United States v. Day, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 245359 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 27, 2026)*:
B. Rebuttable Presumption and Good Faith
In Peffer, the Sixth Circuit stated “[a]s a general rule” that it is reasonable to presume that a person’s residence is where possessions like guns would be kept. 880 F.3d at 270. But, the Sixth Circuit noted, this presumption is “rebuttable and cannot always be relied upon by a magistrate in finding a nexus between the object used in a crime and the alleged criminal’s residence, because the ‘totality of the circumstances presented’ in the affidavit may suggest that the object is more likely to be found elsewhere or nowhere at all.” Id. (quoting Brown, 828 F.3d at 382). Thus, the Peffer standard provides that “a magistrate may presume that there is a nexus between that object and the suspect’s current residence, unless the affidavit contains facts that may rebut that presumption.” Id. at 270-71 (emphasis added).
Day argues this rebuttable presumption exception applies, extinguishing probable cause and good faith. ECF Nos. 30 at PageID.146; 31 at PageID.156. Specifically, Day claims he has rebutted the presumption that evidence would be found at his residence because the informant told officers that the guns used in the homicide were at another location—the Cherrylawn address. ECF Nos. 30 at PageID.146; 31 at PageID.156. The Government responds that this does not rebut the presumption, and in any event, the good-faith exception would apply because the officers reasonably relied on a heavily detailed affidavit. ECF Nos. 28 at PageID.127; 31 at PageID.169. This Court finds that circumstances surrounding Cherrylawn do not fall within Peffer’s rebuttable presumption exception, and even if this Court were to find that there was not probable cause to search Day’s residence, this Court would be further compelled to find that the good-faith exception applies.
As Peffer noted—and the Government argued at the hearing—facts that may rebut a presumed nexus between a suspect’s residence and a gun used in a crime include evidence that the gun “was discarded, sold, or was otherwise disposed of.” 880 F.3d at 270; see also ECF No. 31 at PageID.169 (providing an example where the informant had told officers that the suspects “threw their guns off the Belle Isle Bridge into the depths of the Detroit River”). The Sixth Circuit further provided that “evidence suggesting that the [gun] was not owned by the alleged criminal” or that the gun does not exist anymore would rebut the presumption about the gun being at the suspect’s residence. Peffer, 880 F.3d at 270. Here, no such evidence about the guns being discarded, destroyed, or not owned by Day, was contained in the affidavit See generally ECF No. 28-1.
But Peffer includes a final example of evidence that might rebut the ordinary presumption: the affidavit shows that the suspect stored his gun somewhere other than his residence. 880 F.3d at 270. Day relies on this language, arguing that the affidavit clearly outlined evidence from the informant that the guns were at Cherrylawn. See ECF No. 30 at PageID.145. However, the information about Cherrylawn was not presented as an equal alternative to the presumption that the guns would be at Day’s address. Instead, the Cherrylawn information bolstered that the police had already ruled out this location, making the presumption that the guns were at Day’s residence arguably more likely. See Gray v. City of Detroit, No. 17-cv-13548, 2018 WL 4745304, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 2, 2018) (finding a search of a home was lawful after the car was searched and ruled out and stating that “[b]ecause [the officer] did not find the guns in [the p]laintiff’s car, there was probable cause to believe that they were located inside of the house”). Had the affidavit stated that the informant told officers about Cherrylawn, but that officers had not searched Cherrylawn and instead immediately searched Day’s residence, this would have rebutted the presumptive nexus to Day’s residence because both locations were unsearched, and, therefore, on equal footing. But because Cherrylawn had already been searched, the presumption that the guns would be at Day’s residence, again, was arguably stronger.3Link to the text of the note
This Court need not address the good-faith exception because this Court has already found that the search warrant provided probable cause to search Day’s residence. See United States v. Pinson, 321 F.3d 558, 565 (6th Cir. 2003). But even if this Court could reject Peffer and find no probable cause, the good-faith exception would presumably apply because including information about the history of the investigation and places that have been ruled out in the affidavit does not make officers’ reliance on that affidavit objectively unreasonable under the generous exception in Leon. See 468 U.S. at 908.
As is evident in the tenor of this opinion, this Court is troubled that the “good faith exception has proven to be the exception that swallows the rule.” United States v. Sanders, 106 F.4th 455, 495 (6th Cir. 2024) (Clay, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Westerlund, 477 F. App’x 366, 369 (6th Cir. 2012) (Cole, J., concurring) (“But, given our ever-widening Leon good-faith exception jurisprudence (an exception that will surely soon, if it has not already, swallow the rule), I respectfully concur on in the result.”). The exception was meant to protect officers for reasonable mistakes in a demanding line of work. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 908. But when, as here with Peffer, the rule does not offer a sufficient bulwark against officer intrusion into individuals’ homes, there is practically no need for the exception. The rules should be designed with the worst officers in mind to protect individuals from them, with the exception providing relief for only the best, well-intentioned officers who make honest, “minor transgressions.” See id.
