The IP address for the house defendant was staying in was linked to child pornography, and the search warrant for the premises clearly described the single family dwelling. Thus, all the personal property of those associated with the property, except visitors, may be searched. There is no constitutional requirement that the owner’s name be specified. State v. Coblentz, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 430 (March 23, 2016).
Much of the information in the affidavit for the search warrant for heroin was many months old when the police did a more recent trash pull and found evidence of THC and “narcotics” without mentioning what or whether it was illegal. The affidavit, however, credited a CI with the claim that defendant uses (present tense) the property now for distribution of heroin. Coupled with the prior information, the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that evidence of drug trafficking would be found. In any event, the good faith exception applies. United States v. McDonald, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75553 (S.D.Ohio June 9, 2016).* [Note: This one is too thin for me to agree with. The CI here was essentially corroborated by what happened nearly a year earlier? That’s just hard to accept.]
Plaintiff was calling police dispatch from a cell phone. Dispatch was able to trace the cell phone apparently via the 911 system. Officers had an arrest warrant for plaintiff, and they had probable cause to believe that she was in a motor home and not a dwelling, sufficient for entry for an arrest warrant. The motor home likely had a lesser expectation of privacy than a dwelling, and the court finds the officers had qualified immunity. [Note: Qualified immunity was unnecessary. If they had an arrest warrant for plaintiff and probable cause to believe she was in the motor home, even treating it the same as a home, the entry was justified, and any qualified immunity analysis is unnecessary. Paoli v. Stetser, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10369 (3d Cir. June 8, 2016).
Defendant was not unreasonably held during a valid traffic stop with reasonable use of a drug dog. He was in the car, the dog alerted outside the car, he was searched twice finding nothing, but his companions said that he had drugs hidden in his buttocks. People v. Pettis, 2016 IL App (4th) 140469, 2016 Ill. App. LEXIS 343 (June 8, 2016).*
911 received a burglary in progress report, and officers responded finding the door open and damaged, blood on the broken window, and the home alarm going off. Exigent circumstances permitted the entry because it was reasonable to infer that the burglar or somebody injured was inside. Moreover, it was done reasonably because the police announced before entry. It can also be sustained under protective sweep. A plain view of drugs is sustained. United States v. Williams, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74033 (E.D.Mo. May 16, 2016), adopted 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73149 (E.D. Mo. June 6, 2016).
Defendant was found to have consented to a search of his cell phone and make a statement without coercion. The search warrant for his house was issued with probable cause. United States v. Wilson, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74609 (S.D.Ohio June 8, 2016).*
Defendant was stopped for having 10 or more scrap tires on his truck which would have required special state registration. The photographs of the truck showed seven tires. The stop was based on a hunch and not reasonable suspicion. The grant of the motion to suppress is affirmed. [Note: Heien and reasonable mistake of fact not discussed. Even so, was it a reasonable mistake of fact? Not in the court’s estimation.] State v. Palmer, 2016-Ohio-3359, 2016 Ohio App. LEXIS 2240 (2d Dist. June 10, 2016).*
The officer had reasonable suspicion when he saw a Tahoe parked behind a school at night known for various illegal activities. He saw an adult and a juvenile in the car, and he walked up to it and saw defendant and the juvenile struggling to get dressed. On review of the R&R, the USDJ finds that the USMJ didn’t err in not reopening the hearing to take additional evidence for the defense because he didn’t show that it would attack the officers credibility, really the only issue. United States v. Milam, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73256 (W.D.Tenn. Mar. 18, 2016),* adopted 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71555 (W.D. Tenn. June 1, 2016).*
Posted inReasonable suspicion|Comments Off on OH2: Stop was on a hunch and suppressed
Defendant was the target of a methamphetamine investigation when DTF officers received information via a CI that she would be arriving on an Amtrak train from Washington State carrying meth. This was in addition to the original meth investigation. When she got off the train, she was meeting a man also named by the CI, and they saw him, too. This corroborated the information from the CI. Her stop after getting off the train was reasonable. State v. Musselman, 2016 ND 111, 2016 N.D. LEXIS 111 (June 7, 2016).
