PA: SW for entire house for activities of one living there included roommate’s separate room

“We granted discretionary review to determine whether a search warrant for an entire multi-bedroom residence shared by appellant, Dylan Scott Turpin, and his roommate, Benjamin Kato Irvin, was constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution even though the warrant was premised solely on the activity of Irvin. We conclude police had probable cause to search the entire residence and therefore the warrant was constitutionally permissible. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Superior Court.” The search was also valid under the state constitution which is even more protective of particularity. Commonwealth v. Turpin, 2019 Pa. LEXIS 5427 (Sept. 26, 2019):

As stated above in our analysis under the Fourth Amendment, there is no evidence in the record to suggest appellant’s bedroom constituted a separate living unit. As such, a search warrant for the house based on the illegal activities of Irvin did not preclude the officers from searching appellant’s bedroom inside that house so long as they had reason to believe the items to be seized might be found therein. See Walston, 724 A.2d at 292. Appellant’s testimony he would shut his bedroom door when he left the residence and did not permit Irvin to enter his bedroom without permission did not negate the probable cause to believe the objects to be seized (in this case heroin, drug paraphernalia, proceeds from illegal drug sales, and cellphones owned or possessed by Irvin) could be present throughout the entire house just as the fact that Korn’s bedroom door was locked at the time the search warrant was executed did not negate the probable cause to search the entire apartment. See Korn, 139 A.3d at 256. Accordingly, we hold the search warrant at issue here was not overbroad in violation of Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and suppression of the evidence discovered in appellant’s bedroom was not warranted.

The court also mentions in the facts that there was no evidence the separate bedroom was ever locked, by a padlock or otherwise. Finally, the good faith exception is not even mentioned.