CA5: Collective knowledge from narcs applies to justification for traffic stop

The totality of the circumstances did not dictate a finding that a turn-signal violation was too stale to justify stopping defendant’s vehicle. A lack of personalized suspicion on the part of the officer who stopped defendant’s vehicle was immaterial because under the collective knowledge doctrine, the officer did not need to form his own suspicion. The suspicion transferred to him by the law enforcement agents who observed defendant’s traffic violation sufficed. United States v. Zuniga, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10656 (5th Cir. June 14, 2017).

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OH11: Running away is withdrawal of consent to search, but reasonable suspicion for a patdown

Defendant was stopped and consented to a search of his person. When that started, he was moving like he was trying to hide something, then he ran away. Considering the location was a high crime area, there was at least reasonable suspicion leading to finding cocaine on this person. Then we have this curious paragraph: “Here, after initially granting consent to search his person, Mr. Shine physically engaged the officers and attempted to run away from them. This unequivocal act, under the circumstances, amounts to more than merely withdrawing his consent to the search. Coupled with his presence in a high crime area, Mr. Shine’s flight was also sufficient to justify a reasonable suspicion that he was involved in illegal activity. The cocaine found as a result of the valid investigatory stop provided probable cause for his arrest.” State v. Shine, 2017-Ohio-4240, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 2298 (11th Dist. June 12, 2017).*

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W.D.Mo.: Observed drug deals with CI showed reliability and lack of staleness of information

A state court judge issued a tracking warrant for defendant’s car based on a heavily corroborated CI who did drug deals with the defendant while LEOs watched. This “shows that the confidential information was reliable and that the information was not vague or stale. The confidential informant’s information in conjunction with the personal observation of the drug transaction by the law enforcement officer were sufficient to support a finding of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant authorizing placement of a GPS tracking device on Defendant’s vehicle.” Defendant did not challenge the SWs for his house. United States v. Bradley, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92315 (W.D. Mo. May 30, 2017), adopted, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91746 (W.D. Mo. June 14, 2017).

Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not moving to suppress the search of defendant’s person. While the CI didn’t name defendant, the officer saw a drug deal go down that defendant was involved in, and that was probable cause. Sanchez-Rebollar v. United States, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92640 (W.D. Tex. June 15, 2017).*

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MA: Use of some additional force in arresting def was not “disproportionate” based on what police knew about firearms in car and risk of violence

The use of some additional force in arresting defendant was not “disproportionate” based on information defendant was armed and that his girlfriend, traveling with him, could use violence to “upset” his arrest. Commonwealth v. Widener, 2017 Mass. App. LEXIS 85 (June 15, 2017):
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MA: Arrest at door alone didn’t justify protective sweep

Half a dozen officers showed up at defendant’s house with an arrest warrant. He met them at the door, and he was handcuffed and arrested and said “Let’s go.” He was asked whether others were in the house, and he mumbled something and said “no.” Officers entered and looked under the bed upstairs finding a gun. The protective sweep was unjustified and unconstitutional. The officers had no reasonable reason to believe anyone else was in the house. Commonwealth v. Saywahn, 2017 Mass. App. LEXIS 84 (June 15, 2017).

The taxpayer’s conclusory claim that the Fourth Amendment somehow was part of the due process section of the Fourteenth Amendment is rejected. “Thermo-Cycler has not provided the Court with any explanation as to how these provisions relate to or impact its due process claim, and the Court will not undertake to figure it out.” Thermo-Cycler Indus. v. Ind. Dep’t of State Revenue, 2017 Ind. Tax LEXIS 21 (June 15, 2017).*

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WaPo: How self-driving cars could determine the future of policing

WaPo: How self-driving cars could determine the future of policing by Orin Kerr

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Motherboard: The Supreme Court Phone Location Case Will Decide the Future of Privacy

Motherboard: The Supreme Court Phone Location Case Will Decide the Future of Privacy by Stephen Vladeck:

Later this year, the Supreme Court will decide if police can track a person’s cell phone location without a warrant. It’s the most important privacy case in a generation.

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S.D.Fla.: 4A IAC claim has to be decided on merits first; if search valid, no IAC

An IAC claim for failure to file a motion to suppress usually requires the merits of the motion be decided. “Because neither of the Fourth Amendment arguments have merit, trial counsel’s failure to move to suppress this evidence did not constitute ineffective assistance. Lancaster v. Newsome, 880 F.2d 362, 375 (11th Cir. 1989) (counsel’s decision not to file a meritless motion cannot support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel).” Flanders v. United States, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91518 (S.D. Fla. June 13, 2017).*

Defendant’s wife was found to have consented to the search of their house, and there was no showing that any part of the place was exclusive to defendant where she couldn’t consent. People v. D’Attore, 2017 NY Slip Op 04888, 2017 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4804 (1st Dept. June 15, 2017).*

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Two on waiver of motions to suppress

Where the motion to suppress was filed the Friday before a Monday bench trial, it was within the discretion of the district court to defer the suppression motion ruling until after all the evidence was in. United States v. Hardison, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10531 (8th Cir. June 14, 2017).