There was reasonable suspicion for detention of the car for 90 minutes for a drug dog and then a search. Defendant has no standing in the car. Besides, there was probable cause for the search of the car. United States v. Corona-Ayvar, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73929 (W.D.Mo. May 9, 2016),* adopted 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73653 (W.D. Mo. June 7, 2016).*
Posted inInformant hearsay, Reasonable suspicion|Comments Off on ND: CI’s info of def carrying meth on Amtrak was corroborated by its details proving otherwise true and another ongoing meth investigation
Defendant was stopped for erratic driving in Brooklyn and his car was driven by another officer to the precinct station where it was inventoried. In the order setting the hearing, the court directed defendant to better address his standing, and he didn’t. Aside from that, there was probable cause for the stop and arrest and plain view. United States v. Bethea, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75057 (E.D.N.Y. June 8, 2016): Continue reading →
Posted inBurden of proof, Standing|Comments Off on E.D.N.Y.: Def got a suppression hearing and was directed to address standing; he didn’t show it
Defendant was a chiropractor being investigated for health fraud, and the investigators procured a search warrant for records. Defendant was the target of an administrative investigation that produced a settlement, an Admonition Letter, with no finding of fault or fraud. The investigator reviewed the Admonition Letter, and he concluded that it did not matter. The court finds it highly material to the investigation and that it was critical to the probable cause finding against defendant–that the USMJ would not have issued this search warrant knowing that. Critically, the search warrant was for health care and tax fraud, but the health care fraud should have been out of the case. Franks is satisfied, and severability does not apply to a Franks violation. United States v. Gehrmann, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76120 (D.Colo. April 25, 2016) (just added to Lexis): Continue reading →
Posted inFranks doctrine|Comments Off on D.Colo.: Rare proved Franks violation; suppression required because of intent; no severability of a SW after Franks violation
Defendant’s 13 hour detention at airport customs was reasonable where it was based on a report from a CI that defendant would arrive from Manila with drugs hidden in his rectum. A dog also alerted on him in the luggage claim area. The dog was found reliable even though it was his fourth sniff on duty. Defendant was strip searched, finding nothing, and refused consent to an x-ray so a search warrant for an x-ray was sought. United States v. Marquez, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75771 (D.Guam June 8, 2016).
Defendant’s stop was extended with reasonable suspicion for a dog sniff. United States v. Corona-Ayvar, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73929 (W.D. Mo. May 9, 2016),* adopted 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73653 (W.D.Mo. June 7, 2016).*
Posted inBorder search|Comments Off on D.Guam: Def’s detention at Customs for 13 hours for SW for rectum was based on RS
The decision of a USMJ to issue a search warrant is reviewed by the District Court for “clear error” in the Ninth Circuit. United States v. Alvarez, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75970 (N.D.Cal. June 10, 2016): Continue reading →
Posted inBurden of proof, Standards of review|Comments Off on N.D.Cal.: Decision of a USMJ to issue a search warrant is reviewed by the District Court for “clear error”
The stop was justified, and the fact the officers had a subjective motive to conduct a drug investigation and never issued a traffic ticket doesn’t make the stop and search unconstitutional. The search warrant for defendant’s home was based on probable cause and was supported by the good faith exception. United States v. Cunningham, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73981 (E.D.Wis. June 7, 2016), R&R 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74073 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 29, 2016).
Defendant was stopped and the officer discovered that he was driving on a suspended DL for a prior DUI. That gave probable cause to arrest and that let to an inventory search. United States v. Parrott, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75826 (W.D.Tenn. April 13, 2016).*
Posted inInventory, Pretext|Comments Off on E.D.Wis.: Fact no ticket was issued for cause for stop doesn’t make stop unconstitutional
Riley does not apply to a search of a cell phone at the border. Calling it “investigatory” doesn’t add anything to the argument. “[A]n entire body of jurisprudence has been built around border searches, and the specific lexicon used by Defendant does not strip that paradigm of the temporal and spatial flexibility built into it.” United States v. Ramos, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73571 (S.D.Cal. June 3, 2016): Continue reading →
Posted inBorder search, Cell phones|Comments Off on S.D.Cal.: Riley does not apply to a search of a cell phone at the border
A federal search warrant issued by a USMJ in the District if Massachusetts could be served on an email provider in Florida under § 2703(b)(1)(A). The affiant’s statement that white collar defendants frequently use email to communicate was sufficient to show probable cause and nexus, despite defendant’s argument of a nexus and a lack of a particularized showing. The lack of a search protocol in the warrant didn’t make it an unreasonable search. United States v. Kanodia, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73395 (D.Mass. June 6, 2016): Continue reading →
The state Department of Environmental Protection gets an order permitting it to enter defendant’s lands at “reasonable hours” to inspect for the source of noxious odors. There is no warrant requirement for lands as opposed to buildings. State v. Dubois Livestock, Inc., 2016 Me. Super. LEXIS 86 (May 11, 2016).
