CA5: Expert opinion on reasonableness in 1983 case improper

“We first find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding portions of testimony from two of Albert’s expert witnesses—Richard Lichten, a police-procedure expert, and Dr. Kris Sperry, the former Chief Medical Examiner for the State of Georgia. The district court held that three of Lichten’s opinions were inadmissible conclusions of law. See United States v. Williams, 343 F.3d 423, 435 (5th Cir. 2003) (‘Reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment or Due Process Clause is a legal conclusion.’); McBroom v. Payne, 478 F. App’x 196, 200 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (explaining that experts are not ‘permit[ted] … to offer legal conclusions, and whether an officer’s use of his firearm was unreasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment is a legal conclusion’ (citation omitted)). We agree.” Albert v. City of Petal, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 19673 (5th Cir. June 22, 2020).

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HI: Knock-and-announce for 25 seconds at 6:15 am before forced entry unreasonable

Under the state constitution, police knocks on the door for 25 seconds in the early morning before forcibly entering after even hearing the homeowner call out was not a reasonable amount of time to respond, and this warranted suppression of the search. State v. Naeole, 2020 Haw. LEXIS 172 (June 22, 2020):

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D.Minn.: Is changing cell phone settings before SW issued a search? SW moots that issue

The court does not have to decide whether changing the settings on defendant’s cell phone prior to obtaining a search warrant for it was a search. The later issuance of a search warrant for the phone moots that point because of inevitable discovery. United States v. Haynes, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110771 (D. Minn. Apr. 27, 2020).* Still, an interesting discussion:

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NPR: WBUR: Boston Bans Use Of Facial Recognition Technology.

NPR: WBUR: Boston Bans Use Of Facial Recognition Technology. It’s The 2nd-Largest City To Do So (“Boston has banned the use of facial surveillance technology in the city, becoming the second-largest community in the world to do so.”)

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OH10: When def subjected to two SWs, only arguing first waives second

Where defendant was subjected to two search warrants and he only argued the first to the trial court, the second was waived for appeal. State v. Wilkins, 2020-Ohio-3428, 2020 Ohio App. LEXIS 2359 (10th Dist. June 23, 2020).

“A finding that Thomas used excessive force when he shot Lloyd during the execution of the search warrant would not necessarily imply the invalidity of Lloyd’s conviction for aggravated assault” under Heck. Davenport v. City of Little Rock, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109274 (E.D. Ark. June 23, 2020).*

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CA8: Def didn’t show standing in rental car with blank rental agreement

Defendant’s possession of a blank rental agreement fell short of showing his standing to challenge the search of the car he was driving. Defendant has to go forward on standing somehow, and Byrd doesn’t say how. United States v. White, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 19618 (8th Cir. June 24, 2020).

Defendant claimed defense counsel was ineffective for not challenging the search. Considering the merits of the search claim, the court finds defendant would have lost on it, so no harm no foul. Collazo v. United States, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110672 (M.D. Tenn. June 24, 2020).*

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NY2: Arrest for burglary justifies SI of backpack

Defendant’s arrest for burglary, a violent crime, and his uncooperativeness justified a search incident of his backpack for possible weapons. People v. Mabry, 2020 NY Slip Op 03540, 2020 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3583 (2d Dept. June 24, 2020).

There was probable cause for defendant’s arrest while executing a search warrant at his house. The officers said they wouldn’t arrest his girlfriend if he claimed the drugs, which he did. It wasn’t coerced. United States v. Sheppard, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110674 (W.D. Ky. June 24, 2020).*

In lieu of appeal, the case is remanded to the trial court to require additional discovery for the defense. “Following that in camera review the circuit court shall determine whether this information regarding the dates, times, and locations of the controlled buys would be helpful to the defense.” People v. Robinson, 2020 Mich. App. LEXIS 3986 (June 24, 2020)* (apparently granting the relief of the appeal and remanding).