Failure to move to suppress until mid-trial was a waiver. It’s in the district court’s discretion to decide it on the merits or treat it as waived. United States v. Walker-Couvertier, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10633 (1st Cir. June 15, 2017).

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NE: SW for property includes vehicles found and belonging there

Search warrant for property includes vehicles parked on the property that are connected to the property [as in the owner]. State v. Hidalgo, 296 Neb. 912, 2017 Neb. LEXIS 87 (June 9, 2017).

Officers coming upon an assault in progress, and there was thus probable cause for seizing the man on top. Pulling plaintiff off resulting in a scratch wasn’t excessive force. Chaney v. Wadsworth, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10499 (9th Cir. June 13, 2017).*

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CA9: Entry by def’s bondsman was by contractual consent; gun not suppressed

Defendant was arrested in his home by his bondsman retaking him, and the bondsman recovered a gun. Defendant was a felon. Defendant consented in advance to being retaken by his bondsman, and that was essentially consent in advance. United States v. Burrow, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10502 (9th Cir. June 13, 2017):
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ID: “Right result-wrong theory” will not be applied to relieve the state of defaulting an argument in support of search

“Right result-wrong theory” will not be applied to relieve the state of failing to make an argument to support the search in the trial court. The state defaulted the argument it advances on appeal. State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 2017 Ida. LEXIS 171 (June 14, 2017):
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The Watergate break-in happened 45 years ago today

Almost certainly just before midnight the night of June 16, 1972, burglars entered the Watergate Complex to break into the Democratic National Headquarters. Shortly after midnight, June 17th, security guard Frank Wills discovered tape keeping a door from locking, and he called the police. See Wikipedia, and the wonderful book by Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein (1974) and movie (1976) All the President’s Men. It was only the second book I’ve read twice, and I saw the movie again back in February thinking of this President and the denials sounding like a flashback to 1973. Déjà vu all over again.

Incidentally, I studied for the bar exam in 1973 while watching every minute of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, colloquially known as the Senate Watergate Committee, on television. And I heard Alexander Butterfield reveal the taping system on Monday, July 16, 1973 to a question posed by Fred Thompson. Butterfield was the subject of 2016’s The Last of the President’s Men by Woodward. I pushed the reading aside and sat upright, muttering the 1970’s version of “WTF?” The bar for me was the next week.

I idolized Sens. Sam Ervin and Howard Baker. Baker made famous “What did the President know, and when did he know it?” I became a Watergate buff, and I was half surprised I passed the bar exam. I knew I was going to be a criminal defense lawyer since about 8th grade. They helped inspire me to be better.

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CA9: SW for one CP message board user’s email account led to finding CP for defendant; no 4A violation

A search warrant was obtained for the email account of a user of the Dark Moon messaging board for users of child pornography. After searching that one, officers got permission to use the email account. That did not lead to an unlawful search of defendant responses. United States v. Brown, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10399 (9th Cir. June 12, 2017):
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WaPo: Third party rights and the Carpenter cell-site case

WaPo: Third party rights and the Carpenter cell-site case by Orin Kerr:
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S.D.N.Y.: Govt couldn’t use “all records exception” because of lack of PC support

Securities fraud warrant was way overbroad and can’t be saved by the “all records exception” to search defendant’s business and apartment and seize even personal records. The search was so intrusive it violated the Fourth Amendment because there wasn’t sufficient probable cause all records. United States v. Wey, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91138 (S.D. N.Y. June 13, 2017) [see NYT: Judge Scraps U.S. Evidence Against Wall Street Financier Wey]
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D.Guam: CI’s tale insufficiently reliable for PC for arrest

A named CI arrested at the airport gave up defendant. The court finds the CI’s tale insufficient for probable cause for arrest, and the arrest and its fruits are suppressed. United States v. Duenas, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91480 (D. Guam June 12, 2017).* Analyzing the proof:
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W.D.Ky.: Mere refusal to cooperate is not RS, but headlong flight pretty much is

Mere refusal to cooperate is not reasonable suspicion, but headlong flight adds a lot to otherwise legally innocuous yet suggestive facts. United States v. Vance, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87086 (W.D. Ky. June 6, 2017):
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OH3: Nine days of pole camera surveillance did not violate the 4A

Nine days of pole camera surveillance did not violate the Fourth Amendment. State v. Duvernay, 2017-Ohio-4219, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 2279 (3d Dist. June 12, 2017).

The officer’s briefly talking to the defendant driver and his passenger did not unlawfully extend the stop. When the stop was over, defendant consented to further discussions. United States v. Torres, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88662 (D. N.M. June 9, 2017).*

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IL: A dog sniff on the third floor apartment doors of an unlocked building violated Jardines

A dog sniff on the third floor apartment doors of an unlocked building violated Jardines. The sniff occurred two years after Jardines. People v. Bonilla, 2017 IL App (3d) 160457, 2017 Ill. App. LEXIS 380 (June 14, 2017):
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