The record supports that defendant consented to the search of his shed. Crozier v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 307, 2016 Ark. App. LEXIS 331 (June 8, 2016).*
Defendant never appealed search and seizure claims that he’s presenting in a 2255. He needs to explain the default. Fierro-Rascon v. United States, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73815 (W.D.Wis. June 7, 2016).*
Posted inAdministrative search, Open fields|Comments Off on ME: State DEP doesn’t need a warrant to enter lands to look for noxious odors
In another Playpen child pornography search, the government’s use of the Tor network to take over the Playpen computer and then route to users’ personal computers through it, looking at those computers, was a search. The “commonsense judgment” is that anybody who finds Playpen on the Tor network does so for seeking child pornography, and the USMJ could reasonably so conclude. Thus, the search warrant was valid even though it was for all computers connected to network. United States v. Darby, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74960 (E.D.Va. June 3, 2016): Continue reading →
Posted inComputer and cloud searches|Comments Off on E.D.Va.: Govt SW affidavit showed PC for any computer logged into Playpen on Tor network
A mere description of a truck and its general location, with no details of how the caller knew that the driver was impaired, was insufficient. Even when coupled with the officer’s one-minute interaction with defendant prior to seizing her where the office only saw “watery eyes” and did not suspect she was impaired when he asked for her license there still wasn’t reasonable suspicion. State v. Wascher, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 414 (June 6, 2016).*
Plaintiff didn’t rebut defendants’ showing that the emergency doctrine supported the search, so summary judgment was properly granted. Navicky v. Gevatosky, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10216 (9th Cir. June 6, 2016).*
Defendant’s vehicle was properly searched by inventory because the driver was being taken away, and, alternatively, when asked if there was anything illegal in the car, he said “No, go ahead.” United States v. Scales, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75003 (E.D.Mich. June 9, 2016).*
Posted inInformant hearsay, Inventory|Comments Off on TN: Mere called-in description and location of allegedly impaired driver wasn’t enough for stop
Defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his trash bags. There were close to house, but they were as close to the street, and they were ready for collection. United States v. Thompson, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73035 (D.S.D. June 6, 2016).
Defendant was stopped in a high crime area for a traffic offense, and he wouldn’t look at the officer and his hand was over his waist like he was hiding something, and his hands were shaking. This was reasonable suspicion for a frisk for a weapon. United States v. Tinker, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186093 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2014).*
Defendant did show his right hand during a stop and the officer justifiably feared a potential weapon. Thus, the frisk was valid. United States v. Tomlinson, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73127 (S.D.Ind. June 6, 2016).*
The trial court abused its discretion in suppressing a search because the officer’s report wasn’t a complete reflection of the video. The video shows defendant clearly consenting by agreeing to it and then opening the car door. State v. Jackson, 2014 La. App. LEXIS 3198 (La. App. 5 Cir. August 1, 2014)* (yes, two years ago).
The police arrived at a house with an arrest warrant for the defendant who was known to be inside. They procured consent from the homeowner which is found to be voluntary. Defendant conceded in the District Court that the homeowner had common authority over the backpack. United States v. Bey, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10468 (1st Cir. June 9, 2016).*
Posted inConsent|Comments Off on LA5: Video of stop supported consent despite the police reports
Police were justified in entering defendant’s apartment without a warrant under the clothing exigency to retrieve clothing reasonably calculated to lessen the risk of injury to defendant, who was wearing only a t-shirt, underwear, and no shoes to go to jail in mid-November. Because the search warrant described documentation, police were permitted to seize defendant’s cell phone and get a second warrant to look at it. Even if the phone was outside of the scope of the first warrant, the police were still allowed to seize the phone because it was in plain view and there was a nexus between the phone and the crime given its location and the documents attached to the phone. State v. Palmer, 2016 Del. Super. LEXIS 204 (May 16, 2016).
Posted inCell phones, Nexus|Comments Off on DE: SW also for documents permitted seizure of a cell phone because nexus was shown; second warrant for contents of phone
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