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CA11 (en banc): Abandonment is a 4A standing issue, not an Art. III standing issue

“Sometimes courts make simple mistakes. And simple mistakes call for simple fixes. Just so here. In United States v. Sparks, we held that a suspect who ‘abandons’ his privacy or possessory interest in the object of a search or seizure suffers no ‘injury’—and thus has no standing—in the Article III sense, and, accordingly, that an argument asserting the suspect’s abandonment is jurisdictional, nonwaivable, and subject to sua sponte consideration. 806 F.3d 1323, 1341 n.15 (11th Cir. 2015). Sitting en banc, we now overrule Sparks and hold, to the contrary, that a suspect’s alleged abandonment implicates only the merits of his Fourth Amendment challenge—not his Article III standing—and, accordingly, that if the government fails to argue abandonment, it waives the issue.” United States v. Ross, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 19642 (11th Cir. June 24, 2020) (en banc).

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GA: Consent at beginning of stop didn’t mean a second search after the stop should have ended

Defendant consented to a search of his car early on into the traffic stop. After the purpose of the stop was completed, a second search of the car wasn’t covered by the initial consent. State v. Drake, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 387 (June 24, 2020).

The officer had no reasonable suspicion for a detention when he approached defendant, and defendant was free to leave. When he attempted to, the officer grabbed his wrist, and he confessed to having marijuana on him. That was an unreasonable seizure. Womack v. State, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 382 (June 24, 2020).*

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WaPo: I was wrongfully arrested because of facial recognition. Why are police allowed to use it?

WaPo: I was wrongfully arrested because of facial recognition. Why are police allowed to use it? by Robert Williams:

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OH9: Def’s observed association with wanted fugitive permitted his seizure at time of fugitive’s arrest, too.

Defendant was in a car wash and the USM fugitive task force was tailing a person in another car at the car wash. That person came over to defendant’s car and spoke to him. When the person being surveilled started to leave, officers converged and also detained defendant because of his interaction with their fugitive and a furtive gesture to the center console. Then they could smell marijuana coming from his car, and that was justification for a search. State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-3438, 2020 Ohio App. LEXIS 2376 (9th Dist. June 24, 2020).

“[T]he district court did not clearly err in finding that the officers entered the home with J.T. Spencer’s consent and were directed to Spencer’s bedroom. Thus, Mills and Reed were lawfully positioned in a place from which they could view the firearm. Spencer contends that the firearm was not in plain view because J.T. and Spencer testified that the dresser drawers were closed. But the magistrate judge credited Mills’ and Reed’s testimony that the drawer was partially open. Spencer has failed to show that no reasonable fact-finder would credit this testimony.” United States v. Spencer, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 19565 (6th Cir. June 23, 2020).*

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Lawfare: Hold Police Accountable by Changing Public Tort Law, Not Just Qualified Immunity

Lawfare: Hold Police Accountable by Changing Public Tort Law, Not Just Qualified Immunity by Paul Stern:

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NPR: Tech Companies Are Limiting Police Use of Facial Recognition. Here’s Why

NPR: Tech Companies Are Limiting Police Use of Facial Recognition. Here’s Why (“Earlier this month, IBM said it was getting out of the facial recognition business. Then Amazon and Microsoft announced prohibitions on law enforcement using their facial recognition tech. Nationwide protests have opened the door for a conversation around how these systems should be used by police, amid growing evidence of gender and racial bias baked into the algorithms.”)

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CA10: Flight from a stop permitted officer to chase def onto his property without a SW

“Officer Estrada’s reasonable suspicion ripened into probable cause when Shelton attempted to flee, thus giving rise to the exigent circumstances necessary for Officer Estrada to pursue Shelton onto the property without a warrant.” United States v. Shelton, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 19430 (10th Cir. June 23, 2020).

