant by Megan Cassidy (“A judge on Tuesday denied an Alameda County Sheriff’s sergeant’s request to reduce his four felony eavesdropping charges to misdemeanors and moved the case forward for a trial arraignment. Sgt. James Russell, 45, is accused of illegally recording privileged conversations between four juvenile robbery suspects and their attorney while the teens were held in custody last year at the Eden Township Substation in San Leandro.”).

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N.D.Cal.: Order to use biometric information to unlock a device is testimonial and barred by 5A

A USMJ in the N.D.Cal. holds that the use of a court order to compel any biometric information (fingerprint, facial recognition, eye scan) is testimonial and violates the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Sealed Warrant, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147836 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2019, unsealed Aug. 26, 2019):
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The Atlantic: Federal Officials Should Be Accountable for Their Wrongdoing

The Atlantic: Federal Officials Should Be Accountable for Their Wrongdoing by Leah Litman (“And judges need to be the ones to make them pay.”)

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Slate: The Rise of Networked Vigilante Surveillance

Slate: The Rise of Networked Vigilante Surveillance by Elizabeth Joh (“What happens when the neighborhood watch gets automatic license plate readers?”)

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NYT: Opinion: The Loophole That Turns Your Apps Into Spies

NYT: Opinion: The Loophole That Turns Your Apps Into Spies by Charlie Warzel (“Just by downloading an app, you’re potentially exposing sensitive data to dozens of technology companies, ad networks, data brokers and aggregators.”)

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Lawfare: How Companies Can Help Make Police Facial Recognition Systems More Transparent

Lawfare: How Companies Can Help Make Police Facial Recognition Systems More Transparent by Jake Laperruque (“As facial recognition becomes an increasingly common law enforcement tool, the risks it can pose are becoming increasingly clear. Recently, police in Hong Kong are weaponizing the technology to identify protesters, who are using everything from face masks to laser pointers to try to avoid government retaliation for taking to the streets.”)

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CA9: Def didn’t show standing in package without his name on it or showing knowledge of contents

Defendant’s papers didn’t show that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a package that arrived on June 5th. His name wasn’t on the package as sender or receiver, the package arrived June 6th, and he didn’t say he was expecting the $64,000 in cash that was in the package. United States v. Johnson, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 28843 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 2019).

Defendant consented to the search of his cell phone including providing the password where he consented at the end of a custodial interrogation. United States v. Arroyo, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162530 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2019).*

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CA3: Ptf’s stabbing a police dog, which he threatened to do if they had it attack him, didn’t justify deadly force in shooting him seven times

Police were in a stand off with plaintiff who had a knife, and they had guns and a dog. Frustrated that he wouldn’t comply, officers threatened to unleash the dog on him if he didn’t put down the knife. Plaintiff said he’d use the knife on the dog. They did, and he did, and they shot him seven times. “While none of the parties demeans the life of the police dog, neither does anyone argue that the dog has the same status as, or should be treated as if it were, a human police officer for purposes of assessing the propriety of deploying deadly force.” [n.6] He states a claim under the Fourth Amendment. Kelley v. O’Malley, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 28829 (3d Cir. Sept. 24, 2019):
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