Defendant can’t show defense counsel was ineffective for not pursuing a suppression motion because he can’t show he had standing to show he might have prevailed. United States v. Powell, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108246 (E.D. Mich. June 19, 2020).*

When the CI makes controlled buys that are used to get a search warrant and the defendant is charged with possession, not the controlled buys, the CI is not a material witness. United States v. Neal, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 19302 (8th Cir. June 22, 2020).*

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IN: Search of def’s car when he shows up at home while SW being executed there was reasonable even though SW didn’t mention car

“Do law-enforcement officers violate either constitution by searching a person’s vehicle when the person drives that vehicle up to his or her house while officers are there executing a search warrant for the house that does not address vehicles? Based on the circumstances here, we answer ‘no’ and affirm the trial court. In arriving at that answer, we provide guidance on the test applicable to these specific types of situations under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We also survey our precedent under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and provide generally applicable guidance on our totality-of-the-circumstances test.” Hardin v. State, 2020 Ind. LEXIS 486 (June 23, 2020).

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IN: Def couldn’t be held in contempt for refusing to unlock cell phone pleading 5A

“When Katelin Seo was placed under arrest, law enforcement took her iPhone believing it contained incriminating evidence. A detective got a warrant to search the smartphone, but he couldn’t get into the locked device without Seo’s assistance. So the detective got a second warrant that ordered Seo to unlock her iPhone. She refused, and the trial court held her in contempt. [¶] We reverse the contempt order. Forcing Seo to unlock her iPhone would violate her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. By unlocking her smartphone, Seo would provide law enforcement with information it does not already know, which the State could then use in its prosecution against her. The Fifth Amendment’s protection from compelled self-incrimination prohibits this result. We thus reverse and remand.” Seo v. State, 2020 Ind. LEXIS 485 (June 23, 2020).

Reason: Volokh Conspiracy: Indiana Supreme Court Creates a Clear Split on Compelled Decryption and the Fifth Amendment by Orin Kerr (“Next stop, the U.S. Supreme Court?”)

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AZ: Ex parte order in 2013 for CSLI showed PC and was constitutionally sufficient and it would be served in NJ

An ex parte court order for CSLI five years before Carpenter, and probable cause was shown. It was the functional equivalent of a search warrant. It also could be served on T-Mobile in New Jersey. State v. Conner, 2020 Ariz. App. LEXIS 597 (June 23, 2020).

To the same effect on the order showing probable cause, except it was 2½ years before Carpenter is State v. Gore, 2020 N.C. App. LEXIS 492 (June 16, 2020).

Defendant’s trial objection to a search was too late to be considered as a motion to suppress which was never filed. Thus, the issue was waived. State v. Gaiser, 2020 W. Va. LEXIS 390 (June 18, 2020) (memorandum).*

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D.Colo.: Resisting a stop without RS is PC

Even if the stop was without reasonable suspicion, defendant’s resisting the officer was a separate crime that justifies with probable cause. United States v. Kazadi, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109060 (D. Colo. June 22, 2020).

Defendant’s stop on a country road serving one house in the middle of the night drew the officer’s attention because it’s the first time he’d seen that. The totality added up to reasonable suspicion for a stop. People v. Wheeler, 2020 CO 65 (June 22, 2020).*

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CA7: Failure to record supplemental testimony for issuance of SW in state court not 4A violation

An Illinois state judge issued a search warrant on a CI’s allegations of being in defendant’s home. The affidavit was essentially bare bones, but the judge took testimony about the CI and his or her basis of knowledge and maybe credibility. It was unrecorded contrary to federal law, but it was a state warrant. After defendant was federally indicted, the suppression hearing had the officer who obtained the warrant testify but he didn’t remember much of the details. The lack of recording didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment because there was no way of recording back in 1789. The good faith exception applies as does the deference accorded search warrants. United States v. Patton, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 19355 (7th Cir. June 22, 2020).

Failing to signal a lane change until the car is already partly in the lane is a traffic violation justifying a stop. People v. Gutierrez, 2020 CO 60 (June 22, 2020).*

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Nat’l L. Rev.: The Constitution Protects Faces in the Crowd

Nat’l L. Rev.: The Constitution Protects Faces in the Crowd by Theodore F. Claypoole (“Unlimited law enforcement application of facial recognition software to surveillance footage is an unreasonable search and a violation of Constitutional rights for people in a peaceful crowd. An officer should need to demonstrate probable cause that the investigated face on camera is a criminal in order to receive official permission to identify a face in a crowd with artificial intelligence. This should not be controversial.”)

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